SYSTEM

OF

CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

SYSTEM

OF

CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

LIBRARY OF
RICHARD OUDERSLUYS

BY

DR. I. A. DORNER,
OBERCONSISTORIALRATH AND PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY, BERLIN.

EDITED BY

DR. A. DORNER.

TRANSLATED BY

PROFESSOR C. M. MEAD, D.D.,
FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF HEBREW IN ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,

AND

REV. R. T. CUNNINGHAM, M.A.

NEW YORK:
SCRIBNER & WELFORD.
1887.

[See other side.

Copyright, 1887, by
SCRIBNER & WELFORD.

INTERNATIONAL CHRISTIAN
GRADUATE UNIVERSITY

BJ
1263
D 712
1887

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

ISAAC AUGUST DORNER, whose posthumous work is here presented to the English-reading public, was born June 20, 1809, at Neuhausen, in Southern Würtemberg, and died at Wiesbaden, July 8, 1884. His father was a pastor, and he was the sixth of twelve children. He enjoyed from the first excellent advantages, and was trained in an atmosphere of piety. After studying at home under a tutor, at a Latin school in Tuttlingen, and at another in Maulbronn, he went in 1827 to Tübingen, where he spent five years at the University in the study of philosophy and theology. Having passed the requisite examinations, he returned to his home and remained there two years, assisting his father in his ministerial work. In 1834 he was called to Tübingen as *repetent* (tutor, or fellow) in the theological department of the University. In 1838 he was made extraordinary professor; and in 1839 he was appointed ordinary professor of theology at the University of Kiel; in 1843, at Königsberg; in 1847, at Bonn; in 1853, at Göttingen; in 1862, at Berlin, where he remained till the end of his life.

Dorner's outward life was in general quiet and uneventful. It was mostly filled with the labours of the study and the lecture-room. But his interest in the world in general was lively; his sympathies were broad; and twice he travelled beyond the limits of the continent: first, during his academic career at Tübingen, when he visited Holland, England, and Scotland; and next, in 1873, when he attended the meeting of the Evangelical Alliance at New York, where he read a paper on the *Infallibilism of the Vatican Council.* He was then 64 years old; but accompanied by his son, Professor August Dorner, the editor of this treatise, he was able

16533

to bear the trying journey, and ever afterwards rejoiced in the privilege of seeing again the old acquaintances and pupils who there welcomed him, and in the new scenes and friends that he there found. Not many years after his return he began to suffer from the incurable malady which ultimately terminated his life. Gradually and reluctantly he relinquished the discharge of his official duties, meeting students finally in his house, when he was no longer able to go to the University. It was during the progress of this disease that he issued (in 1879–81) his *Glaubenslehre*, and (in 1883) a collection of his miscellaneous articles. And finally, he laboured till the very end of his life in preparing for the press the *Christliche Sittenlehre*, a translation of which is herewith published. His mental faculties remained unclouded up to the last; and in spite of severe physical prostration he continued to manifest the liveliest interest in the personal welfare of friends and in the religious and theological movements of the day.

The last twenty years of Dorner's life were clouded by the dementia of his youngest son—a youth of the brightest promise, who, while pursuing his gymnasium studies, was overtaken with the disease from which he has never recovered. To those who knew the intensely domestic and affectionate nature of the man, the manner in which he bore this trial was a touching revelation of the depth of his Christian faith and resignation. And when to this affliction was added his own physical suffering, his Christian character still bore the test. As Professor Kleinert says, in his memorial address before the Berlin Faculty, "In all this no complaint passed over his lips, no painful word concerning his bodily pain. Scarcely a quiver of the hand, or a tear in the eye, betrayed his mental suffering, when he had to surrender to other hands one after another of the official duties and voluntary labours of benevolence which had grown into his very heart. . . . He suffered not like a Stoic, with a heart steeled against the Medusa gaze of a brazen fate. He suffered like a child of God that receives from the Father's hand, with unwavering trust, even what is hard to bear; like one that has peace in the atonement and has hope reaching beyond death."

This calm fortitude displayed in the crucial hour was but

the natural expression of a character formed long before. Even one who knows Dorner merely as the theological writer will in his writings easily detect the fine Christian tone which characterized the man; but no one who did not personally know him can get a true impression of the Johannean tenderness and childlike simplicity which distinguished him above almost any one of equal eminence and intellectual power whom the world has ever known. The most shrinking youth, the most timid foreign student, embarrassed by the consciousness of imperfect acquaintance with the German language and by the fear of encroaching on the time of one who was full of thought and labour, was at once put at ease when he felt that warm shake of the hand, saw that indescribably sweet smile, and heard those cordial, unaffectedly kind tones. Love beamed from his eyes and all his features. Professor Heinrici of Marburg relates, in the *Deutsch-evangelische Blätter*, his experience in first forming Dorner's acquaintance. Armed with a letter of introduction, he had found his way to the professor's room. "There I stood for the first time before the man from whom I expected so much. How differently I had conceived him! I saw no towering form, no boldly arched forehead. Simply and kindly, with a 'Grüss Gott,' he offered me his hand, and while he read the letter, a gentle smile gleamed on his countenance. As he then, tipping his head slightly to the left in his peculiar way, looked at me with his clear eyes intently and full of kindness, and by his responsive questions drew me out from my embarrassment and encouraged me to talk, I soon forgot, in inconsiderate familiarity, the value of his time, and was not weary of telling him about my vague ambitions and my zeal for knowledge." Further on the same writer says, "Never have I heard from him a bitter word about persons, even when he gave expression to his 'ecclesiastical pain' and his apprehensions concerning certain tendencies of theological inquiry." This testimony could probably be confirmed by all who knew him. His was a saintliness in which there was no trace of cant or of coldness. There was that in his whole demeanour which commanded at once confidence and affection. He realized in a rare degree the evangelical conception of the Christian, as one who has

become as a little child. He retained to the last his fondness for his native place, and for the relatives and friends who still lived there. In the commemorative address which was delivered at the funeral services at Tuttlingen by assistant preacher Knapp, a charming picture is given of the visits which Dorner used often to make at Tuttlingen and Neuhausen. "What a festive occasion it was for all his relatives, when the revered 'Uncle Professor' was again here, recognised, in spite of his distance, as the noble head of the great family, stooping down to the smallest child among his relatives here with a kind word and a warm kiss! What festive occasions, when in the house or in the garden the relatives were gathered around him, and took in the manna which gently dropped from his conversation and instruction! For everything he had a sympathetic feeling; every little word that he heard he deemed worthy of a considerate attention and of a fitting and helpful reply."

It is not strange, therefore, that when his death called forth from his numerous friends and admirers their judgment of the man, stress was always laid on his personal character as being the most shining feature in him, though in the galaxy of the intellectual and the learned he also shone as a star of the first magnitude. Says Professor Kleinert at the close of his address, "Beside the torso of his last work stands the image of his life, labour, and suffering, a model for coming generations of theologians to gaze at—an ethics, written and finished by the Spirit of Jesus Christ who redeemed him." And another of Dorner's colleagues, Professor Weiss, echoes this sentiment, and adds, "Who could ever forget it, who had once come into contact with him—the power of this Christian personality which, just because in its unadulterated simplicity it made no pretence to be anything, impressed one all the more powerfully? There rested something of child-like cheerfulness on those dear features; there beamed such warmth of heart out of the kindly eyes; his uniformly amiable spirit had for every one a sympathetic word full of kindness and gentleness. And yet there rested on his whole being a consecration such as is lent only by the nobility of a thorough sanctification of the inmost nature and by the dignity of a matured wisdom." Dorner did not possess the aggressive

nature which made Tholuck so great a power in influencing the young. He had not the same Socratic power of drawing them out. He had not the many-sidedness of mind, nor the humour, now playful now grim, nor the facility of language, which made Tholuck so successful in getting hold of both natives and foreigners. But, on the other hand, there was in Dorner a depth and an evenness of religious consecration, a poise and symmetry of character, which showed itself without many words, and which made him as a man even more powerfully influential than his more widely known contemporary. He uttered fewer of those epigrammatic and striking sayings which Tholuck's friends can recall and quote as uttered by him. But the impression made by his personality, even when no utterance of his can be distinctly remembered, was ineffaceable. Though he had not so wide a circle of acquaintances as Tholuck, he had sympathies no less wide. He had perhaps even a greater capacity to appreciate what was good in other nations than his own. He loved to recognise and admire moral worth and moral grandeur wherever they were to be found. He reverenced the dignity of personality. His theology is tinctured with this sentiment. His own life and bearing witnessed to the reality and power of it. It made him, on the one hand, almost unique in humility; it made him, on the other hand, untiring in his efforts, both philosophical and practical, to exalt the individual character.

Although so quiet and unobtrusive in his manner, Dorner was a most active man, making his influence felt not only in his house and in his lecture-room, but in ecclesiastical bodies of every sort, and in the missionary activities of the Church. He was one of the leaders in the founding of the Church Diet—a movement called forth by the revolutionary excitements of 1848. He was also prominent in advocating the organization of an ecclesiastical synod, with a view to the development of the religious energies and independence of the German Protestant Church. He was an influential member of the *Oberkirchenrath*, the highest ecclesiastical body in Prussia. He took an active part in the work of revising Luther's translation of the Bible. He was an enthusiastic promoter of the cause of Inner Missions. He was connected with, and deeply interested in, the work of the Evangelical

Alliance. When he was in the United States, he carefully observed the beneficiary institutions designed for indigent students, and perfected afterwards the execution of a similar plan which he had at heart for students in Berlin; the so-called Johanneum and the Melanchthon House are the permanent fruits. If, as compared with nearly all his contemporaries, he stood in intellect and culture as much above them as Paul above the other apostles, he could also, like Paul, be said, in comparison with his fellows, to be "in labours more abundant." Accordingly, though Dorner can now safely be reckoned among the wise "that shine as the brightness of the firmament," it is not because he avoided those conflicts which exposed him to opposition and even to obloquy. He was gentle, but he had strong convictions. And his prominent position in the practical direction of ecclesiastical affairs brought him into collision with many even of those who, in their theological position, were at one with him. He was, and still is, by many regarded as having failed to understand the best interests of the Church. But his motives were respected, even when his measures were opposed. If he sometimes seemed to be too indulgent towards error, it was because he had a deliberate and sincere zeal for a large-minded toleration. He deprecated resort to coercive measures, whether political or ecclesiastical. He had an almost unbounded confidence in the power of Christian truth and Christian character to rectify and purify the Christian Church. He believed in the words of Christ, "If ye abide in my word . . . ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." He believed in the presence of the personal Redeemer in the Church, and in His power to lead it onward and upward towards perfection.

This faith in the personal Christ is the keynote, moreover, of his theological thought and effort. When Strauss in 1835 issued his *Life of Jesus*, in which he sought to undermine Christianity by attacking the genuineness and credibility of its records, Dorner in the same year began the publication of his great work, the *History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ* (completed in its second and greatly enlarged edition in 1856), which aimed to show that, the primitive Church being both the product and the portrayer

of the person and work of Jesus, its foundations are secure against being shaken by any criticism of the details of the written record. "Dorner's theological labours," says Prof. von der Goltz, in an address commemorative of Dorner and of Dorner's friend and associate, Emil Herrmann, "had from the outset two fixed starting-points, closely connected with one another in the idea of personality—the theanthropic person of Christ and justifying faith. Christ the centre of piety, Christ the Head that animates the Church, Christ the centre of the creation of God and of the world's history, Christ the second Adam, as the essential and perfect vehicle of God's condescending holy love to men, but also as the prototype of a permanent humanity destined for fellowship with God and transfiguration in God; this, on the one hand, and, on the other, justifying faith, as the source not only of the doctrine, but also of the life, of the Evangelical Church; justifying faith, as requiring and finding the authority of God's word which testifies of Christ, and as constituting the perennial source, whence is derived the freedom and the dignity of the Christian, the renewal and sanctification of man, and the animation of all civilised life through the divine forces that sustain and train it—these were the two poles between which Dorner's research and production moved." His motto was Col. ii. 3, "Christ, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." To unfold those treasures, all the energies of his mind and all the intensity of his moral nature were devoted. He believed in the power of the human soul to grasp speculatively much of the wealth of divine truth. He had no sympathy with the pseudo-modesty of those who affect to despise metaphysical speculation, and to trace only the historical development of human belief. He held that the intellect and the conscience are, both of them, real sources of the cognition of truth. But he did not therefore hold that we are independent of history. It was not a merely ideal, but the historical, Christ, who formed the centre and inspiration of his thought. And though sometimes in his speculations he may have seemed to take too daring flights, yet he was not seeking thus to penetrate absolutely new realms of knowledge, but rather to make more intelligible and impressive, both to himself and others, the

immutable truths of God's revelation of Himself, both the natural and the supernatural. In the combination of metaphysical subtlety with intense spirituality he was a second Augustine. His theology was a part of his religion. In all his speculations his heart was more deeply interested than his head.

It is, therefore, quite intelligible that Dorner's lectures on *Christian Ethics* should have been those that were listened to with the greatest interest. It was in the discussion of this theme that he treated what was nearest his own heart. Christian life was to him the best part of Christian theology. Had he been able to elaborate the whole work for the press, it would undoubtedly have exhibited more perfectly his own conception of the foundation and development of morals. But even without this advantage the book will be welcomed by Dorner's many friends and admirers, not only as his last published treatise, but on account of its own intrinsic merits. It is not necessary here to characterize the work in detail. It speaks for itself. As might be anticipated, neither the empirical nor the utilitarian theory of morals receives any support from the author. In spite of the loud-mouthed claims of materialistic and semi-materialistic writers, that the *à priori* and intuitional methods are obsolete, it will have to be confessed by any one who carefully reads this treatise that the last word has not yet been uttered.

But little need be said respecting the translation of the *Christian Ethics*. There would doubtless have been a greater uniformity of style, could a single translator have done the whole work; but it is to be hoped that in this respect the reader will find no marked difference. The translators have aimed to reproduce the thought in as literal a translation as regard for idiomatic English would allow. In some cases it has been impossible, without unpardonable freedom, to avoid phrases which will have a somewhat foreign and obscure sound; but in such cases the connection will, it is hoped, always sufficiently elucidate the sense. Dorner's style, as his translators have always found, is anything but easy to translate. But this does not imply want of clearness in the original. What to a German, especially one versed in the schools of thought in which Dorner was trained, would be

quite simple and intelligible, may sometimes seem, especially in a slavishly literal translation, to be little better than nonsense. But in such cases the fault is not that of the original author, but rather that of the translator himself, whose business it is first to understand the original and then to make it intelligible in the translation. If the *Christian Ethics*, in its English dress, does not meet this requirement, the translators will not undertake to evade their personal responsibility, but will be thankful for kindly criticism.

The first part of the book, as far as p. 224, has been translated by the undersigned, the remainder by Rev. Mr. Cunningham.[1] The notes and additions by the translators are enclosed in square brackets. As the editor's notes are likewise thus designated, those of the translators are further marked by the addition of "Tr.," except in cases where they would be readily recognised without this mark. The additions in the earlier part of the English translation consist chiefly in an enlargement of the lists of books given by the author and editor. It has been attempted, so far as possible, to ascertain which of the foreign works have been translated into English, and to give the titles of the translations. Also, a considerable number of English and American works have been inserted in the lists. Besides these additions, which are designated by the brackets, many minor emendations, which could not conveniently be thus marked, have been made in the titles and date of publication of the books found in the German original. It has been impossible, in the time and with the means at command, to attempt anything like completeness or perfect accuracy in these additions. But it is hoped that what has been done will in some degree enhance the value of the book, the labour on which, much greater than was anticipated, has been lightened by personal affection and reverence for the lamented author.

C. M. MEAD.

Berlin, 1886.

[1] The Publishers consider it right to state that, owing to temporary indisposition, Mr. Cunningham was unable to revise his MS. This work, together with the revision of the proof-sheets and the completion of several gaps in the translation, has, however, kindly been undertaken by Miss Sophia Taylor (translator of Luthardt's *Apologetic Lectures*, Schürer's *New Testament Times*, etc.).

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

—o—

In editing I. A. Dorner's *Christian Ethics* I fulfil a duty laid upon me by the author's death—a duty which I undertook the more willingly, as the lamented author had commissioned me to do the work in case of his decease. Dorner had intended to publish his *Ethics*, and a copy dictated by him, extending from p. 1 to p. 264, was finished, as also an older dictated copy which, with a few breaks, extended from p. 275 to p. 463 (German ed.). In these portions I have made only slight editorial alterations, where the copy, which could not be revised by the author, contained errors or infelicities; and in doing so I have always followed the manuscripts of the lectures as they lay before me. The remaining part of the work I have taken from Dorner's lecture notes, making the lectures of 1879 the basis, yet not excluding additions from previous lectures. I have always confined myself to the language of the text before me; and where I deemed it necessary to interpolate anything for the sake of perspicuity (which was seldom the case), I have indicated the additions by square brackets, and generally put them in the form of footnotes. The principal additions belong to the department of references to books, the author not having reached the point of completing this part for the press.

The *Ethics* forms an indispensable companion piece to the *Dogmatics* in Dorner's system; and I hope that the publication of it will give satisfaction to the theological public, inasmuch as the lectures on ethics were among the most favourite ones delivered by Dorner. May the defects which inevitably attach to a posthumous work be concealed by the wealth of thought, and by the originality in the construction of the ethical system, which the work presents.

The Editor, A. DORNER.

Wittenberg, *June* 20, 1885.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

§ PAGE

1. Relation of Christian Ethics to Faith and to Dogmatics, . . 1
2. Meaning of Morality, ... 6
3. Relation of Theological or Christian Ethics to Philosophical Ethics, 17
4. Method, ... 42

SYSTEM OF ETHICS.

5. Syllabus, ... 48

A.—STARTING-POINT.

6. Connection between Morality in general and the Idea of God, . 58
7. The Nature of Morality, primarily in God, ... 68
8. Transition to the World, ... 93
9. God's Ideal of the Ethical World in general, . . . 96

B.—SYSTEM.

FIRST PART.

FOUNDATION.

FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINE. THE PREREQISITES AND PRELIMINARY STAGES OF CHRISTIAN MORALITY.

9*a*. Syllabus, ... 112

FIRST DIVISION.

THE ORDER OF THE WORLD AS FIXED BY GOD AT CREATION, ANTECEDENT TO THE MORAL PROCESS.

FIRST SECTION.

THAT WHICH IS COMMON TO ALL MEN IN THE MORAL FACULTIES WITH WHICH THEY ARE ENDOWED.

CHAPTER FIRST.

10. Man's Natural or Physical Endowment by Creation, . . 113

CHAPTER SECOND.

§ PAGE
11. The Psychical Element in Man's Moral Constitution, irrespective as yet of Reason, ... 122

CHAPTER THIRD.

12. The Rational Element in the Moral Constitution, . . 134

SECOND SECTION.

INDIVIDUALITY IN MAN'S MORAL ENDOWMENT.

13. On the Nature of Individuality, ... 141
14. The Actual Genesis of the chief kinds of Individuality, . . 149
14*b*. Continuation. The Temperaments, ... 155
15. The Races and Nationalities, ... 162
16. The Talents, ... 174

THIRD SECTION.

THE IMMEDIATE OR NATURAL UNION OF THE DIFFERENCES IN HUMAN NATURE.

17. Civilisation as originating in a natural Growth, . . . 177
18. The Defects of the Civilisation which springs up by Nature, . 183

SECOND DIVISION.

THE DIVINE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE AS THE LAW OF ACTION FOR THE MORAL FACULTIES; OR THE FORMAL MORAL PROCESS.

19. Synopsis, ... 191

FIRST SECTION.

THE BINDING CHARACTER OF THE OBJECTIVE LAW.

20. The Moral Law grounded in God. Its Fundamental Features, . 196
21. The Denial of the Formal Fundamental Attributes of the Moral Law, ... 202
22. Oneness of the Moral Law, and the Conflict of Duties, . . 213
23. Duty and Right, ... 221

SECOND SECTION.

THE DOCTRINE OF CONSCIENCE.

24. } The Nature and Significance of Conscience, . . . 225
24*a*. }
25. Degrees of Conscience, ... 237
26. Historical Forms of Conscience, ... 248

THIRD SECTION.

THE DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM.

27-29. The Historical Forms of the Antithesis of Determinism and Indeterminism, ... 253
27. Absolute Physical Determinism, and Absolute Indeterminism, . 253
28. Physical Determinism and Determinism of Indifference, . 260

§ PAGE
29. Theological Predeterminism. The Doctrine of Absolute Predestination and Predeterminism of Freedom. Freedom, as the Transcendental Freedom of an Intellectual Existence, . . 266
30. Positive Doctrine of Freedom, ... 273

THIRD DIVISION.

THE MORAL ORDER OF THE WORLD AS THE PRACTICAL GOAL OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE MORAL PROCESS.

31. The Contents of the Moral Ideal, ... 283
32. The Way to the Realization of this Ideal, ... 298

FIRST SECTION.

ADVANCE FROM THE EUDÆMONISTIC STAGE TO THE STAGE OF LAW, OR OF RIGHT.

33. The Absolute Sphere of Right (Relation between God and Man), . 301
33*a*. The Secondary Sphere of Right, ... 303

SECOND SECTION

THE IMPERFECTION OF THE STAGE OF LAW OR OF RIGHT.

CHAPTER FIRST.

ITS IMPERFECTION APART FROM SIN.

34. Its Imperfection in the Absolute Sphere, ... 311
34*a*. Its Imperfection in the Secondary Sphere, ... 313

CHAPTER SECOND.

35. The Stage of Right with reference to Evil, ... 316
Note, ... 320
35*a*. The Actual Existence of Sin in Humanity, . . . 320
35*b*. The Historical Counteraction of Good against Evil, and the Preparation for the Principle of Christian Morality, . . 325

THIRD SECTION.

THE STAGE OF LOVE OR OF THE GOSPEL AS ESSENTIALLY THE ETHICAL GOAL OF THE WORLD.

36. The Necessity of the Stage of Love, by means of a Revelation on the part of God, ... 332
37. The Necessity of the God-man from Ethical Points of View, . 334

SECOND PART.

THE GOOD AS REALIZED IN CHRISTIANITY.

38. Syllabus, ... 343

FIRST DIVISION.

CHRIST THE GOD-MAN, AS THE REALIZATION, IN PRINCIPLE, OF MORALITY IN MANKIND. ETHICAL CHRISTOLOGY.

39. Summary, ... 343

FIRST SECTION.

CHRIST THE PERFECT REVELATION OF THE LAW.

§ PAGE
40. Christ the Revelation of the Law, ... 344

SECOND SECTION.

CHRIST THE ALL-EMBRACING VIRTUE AND THE MAN WHO RENDERS COMPLETE SATISFACTION TO GOD.

41. Christ the all-embracing Virtue, ... 348

THIRD SECTION.

CHRIST AS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD AND THE HEAD OF HUMANITY.

42. Christ the Principle of the Kingdom of God (of the Highest Good), 351

SECOND DIVISION.

CHRISTIAN VIRTUE AS EXHIBITED IN THE INDIVIDUAL.

43. Introduction, ... 355
43*a*. Syllabus, ... 363

FIRST SECTION.

THE GENESIS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER.

CHAPTER FIRST.

44. Faith, ... 364

CHAPTER SECOND.

45. Love, ... 372

CHAPTER THIRD.

CHRISTIAN WISDOM.

46. Christian Wisdom, ... 382
47. The Christian View of the World, ... 388

SECOND SECTION.

THE SUBSISTENCE OF THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER BY MEANS OF CONSTANT RENEWAL AND EXERCISE.

48. The Subsistence of the Christian Character, Fidelity, Stedfastness, Sobriety—Ascetics, ... 401

THIRD SECTION.

THE SELF-MANIFESTATION OR SELF-DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER.

49. Synopsis, ... 412

CHAPTER FIRST.

THE SELF-DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER IN ITS ABSOLUTE RELATIONS.

§		PAGE
50.	Christian Piety in itself,	413
51.	Christian Piety as Inward Activity in Contemplation and Prayer,	416
52.	Contemplation,	417
53.	Prayer,	422
54.	Times of Prayer and Contemplation, or the Order of Life determined by Christian Piety,	430
55.	Christian Religious Zeal,	441

CHAPTER SECOND.

THE NEW PERSONALITY, CREATED IN THE IMAGE OF GOD, IN RELATION TO ITSELF.

56.	Christian Self-love ; the necessary Grounds on which it rests,	445
57.	Christian Self-love ; its Nature in general,	449
58.	Christian Self-love ; its special characteristics both in itself and with regard to Others,	452
	I. Care for Personal Worth and Well-being,	452
	Survey,	452
	1. Care of the Physical Life,	452
59.	Care of our Physical Existence,	452
59*a*.	Duelling,	454
60.	Care of the Body,	456
61.	Attention to Virtuous Happiness,	458
62.	Attention to Virtuous Purity and Beauty,	464
63.	Virtuous Ownership,	469
	2. Christian Self-love with respect to the Spirit,	480
64.	Virtuous Refinement and Stability of Character,	480
	II. Christian Self-love as Self-affirmation and Self-manifestation with reference to Others,	484
65.	Survey. (Personal Dignity shown in Independence of Character, in maintaining our Good Name and our legitimate Personal Influence by means of Truthfulness, and in the Choice and Exercise of a Vocation),	484
66.	Truthfulness,	487
67.	Oaths,	492
68.	Vocation,	498

CHAPTER THIRD.

THE CHRISTIAN IN RELATION TO OTHERS, CHRISTIAN SOCIAL LOVE.

69.	Christian Social Love,	504
70.	Social Intercourse,	514

THIRD DIVISION.

THE ORGANIZED WORLD OF CHRISTIAN MORALITY, THE MORAL COMMUNITIES IN THE KINGDOM OF GOD.

71.	Synopsis,	516

FIRST SECTION.

THE (NATURAL) FUNDAMENTAL MORAL COMMUNITY, OR THE HOUSEHOLD.

CHAPTER FIRST.

§ PAGE
72. Marriage, ... 522

CHAPTER SECOND.

73. The Family, ... 549

CHAPTER THIRD.

74. Extension of the Household by means of Friends and Servants, . 552

SECOND SECTION.

THE SPECIAL MORAL COMMUNITIES THAT ARE THE PRODUCT OF REFLECTION OR OF HUMAN ART.

CHAPTER FIRST.

THE STATE.

75. Idea of the State, ... 554
76. Antithesis of Rulers and Subjects, ... 562
77. The Constitution, ... 568
78. Relation of the State to its Future and to other States, . . 578

CHAPTER SECOND.

79. Art, ... 581

CHAPTER THIRD.

80. Science, ... 587

THIRD SECTION.

THE ABSOLUTE SPHERE, THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY.

81. Idea of the Church, ... 591
82. Cardinal Functions of the Church, ... 598
83. Ecclesiastical Organization, ... 604

SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

—o—

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1.

CHRISTIAN Morals or Ethics is the second main division of Thetic [Positive] Theology. As such it has, in common with Dogmatics, its source in Faith, which involves an immediate knowledge not only of God and of His acts, but also of man and of his relation to God and to the divine will.

1. The relation of systematic theology to the other departments of theology has been pointed out in detail by me in another work.[1] The peculiarity of systematic theology lies in this, that it and it alone has for its province to exhibit and to establish Christian truth as truth. Thereby it answers to an essential need of the soul, and to the inmost tendency of Christianity as proceeding out of the self-revelation of God. When faith has accepted Christianity, it receives, indeed, at the outset as its reward the satisfaction of a son who has found again the lost house of his father. The believer knows also, in a certain sense, what or on whom he believes; and that which Christianity contains, answering truly to his needs, works out its quiet, healing, illuminating effect. But the spirit of the faith which desires to grow up to manhood does not stop short with knowing on whom it believes. It desires to know also why it believes with a good conscience, and with the stedfastness and fidelity which, through the apprehension of the intrinsic truth of what is believed, assumes

[1] *System of Christian Doctrine*, i. pp. 21–24.

the form of duty and of a self-assured, joyful aspiration. Only when one has recognised that the Christianity delivered to him is the truth, which nothing in heaven or on earth can contradict, is he able properly to give an answer (1 Pet. iii. 15) against doubts, whether coming from within or from without; only from the recognition of Christian truth as truth comes also the living impulse to champion victoriously the sovereignty of Christian truth. For the truth must lay claim not merely to be valid as truth for this or that individual, but to find due recognition with all rational beings; and from this it is plain why the Christian knowledge, so highly commended in the New Testament, is of the greatest importance for the practical life of individuals and of the Church. Only thus does Christianity do justice to itself as the divine revelation. Before the Christian revelation God poured out upon mankind a wealth of valuable knowledge, and even foretold the consummation of religion. Nevertheless before the Christian era men were not yet in the position of children of God, but still in the position of servants (Gal. iv. 1). But it is the characteristic of the servant not to know what the master does (John xv. 15). He learns indeed the master's will, and if he be a faithful servant he puts confidence in the master's word as wise and good; but the servant as such has no insight into the goodness and wisdom of the divine utterances. For this reason, as the later books of the Old Testament show, he lacks also the power to encounter arising doubts victoriously, and not through mere resignation, such as is required, *e.g.*, in Ecclesiastes and in the Book of Job. It is true that mere resignation is a waiting for the future solution of the doubts and perplexities of thought; it is strictly, however, no real progress towards a more and more comprehensive, harmonious view of the world, but is at best only an exercise in humble and quiet stedfastness in a position already reached, yet still imperfect.

2. Systematic theology, like theology in general, presupposes *experience*, outward, and especially inward, or *faith;* for faith brings Christian experience.[1]

Faith is, first, the eye, or the faculty, which takes Christian truths and facts into the mind; but it likewise includes in

[1] Cf. my *System of Christian Doctrine*, vol. i. pp. 17–21.

itself these Christian objects in such a way that it delivers them over to philosophic thought and apprehension, to be elaborated and further appropriated. For it itself has an impulse not merely to get possession of the truth, *i.e.* of Christianity, but also to become conscious and sure of the truth *as* truth, to which end science also essentially contributes (2 Tim. i. 12; 1 Pet. iii. 15). Where faith is there is a Christian person, to whom is presented a world of things on which his powers of cognition and of volition are to be exercised. Accordingly it might seem plausible, dogmatics and ethics being derived from faith as a higher unity, so to view faith as their common source, that dogmatics should be looked upon as theoretical theology, ethics as practical theology; but this view would do justice to neither the one nor the other. For ethics no less than dogmatics must present a theory, a system of knowledge; dogmatics, on the other hand, could not be satisfied with being directed merely by theoretical considerations. The difference between them, while they in common claim to be sciences, lies rather in their subject-matter.

Schleiermacher[1] says that the Christian life is, on the one hand, one of repose, and as such is the subject of Christian doctrine; that, on the other hand, it is a life of activity, and as such is to be described by Christian ethics. But to say nothing of the fact that on this view there would result only a quantitative and therefore fluctuating difference between the two, it is plain that since both would be only mutually supplementary descriptions of a pious Christian's state of mind, they would treat merely of that which is human and subjective. Nay, since piety is something ethical, a virtue, we do not get beyond the realm of mere ethics. And the case is similar with Nitzsch, who, in his *System of Christian Doctrine*, goes on to treat of dogmatics and ethics as a single science. Nitzsch says the Christian personality is a totality, a solid unity, and that therefore the completest form of dogmatic and of ethical science is the presentation of the one Christian life in its fulness, that is, the treatment of dogmatics and ethics rather as one science, inasmuch as in Christianity the religious and the moral are inseparably

[1] *Christl. Sitte*, pp. 12–24.

connected and are meant to permeate each other. But if the task were merely to present the higher Christian life in its unity, of course, therefore, according to its religious and moral character, there would remain, strictly speaking, nothing but morality to be treated; for dogmatics there would be left no special province. Christian personality is morally complete only in so far as it includes Christian piety; but in that case there would be left as the subject-matter of systematic theology only the human being, the Christian person; about God and divine acts it would have to keep silence. This leads to the correct statement of the relation between dogmatics and ethics.

3. It is true that if there were no objective knowledge of God, not even in Christianity, the right of dogmatics to a special existence would be out of the question. But it is only in the most modern times that some men have embraced such a doctrine of absolute ignorance of God Himself and His essence, and are preparing even to affirm that it is a higher knowledge. It is not so much Kant's critical system from which such a doctrine is derived, for his is not a system of scepticism; it proceeds rather from the assumption, imported from France and England, that all knowledge is derived merely from experience, that in the mind there is no independent source of knowledge.[1] But Christianity rejects this theory, however much it may wrap itself in the garment of a self-chosen humility. According to Christianity, it is the heathen who know nothing of God; but Christianity has brought a revelation from God, and that not merely concerning mankind; rather the new disclosures which it has indeed brought concerning men, their nature, and their destiny, have their ultimate foundation always in this, that it brings disclosures concerning God and concerning divine acts which point back to the divine essence. If this is certain to the Christian mind, then we have, as the province of dogmatics, distinguishing it from all other branches of learning, and insuring for it an independent position, the description of God and His acts. If this is so, then there remains as the subject of ethics in general the normal, *i.e.* ethical, life of the

[1] Reference is here had especially to Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert Spencer.

human creature. The ethical has, to be sure, its place in dogmatics, namely, the ethical element in God, a knowledge of which presupposes an ethical element in man. Spinoza's ethics is an ethics of God and of the creature. But on the very supposition that dogmatics, as it ought, treats of an ethical conception of God, and accordingly sets forth the ethical element in God, there remains to ethics in distinction from dogmatics the ethical element in the creature, especially mankind, as its peculiar domain. As surely as God and the creature are different, so surely are dogmatics and ethics to be distinguished. Thus, moreover, so much is at once determined concerning the relative place of the two departments, that so surely as God is the supreme cause upon which everything else depends, ethics cannot be called the foundation of dogmatics, but stands to dogmatics in a relation of dependence.

But this does not mean that ethics is only a dependent appendage, or even part, of systematic theology. Ethics, rather, is a relatively independent department standing side by side with dogmatics. God's creative causality is not exhausted when it has made a dependent thing without a causality and life of its own. In that case there would be only God and the divine act, nothing existent but this. Rather, on the other hand, the will and the aim of the creative activity of God is the production of life in His creatures, especially in intelligent creatures—a life having its own independent action. This is implied in the fact that there is no creative act of God which does not pass over into preservation, that is, into the realm in which there is room for secondary causality. The delineation, however, of that human causality, which merits the name of ethico-Christian, presupposes not merely some one single dogma, but God and the totality of His acts, *i.e.* the whole of systematic theology; so that for this reason also ethics is a science different from dogmatics and relatively independent. On this point, too, we should not be confused by the circumstance that certain doctrines indeed, as that of sin, of regeneration, of sanctification, and of the Church, demand a place in both departments, for they occur in them under different aspects—in dogmatics, under that of divine activity, of their relation to the divine decree, and of the

realization of the decree; in the science of morals, under the aspect of human activity.

4. In the foregoing the province in general is indicated into which our science falls. But since the activity of human life is very manifold, the question arises whether everything and anything which can be called a human function belongs to our science, or whether only a narrower circle of human activity is to be reserved for it. The word moral, it is true, is used in a wider sense, embracing both the morally normal and the morally abnormal. But ethics, as will soon be more clearly shown, has primarily to do with the normal or the good. But, in the next place, the word moral, even in the wider sense, is not applicable to every kind of human activity. There is a multitude of conditions and functions to which the idea of morality is applicable in neither a good nor a bad sense; therefore we must advance to a stricter definition of the subject of our science.

§ 2. *The Meaning of Morality.*

The subject of Christian ethics is, in the first instance, the morally good, or the *absolutely worthy*, as existing for the human personal *will*, and as attaining reality through it, *i.e.* by means of the self-determination of the will. As the absolutely worthy, the ethical is to be distinguished from the physical, the logical, and the æsthetical, all of which, although it cannot be denied that they have a peculiar worth and even a certain necessity, yet, in comparison with the ethical, have only a mediate, secondary importance. But in the idea of the good, and derivable from it alone, is involved, moreover, the notion of evil as its opposite; and to this also is applicable the notion of self-determination of the personal will. So then the two, the morally good and the morally bad, although they constitute in relation to each other an absolute antithesis, the absolutely worthy and the absolutely worthless, yet, as moral, stand *sensu medio* opposed to the physical.

1. In order to attain to a definite conception of our science, we start with the various names which in the course of centuries have been coined for it; for in the giving of names the awakened rational instinct is accustomed to picture forth the essence of the thing to which it has been devoting its attention. The consideration of names is all the more instructive when they express various conceptions of the object, or various aspects presented by it. First to be considered are the terms, science of the good, of duty, and of virtue.

a. As to the first name, man, as a teleological being, endowed with a power to judge of things according to their worth, asks, so soon as understanding is awakened, what end is worth striving after and can be attained by effort. Very many things present themselves as possible; but the intelligent man will decide in favour of that which seems to him to be the greater good, *i.e.* seems to be most in harmony with his nature and inclinations. So it is natural that one of the oldest forms of the doctrine of morals is that of the good, or of the good things which can make life worth living, or make it happy, and to which human action, self-determination in doing and leaving undone, should conform. There are, to be sure, peoples to whom life itself appears to be an evil, as the Buddhists; but even these have a doctrine of the highest good. Their good consists in being delivered from this evil of life, by withdrawing the consciousness and will from the multiplicity of finite things, in order, after these have both been subdued, to attain to an inactive blessed rest, if not to annihilation. With the West-Aryan peoples, and especially with the Hebrews, it is otherwise. Since they look upon life as a good, their effort is directed to preserving and enriching it by means of well-ordered consistent action; for these races have a historic sense. With them moral precepts or rules have the aim so to regulate life that it shall be superior to all evils, and thus become more and more worth living. It was this that led the Greeks and Romans to inquire after the *ἀγαθόν* or *καλοκαγαθόν*, after the *bonum* or *summum bonum;* and in like manner the Hebrew חָכְמָה (wisdom) promises life through the knowledge of the true good and of the means of attaining it.

But the word *bonum*, *ἀγαθόν*, like our "good," or like *κακόν* and *malum*, is ambiguous. That can be called good which is agreeable and yields pleasure. It can also mean that which is in itself universally and absolutely good. If good is taken in the first sense, then a doctrine of morals having positive contents, and being valid for all individuals alike, is not possible, since the difference of inclinations and of needs in different individuals is endless, and since, so long as there is no law universally binding, it must rest with the judgment of the individual to determine what he shall look upon as the pleasure congenial to him, or as the damage or pain to be shunned. Furthermore, in this case virtue only signifies a means; it is only the ability or skill to unite the greatest possible well-being with the least possible evil. But most certainly a higher conception of good things is possible, and especially of the highest good. Even Plato and Aristotle could talk of a good which has ideal worth and import,—Plato especially, even of an *ἀγαθόν* which is connected with the *ὅσιον*. They find the highest good ideally in wisdom or in the knowledge of truth; they find it really in the State, which, if it is just and endued with all virtues, provides for each individual that which is best and due. But knowledge in and of itself, as even Aristotle begins to see, cannot insure a good will, or virtue; it is an erroneous intellectual conception of Socrates and Plato, that knowledge certainly determines and moves the will. In the State, however, the chief importance attaches to the outward act, the overt work, by which the State continually renews itself; but the disposition and the moral worth of the individual receive in this case too little attention.

A higher claim to constitute the highest good is made by the Biblical idea of the kingdom of God, which indeed bears a certain analogy to that of the State (as is indicated in the phrase *civitas Dei*), but contains a more comprehensive and higher meaning. And, in fact, some modern moralists, as Schwartz and Hirscher, have treated ethics as the doctrine of the kingdom of God. But certain as it is, that objective reality belongs to morality as a whole, yet the notion of the kingdom of God is not in itself adequate to be an exhaustive description of morality. By it one essential aspect of morality is expressed, namely, that it is

an entity. But so is nature, the physical world, an entity; and the essence of morality is not expressed unless at the same time personality and its self-activity are taken into consideration. In the notion of the kingdom of God in and of itself the notion of personality, so weighty in morals, is thrown too much into the background; and yet morality must have its first existence in the person: a thing does not first become moral by means of society or the kingdom of God.

b. Others recognise that the peculiarity of morality does not consist in its simply having an objective being. They see rather that an *Ought* bearing upon the will, that is, *the notion of duty*, or *the moral law*, is an essential characteristic of morality. The Stoics therefore define our science as the *ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθηκόντων*; and here belongs also Kant's Categorical Imperative, upon which he seeks to build his doctrine of morals. Does now this definition embrace the whole realm over which ethical science must lay claim? Certainly nothing can be shown to be moral which may not in some way be or become duty; the whole realm of morals must be brought under the aspect of duty; and this is accordingly *an essential* side of the matter. It must be acknowledged, too, that in the very notion of duty personality is recognised; for this notion is determined by personality as a union of will and understanding. The idea of duty indeed, although it itself represents that which is morally necessary, presupposes freedom, self-determination; for the necessity of duty is quite another necessity than that of compulsion or of natural law. The law which is involved in duty is not characterized by the necessity of immediately passing over into actuality so soon as it is present to the soul; rather, its characteristic is the desire to become actualized through free self-determination. It is an appeal to freedom; it is a distinction between man and all merely natural creatures, whereby he is ennobled. And something so lofty lies in this consciousness of freedom, that there are attempts at ethical systems which have as their leading idea merely this freedom, the self-determination of free personality; thus, to be sure, we are unawares led back again to a sort of more refined utilitarianism, and that which is morally necessary is not secure as over against mere caprice. Important for morality as self-determination is, yet not every-

thing which proceeds from self-determination can be therefore called morally good, unless the word moral is taken *sensu ambiguo*. To be sure, as no definite moral element is involved in the mere notion of freedom, and as at the best, if the self-assertion of freedom is conceived to be morality, only the negative requirement can be made, that everything impairing freedom should be averted, without any positive moral process taking place; so also the notion of duty is in itself only a formal one. It affirms indeed that only that is duty which is absolutely obligatory; but what that is which is absolutely obligatory is not evident from the notion of duty in itself, and can also not be derived from it. Consequently here, too, at the best we reach only the negative result of excluding what cannot pass as moral, and is therefore to be avoided, but without knowing any the better what is to be regarded as really accordant with duty. Furthermore, the notion of law represents morality in the sense of that which *ought to be;* but the mere Ought is a nonentity. If, therefore, the whole of morality were included in law, it would remain excluded from actuality. But that which is new and essential in Christian ethics consists in just this, that Christianity is the power to transform moral obligation into moral fact.

c. This is recognised in a third designation of our science, namely, when it is regarded as the doctrine of virtue. Kant also professed to treat of ethics in his doctrine of virtue; but he did not get beyond the demand for virtue, that is, he substantially sticks fast in the law; whereas Christian ethics demands that morality become a reality, as it has been manifested in Christ and is working on in the Church. So much, to be sure, Kant rightly emphasized, that in order to morality there must be an inward disposition as a constant power, without which right conduct would be soulless and mechanical. The right moral disposition, however, is power for virtue. But however certainly the notion of virtue must be included in the full definition of our science, yet the designation of it as the doctrine of virtue would likewise not embrace the whole realm of morality. Morality which, when it takes a personal form, becomes complete in virtue, has also essential reference to ethical good, or to the objective

system of good things in which the capacity for virtue finds its appropriate activity. But just on that account there belongs to morality an objective rule as a goal, or as a work to be done.

2. From a survey of the three above-mentioned chief ways of conceiving the ethical principle, it follows that it presents a threefold aspect; and we shall see how, under the designations, Doctrine of the Good (Doctrine of the Kingdom of God), Law (or Doctrine of Duty), and Doctrine of Virtue, are comprehended three fundamental and connected forms of the ethical principle. The most adequate designation of our science will doubtless be that in which all three forms have place. As such designation there present themselves furthermore the terms Moral Science and Ethics [the latter being the preferable term].

Note.—[In the original, "Moral, Ethik, Sittenlehre," the words in square brackets being added by the translator, as indicating the conclusion to which Dorner comes after an etymological discussion, much of which would be of no use to the merely English reader, inasmuch as it treats largely of the etymological significance of German words. Moreover, the objections urged against the use of the word "moral," however forcible they may be to Germans, do not equally bear against the use of that word in English. And as the word will be constantly used in the translation, it seems best to throw the etymological disquisition into the form of a note.—Tr.] The term "Moral," *disciplina moralis*, formerly much used, is exposed to the objection that this word looks more to the appearance than to the essence and inward source. *Mos* as = "usage," "custom," may have nothing to do with the ethical life; *mores* designates indeed the ethical character, but as the plural signifies, not as an inner unity, but as a continuity of similar self-manifestations of what is within. The terms *Ethik, Sittenlehre*, on the contrary, present the possibility of comprehending all three of the fundamental forms of morality. Etymologically, ἦθος is the Ionic form of ἔθος (which probably comes from ἔζω, to sit, as in similar manner *Sitte* is connected with *sitzen, Gewohnheit* with *wohnen*). Ἦθος, like *Sitte*, designates in the first place what is current, as sanctioned by usage, and so there lies in it a reference to rule or law; and, secondly, since ἦθος, *custom* [*Sitte*], has for its source not merely individuals as such, but objective communities, the word ἦθος, *Sitte*, points to a social

circle in which the *Sitte* governs or has an existence, a home. But, thirdly, by ἦθος is meant not merely an objective existence in a social circle, as this expresses itself in usages that are possibly merely outward and mechanical; but it is essential to the word that it denote the inward character, whether of a people or of a person. *Ethos* is to the Greeks the fundamental mood, the disposition of the soul, or the inner state of character.[1] Ἦθος is thus the seat, or the moral vital element, in which one has his home, therefore related to *ingenium*, *Geist;* but even if not exclusively, yet chiefly, with an ethical meaning, in that ἦθος is contradistinguished from πάθος, mere passivity. So then it designates the inward ethical (good or evil) life, and comprehends that which has become an habitual state, an animating principle, in the subjective fundamental trend which is the germ of virtue or morality. Similarly *Sittenlehre* points to usage or law, and to an objective circle in which it has validity; and since Christian "Sittenlehre" does not suggest doctrines of customs (*Sitten, mores*), but of Christian *Sitte* as *Sittlichkeit* [morality], our [German] language means by the word also the inward aspect of virtue; the term *Sittlichkeitslehre*, on the other hand, would stamp ethics too one-sidedly as the doctrine of virtue. Accordingly Christian *Ethik* or *Sittenlehre* is the science of Christian morality [*des christlich Sittlichen*] in its totality, the science of that which in Christendom passes as moral [*das Sittliche*], and which therefore constitutes its peculiar *Ethos*.[2]

3. If, now, we have the most adequate *name* for our science, what, next, is the more exact *meaning* of morality, concerning which the science treats? It is, like the word "spirit," hard to define, because the danger always is that in the definition the very thing to be defined will be presupposed. The usual method of definition is to go back to a generic idea, including under it various species, which last are distinguished from one another, and are thus more exactly defined. This method fails here, because there are not several species co-ordinate

[1] Cf. Bonitz, *Wörterbuch zu Aristoteles*, article ἦθος.

[2] [It may here be remarked further, that Dorner uses very frequently the phrases "*das Sittliche*" and "*das Ethische*" to denote morality in general, as a fact and as an object of thought. The literal rendering, "the moral," or "the ethical," would be un-English and harsh. They are accordingly commonly translated "morality," as, *e.g.*, just above, "the science of Christian morality" (German: "*die Wissenschaft des christlich Sittlichen*"), but occasionally, "the ethical (moral) element (principle, sphere, etc.)."—Tr.]

with morality. Morality is itself the highest thing, the one thing of its kind—*ens sui generis*. But yet, on the other hand, it is a mode of spiritual existence, beside which there are other things of spiritual worth which must be definitely distinguished from it. Let us seek, then, by distinguishing it from other things, in relation to both its form and its contents, to come more nearly to the nature of morality.

a. As to its *formal* aspect, we must indeed, with Rothe, attach importance to the consideration that in ethics the function of personality or of self-determination is essential. But if from this the definition should be derived: That is moral which comes to pass through the self-determination of the person, this would, it is true, express a characteristic of that which is moral, as distinguished from that which is merely physical; but the definition would be unsatisfactory in a twofold respect. The playing of a child upon whom the consciousness of an ethical rule has not yet dawned, is not yet to be placed under the category of the ethical, although will, self-determination, and consciousness need not be wanting in it; it belongs to the realm of the ante-ethical.

Again, the personal self-determination may be an abnormal, immoral one; and in this aspect the definition which stops short with formal personal self-determination would be satisfactory only if moral science were the science just as much of immorality as of morality. Now we have indeed already acknowledged that the word moral can be taken in an ambiguous sense, and that the immoral no less than the moral necessarily presupposes personal self-determination. Still, strictly speaking, the one cannot be of as much importance as the other to ethics, for ethics is concerned first and above all with the ethically normal or good. From this the notion of evil comes of itself, as the absolute contrary of moral good; the notion of moral good is not derived from that of evil, but *vice versa* the former only is an original notion which can be grasped without the notion of evil having been previously given. True, Lactantius says, *malum interpretamentum boni;* and it is beyond dispute that this distinguishing of the notion of the good as the contrary of evil invests the former with a new and greater definiteness; but the notion of evil is so far forth absolutely dependent on that

of good, that I must have beforehand a notion of what good is in order to know what evil is. We shall not be able, therefore, in the definition of ethics to treat both sorts of personal self-determination as equally essential.

On the other hand, in ethics itself evil cannot be disregarded, as Schleiermacher in his *Philosophische Ethik* was inclined to do; but in ethical discussions the notion of evil will have to take only a secondary position dependent on that of good. Empirically, indeed, evil exists together with good, at least now. But as it did not always have to be thus, so it will not always be thus. When now it is considered that personal self-determination, in order to be called morally good, must conform to a rule by which caprice and hesitation between various possibilities are excluded, then it is seen that the morally good, whatever it may consist in, has somewhat in itself which is wanting in everything else, namely, the power absolutely to put under obligation and allegiance to itself. Kant stopped short at this formal feature of the absolute obligatoriness of the morally good, without expressing himself more definitely as to its nature. He assumes that moral good is sufficiently distinguished from everything else by the form which belongs to it, and to it alone, of absolute obligatoriness; and that what is moral is to be distinguished from what is immoral by the fact that the latter is destitute of that absolute originality. Subjectively expressed, this means: The will is good, when it acknowledges that absolute obligatoriness; the good disposition consists in respectful submission to the Categorical Imperative. But it will not suffice to stop with this merely formal feature, and to find the good disposition insured by the simple fact that there is respect for the absolute obligatoriness of law in the abstract. For if nothing is said about the contents of the law, or about what that is which is absolutely binding, then in order to a good disposition it would only be needed that the law should be willed—should be *conceived* as absolutely obligatory—although in itself it might be even not obligatory, nay, might itself even be evil. It would be the good intention alone through which anything would receive the stamp of good; there would be room even for the Jesuitical principle. So, then, only that disposition is entitled to be called good which is directed towards the

right thing. Wisdom belongs essentially to the morally good disposition.

Note.—Kant, in his definition of the meaning of morality, does not find the bridge which leads over from the merely formal, to the substantial, notion, and by means of which alone the definition is precisely enough fixed.

b. The substantial element, by means of which ethical good is constituted such, might be found stated in this proposition of Schleiermacher's *Philosophische Ethik:* The ethical is the union of reason and nature,—a proposition with which Rothe substantially agrees.[1] Since reason and mind are abstractions, having no morals (only persons have morals), Rothe expresses Schleiermacher's thought thus: "Morality is the appropriation of the material (earthly) nature by the human personality as accomplished by the determining influence of personality upon nature." This leaves Christianity out of consideration, and stops with morality in general. But the appropriation of nature, as also the union between reason and nature, can take place in a twofold manner: either so that nature, the material world, is subjected to mind, or, *vice versa*, mind to nature. There is, too, a false union of mind and nature. It may, indeed, be said that reason as such is security for the good, and likewise that personality, in distinction from individuality, is that which has taken up into itself what is of universal validity, so that an abnormal union of nature and reason (or personality) seems to be excluded by the very notion of the latter. But by common usage we speak of errors of the reason, and of an evil tendency of the personality, so that by neither of these is expressed what that is which is good, but rather this still remains merely presupposed. When Rothe says, further, that that personal self-determination is ethically good which is consonant with the notion of personality,[2] it must be remarked that the very thing in question is, what is consonant with personality? And if it should be said, it is that which conforms to what is normal in personality, then, since nature too has its law and its norm, we need first to be told what is the characteristic feature of the ethical norm. Furthermore, the union of reason with nature, even if this union were to mean supremacy of mind over nature, does not as yet embrace

[1] *Theol. Ethik*, 2nd ed. § 102; 2nd ed. p. 427; cf. § 87. [2] *Ibid.* p. 431.

all that is morally good. On the contrary, the primary thing is the inward union, the harmonizing of the powers of the soul, that is, the normal self-shaping of the person, the right shaping of the soul, as being the power to mould nature without us, as well as our own body, in the right way.

We come a step farther, perhaps, by bringing in the notions of purpose and of worth. It belongs essentially to the will, as already observed, to direct itself towards an object. That towards which it directs itself has for it a worth, or is held by it to be a good thing. Now, while it can set before itself, as its object, things of endless variety, it will always ascribe a worth to that with which it is engrossed; but these values may be only of a finite, nay, merely specious sort. Now that which has merely this character is not yet the ethically good. Life, harmony, beauty, and intelligence, or knowledge, have doubtless a value; of none of these in itself, however, can it be said that it is intrinsically of *absolute value;* for this highest predicate belongs only to the ethically good, and distinguishes it from all other forms of good, and exalts it above them. Ethical good is not yet conceived of, unless it is conceived of as the absolutely valuable over against all other existing things; but when it is conceived of, it is conceived of in its unique sacred majesty. But casting, by way of anticipation, a glance from this point at the distinctive peculiarity of Christian ethics, we may say that, to the Christian, what is morally good consists in this: that the first creation, the material and the psychical, accordingly also the natural person, is appropriated by the second creation, or by the Christian *pneuma*, through the agency of the self-determination of the *ego*. Speaking comprehensively, and distinguishing from all others Christian morality as the perfect morality, we may therefore say: Christian ethics is the science of that which is absolutely worthy,—of that which, as to form, is worked out through continual personal self-determination; but, as to substance, is to be described as the appropriation, by means of the divine *pneuma*, of the natural personality, and, with it, of the first creation.

Note 1.—The bringing in of the notion of worth might seem to lead to a utilitarian conception of morality. But that would

be the case only if the worth in question were a worth merely because it furnishes enjoyment or satisfaction to the person; but a thing having this kind of value would have its value, not in itself, but simply in its relation to other things, as being useful. But then ethical good would be only of limited and not of absolute value.

Note 2.—It might be objected to what has been said above, that to knowledge or cognition also an absolute worth must not be denied. But that cannot hold of every sort of cognition. Even thinking about God and His attributes, if it is exercised only as about an object of mathematics, is not of absolute worth, even if it does not, as is probable, lead to false propositions. On the other hand, such a cognition as, joined with love, vitally knows God as the highest and original Good, and thus thinking enters in thought into a responsive relation to God, is indeed of absolute worth in itself, and is something to be aimed at on its own account. Such knowledge, however, is wisdom, a virtue belonging therefore to morality itself; and it partakes of the character of self-determination, of personality. And the case is similar with religion. We should not, to be sure, make morality and religion identical, but religion also in itself has absolute value, and is an ultimate end. But so far forth as it is this, it too is a virtue, piety, and is included in the notion of the ethical.

§ 3. *Relation of Theological or Christian Ethics to Philosophical Ethics.*

The relation between Christian and philosophical ethics is neither that of necessary opposition or contradiction, nor that of identity, but that of difference, which is destined to become continually less and less. This adjustment advances in proportion as Christian ethics appropriates to itself everything belonging to the first creation, and as philosophical ethics recognises the reasonableness or truth of Christianity, and so becomes Christian. Yet this adjustment is accomplished by continuing to treat the two separately; thus separated they tend towards union in the process of conflict. The dissimilarity of the two, so long as it lasts (as also the likeness), is partly one of form, partly one of sub

stance. But it points back to the difference between natural and Christian ethics.

1. The relation between philosophical and theological ethics is the same as that between philosophy and Christian theology in general, and points back to the deeper and more general distinction between the first and the second creation. In the first place, it is to be insisted that their relation to each other is not that of an original inherent contradiction. True, the doubt has often arisen in the Church, whether there can be a moral philosophy, a natural moral knowledge not first emanating from historic revelation, be the obstacle to it the imperfect intellectual equipment of man, or the disturbance occasioned by sin. The first view appears in Socinianism, which, the less its doctrine of revelation contributes to dogmatics, so much the more traces our moral knowledge back to revelation. The other view is more often heard expressed in the Church. Not so much, indeed, in the Roman Catholic Church, which, however, is inclined to depreciate natural knowledge in favour of the authority of the only infallible Church; to which must be added that its notion of Christian morality comes into collision with natural morality. But neither the authority of the Church, nor the doctrine of a twofold morality, could be made to work in the Evangelical Church. On the other hand, here it was the doctrine of natural sinfulness and obscuration of reason, which, when carried to the extreme, led to a similar result, viz. to the doctrine that a true ethical knowledge is to be denied to the natural man.

But by going too far in this respect the danger is incurred of excusing sin and of making difficult the transition to sorrow and repentance; for the degree of guilt depends upon the measure of moral knowledge to which the evil is opposed (Luke xii. 47, 48). Were there in the natural man no knowledge of duty at all, as there is not in the brute, then a moral perception could not be implanted in him supplementarily from without, either through the authority of the Church or through revelation. He could be instructed about moral requirements; but that this instruction is absolutely binding upon him, or is duty, he cannot know, unless he at least possesses the natural knowledge that he is under

obligation to do that which is good,—or that which proceeds from God, the supreme source of all moral law,—and to avoid the opposite. But the gravest objection is this, viz. that if all natural moral knowledge should be denied, the transition to Christian faith could be made only by an act of moral caprice. To reject redemption would be excusable, yes, natural, if there were no such knowledge of good and evil as enables one to perceive the necessity of redemption and the duty of seeking help from it. But since, according to Rom. ii. 13 sqq., John i. 5, v. 38, even in fallen man the light of conscience is still to be recognised, and since, on the other hand, it is obvious enough that to know good and to do it are two very different things, and that even by means of higher moral knowledge the need of redemption is as yet not removed, but only the consciousness of this need augmented, therefore the objections against the possibility of a philosophical ethics more and more subsided in the Church. And, indeed, it would have been an unjustifiable loss to ethical knowledge, if all the ethical labours, thoughts, and works of the ancients, of a Plato, an Aristotle, the Stoics, Cicero, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, were to be counted for nothing. Even Melanchthon, therefore, wrote a *Philosophia Moralis.*

2. Since philosophy has raised itself to an independent position, it has not seldom affirmed, that between philosophical and Christian ethics there is an irreconcilable contradiction, and that there remains for Christian ethics no special place. We need not here consider those who, like the materialists, defend an ethics of selfishness; there are others, too, who say that a historical element is essential to Christian ethics, but that that condemns this ethics in advance to an unscientific form. Christianity, they affirm, impairs moral autonomy and freedom, because it sets up the moral commands as commands of God, and thus obedience to them becomes service, and the motive for moral conduct is vitiated through the fear of God, or through regard to future reward. Finally, it is said, human freedom is violated by the doctrine of grace.

But these objections, all of which are rooted in a false conception of Christianity, would hold equally against all connection between ethics and religion, and consequently would lead

to the exclusion of the virtue of piety from ethics, and therefore to the mutilation of this science. The above-mentioned objections are especially familiar in the Kantian philosophy, which, however, on its own part does not avoid a self-contradiction; for if the contradiction between the moral ideal and reality is an eternal and insuperable one, it leads legitimately to doubt concerning the right, and the absolute obligatoriness of such a powerless, impotent ideal. Therefore in the following period, which threw itself into the arms of Empiricism and of natural science, appeared Anthropologism. This doctrine, because it does not recognise the existence of an ethical Absolute as the primeval power over all, but gives up the idea of God, retains only that of conditioned limited being, casts aside all absolute binding legislation, and therefore does not get beyond mere caprice and utilitarianism; but thereby it impairs the very essence of human nature. For the strength and security of the rational essence of our nature lies in God.

3. Both these assumptions of an essential contradiction between Christian ethics and natural or philosophical ethics, Christianity refuses to admit; on the contrary, it recognises a certain relationship between the latter and itself which lies in the very saying, "The law is our tutor to bring us unto Christ." The first creation, although deformed by sin, is yet the object of divine preservation; it is implied in the second creation and constitutes its basis; it is perverted, but not as to substance: the substance of the world has remained metaphysically good. This affinity between Christian and philosophical ethics appears in respect both to matter and to form. Christian morality, like natural morality, requires a material something on which to act; even for Christian morality there is no other, no purely spiritual, world, but merely one and the same world, that of the first creation. The duties of the soul towards itself and towards the body are binding in Christian ethics also. Marriage, the family, civil and political communities, had place before Christianity itself; an inner logic inheres in their very essence, and approves what promotes them and rejects the opposite; and if a moral sense is united with the perception of the inner nature of all these institutions, then we have a moral law enriching itself more and more,—a law which Christianity, too, cannot but recognise. Besides

this material likeness there is a formal one also. Natural morals, like Christian morals, must operate on the rational faculties of thought and will. Personal self-determination, as both must acknowledge, is indispensable if anything is to come into the department of morality, even though morality be taken only in the wider sense.

4. Nevertheless it must be maintained that there is as little a direct identity, as an essential contradiction, between natural or philosophical ethics and Christian ethics. The discussions on ethics from the theological and the philosophical sides exhibit in fact great differences still existing. Theological ethics is wont to regard as its basis the inner ethics, which occupies itself with the individual.[1] It considers the inward healing, purifying, strengthening of the individual, especially in the religious sphere; and so accordingly ascetics, which usually forms no part of philosophical ethics, occupies an important place in it. Philosophical ethics directs itself rather to the worldly side of morality, to what is wrought, to social relations, possibly also to the consideration of moral conduct towards one's self. So far as the individual is taken into view, philosophical ethics pays little attention to the religious element in the moral nature of man, and in general to the moral inclination towards God; all the more, on the contrary, it lays stress on the natural moral power, on self-imposed laws, and on the fulfilling of the law. Natural reason is here commonly made the *source* of ethical knowledge, being assumed to be everywhere essentially the same. Natural reason does not exact of its pupils that they first pass through a moral and religious process, but taking for granted that men understand and assent, it addresses itself without any further concern to the general rational constitution. Logically connected with this is the fact that philosophy is wont to take less account of wickedness, and therefore also of the atonement. It can therefore be said, in this respect, that theological ethics sharpens the moral conscience of philosophical ethics, taking the place of ascetics in relation to it; as, on the other hand, it can be said that philosophical ethics sharpens the logical conscience of theological ethics. They support each other by their close connection.

[1] Cf. Frank, *System der Christl. Sittlichkeit*, i. § 5, p. 49 sq.

But the nature of the case also forbids the direct identification of theological and philosophical ethics, although this has been attempted on both sides. On the philosophical side, it has been said that the ethical subject-matter is the same, since there is only one kind of morality; look away from the breadth and fulness of the historical additions in theological morals, strip away this positive element which belongs merely to the form of presenting Christianity, and then, it is said, we see that the remaining ethical kernel of theological ethics is the same as is peculiar also to philosophical, only that the latter adheres to a stricter scientific form. But as for the strictness of the demands of science, theological ethics, if duly regardful of itself, will not consent to be left behind the philosophical, as Rothe's *Theologische Ethik*, 2nd edition, evinces with especial force. And then as to the historical element in Christianity, this is not merely an idle scholarly addition to it, or a form of presenting it, and has not merely the importance of external authority. It is itself of ideal and real ethical significance, and is an essential factor in making morality actual in humanity; above all is this true of the person of the ethical Mediator. An ethics which should conclude its system without Christ would fail to preserve the very kernel of that which in Christianity lays claim to be ethics.

Nevertheless not philosophers merely, but theologians also, have assumed an essential identity between Christian and philosophical or even natural morals. In the last century it was a favourite mode of speech, that there is properly no strife except about dogmatic points; that in the ethical sphere Illuminism and Christian theology are essentially at one; that both advocate the highest interests of humanity. It must be acknowledged that the ethical element in Christianity is in certain respects more easily grasped than the dogmatical, that it commends itself more readily to the universal reason, which is pleased with what is praiseworthy and of good report, and what the natural man inwardly approves. Finally, too, Christian faith is conscious that it represents the true universal reason. Nevertheless it cannot be granted that natural and Christian ethics are identical. The most important difference is that the former never gets essentially beyond the Ought, the moral requirement. Christianity affirms that

it carries in itself the real, operative principle of virtue; and it has evinced this in a history of many centuries, in which it has in part worked out, in part begun, a regeneration of mankind. Christian ethics has its life in the Divine Spirit, the source of the second, the perfect creation; likewise also Christianity discloses to faith a pure higher world of fellowship, the kingdom of God, in which heavenly forces have incorporated themselves into the world of created beings. This has the more significance, inasmuch as Christian ethics makes the kingdom of God proceed from the continual overcoming of sin, of guilt, and of error, and makes earnest work of the conflict with them; whereas philosophy likes to look away from this night-side of human life, but is therefore accustomed to move in an abstract and unreal realm.

This relation to sin, which is essential to Christian ethics, involves, as a consequence, that Redemption, the historical person of the ethical Mediator, is an integral factor of Christian ethics; nothing but love to God transformed into love to Christ is true Christian love. This historical element is indeed a new element, whose place cannot be supplied by *à priori* thinking, but is yet not on that account a merely accidental thing, outward and empirical, and unattainable by the rational being. For reason, rather, Christianity exists; to reason it directs itself. The inward experience which faith brings is clothed with the consciousness of inward truth. The new historical element, as it is not contrary to reason, must also not be beyond reason; to faith it is the eternal and abiding revelation of eternal truth and reality. But, it is true, this union of the natural man with Christianity is possible only by means of a religious attitude of mind. The self-surrender that faith makes leads to an assimilation of Christianity on the part of the reason, which is made for Christianity. By faith reason is not suspended, but freed from error and sin, and led on towards perfection. The same Paul who says that the gospel is to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks seeking after wisdom a foolishness, adds that it is nevertheless in itself a foolishness of God which is wiser than men, yea, the power of God and the wisdom of God.[1]

[1] Cf. my *System of Christian Doctrine*, Pisteology, i. pp. 33–168.

5. And now, summing up the foregoing, we can define exactly the relation of Christian ethics both to natural and to philosophical ethics. As to the relation between the first two, identity can at all events not be affirmed; that would imply that the second creation is to be derived from the first; but this is not admissible, even if we might leave out of account the power of sin which has entered into the first creation. But all true moral perception is not thereby denied to the natural man; and when now Christianity is received in the act of faith, *the natural and the acquired Christian knowledge of morality may very well, to the mind of Christian moralists, flow together into one.* For the human reason just as truly obtains an inward certainty concerning Christianity as it possesses such a certainty concerning the natural moral cognitions; for without Christianity the general moral cognitions of men would become uncertain, since a moral ideal set up without the possibility of its being realized would for ever be a specious illusion. But because it is not necessary that the natural and the ethical, however different, should remain for ever separate, or even contrary to each other, therefore it follows, secondly, concerning the relation of Christian ethics to philosophical ethics, that they need not be opposed. As there is no necessity that theological ethics be unscientific or blind towards the first creation, *so there is also no necessity that philosophy be and remain irreligious or even non-Christian.* It is the aim of Christianity to bring the first and the second creation to a mutual recognition and understanding. By this it is meant that theological ethics must also endeavour to become veritably a science, and that philosophical ethics can attain to its perfection only by becoming Christian, and thereby embracing the whole realm of morals.

When certain modern thinkers reject natural theology, either on the ground that Christian doctrine is vitiated by it, or on the ground that there is no natural theology, they must logically reject also all natural ethics for one or the other of the above-named reasons. But to deny to the natural man all moral cognition, is opposed alike to experience and to the doctrine of the Bible. This would also leave no point of connection for a knowledge which is to be communicated from without; especially would a revelation be unable

to attain its object; and on that account this opinion is seldom heard. A more frequent notion, on the other hand, is that natural ethics and Christian ethics are two irreconcilable things. But Christianity claims the right to regard all ethical truth, wherever it may be found, as belonging to itself. The same Logos that appeared in Christ is also the prime agent in the first creation, and cannot therefore be in contradiction with Christianity. To be sure, abnormalness has entered into the first creation, and thereby a contradiction of Christian morality; but even in the man inured to what is abnormal, there still inheres a secret ethical knowledge, that is, one capable of being awakened, which condemns this abnormalness, and which can itself be enucleated. Besides this, Christian ethics, since it also embodies in itself natural ethical knowledge, can purify the latter from its morbid adulterations, while yet this influence need not be felt by the natural reason to be a foreign ordinance. If, now, the first creation belongs to Christian ethics as well as to general philosophical ethics, without there being, therefore, any necessity that these two be brought into contradiction with each other, then it must be possible for one and the same person to produce (as, *e.g.*, Schleiermacher has done) a Christian and a philosophical ethics, the latter being confined to the natural moral knowledge derived from the reason.

Now it may indeed be said that reason, which is often appealed to as to something fixed and universally the same, is, on the contrary, something very variable, subject to history and to growth, and that to this history belongs essentially also the influence of Christianity; so that the difference between Christian ethics and the ethics of natural reason threatens to become a fluctuating one. But Christian morality is wrought out through a process of redemption from sin and guilt; and this forms a distinction between it and the ethics of natural reason, which is essential, and not to be obliterated. But by this it is not denied that it is still the duty of philosophical ethics to become Christian; as, on the other hand, Christian ethics has to demand of itself that it be strictly scientific, and so at the same time the expression of the philosophic spirit. Philosophical ethics can become Christian, for the philosopher can recognise it as reasonable that he subject himself to the ethico-religious process which Christianity requires. But so, too, can Christian

ethics take on philosophic form; for by accepting Christianity the Christian gives up no whit of his rational nature, but, on the contrary, he fructifies and enriches it. The union of Christian and of philosophical ethics is therefore to be designated as the goal; but the way to this union is long, and the attaining of this goal is nothing less than the whole of the world's history.

We stand as yet in the midst of this process; and, in order that the union may become real and lasting, it is well-advised for us here not to conceal and not to multiply the differences. This does not imply that theological ethics, until this goal is reached, should not seek to have a strictly scientific or speculative character; but it does imply that both systems should have an independent position side by side, so long as philosophical ethics necessitates and demands this. Furthermore, so long as a training process to bring men to Christ is still necessary, there will be, even as seen from the Christian standpoint, a place for philosophical ethics; so far as it is true, it at least represents the law. Theological ethics should readily allow to philosophical ethics all freedom of operation, yet without prejudice to the claim that in Christianity is given absolute ethical truth; only a free inward assent has moral worth. Philosophical ethics may also commend itself to human nature which prophesies a Redeemer, although it itself becomes no prophet; and so it can serve as a guide to Christianity, being accessible to the universal consciousness of mankind. The progress of such philosophical ethics is therefore to be regarded by an intelligent theology as an advantage to Christian science. On the other hand, theological ethics must not contradict the natural moral cognitions, which on their part form a barrier against possible false conceptions of Christianity. While now both cultivate towards each other such a free independent relation, the alliance can become sincere and firm on both sides—between the first creation with its capacities and its susceptible needs, and the second creation with its fulness of life and of love.

The separation of the two involves conflict; for the non-Christian reason is still destitute of the Christian element, and opposes it, since man is inclined at every stage to treat his own mental world as a complete whole; and so it is the work

of Christian science to show that the want of the Christian element is a defect in philosophy itself, and that philosophy without Christianity cannot be rounded off into a perfect whole. On the other hand, reason, after it has been laid hold of by Christianity, is not at once so perfectly cultivated in all directions, that universal human reason cannot be partially right in opposition to it. But just by conflict, if the love of truth be not wanting, mutual approach and understanding are brought about. This love of truth on its theological side makes advance in constant regeneration of itself by taking more and more perfect possession of everything belonging to it, that is, of the whole world of the first creation. In this work theology has one of the most important levers, and one of the most efficient, even though often uncomfortable, allies, in philosophical ethics and in the opposition which it can present to every production that is not perfectly scientific.

Note.—Rothe distinguishes between philosophical and theological ethics thus: For philosophical ethics the δός μοι ποῦ στῶ is the fact of man's judgment concerning himself—*cogito ergo sum;* since man is a microcosm, all thoughts as such are included in him, and the problem is to unfold the fact of self-consciousness into an exhaustive intellectual system. Theological ethics, on the other hand, has as its point of departure the theistic sense, or the *ego* as religious, and requires that the *ego* clearly understanding itself should know itself as under the control of God, from the idea of whom as the starting-point it then operates. But, we may reply, the philosopher also can take as his starting-point the theistic sense, inasmuch as religion belongs to the rational nature of man in general, and so of the philosopher also. Spinoza and other philosophers illustrate this; but the product even in this case does not on that account become Christian ethics; and conversely a Christian ethics as such can take as its starting-point self-consciousness, and, if this is defined in a Christian sense, can construct a system which is really theological, but which, according to Rothe, must be called philosophical. Therefore we say, rather, philosophy also, it is true, can turn to account the general theistic sense which inheres in reason, and can, though it usually indeed does not, produce a religious ethics. But Christian or theological ethics is not possible merely through the general theistic sense, but only through that sense as modified by Christianity. It is only the Christian idea of God from which, as its premise, a Christian system of

ethics can take its starting-point. This idea of God is disclosed first in Christianity, because the holy love which constitutes the Christian idea of God becomes truly manifest only through the deed of love; the apprehension of God as love, however, is faith. But although faith is designed for all, yet not all men have faith. If the philosopher embraces it, he loses nothing of that which is special to him; but he enlarges his circle of vision and enriches his mental possession; for the gospel is fitted and designed to become the possession of the rational mind, although only through an ethical process. But if the philosopher does not embrace faith, then he has, of course, only his natural *ego* and the general theistic sense; no one can forbid his seeing how far he can get on with these. But at the same time he has no right to say that only his wisdom is philosophical, and that there is no Christian philosophy. By such an assertion he would, as, *e.g.*, H. Ritter's celebrated work on Christian Philosophy shows, involuntarily restrict and impoverish the realm of philosophy itself. Therefore we repeat, philosophical ethics and Christian ethics are not essentially different in form, for both can be speculative; also, not in their substance as such, as though the philosopher were necessarily not a Christian; but only the empirical character of the philosophy of a given time makes the separation of the two necessary. So long, however, as they are separated, a twofold method is possible for each: either to start from human consciousness (philosophical ethics from human consciousness in general, Christian ethics from consciousness as modified by Christianity), or from the idea of God, either the general idea or the distinctively Christian idea.

Editor's note.—At this point the author in his lectures was accustomed to give a survey of the history of ethics, but in the manuscript which he had dictated for the press he omitted it. [The titles, etc., in square brackets and some minor alterations have been added by the *translator*. The parts in quotation marks are taken from notes of the *author*. For the remainder the *editor* is responsible.—Tr.]

Works on the History of Ethics.—Schleiermacher, *Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre.* Neander, *Ueber das Verhältniss der hellenischen Ethik zur christlichen* (*Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, edited by Jacobi, 1851). *Geschichte der christlichen Ethik*, 1864. De Wette, *Sittenlehre* (vol. ii. Abtheilung 2, *Lehrbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre*), 1833. Stäudlin, *Geschichte der Moralphilosophie*, 1823. L. von Henning, *Die Principien der Ethik in historischer Entwickelung*, 1825. Wuttke, *Handbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre*, 1861, vol. i. pp. 21–299. [*Christian Ethics*, translated by J. P. Lacroix,

Edinburgh and New York 1873, vol. i.] Wehrenpfennig, *Die Verschiedenheit der ethischen Principien bei den Hellenen*, 1856. Maurice, *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*. Vol. i. *Ancient Philosophy*, new ed. 1872. Ritter, *Geschichte der Philosophie*. [In English: *The History of Ancient Philosophy*, translated by A. J. W. Morrison, Oxford 1838.] Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*. [In English: *A History of Greek Philosophy*, translated by S. F. Alleyne, London 1881.] Erdmann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*. Brandis, *Handbuch der Geschichte der griechisch-römischen Philosophie*. Max Müller, *Essays*, 1869 [original English: *Chips from a German Workshop*], vol. ii. [G. H. Lewes, *History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte*, 5th ed. 1880.] Strümpell, *Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (2nd Abtheilung: *Die praktische Philosophie*, 1854). I. H. Fichte, *System der Ethik*, 1850, 1851. Vol. i. is historical. Paul Janet, *Histoire de la philosophie morale et politique dans l'antiquité et les temps modernes*. James Mackintosh, *Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy* [4th ed. by Whewell, 1872]. W. Whewell, *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*, 1862. Feuerlein, *Die philosophische Sittenlehre in ihren geschichtlichen Hauptformen*, 2nd Theil, 1856–59. Leopold Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*, 2 vols. 1862. Theobald Ziegler, *Geschichte der Ethik*, vol. i. 1881. Vorländer, *Geschichte der philosophischen Moral- Rechts- und Staatslehre der Franzosen und Engländer*. Cuno Fischer, *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, 3rd ed. 1878–84. Windelband, *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, 2 vols. 1878–80. Jodl, *Geschichte der Ethik der neueren Philosophie*, 1882. Eucken, *Geschichte und Kritik der Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart*, 1878. Harms, *Philosophie seit Kant*, 1879. *Die Formen der Ethik*, 1878. E. von Hartmann, *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins*, 1879. *Geschichte des Pessimismus*, 1884. I. A. Dorner, art. *Ethik* in Herzog's *Real-encyklopädie*.

Gottfried Arnold, *Erste Liebe, d. i. wahre Abbildung der ersten Christen*, 1696. Cf. Neander's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 1823 sq. Jean Barbeyrat, *Traité de la morale des Pères de l'église*, 1712. Ceillier, *Apologie de la morale des Pères*, 1718. Stäudlin, *Geschichte der Sittenlehre Jesu*, 4 vols. 1799–1823. *Geschichte der Lehre von der Sittlichkeit der Schauspiele, vom Eid, Gebet, Gewissen*. Marheinecke, *Allg. Geschichte der Moral in den der Reformation vorangehenden Zeiten*. Feuerlein, *Die Sittenlehre des Christenthums in ihren geschichtlichen Hauptformen*, 1855. Alex. Schweizer, *Geschichte der reformirten Ethik*. (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1850.) Gass, *Zur Geschichte der Ethik*, in Brieger's *Zeitschrift*, i. ii. *Optimismus und Pessimismus*, 1876. *Die Mystik des Nicol. Cabasilas*. *Geschichte der christlichen Ethik*, i. 1881.

H. J. Bestmann, *Geschichte der christlichen Sitte*, 1880. Niedner in his *Kirchengeschichte*, § 81, 106, 120–126, 150, 179, 193. From the Reformation on § 213, 249, 251, 254. Also Rothe, *Vorlesungen über Kirchengeschichte*, ed. Weingarten.

MONOGRAPHS.—Hildebrand, *Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie*, vol. i., describing classical antiquity. Jul. Walter, *Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft in der griechischen Philosophie*, Jena 1874. Zeller, *Vorträge und Abhandlungen*, vol. i. (*Pythagoras, Der Platonische Staat.*). Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*, 1868.—On Heraclitus: Bernays, *Heraclitea. Heraklitische Studien* in the *Rheinische Museum*, new series, vii. 90–116. Lassalle, *Die Philosophie Heraklit des Dunkeln von Ephesus*, 1858. Schuster, *Heraklit von Ephesus.* Schleiermacher, *Werke*, iii. 2. Heyder, *Ethices Pythagoreæ vindicia.* Lortzing, *Die ethischen Fragmente Demokrit's.* Friedrich Lübker, *Die sophokleische Theologie und Ethik*, 1851–55. *Beiträge zur Ethik und Theologie des Euripides*, 1863. Harpf, *Die Ethik des Protagoras*, 1884.—On Socrates: Schleiermacher, iii. 2. 287 sq. Brandis, *Rheinisches Museum*, i. 188, ii. 85. Also Luzac, Wiggers, Delbrück, Dissen, v. Lasaulx. [Jan Luzac, *Lectiones Atticæ, De Δικαιοπολία Socratis dissertatio*, 1809. *Oratio de Socrate cive*, 1796. Gustav Fr. Wiggers, *Sokrates als Mensch, Bürger, und Philosoph*, 2nd ed. 1811. Part of it in English: *A Life of Socrates*, translated from the German by W. Smith, London 1840. (In same vol. *Life of Socrates*, by Diogenes Laertius, in Greek, and Schleiermacher, *On the Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher*, translated by C. Thirlwall.) Fr. Fer. Delbrück, *Sokrates, Betrachtungen und Untersuchungen*, Cologne 1819. Ludolf Georg Dissen, *De philosophia morali in Xenophontis de Socrate commentariis tradita*, Göttingen 1812. Ernst v. Lasaulx, *Des Sokrates, Leben, Lehre, und Tod*, etc., Munich 1857.] Siebeck, *Ueber Sokrates Verhältniss zur Sophistik*, 1873.—On Plato: Schleiermacher's translation, with introductions. [In English: The *Apology of Socrates*, the *Crito*, and part of the *Phædo*, with Schleiermacher's introductions, and his essay *On the Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher*, 1863.] Also translation by Müller, with introductions by Steinhart. Köppen, *Politik nach platonischen Grundsätzen*, 1818. *Rechtslehre*, 1819. Van Heusde, *Initia philosophiæ Platonicæ*, 1827–31. Bonitz, *Platonische Studien*, 2nd ed. 1875. Carl F. Hermann, *Vindiciarum Platonicarum Libelli Duo*, 1840. *Die historischen Elemente des platonischen Staatsideals*, 1849. *Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie*, 1839. Also Susemihl, Munk, Krohn, and others. [Franz Susemihl, *Prodromus platonischer Forschungen*, Göttingen 1852. *Die genetische Entwickelung der platonischen Philosophie*, Leipzig 1855–60. Ed. Munk, *Die natürliche Ord-*

nung der platonischen Schriften, Berlin 1857. August Krohn, *Die platonische Frage*, Halle 1878. *Studien zur sokratisch-platonischen Literatur*, Halle 1876.] Baur, *Das Christliche des Platonismus, oder Sokrates und Christus.* (Edited by Zeller: *drei Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der alten Philosophie*, 1876.) Stuhr, *Vom Staatsleben nach platonischen, aristotelischen, und christlichen Grundsätzen*, 1850. Kretzschmar, *Der Kampf des Plato um religiöse und sittliche Principien des Staatslebens*, 1852. Grundey, *De Platonis principiis ethicis*, 1865. Justi, *Die ästhetischen Elemente in der platonischen Philosophie*, 1860. Von Stein, *Geschichte des Platonismus.* Michelis, *Die Philosophie Plato's*, 2 vols. 1859–60. Teichmüller, *Die Reihenfolge der platonischen Dialoge*, 1879. Wildauer, *Die Psychologie des Willens bei Sokrates, Plato, Aristoteles*, 1879. [English works: W. Whewell, *The Platonic Dialogues for English Readers* (Cambridge 1859–61). *The Dialogues of Plato*, translated, with analyses, etc., by B. Jowett, 5 vols. Oxford 1875. *The Republic of Plato*, translated by J. L. Davies and D. J. Vaughan, 3rd ed. Cambridge 1866. *Plato and the other Companions of Sokrates*, by George Grote, 3 vols. 2nd ed. London 1867.]—On Aristotle: Schleiermacher, *Ueber die ethischen Werke des Aristoteles*, Werke, iii. 3. 306 sq. *Ueber die griechischen Scholien zur Nikom. Ethik*, iii. 2. 309 sq. Adolf Stahr, *Aristotelia*, 1830–32. Brandis, *Ueber die Schicksale der aristotelischen Bücher* (*Rhein. Mus.* i. 236 sq.). Spengel, *Ueber die unter dem Namen des Aristoteles erhaltenen ethischen Schriften* (*Abh. der bair. Akad. der Wissensch.* 1841, vol. iii.). Bernays, *Aristoteles' Politik übersetzt*, 1872. Biese, *Die Philosophie des Aristoteles.* Bonitz, *Aristotelische Studien. Wörterbuch zu Aristoteles.* Trendelenburg, *Herbart's praktische Philosophie und die Ethik der Alten*, in the *Abhandlungen der Berliner Akad.* 1856. Also, *Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie*, vol. ii. iii. (*Der Widerstreit zwischen Kant und Aristoteles in der Ethik*, vol. iii. p. 171 sq. *Zur aristotelischen Ethik*, vol. iii. p. 399 sq., vol. ii. p. 352 sq. *Nothwendigkeit und Freiheit in der griechischen Philosophie*, vol. ii. p. 112 sq.). Sir A. Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle* [Greek, with copious English notes and essays, 4th ed. London 1885]. Hartenstein, *Historisch-philosophische Abhandlungen: Ueber den wissenschaftlichen Werth der Ethik des Aristoteles*, p. 340 sq. Matthies, *Die platonische und die aristotelische Staatsidee*, 1848. J. Lommatzsch, *Quomodo Plato et Arist. religionis ac reipublicæ principia conjunxerint*, 1863. Teichmüller, *Aristotelische Forschungen*, 2 vols. 1867–69. *Die Einheit der aristotelischen Eudämonie. Bulletin de la classe de sc. historique de l'Académie des sc. de Petersbourg*, xvi. 1859. *Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe*, 1879. (Heft 3, *Die praktische Vernunft bei Aristoteles.*)

Ueberweg, *Ueber das Aristotelische, Kantische, Herbartische Moralprincip.* (Fichte's *Zeitschrift,* vol. xxiv. 1854, p. 71 sq.) Eucken, *Ueber die Methode und Grundlagen der Ethik des Aristoteles,* 1870. A. C. Bradley, *Staatslehre des Aristoteles,* transl. by Immelmann, 1884. [The original: *Aristotle's Conception of the State,* 1880.] Hildebrand, *Die Stellung des Aristoteles zum Determinismus und Indeterminismus,* 1884. W. M. Hatch, *Moral Philosophy of Aristotle,* 1879. Bernays, *Theophrast's Schrift über die Frömmigkeit.* [English Works: *The Nic. Ethics of Aristotle,* mainly from the text of Bekker, translated by D. P. Chase, 4th ed. Oxford 1877. Also a translation by F. H. Peters, London 1881. *The Politics of Aristotle,* translated, with introductions, notes, and indices, by B. Jowett, 1885. *The Politics of Aristotle,* translated by J. E. C. Welldon, London 1883. *Aristotle,* by Geo. Grote, edited by Alex. Bain and C. G. Robertson, 2nd ed. London 1880.]—On the Stoic Philosophy: M. Heinze, *Stoicorum de affectibus doctrina,* 1861. Diehl, *Zur Ethik des Stoikers Zeno,* Programm, 1877. Baur, *Seneca und Paulus, das Verhältniss des Stoicismus zum Christenthum* (edited by Zeller: *Drei Abhandlungen,* etc., 1876). Waldstein, *Einfluss des Stoicismus auf die älteste christliche Lehrbildung* (*Studien und Kritiken,* 1880, iv.). Weygoldt, *Philosophie der Stoa,* 1883. [*Seneca's Works,* translated by Thomas Lodge, London 1614. *Seneca's Morals by way of Abstract,* by R. L'Estrange, London 1793; Hartford, Conn., 1807. F. W. Farrar, *Seekers after God,* Sunday Library, vol. iii. London 1868. Bishop Lightfoot, Essay on *St. Paul and Seneca* (in *Commentary on Epistle to the Philippians*). W. T. Jackson, *Seneca and Kant,* Dayton O. 1881. W. W. Capes, *Stoicism,* London 1880.]—On Epicurus: Guyau, *La Morale d'Epicure.* Gompertz, *Neue Bruchstücke Epikur's, besonders über die Willensfrage* (*Akademie der Wissenschaften,* Vienna 1876, No. 5). Von Gizycki, *Ueber das Leben und die Moralphilosophie des Epikur,* 1880. Heinze, *Eudämonismus in der griechischen Philosophie,* 1883. [*Epicurus's Morals,* faithfully Englished by Walter Charleton, London 1670. Also a translation by J. Digby, newly edited by J. Tela, London 1822. W. Wallace, *Epicureanism,* London 1880.]—On Plutarch: Möller, *Die Religion Plutarch's,* 1881. O. Gréard, *La morale de Plutarque.* Volkmann, *Leben, Schriften, und Philosophie des Plutarch von Chäronea,* 2nd ed. 1872. W. Mueller, *Ethices Plotinianæ lineamenta,* 1867. [*Plutarch's Morals,* translated from the Greek by several hands; corrected and revised by W. W. Goodwin, with an introduction by R. W. Emerson, Boston 1870. *Hellenica: A Collection of Essays on Greek Poetry, Philosophy, History, and Religion,* edited by Evelyn Abbott, London

1880. Diogenes Laertius, *The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*, translated by C. D. Yonge, London 1853.]—On Philo's Ethics: Wolff, *Philos. Monatshefte*, Bd. xv. [*Works of Philo Judæus*, translated by C. D. Yonge, Bohn's Eccl. Library, 1854–55.]—On Old Testament Ethics: Oehler, *Theologie des alten Testaments*, 2nd ed. 1882. [In English: *Theology of the Old Testament*, translated by Ellen D. Smith and Sophia Taylor, 1874: T. and T. Clark.] Schultz, *Alttestamentliche Theologie*, 2nd ed. 1879. Jarrel, *Old Testament Ethics*, 2nd ed. 1883.—Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*, 3 vols. Keim, *Rom und das Christenthum*, ed. Ziegler, 1881.

Thoma, *Geschichte der christlichen Sittenlehre in der Zeit des neuen Testaments*, 1879. Ernesti, *Die Ethik des Apostel Paulus*, 3rd ed. 1880. Weitzsäcker, *Die Anfänge christlicher Sitte* (*Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* 1876, Heft 1). Zöckler, *Kritische Geschichte der Askese*. Uhlhorn, *Die christliche Liebesthätigkeit*, 2 vols. [2nd ed. 1884. Vol. i. translated by S. Taylor, *Christian Charity in the Ancient Church*, 1883]. Huber, *Philosophie der Kirchenväter*.—On Justin: Semisch [*Justin der Märtyrer*, 1840]. Engelhardt, *Das Christenthum Justin des Märtyrers*, 1878.—On Montanism: Schwegler [*Der Montanismus und die christliche Kirche des zweiten Jahrhunderts*, 1841]. Ritschl, *Altkatholische Kirche*, 2nd ed. 1857. Belck [*Geschichte des Montanismus*], 1883. Bonwetsch [*Gesch. des Montanismus*], 1882.—E. R. Redepenning, *Origenes*, 1841. Mehlhorn, *Origenes' Lehre von der Freiheit*, in Brieger's *Zeitschrift für historische Theologie*, vol. ii. Fr. Jul. Winter, *Ethik des Clemens von Alexandrien*, 1882. Th. Förster, *Ambrosius*, Halle 1884. A. Dorner, *Augustin*, pp. 295 sq., 308 sq., 323 sq. Reuter, *Geschichte der Aufklärung im Mittelalter*. Werner, *Alcuin und sein Jahrhundert*. Baur, *Die christliche Kirche im Mittelalter*. Plitt, *Der heilige Bernard, Anschauungen vom christlichen Leben*, in Niedner's *Zeitschrift*, 1862, p. 194 sq. C. August Hase, *Franz von Assisi*, 1856. [Sir James Stephen, *St. Francis of Assisi*, in *Essays in Eccl. Biography*, vol. i. 4th ed. 1860.] Rémusat, *Abälard*. Braun, *De P. Abœlardi Ethica*. Deutsch, *Abälard*. Bittcher, *Die Schriften, der philosophische Standpunkt, und die Moral des P. Abälard* (*Zeitschrift für historische Theologie*, 1870). Werner, *Thomas von Aquin*. [R. B. Vaughan, *The Life and Labours of S. Thomas of Aquin*, 1871–72.] Jourdain, *La Philosophie de Thomas*. Rietter, *Die Moral des heiligen Thomas*. Baumann, *Die Staatslehre des Thomas*, 1873. *Die klassische Moral des Katholicismus* (*Philosophische Monatshefte*, xv. p. 449 sq.). On Thomas Aquinas's theory of virtue: Neander in the *Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, edited by Jacobi, 1851. On Duns Scotus: A. Dorner in Herzog's *Realencyclopädie*, 2nd ed.

Ullmann, *Reformatoren vor der Reformation.* [In English: *Reformers before the Reformation*, translated by R. Menzies, T. & T. Clark, 1855.] Lechler, *Johann von Wiclif*, 1873. [In English: *John Wycliffe and his English Precursors*, translated by P. Lorimer, Rel. Tract Soc., London, new ed. 1884.] Wilhelm Preger, *Geschichte der deutschen Mystik*, 1874. Schwab, *Johann Gerson.* On Eckart: Lasson [*Meister Eckhart der Mystiker*, 1868]. Martensen [*Meister Eckart*, from the Danish, 1842, new Danish ed. 1851].—Engelhardt, *Richard von Sanct Victor und Joh. Ruysbroek.* Liebner, *Hugo von Sanct Victor.* Ritschl, *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, vol. i. 2nd ed. 1882. [In English: *A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, translated by J. S. Black, Edinburgh 1872.] *Geschichte des Pietismus*, 2 vols. Luthardt, *Die Ethik Luther's in ihren Grundzügen*, 1867. Lommatzsch, *Luther's Lehre vom ethisch-religiösen Standpunkt.* Lobstein, *Ethik Calvin's.* Herrlinger, *Die Theologie Melanchthons.* Luthardt, *Melanchthon's Arbeiten im Gebiet der Moral*, 1884.—On Thomas Venatorius: Schwarz in *Studien und Kritiken*, 1850. On Lambert Daneau: P. de Felice [*Lambert Daneau . . . . sa vie, ses ouvrages, ses lettres inédites*], 1881. Henke, *Georg Calixtus und seine Zeit*, 1853. [Abstract of the foregoing by C. M. Mead in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1865.] On the history of Pietism, cf. Nippold, *Studien und Kritiken*, 1882, p. 347 sq. Sachsse, *Ursprung und Wesen des Pietismus*, 1884.

Zeller, *Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie.* V. Cousin, *Histoire de la Philosophie morale au 18 siècle*, 1839–42. Leslie Stephen, *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, 1876. E. B. Hartung, *Grundlinien einer Ethik bei Jordano Bruno*, 1878. F. M. Heinze, *Sittenlehre des Descartes*, 1872. Sigwart, *Spinoza's kurzer Traktat von Gott, dem Menschen und dessen Glückseligkeit*, 1870. Avenarius [*Ueber die beiden ersten Phasen des spinozischen Pantheismus*], 1868. Theodor Camerer [*Die Lehre Spinoza's*, 1877]. Paul Wilhelm Schmidt [*Spinoza und Schleiermacher*], 1868. [W. H. White, *Spinoza's Ethic*, translated, London 1883.] Frederick Pollock [*Spinoza, his Life and Philosophy*, 1880. James Martineau, *A Study of Spinoza*, 2nd ed. 1883]. Mayer, *Thomas Hobbes, Darstellung und Kritik seiner philosophischen, staatsrechtlichen und kirchenpolitischen Lehren*, 1883. Winter, *Darlegung und Kritik der Locke'schen Lehre vom empirischen Ursprung der sittlichen Grundsätze*, 1884. E. Tagart, *Locke's Writings and Philosophy*, 1855. Cuno Fischer, *F. Bacon und seine Nachfolger*, 2nd ed. 1875 [Fischer's earlier work, *Franz Baco von Verulam, Die Realphilosophie und ihr Zeitalter*, 1856, was translated by J.

Oxenford under the title, *Francis Bacon of Verulam, Realistic Philosophy and its Age* (with appendices), London 1857]. E. Pfleiderer, *A. Geulinx als Hauptvertreter der okkasionalistischen Metaphysik und Ethik* [2nd ed. 1882]. Göpfert, *Geulinx ethisches System*, 1883. E. Pfleiderer, *Empirismus und Skepsis bei Hume.* Von Gizycki, *Die Ethik Hume's*, 1878. Zimmermann, *Ueber Hume's empirische Begründung der Moral*, 1884. [J. D. Morell, *Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe*, 2nd ed. 1847.] Lechler, *Geschichte des englischen Deismus*, 1841.—Reuchlin, *Geschichte von Port-Royal* [1839–44. Sir J. Stephen, *The Port-Royalists*, in *Essays in Eccl. Biogr.* vol. i.]. On the Jesuits: Pascal, *Lettres à un Provincial.* [In English: *The Provincial Letters of Blaise Pascal*, Glasgow 1851; another translation (in "The Golden Library"), London 1875; another, edited by J. de Soyres, 1880.] Perrault, *Morale des Jesuites*, 3 vols. 1667, 1702. [In English: *The Jesuits' Morals*, 1670. Sir J. Stephen: *The Founders of Jesuitism, l.c.* vol. i.] Crome, *Pragmatische Geschichte der Mönchsorden*, 1774–83, vols. ix. and x. Ellendorf, *Die Moral und Politik der Jesuiten*, 1840. Gieseler, *Kirchengeschichte*, vols. iii., and v. p. 42 sq. [In English: *A Text-book of Church History*, translated by S. Davidson, revised and completed by H. B. Smith, New York 1868.] Semisch, *Der Jesuitenorden*, 1870. Steitz, article *Jesuiten* in Herzog's *Realencyclopädie.* Also Wagenmann in Palmer's *Pädagogische Encyclopädie.* A. Keller, *Die Moraltheologie des Pater Gury*, 2nd ed. 1869. Harless, *Jesuitenspiegel.* [Stewart Rose, *Ignatius Loyola and the Early Jesuits*, London 1871. W. C. Cartwright, *The Jesuits, their Constitution and Teaching*, London 1876.]—Heppe, *Geschichte der quietistischen Mystik.* Thomas Fowler, *Shaftesbury and Hutcheson*, 1882. Von Gizycki, *Die Philosophie Shaftesbury's*, 1876.—On the Scottish School: M'Cosh, *The Scottish Philosophy*, 1875.—On Leibnitz: Trendelenburg, *Beiträge*, vol. ii. p. 188 sq. Zimmermann, *Das Rechtsprincip bei Leibnitz*, 1852. Pichler, *Die Theol. des Leibnitz*, 1869. Caspari [*Leibnitz' Philosophie beleuchtet vom Gesichtspunkt der physikalischen Grundbegriffe von Kraft und Stoff*], 1870. E. Pfleiderer [*G. W. Leibnitz als Patriot, Staatsmann und Bildungsträger*, etc.], 1870.—On his Optimism: G. Jellinek [*Die Weltanschauungen Leibnitz und Schopenhauer's, ihre Gründe und ihre Berechtigung*], 1872. Engler, [*Darstellung u. Kritik d. Leibnitzischen Optimismus*], 1883. Léon Ollé-Laprune, *La philosophie de Malebranche.* Rosenkranz, *Diderot's Leben und Werke*, 1866.—On Voltaire: Strauss [*Voltaire, sechs Vorträge*, 3rd ed. 1872.] Bungener [*Voltaire et son Temps*, 1851. In English: *Voltaire and his Times*, Edinburgh 1854]. — Zeller, *Ueber das Kantische Moralprincip und den*

Gegensatz formaler und materialer Moralprincipien, 1879. (*Vorträge*, vol. iii. 1884, p. 156 sq.) Meurer, *Das Verhältniss der Kantischen und Schiller'schen Ethik*, 1880. A. Dorner, *Ueber die Principien der Kantischen Ethik*, 1875. Lehmann, *Ueber Kant's Princip der Ethik und Schopenhauer's Beurtheilung derselben*, 1880. Robert Adamson [*On the Philosophy of Kant*], German trans. by Schaarschmidt. Cantoni, *Emanuele Kant*, vol. ii. *La philosophia Pratica*.—On Fichte: Harms, *Abhandlungen zur systematischen Philosophie*, p. 277 sq. A. Lasson [*Fichte im Verhältniss zur Kirche und Staat*, 1863].—On Schleiermacher: Hartenstein, *Die Principien der Schl. Philosophie*. Schaller [*Vorlesungen über Schleiermacher*, 1844]. Strauss [*Der Christus des Glaubens und der Jesus der Geschichte, eine Kritik des Schleiermacher'schen Lebens Jesu*, 1865]. Weissenborn [*Vorlesungen über Schleiermacher's Dialektik und Dogmatik*, 1847]. Schenkel [*F. Schleiermacher, ein Lebens- und Charakterbild*, 1868]. Twesten, *Einleitung zur philosophischen Ethik*, 1841, and *Zur Erinnerung an Schleiermacher*, 1869. Vorländer, *Schl.'s Sittenlehre, ausführlich dargestellt und beurtheilt*, 1851. Dilthey, *Das Leben Schl.* vol. i. Bender, *Theologie Schl.* 1878. [Runze, *Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre in ihrer Abhängigkeit von seiner Philosophie*, etc., 1877.]

Modern moralists: "From Kant's school emanated: The Rationalistic moralists, Johann Wilhelm Schmid [*Ueber den Geist der Sittenlehre Jesu und seiner Apostel*, 1790] and Carl Christian Erhard Schmid [*Versuch einer Moralphilosophie*, 1802] and Krug, *Lehrbuch der christl. Sitte*. The Supernaturalistic moralists: Stäudlin [*Philosophische und biblische Moral*, 1805], von Ammon [*Handbuch der christl. Sittenlehre*], in three volumes, full of anecdotes, 1823–29, and Vogel, with a leaning towards Jacobi [Henrich Vogel, *Die Philosophie des Lebens der Natur gegenüber den bisherigen speculativen und Naturphilosophien*, 1845].—Opponents of Kant: Reinhard, *Die christliche Moral*, 5 vols. 1788–1815, containing much ethical material with fine moral judgment, following Wolff's doctrine of perfection. Also von Flatt [*Briefe über den moralischen Erkenntnissgrund der Religion überhaupt, und besonders in Beziehung auf die kantische Philosophie*, 1789. *Vorlesungen über christliche Moral*, 1823]. Berger [*Die Sittenlehre des neuen Testaments* (Theil 4 of his *Einleitung in das N. T.*), 1797–1800]. Representatives of the Jacobi-Fries school: De Wette, *Sittenlehre*, 4 vols. 1819–23, Küster, Baumgarten-Crusius" [*Lehrbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre*, 1826].

From the school of Hegel, who in his *Rechtsphilosophie* also treated of ethics, proceeded: "Daub, *Christliche Moral*, 3 vols.

1840–41. Marheineke, *System der christlichen Moral*, 1847. Somewhat more of Schleiermacher's influence is seen in Wirth, *System der Ethik*, 2 vols. 1841. Martensen, *Grundriss des Systems der Moralphilosophie*, 1841. H. Merz, *System der christl. Sittenlehre in seiner Gestaltung nach den Grundsätzen des Protestantismus im Gegensatze zum Katholicismus*, 1841."

"To Schleiermacher's school belong: Rütenick, who compiled a popular work on Christian ethics [*Der christliche Glaube*, Theil 2 also with the title, *Sittenlehre*], 2nd ed. 1841. Wyss, *Vorlesungen über das höchste Gut.* Gelzer, *Die Religion im Leben oder die christliche Sittenlehre*, 1839. Jäger, *Die Grundbegriffe der christlichen Sittenlehre*, 1856, has made some just strictures upon Schleiermacher.—Nitzsch in his system unites dogmatics and ethics from the Biblical, as Sartorius (*Die h. Liebe*, 3rd ed.) from the Lutheran, point of view. [Nitzsch, *System der christlichen Lehre.* In English: *System of Ch. Doct.*, trans. from the 5th German ed. by R. Montgomery and J. Hennen, Edinburgh 1849. Sartorius, *Die Lehre von der heiligen Liebe*, 4th ed. 1861. In English: *The Doctrine of Divine Love*, trans. by S. Taylor, 1884.] Schwarz, too, a friend of Schleiermacher, treated Evangelical Ethics as a branch of the general doctrine of the kingdom of God." [Schwarz, *Handbuch der evangelisch-christlichen Ethik*, 1821; 2nd ed. with the title, *Die Sittenlehre des evang. Christenthums als Wissenschaft*, 1830.]

"Bruch, *Lehrbuch der christl. Sittenlehre*, 1829–32.—Of Neander's school: Böhmer, *System des christlichen Lebens nach seiner Bejahung, Verneinung, Wiederherstellung wissensch. dargestellt.* From the Lutheran point of view, besides Sartorius: Harless, *Christl. Ethik*, 1842 [7th ed. 1875. In English: *System of Christian Ethics*, trans. by A. W. Morrison and W. Findlay, 1868], condensed in form and rich in thought, but confined to too narrow limits (freedom not treated particularly; in the sphere of objective things only the preservation of saving grace is taken into view). Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 2. p. 263. He makes ethics the delineation of the essence of Christian conduct, *i.e.* he views morality from the point of view of moral *exercise.* The *genesis* of the moral disposition is not treated, but only the manifestation of the Christian possession of the disposition, in virtues and in *communities* [Hofmann's *Theologische Ethik* was published in 1878. Ed.]. Wuttke, *Handbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre*, 1861, 2 vols. [In English: *Christian Ethics*, New York, Nelson & Phillips, 1873], makes large use of Rothe and Schleiermacher, but makes little acknowledgment of his obligation. Vilmar's *Theologische Moral*, 1871, is good in its delineation of sins and vices and their ramifications. Bernhard Wendt, *Kirchliche*

Ethik vom Standpunkt der christlichen Freiheit. The title of the second part is: *Das Reich Gottes und das Reich der Welt*, 1865. Cullmann, *Die christliche Ethik*, 2 vols. 1864–66, treats ethics from a theosophic standpoint. Alex. von Oettingen, *Moralstatistik*, of which the second part constitutes a *Christliche Sittenlehre*, 1873, 3rd ed. 1882, outlines a system of social ethics. He occupies himself with the important problem, how human freedom can be harmonized with statistics. His solution is, that man's freedom is by nature dependent on the race, and that the power of sin preponderates, being subject to a course fixed by law. Christianity alone breaks through the natural law of sin. The co-working of the race and of the weak freedom which existed before Christianity explains, he thinks, the statistical regularity of the manifestations of sin in the domain of nature. Martensen, *Die christliche Ethik*, Allgemeiner Theil, 3rd ed. (Specieller Theil, *Die individuelle und die sociale Ethik*), 1878 [cf. my notice in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1878. Ed.]. [In English: *Christian Ethics*, translated from the original Danish by C. Spence, 1873; *Christian Ethics*, translated from the German by W. Affleck, 1881, both published by T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh.] Chr. Fr. Schmid, *Christliche Sittenlehre*, edited by Heller, 1861, is one of the best works, especially thorough in laying the foundations. [In English: *General Principles of Christian Ethics*, first part of Schmid's work trans. and abridged by W. J. Mann, Phil. 1872.] Rothe, *Theologische Ethik*, 3 vols. 1845–48, 2nd ed. 1867, 2 vols. (Holtzmann added to the two volumes of the new edition [prepared by Rothe himself] the remainder according to the first edition); he is since Schleiermacher the most original moralist." J. P. Lange, *Grundriss der christl. Ethik*, 1878. Hermann Weiss, *Die christl. Idee des Guten*, 1877. O. Pfleiderer, *Grundriss der Glaubens- und Sittenlehre*, 2nd ed. 1882. H. L. J. Heppe, *Christl. Ethik*, edited by Kuhnert, 1882 [published at the same time, with the historical section omitted, under the title, *Christliche Sittenlehre*]. J. T. Beck, *Vorlesungen über christl. Ethik*, 1883, 2 vols. ed. Lindenmeyer. Frank, *System der christl. Sittlichkeit*, vol. i. 1884.

"Modern philosophical moralists: Stahl, *Die Philosophie des Rechts*, in 2 vols. 2nd ed. 1845, theologically deduced, but unsatisfactory in its treatment of principles. Hartenstein, *Die Grundbegriffe der ethischen Wissenschaften* (Herbartian), 1844. Chalybäus, *System der speculativen Ethik*, 2 vols. 1850. After his statement of principles (phenomenology of ethics), he treats of eudæmonology, the doctrine of right, and religious ethics. Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik*, 1860 [2nd ed. 1868]. I. H. Fichte, *System der Ethik*, 2 vols. 1850–53.

Calderwood, *Handbook of Moral Philosophy*, 1872 [7th ed. 1881]. A. Leitch, *Ethics of Theism: a Criticism and its Vindication*, Edin. 1868."—Schuppe, *Grundzüge der Ethik und Rechtsphilosophie*, 1881. Seydel, *Ethik oder Wissenschaft vom Sein Sollenden* (disciple of Weisse), 1874. Von Hartmann, *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins*, 1879. Baumann, *Handbuch der Moral, nebst einem Abriss der Rechtsphilosophie*, 1879. H. Lotze, *Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie*, 1882 [2nd ed. 1884. In English: *Outlines of Practical Philosophy*, translated and edited by Prof. G. T. Ladd, Boston 1885]. Bergmann, *Ueber das Richtige, Erörterung der ethischen Grundfragen*, 1883. Flügel, *Probleme der Philosophie und ihre Lösungen*, 2nd Theil, 1876. Ziller, *Allgemeine philosophische Ethik* (Herbartian), 1880.—Works treating ethics from the standpoint of empiricism: Von Gizycki, *Grundzüge der Moral*, 1883. Herbert Spencer, *Thatsachen der Ethik*, translated into German by Vetter [Orig. English: *The Data of Ethics*], 1879. Carneri, *Grundlegung der Ethik*, 1881. Leslie Stephen, *The Science of Ethics*, 1882. Guyot, *La Morale*, 1883.

Catholic moralists: "In the 18th and 19th centuries the ethics of Catholic as well as Protestant writers was shaped by the philosophical systems. Following Wolff's philosophy there were: Stadler [*Moralische Grundsätze*, 1791] and Schwarzhüber [*System der christlichen Sittenlehre*, 1794]. Following Kant: Hermes [*Einleitung in die christkatholische Theologie*, 1819], Braun, Vogelsang [*Lehrbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre*, 1834–39], Elvenich [*Die Moralphilosophie*, 1833]. Following Fichte: Geishüttner [*Theologische Moral*, 1805]. Following Schelling: Cajetan von Weiller [*Tugend die höchste Kunst*, 1816]. Thoughtful, moderate, and pious are the works of Michael Sailer (*Handbuch der christlichen Moral*, 1834), Hirscher, *Christliche Moral*, 1851. More strictly Catholic, yet not Jesuitic, but Thomistic, is Werner's *System der christlichen Ethik*, in 3 vols. 1850–53."—Stapf, *Christliche Moral*, 1841. Schwane, *Spezielle Moraltheologie*, 1878. Linsemann, *Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie*, 1878 (influenced by Möhler). E. Müller, *Theologia moralis*, 4th ed. 1883. Lehmkuhl, *Theologia moralis*, vols. i. ii. 1884. Gury, *Casus conscientiæ*, 1881. *Compendium theologiæ moralis*, 1881 (Jesuitic).

[The following additional English and American works on ethics may also be named; but no attempt is made to give a list complete either in number or in analysis.

Hugo Grotius, *De jure belli ac pacis libri tres* (1625, later ed. 1751), in Latin with abridged translation, 3 vols., and in English alone, 1 vol., *Grotius on the Rights of War and Peace*, by W. Whewell (Cambridge 1853). Francis Bacon, *Advancement of*

Learning (1605). Do. with Bacon's *Essays* (in Beeton's *Books for all Time*, 1874). Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651, reprinted, Oxford 1881). *Moral and Political Works* (1750). *English Works*, ed. by Sir Wm. Molesworth (1839–45). *Opera Philosophica*, ed. by Molesworth (1839–45). Ralph Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* (1st. ed. 1678), with a treatise on *Eternal and Immutable Morality*, and with Mosheim's notes and dissertations translated by J. Harrison (London 1845). *The Ethical Works of Ralph Cudworth: a Treatise on Free Will*, edited by J. Allen (London 1838). Henry More, *Enchiridion Ethicum, præcipua Moralis Philosophiæ rudimenta complectens* (1669, new ed. 1695). Richard Cumberland, *De Legibus Naturæ* (1672). *A Philosophical Inquiry into the Laws of Nature* (1750). John Locke, *Essay on the Human Understanding* (1690, 32nd ed. 1860. New ed. World Library of Standard Works, Ward, Lock, & Co., London 1881). Samuel Clarke, *A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God* (London 1705, 8th ed. 1732). *A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion* (London 1706, in Watson's collection of Theol. Tracts, 1791). Shaftesbury, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (1711, 5th ed. 1773. New ed. by W. M. Hatch, London 1870). Bernard de Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices Public Benefits* (1714, 9th ed. 1755, Edinburgh 1772). William Wollaston, *The Religion of Nature Delineated* (1725, 8th ed. 1759). Joseph Butler, *The Analogy of Religion*, etc. (1736. Numerous editions have been published, of which may be mentioned that of the Religious Tract Society, London 1881, edited by J. Angus, which also includes fifteen of Butler's sermons). Bishop Butler's *Ethical Discourses*, prepared as a text-book in Moral Philosophy by Dr. Whewell, edited by J. C. Passmore (Philadelphia 1855. Both these include Butler's *Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue*). George Berkeley, *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1734). New edition with prolegomena and annotations by C. P. Krauth (Philadelphia 1874). Francis Hutcheson, *A System of Moral Philosophy* (1755). David Hartley, *Observations on Man* (1749, 5th ed. 1810, London). David Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature* 1739. *The Philosophical Works of David Hume*, edited by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose (London 1874). Richard Price, *A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals* (1758, 3rd ed. 1787). Adam Smith, *Theory of the Moral Sentiments* (1759, 12th ed. 1809). *Works*, edited, with a life of the author, by Dugald Stewart (London 1812). *Essays, Philosophical and Literary* (World Library, etc., London 1880). Joseph Priestley, *The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated* (London 1777). *Disquisitions relating to Matter and*

Spirit (including the foregoing, 2nd ed. Birmingham 1782). *Works*, edited by J. T. Rutt (London 1817–31). Jonathan Edwards, *Two Dissertations*: I. *Concerning the End for which God created the World;* II. *The Nature of True Virtue* (Boston 1765, Edinburgh 1788). On *Freedom of Will* (Boston 1754). *Works* (London 1817, Edinb. vols. ix. x. 1847, New York 1879). William Paley, *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (1785). *The Moral Philosophy of Paley*, with notes and dissertations by Bain (1852, Chambers's Instructive and Entertaining Library). Paley's *Moral Philosophy*, with annotations by Richard Whately (London 1859). Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (London 1789, new ed. 1823, Oxford 1876). Thomas Reid, *Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind* (1788). *Works*, edited, with notes, dissertations, etc., by Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh 1846–63). Dugald Stewart, *The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man* (Edinburgh 1828). *Works*, edited by Sir W. Hamilton (1854–58). Thomas Brown, *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* (1820). Do. with *Lectures on Ethics*, and preface by T. Chalmers (20th ed. London 1860). James Mill, *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* (1829). Do. with notes by A. Bain, A. Findlater, and G. Grote; edited by J. S. Mill (London 1869). S. T. Coleridge, *The Friend* (1812). Do. new edition, revised by D. Coleridge (London 1863). *Aids to Reflection* (1825). Do. edited by D. Coleridge (7th ed. 1854). Do. edited by T. Fenby (London 1873). *Works*, edited by W. G. T. Shedd (New York 1853, reprinted 1884). Jouffroy, *Introduction to Ethics*, translated from the French by W. H. Channing (Boston 1838). Francis Wayland, *Elements of Moral Science* (1835, 95th thousand, Boston 1868). Jonathan Dymond, *Essays on the Principles of Morality* (London 1829, 4th ed. 1842 and 1851). Ralph Wardlaw, *Christian Ethics* (London 1833, 5th ed. 1852). William Whewell, *The Elements of Morality* (1845, 4th ed. Cambridge 1854). L. P. Hickok, *A System of Moral Science* (Schenectady 1853). Do. revised with the co-operation of J. H. Seelye (Boston 1880). Joseph Haven, *Moral Philosophy* (Boston 1859). Archibald Alexander, *Outlines of Moral Science* (New York 1852, new ed. 1876). Mark Hopkins, *Lectures on Moral Science* (Lowell Institute Lectures, Boston; New York 1862, new ed. 1870). *The Law of Love, and Love as a Law* (New York 1869, revised ed. 1881). John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism* (London 1863 2nd ed. 1864). *Dissertations and Discussions* (particularly on *Bentham*, vol. i., and *Dr. Whewell on Moral Philosophy*, vol. ii. London 1859). E. H. Gillett, *God in Human Thought* (New York 1874). *The Moral System* (New York 1874). Alexander Bain, *Mental and Moral*

Science (London 1868, 3rd ed. 1872). *The Emotions and the Will* (1859, 3rd ed. 1875). F. D. Maurice, *The Conscience: Lectures on Casuistry* (London 1868, 2nd ed. 1872). Henry Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics* (London 1874, 3rd ed. 1884). J. H. Fairchild, *Moral Philosophy; or, the Science of Obligation* (New York 1869). C. G. Finney, *Systematic Theology*, particularly the part on *Moral Government* (Oberlin, Ohio 1878, edited by J. H. Fairchild). Kant's *Theory of Ethics*, translated by T. K. Abbott (1873). Third edition under the title, *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, and other Works on the Theory of Ethics* (London 1883). T. R. Birks, *Supernatural Revelation; or, First Principles of Moral Theology* (London 1879). E. G. Robinson, *The Relations of Moral Law to Science and to Religion* (Boston 1881). Stanley Leathes, *The Foundations of Morality*, being *Discourses on the Ten Commandments* (London 1882). F. Pollock, *Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics* (London 1882). T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics* (Oxford 1883). Wm. Arthur, *Difference between Physical and Moral Law* (Fernley Lecture, London 1883). Paul Janet, *Theory of Morals*, translated by Mary Chapman (New York, C. Scribner's Sons, 1883). James Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory* (London 1885). Noah Porter, *Elements of Moral Science* (New York, C. Scribner's Sons, 1885). *Kant's Ethics* (Chicago 1886).

Historical: Robert Blakey, *History of Moral Science* (2nd ed. 1836, Edinburgh). W. E. H. Lecky, *History of European Morals* (1869, 3rd ed. 1877). Henry Sidgwick, article on *Ethics* in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 9th ed. Also *Outlines of the History of Ethics* (London 1886). John Stuart Blackie, *Four Phases of Morals: Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, Utilitarianism* (Edinburgh 1871).

On Biblical morals: C. A. Row, *The Moral Teaching of the New Testament* (London 1872). J. A. Hessey, *Moral Difficulties connected with the Bible* (Boyle Lectures, 1871). J. W. Haley, *Examination of Alleged Discrepancies of the Bible* (Andover, Mass. 3rd ed. 1876). J. H. Jellett, *An Examination of some of the Moral Difficulties of the Old Testament* (Dublin 1867). Newman Smyth, *The Morality of the Old Testament* (1887).]

§ 4. *Method.*

The immediate source of knowledge for Christian ethics is the mind enlightened by Christianity; standing, therefore, in inward accord with the Bible, and regulating itself by it; educated, moreover, by the Church and by the history of the moral sentiments of the Church. The material

given by this source of knowledge is to be brought into systematic form, in which the classification shall correspond to the divisions of the subject as objectively presented.

1. It was recognised originally that the Christian, through the Holy Spirit, has in himself an independent source of ethical knowledge in harmony with the doctrine of Christ and the apostles, which was at first transmitted orally. Yet this did not involve a sharp definition of its limits as over against non-Christian teachings of philosophy or morals, and especially did not secure it against spiritualistic extravagances such as showed themselves in Gnosticism and the beginnings of a self-mortifying asceticism. The fixing of the canon and, in connection with it, the organization of the Church in episcopal and synodal form put a check upon caprice, it is true, but only too quickly was Christianity transformed within the Church into a *nova lex*, a new sort of legal religion. This degeneration increased after the synods arrogated to themselves, with reference to both dogmatics and ethics, a right of legislation under divine authority; and the hierarchy in the Middle Ages ruled the consciences and the moral conceptions of men by means of the confessional.

By the *Reformation* immediate access to the Bible, yes, to God Himself, even without a mature ethical knowledge, was restored, and the Christian conscience reinstated in its rights. Yet frequently a new legal position was taken, the principle of faith not being sufficiently used as a means of promoting ethical knowledge; and therefore individual assurance of the intrinsic truth of the things recommended by Biblical authority was too little cultivated. Furthermore, the principle of the Reformation at first spread its clear light predominantly only upon the inward, personal side of ethics. The relation to the worldly side remained still fluctuating and unsatisfactorily defined, since rather only the getting and keeping of salvation through faith and sanctification was looked at as one's ethical duty. On the other hand, the duty was neglected of leavening the whole world of the first creation with the Christian spirit, and thereby building up a temple in mankind which comprehends every department of

morals: the individual, marriage and the family, social, civil, and political life, art, science, and the Church. The view of things became broader and freer by means of the philosophical movement beginning with Kant, which, to be sure, at first hostilely opposed Christian ethics as well as dogmatics, but turned again, especially through Schleiermacher's influence, towards religion and Christianity. More recently theological ethics recognises, as a source of ethical knowledge, Christian experience or faith, and the Bible, *i.e.* the material and the formal aspects of the evangelical principle.

2. That universal human reason by itself cannot be a source of knowledge for Christian morality, is plain from what has been already said of the relation between natural and Christian ethics. On the other hand, however, ethics is no historical science; it is neither a part of Biblical theology nor of symbolics, but a positive science, and as such has for its province to set forth Christianity as the truth, and to show the grounds of it. Therefore no merely external authority, however venerable, can be the *immediate* source of knowledge for it; not the Holy Scriptures, still less the Church. The material given by the Church and by the sacred Scriptures must first be appropriated spiritually, *i.e.* in faith, before it can be systematically stated. Christianity requires that men come to a knowledge of its truth through faith (John viii. 31, 32), and so to a union of reason and of Christianity, which is, to be sure, at first of an ethico-religious sort, but which must be capable of being developed into scientific certainty. Just in the department of ethics it is of especial importance to hold faithfully to the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit, who gives personal knowledge, because otherwise even the sacred Scriptures could not be rightly understood. This is shown in Church history by the numerous errors whose origin is due to a literal instead of a spiritual apprehension, *e.g.* of the Sermon on the Mount. Furthermore, to that Christian good which it is the part of morality to attain belongs also the implanting of a moral knowledge and judgment of one's own (Heb. v. 14; Rom. xii. 2); for the ethical is willed perfectly only when it is willed as that which is in itself good, because willed by God. But, in order to this, one must use his own knowledge as the light of the will. Wisdom is a part of the actualized

Christian good itself. Suppose an external authority enjoined the right and the good; still if one did not recognise it as what is in itself good and divine, then, at best, he would come to a legal obedience; but this is not as yet that which is good in the Christian sense.

3. Nevertheless in theological ethics the Bible has a radically important place; it is to the Christian an authority, —not merely an outward one, however, but an inward one. He is inwardly bound to it by the bond of reverential love. He finds in it, in the circle of the apostles and prophets, his spiritual home, his vital element; for faith itself, born of the word and the Spirit, is an espousal with the sacred Scriptures, which, through the Holy Ghost, become again living in man. Moreover, faith is no finished thing, so that, if only it once exist, it always continues of itself according to the law of inertia, as it were; rather, it continues only by means of perpetual reproduction, in daily self-renewal, by use of the same means which served to originate it. Then, too, it is an unfinished thing in the further sense, that it is as yet continually imperfect, and is in need of growth, which is effected by more and more incorporating into one's fibre the contents of the Scriptures. The original, objective Christianity, as it lies before us in the canon and is to be set forth by Biblical theology, as the science of the contents of the canon, remains at every stage the *norm*, which must not be contradicted by that which wishes to pass for Christian morality. On the other hand, since ethics, like every science, is a progressive one, it is only natural that the ethical contents of Scripture, which Biblical theology presents historically, should at a given period not be exhausted by our knowledge; and so also that the same ethical idea, later, in other relations, should have to seek another form of expression than at the outset.

To the Old Testament belongs an authority mediated and conditioned by the New. If ethics includes the *origin* of morality, and does not merely presuppose that origin, then the Old Testament, the Law and the Prophets, acquires a permanent significance; for it indicates negatively and positively the normal progress towards Christian morality, partly, to be sure, in national Israelitish form. But in this very respect two things are noteworthy. On the one hand, it is

a divinely purposed *limitation* of the Old Testament, that religion clothed in national form is in the theocracy intimately interwoven with the State, from which limitation the catholicity of Christianity would hold itself free. But, on the other hand, there is in the Old Testament also something already made actual, which in the New forms a problem to be solved only gradually, namely, a *national life shaped by the principle of religion.* In this respect there is in the Old Testament something typical, something which in Christianity could not at the outset exist. The Old Testament, in this respect, has yet to await a resurrection in transfigured Christian form. Especially, too, the history of the Old Testament, as well as the law, contains in this relation a wealth of guiding suggestions. For the rest, it is indeed to be said that nothing in the Old Testament could stand unmodified in the New, that everything, even the Decalogue, has in the New Testament a new sort of validity (Matt. ix. 16; Heb. xii. 26; cf. Hag. ii. 7). On the other hand, it should be said that of the revelation in the Old Testament nothing is lost, but that in Christianity it has no termination other than its completion or its fulfilment.

4. In the *Church*, so far as it is led by the Holy Spirit, we see the developments of the morality of primeval canonical Christianity, not without many aberrations (as we know indeed), so that the Church can no more serve as an immediate source of knowledge for ethics than for dogmatics. But an enlightened faith, in harmony with the sacred Scriptures, and governed by them, serves as the critical element over against ecclesiastical morality, and is able to make Christian morality secure. With this restriction the other side must also be taken into view. In Christendom there is an evolution of Christianity; the Church possesses wisdom and works of wisdom which it is essential as a means of culture to contemplate. As dogmatics must not disregard the work of framing doctrines which has been accomplished by the Church, and act as though before now nothing had been done, so, too, ethical knowledge is a common work of the Church; and every moralist who enters upon it, should be exempt from the fancy that he is to begin from the very commencement. For every one who wishes to take part, as a

member, in this history of the evolution of the truths of the Church must be simply a member. But further, ethics in general, as well as its single departments, has a variable side, and we must work for the present time. To the present duty one is equal only in case he knows what already exists of the kingdom of God, and what does not. Isolation from the social life of the Church would engender eccentricities, which through intercourse with others would be worn off. In general, ethics, even more than dogmatics, has immediate reference to society. This necessary relation of ethics to the Church implies, finally, that theological ethics cannot overlook the difference of confessions, especially between the Evangelical and the Roman Catholic. The doctrine already laid down concerning the source of knowledge, and concerning authority and law, places us on the Protestant side; but no less also does the ethical subject-matter.

THE SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

—o—

§ 5. *Syllabus.*

The fundamental objective knowledge contained in the faith of a mind enlightened through Christianity is, primarily, knowledge of God, and is consequently of a dogmatic character; but as knowledge of the *ethical* God, or of the aboriginally moral Being, it is at the same time the source of the true knowledge of morality in the world, which forms the proper subject of ethics. From the ethical God, as He is made known to faith by the whole system of the facts of revelation, morality in the world, and therefore also Christian ethics, has its scientific point of departure. Now in order to get a knowledge of Christian morality, it is needful, *first*, to present everything that serves theoretically and practically to establish it; and, *secondly*, to set forth how Christian morality has been unfolded, or has branched out into the kingdom of Christian good. Hence Christian ethics, as derived from the idea of God, is divided in the following way:—

A. Starting-point: The ethical idea of God as found in the enlightened Christian spirit. (Lemmas borrowed from Dogmatics.)

B. Topical Arrangement of the System.

I. Foundation; or the divinely-ordained ideal and real *prerequisites* for the realization of the ethical end for which the world was made, *i.e.* of the kingdom of God; and the

GRADUATE UNIVERSITY

process by which a moral world comes into being. [Things presupposed in *Christian* morality.—Ed.]

II. The development of Christian morality into the wealth of good which is found in Christianity, or in the kingdom of God. Special ethics. The world of Christian good.

1. If it be acknowledged that we are called upon to recognise the intrinsic truth and necessity of Christian morality, then the system of ethics must be connected with the Christian idea of God. This may seem unnecessary, if one has in view Schleiermacher's *Christliche Sitte*, or the psychological method which is so common, and which especially suits a widespread taste of the times. Schleiermacher treats the subject in a purely descriptive way; he aims to portray the existing ethico-Christian world, its excellences, its virtuous forces, its conduct. What he calls the expansive action of man also exhibits, it is true, the conquest of the world by the Holy Spirit; but the history of mankind, as it is raised from elementary beginnings, through the stage of law, up to the stage of Christian morality, is not portrayed. As contrasted with a merely imperative legal form of ethics, the descriptive has certainly the advantage that it indicates that morality does not exist merely in the form of obligation, but, since Christ's time, also in the form of reality. But if ethics is to be not merely an empirical or historical science, if it seeks rather to answer the longing of the conscious Christian mind to apprehend the intrinsic truth and necessity of moral good, then we cannot stop with a merely descriptive form of ethics. Furthermore, Schleiermacher does not depict the origin of Christian morality and the regeneration of the individual, but only presupposes them. We, too, in our treatment of ethics, assume Christian faith as already existent; but we assume this in such a way that the very task is put upon us of learning how this faith in form and substance is justified.

The psychological method may seem, now, to accomplish this end, in that it describes the moral constitution, freedom, and conscience, and the normal development of that constitution, and yet in doing this at the same time proceeds genetically. Yet merely seeing the genesis of a thing does not involve seeing its intrinsic truth and necessity; this becomes possible

only by connecting it with the Christian idea of God. To be sure, a man with a Christian moral sense has a feeling of the truth of Christian morality; he has an immediate inward certainty of it; still, this is not objective scientific certainty, but rests rather only on subjective feeling.

2. Necessity of connecting the ethical system with the Christian idea of God. If it be recognised as the aim of the moralist scientifically to apprehend the intrinsic truth and necessity of the ethical principles of Christianity, then the ethical system must be appended to dogmatics, or, more precisely, to the doctrine of God and His revelations. It is true, faith involves consciousness of the world and of self no less than consciousness of God; and hence it might be supposed that ethical and dogmatical truth are co-ordinate, and that it would be equally admissible to derive the dogmatical from the ethical as its foundation. But God is beyond doubt the supreme source of morality in general, although as a matter of fact the moral sense may apprehend self before it apprehends God. The moral sense would even be insecure and without basis, if ethical truth had its ultimate foundation only in the fact that conscience, especially the Christian conscience, feels something to be true, and has an inward immediate conviction of its own about it. Indispensable as this individual inward apprehension of morality is, as a way or means to objective moral knowledge, yet this purely psychological procedure would plainly not be suited to the nature of the subject. For by such a representation our conscience, and in general our moral knowledge, would be made to be that in which the idea of good in general, as well as that of Christian good, has its ultimate ground; whereas the order must rather be reversed. For either the ethical idea has no objective basis, but only a subjective one, or the ethical idea is objective, as every Christian assumes it to be; and in that case conscience, even the Christian conscience, rests on it. But ethical knowledge not grounded in objective ethical truth would, when confronted, *e.g.*, by unbelief or materialism, come to suspect itself of being only a subjective fancy, even though shared by many.

Those who would stop short with laying a merely psychological foundation of morality neglect the scientific duty of inquiring after the objective reality which forms the principle

of moral being and knowledge. They give to that which is not the *principium essendi*, but only the subjective *principium cognoscendi*, a position as if it were at the same time the ultimate principle,—a confounding of things which leads to a false autonomy. The Christian's subjective moral sense, joined with conscience, forms only the point of mediation which the ethical idea that is in God posits for itself in order to give subjective certainty of itself, viz. of the objective idea, as objective. The very nature of conscience vouches for this. For conscience is not a knowledge of a free positing of moral law through the absolute autonomy of the individual; but it is a knowledge that one is bound to a spiritual power not posited by us, which, even without our knowledge or existence, would have right, worth, and truth in itself. Because the moral knowledge in the conscience and Christian consciousness is knowledge of something objective, and knows too that this something is objective, it is not merely subjective knowledge, but subjective *and* objective. But this directs us to the idea of God as the source of ethics. For morality in general does not first come into existence through thought; but, on the contrary, it is recognised by reason through a necessity which is antecedent to all subjective activity,—a necessity, moreover, which we have not made, but which lays hold of us so soon as we come to specifically human consciousness. Since this is so, we must go back to the cause which created this being of ours, constituted and acting as it does; which cause must be recognised also as the ultimate cause of our moral knowledge; that is, we must go back to God. This going back to God harmonizes also with what has been previously said of the relation between dogmatics and ethics (§ 1). Proceeding from dogmatics, ethics branches off into a department by itself. Although, therefore, ethics does not have to furnish its own doctrine of God, it must yet be derived in an introductory way from the specifically-Christian idea of God, which is disclosed to faith by means of the world of revelation, and is brought to systematic statement in dogmatics.

3. *Synopsis.* This starting-point being now presupposed, the ethical system is to be divided into a *fundamental* and a *constructive* part.

The *First Part* has to do with the world of the first

creation, but with this in its connection with the idea of God's moral aim for the world, as disclosed in the Christian revelation. To Christian ethics belongs the consideration of the first creation, because this is regarded by Christianity as the work of the same agent, the Logos, whose personal appearance is Jesus Christ. In it the Logos has His pre-existence; it was arranged from the beginning with reference to the moral purpose of the world; and the Logos created it with a view to the second creation for which it is to be the basis. This fundamental part has to consider the totality of the things presupposed in an ethical world, that is, the whole arrangement of the world made with reference to morality as the world's goal. It has to consider the preparatory stages of perfect morality and its factors. It has three divisions.

The *First Division* treats of the *natural* world, of man physically and mentally, also of nature around him, of the order of the world as created by God, irrespective of the moral process itself properly so called. (Sphere of Eudæmony.)

The *Second Division* treats of the order of the world, so far as through it there is made possible a moral process, and therewith through human agency a second higher creation on the basis of the first. The world bears in itself an ideal purpose, and is therefore endowed with conscience and freedom. This ideal purpose is the law for the action of the moral forces.[1]

The *Third Division* delineates the practical end aimed at in the moral process, or the ideal cosmos towards whose realization the world is advancing by means of the moral process. The realization of this end is made possible, in spite of sin, by the God-man who forms a part of the plan of the actual world.[2]

[1] [This Division treats, therefore, of the *formal* conditions of the ethical process: of the objective law of God, of the subjective law or conscience, and of freedom.—Ed.]

[2] [This Division describes the law in its contents: first, the practical goal itself, as it is fixed in God's order of the world; at the same time, however, by means of that goal the way to it is also fixed. Hence this division considers, in addition, the *moral stages* leading to the goal; the stage of law, the imperfection of this stage, both apart from sin and on the assumption of its reality; and, finally, the stage of love, which, without the God-man, can neither be conceived nor realized, and which, therefore, before Christianity, was only an ideal, a requirement.—Ed.]

The *Second Part* will exhibit the *Christian* moral world as an organism, with its various members, in which law, virtue, the highest good, have become united and blended, and become so more and more. The starting-point of this Part is with the actual God-man Jesus Christ, who in His true manhood presents the law in living form, and who is personal virtue, and who for this very reason becomes also the prime source of the realization of the end for which the world was made, that is, of the kingdom of God. This Part next describes, in its origin, its continuance, and its activity, the human personality restored to the image of God. Finally, it treats of the ethico-Christian world as divided into the several moral communities which, taken together, constitute the kingdom of God.

4. By this arrangement we obtain ethics as a collateral department for dogmatics, and thus secure for ethics a firmer structure. For, following the dogmatic starting-point, *i.e.* Theology strictly so called, which treats of God's ethical nature, we obtain an ethical Cosmology and Anthropology, Ponerology, Christology, and an ethical doctrine of the kingdom of God as the ultimate ethical goal (ethical Eschatology).

The end for which God created the world is not an impotent thought, but an earnest one, incessantly striving to become actual in the world; for which reason it cannot be thwarted by actual sin, which is to be treated of in ethical ponerology. Accordingly it is to be shown that, conformably to the eternal divine idea of the world, *i.e.* conformably to God's moral purpose for the world, the original thought of love proceeding from divine wisdom is, on account of sin, accomplished only in the following way: The divine-human power which belongs to the divine idea of humanity, and which has appeared in Jesus Christ, evinces itself as a restoring and atoning power. This power inheres in the Son of man, who is Son of God, and is applied by him for the benefit of our race; and by this means He builds up His kingdom in the individuals who are appropriated by Him, and who appropriate Him to themselves. This kingdom we are then to consider according to its divisions in detail, showing how it is no longer merely a Platonic ideal, an imperative possibility or law, but a real power in the present time in

which we stand, and an object of Christian knowledge; though a reservation must be made of eschatology, which views the idea of the kingdom as needing to be transformed into reality by means of an ethical process.

5. The classification here given is adapted to the ethical material. It has long been recognised that morality can exist in three forms, and is not fully viewed without them all, namely, as Law, also called Duty, as Virtue, and as the highest Good, of course as the highest moral Good in the world. For the absolute Good is of course God, who, far from being a result, is rather the living prerequisite of the highest Good in the world. Now in the given classification all three conceptions find their due place, and in such a way that at the same time it is made evident how the idea of Good in the three is systematically and completely unfolded, and so, how these three taken together contain the whole.

First, the law is to be considered in itself, namely, as the moral ideal, or the Ought-to-be, for which the world exists, arranged as it is. Since this Ought stands opposed to a natural condition or fact, which does not yet correspond to the Ought, or even contradicts it, therefore through the impulse of the Ought, which has to do with the will, there is brought about a process in which morality *comes to be*. Every Should-be demands an Is; it requires, not merely single acts, but a state of being; and hence the subjective goal of the process is *virtue*. But the things which in the *process* are as yet separate and only striving to become one, seek to become, and do become, blended in the *highest good;* and just this union is the fact of morality. Law and virtue, from which the highest good in its different aspects is framed, are thus treasured up in the highest good. For the forces of virtue are themselves a part of the highest good, which maintains itself only through continual reproduction from those forces, whose vitality promotes and maintains all forms of moral good. Moreover, in virtue the law is realized. Finally, the ethical institutions, such as the family, the State, the Church, not only have the quality of being products and acts of virtue, but they are also powers objectively existent, which through their ἦθος help to produce virtue itself, and confirm the law.

But this consummation is only the result of a moral process

or of a growth; for at first this union does not exist, but the objective law or obligation, and the actual state of man with his world, still stand apart from each other. A divinely ordained natural state of the world and of man exists, to be sure, with a wealth of capacities and of susceptibilities, which constitute integral factors of the idea of the kingdom of God, and without which as prerequisites the various phases of Christian good could never be attained; but in their natural unmodified form these faculties are not yet the highest good, but only materials for it which are to be elaborated.

The *First Part* considers, therefore, the necessity of these factors, and defines, on the one hand, what by nature is, and on the other, what ought to be,—these two, each by itself. And so there come into particular consideration, first, man and his world in their natural state, which are designed to be incorporated into the highest good through an ethical process (Division 1); and next, the law, as to its form (Division 2) and its contents, *i.e.* the world's moral goal (Division 3). What ought to be and what is, law and nature, however, must not be left separate from each other; their union is absolutely required by the law and by the human constitution itself. So by means of the law comes a moral process or development, of which likewise the Third Division of the First Part has to speak. The process can indeed be disturbed by evil, but has therefore nevertheless as its fixed goal the task of uniting the obligatory and the actual, which task is consummated essentially in personal virtue.[1] The notion of virtue is the middle term which unites the obligatory and the actual; which helps the law, that hitherto is only ideal and not real, to its realization, and which on the other hand lifts up what is merely natural, and gives it an ethical character or ideality. For this reason also the true highest good, as to its principle, takes its starting-point in this notion. Therefore as the moral sense matures, the *requirement* of the law more and more concentrates itself, not in the requirement of definite things to be done or not done,—of works or pro-

[1] [Until the process reaches the *Christian* stage, it does not get beyond the antithesis of requirement and fact, and accordingly belongs still to the *legal* stage, and ends with a *requirement* which finds its fulfilment only in Christianity.—Ed.]

ducts,—but in the requirement that the whole man, this unit, be virtuous; or, more strictly speaking, since sin has entered in, in the requirement of regeneration, that is, of the union of nature and law, by means of the Divine Spirit or Christian Grace.

The *Second Part*, embracing the realm of *Christian* good, is on that very account also a presentation of the highest good. It is proper to place this at the end, since it is the highest good only as being a moral product, which presupposes the morally productive power, or virtue, the ethical δύναμις with the virtuous actions. To be sure, the ethical institutions, such as the family, the State, the Church, not only have the property of being products of virtue and of virtuous acts, but they also help to produce the virtuous force itself, and thus help to maintain the Good. Otherwise looked at, the virtuous forces are themselves a part of the highest good. Hence it appears that the Second Part is not merely the doctrine of the highest good, but, as the doctrine of the kingdom of God, is also the doctrine of the virtuous forces in individuals and in communities. When the stage of perfection or of Christian good is reached, virtue and the highest good are inwrought into each other, neither exists without the other. At that stage the law, too, has to be noticed, namely, as *something in process of fulfilment, not as mere obligation*, inasmuch as virtue is nothing else than the law itself translated into personal life, taken up into the will and the being; virtue is a transition into a new mode of existence which is required by the objective law itself. The acts of virtue also show their intimate relation to the law; for they are, and are termed, acts of duty. Thus it is clear that at the *Christian stage* these three fundamental conceptions are preserved, but they are blended together, the moral law itself requiring that they be thus blended.

If the First and the Second main Parts are taken together it is at the same time evident that our method makes possible a *genetic* presentation of the moral element and of the moral goal in the world's history, and does not stop merely with a description of the actual moral state.

In short, the *First Part* presents morality as a requirement not yet realized, as law. In order to this, however, not

merely must the moral ideal be presented, but also the way in which this moral ideal is to be realized, especially in view of the entrance of sin into the world. Since morality is designed to be realized, it must also be shown what process morality must pass through in order to be realized. This process also is included in the moral requirement. But it is peculiar to this process itself that the idea of good first comes to consciousness in the form of a requirement. Therefore we must not merely set forth the abstract ideal or the requirement, but at the same time must show how morality in the form of requirement sets the process on foot, and how it finally points beyond itself to something more than a requirement. The *Second Part*, on the other hand, presents the requirement as realized first in Christ, He being the perfectly actual and virtuous personality and germinal principle of the kingdom of God; and it depicts next Christian personality and ethical communities.

A.—STARTING-POINT OF ETHICS.

§ 6. *Connection of Morality in general with the Idea of God.*

The dogmatic source of ethics, by means of which the conception of moral good in general is scientifically gained and established, is the idea of God ethically conceived. God is the Good whose ultimate reason is in itself, or the aboriginally good Being.

Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, i. § 26, pp. 305–323.

1. In recurring, as we do in our thesis, to Christian dogmatics, particularly to the idea of God and His acts, we are only concerned, out of the many attributes of God, or objective limitations of the concept of God, to fix upon those which pertain to the scientific grounding of morality. Therefore especially the so-called physical and logical attributes of God fall for our purpose into the background. Three questions are of decisive importance with reference to the basis of morality in general. (1) Is the idea of morality a necessary idea? (2) Does an absolute reality belong to it? (3) How are the ethical features in the concept of God related to the other so-called divine attributes?

When the idea of morality is conceived, there is involved in it the conception of that which is absolutely worthy and supreme; for while things without number come to our knowledge which have worth, yet in comparison with morality everything has only a limited or subordinate worth, *e.g.* life, power, beauty, fitness, and utility. Even knowledge or intelligence, though indeed a good, yet is not superior to morality, but likewise must take towards it the attitude of servant or means. But certain as it is that morality as such is really conceived of only when it is conceived of as thus eminently unique, still this decides nothing as to the question whether

it is a necessary thought, and whether the object thought of is a reality. We ask, therefore, is this idea of moral good an absolute necessity in rational thought, or is it only a subjective, accidental fantasy? Must the reason as such conceive of the morally good, which, when conceived of, is conceived of as that which is strictly the highest, the absolutely worthy? Certainly it is possible for man not to conceive of this idea; it is possible for him not to think at all, or to be employed with only finite notions. But in either case the reason is not conducting itself as active reason; on the contrary, it may be shown that only by means of this idea is reason actual reason; for without it there would exist for man only what is finite, physical, or natural. But in this case he himself would be only a finite being; shut up to the mere world of nature, he would be perhaps the cleverest among animal beings, but not rational. Kant correctly discerned that, in relation to the natural world, morality is supernatural, a miracle. For a miracle, in the strict dogmatic sense, is constituted by every specifically higher stage, as distinguished from the lower.

It might now, however, be objected: Man himself also is a finite being; hence it cannot be said that he is not rational until he conceives of something having infinite worth, viz. that which is ethically good; rather, the pure conception of this seems to be something transcending even the powers of man. But we reply: Man's finiteness consists in his being not self-existent, but a creature of God; by no means, however, in the fact that the infinite is inaccessible to him, that he is excluded from it. By the very fact that he can be the vehicle of the infinite, he is a reasonable being. If it be asked whence the idea of moral good comes to the human mind, the answer is as follows: This idea cannot have a finite origin from nature; in nature is only finite adaptation of means to ends. But the absolute cannot be derived from the relative; that would be a reducing of the ethical to the physical, and would therefore be a denial of its characteristic essence. Just as little can the ethical idea (cf. § 5. 2) be derived from the ontology of the human mind. For, again, it is not really conceived of, if it is conceived of as a merely subjective product, as only a subjective notion. The ethical is only then conceived of when validity and worth, independent of our

thought, or even of our existence, are adjudged to the idea of it. When it is considered that the idea of morality can neither originate from nature below us, nor be a mere product of reason (since rather we become rational beings only through participation in this idea), the true doctrine must be that man as finite cannot make himself rational, but that when something infinite takes form in him, primarily in his intelligence, he becomes a rational being. The eternal ethical idea itself lets itself down into the animated dust, primarily into the consciousness; and ethical knowledge has in this very idea its origin. Considered historically, indeed, morality comes to us only through the medium of our own thought. Conscience, however, does not make a thing good; but that which is good, the ethical idea, apprehended by thought, makes our knowledge ethical knowledge. Having this ethical knowledge, we recognise ourselves, not as creative, but as bound by a higher power, by the ethical idea positing itself in us, and thus making us rational beings. On the ground of this fact, the idea of moral good is necessary for the self-developing human mind. This appears, too, especially from the fact that the ethical lies at the root of all knowledge, so that to renounce it is to renounce all knowledge. Thought results in knowledge only if it *wills* to become knowledge, *i.e.* strives to gain wisdom as a good (this being what the very word *φιλοσοφία* expresses), and has confidence that it can be attained. But in both these things lies an ethical conception: on our side, the love of truth; on the other side, the assumption of its accessibleness, communicableness, its wish, as it were, to be known, its love of being known by us. Only such thought as involves that love and this confidence, and is therefore ethical thought, can become knowledge and attain to the high quality of wisdom. Therefore without the operation of the ethical element there is no knowledge; this element belongs to the necessary conditions of the possibility of all knowledge, that is, of the rational character of man.

But if now thought, in order to correspond to its rational object, must count on an ethical element and incorporate it as an impelling factor, as love and confidence, into the cognitive process, then it must also be possible to conceive and to define the ethical as such. If this is done, the idea of

morality (*vid.* above, pp. 58, 59) is recognised as something not merely subjective, or derivable from nature and finiteness; as something not indifferent, which can come or go without affecting the rationalness of the mind; and finally, as something not merely valuable along with other things,—but as the good, the absolutely valuable. It is a thought which, if it is once conceived, cannot at pleasure be forgotten or ignored, but demands to be thought again and again,—to work on perennially, in order to communicate itself to the whole mental life. If it is once thought, it is a possession which can never again be rationally given up, but which is summoned to be omnipresent in human life; it is a factor authorized by a higher inner necessity; and to ignore it or want to forget it would be, not merely imperfection of discernment, but culpable neglect. Where the ethical idea asserts itself, there, too, is present the consciousness of the duty to remain heedful to it; this is not a physical or a logical necessity, but a sacred necessity adapted to the realm of freedom. Thus moral thought can be renounced only at the price of renouncing true rationalness, yes, all knowledge. The ethical idea, as soon as it has appeared, puts its preservation or reproduction into the care of a peculiar necessity of its own—duty, which is necessity addressed to freedom, and therefore the highest form of necessity.

2. Of this thought, now, we say that it is also to be made a part of the idea of the necessary and absolute spiritual Being, or of God. For since the ethical idea vindicates for the absolutely valuable the highest place, it must also have a necessary place in the divine intelligence. Nevertheless there still remains the question whether the ethical idea must be conceived of as also real (in itself or in God),—just as necessarily *existent* as it must be necessarily conceived. There are not wanting those who recognise the idea of morality as merely necessary to thought, but not as also necessary in reality; who conceive it only as a necessary obligation, as a law or regulation for the world. In support of their view that morality is only a necessary ideal, but no reality, they might seek to argue thus: It is a contradiction of the notion of the ethical that it should be directly connected with reality; for rather it becomes actual only by means of the will after it has been appre-

hended by cognition as a duty. A certain existence, to be sure, the law must have, at least in thought or knowledge, but this implies that it has at first no existence in the will. To this, now, is to be answered: It is indeed indisputable that morality may also take on the form of obligation which is not yet realized. With men it *must at first be duty;* and yet even this points back to a real existence of morality,—not merely to an existence in the intellect which at the same time is a non-existence in the will, but to an existence of it at least in the cause by which the rational moral consciousness is produced. For to such a cause out of itself the human reason points, reason being not posited by itself, but given to itself by the absolute cause. But that we must actually posit the real existence of morality in God, and this, too, not merely in His knowledge, but also in His will and being; that therefore morality cannot be conceived of as merely an ideal without existence, and God not as mere universal law, is shown by the following considerations.

Existence, reality, is no indifferent matter for the idea of morality, so that it would remain what it is, even whether it remains eternally deprived of existence outside of the intellect or not; as, say, for mathematical truths, *e.g.* for the laws of the triangle and its angles, or of the circle and its radii, it is indifferent whether there is a triangle or a circle in reality. For rather the characteristic feature of the idea of morality is just this, that it has essentially a tendency to existence, to become actual in existence; and the meaning of absolute obligation is just this, that for the obligatory thing a real existence is demanded. The good is the thought which seeks to move the will and sway the being. Schleiermacher justly says, that, if we thought the law of morality would remain eternally an unfulfilled although unconditional requirement, we should have to doubt its intrinsic right to make an unconditional requirement,—that absolute impotence would not consist with the right to unconditional validity. But if, now, it lies in the thought of morality in general, that it unconditionally requires for itself existence also; if there even inheres in it, as that which is absolutely most worthy, the right to rule over all reality,—then the ground of this can at all events not lie in the ethical principle itself, in case it has no reality

in God. If it is in the divine intelligence, it cannot desire to remain confined only to it. But there can also be no hostile power conceived of, whether in God or out of Him, which is able to debar morality from the existence that it desires; for then the Divine Being would no longer be a unity in itself, but would be duplex.

Since the divine intelligence must include in itself morality as something necessary, and positively requiring to be real, it follows that the doctrine of Duns Scotus also is untenable, namely, that morality, although for us obligatory, originates only from God's free absolute power (*supremum liberum arbitrium*), but that God's own essence has nothing to do with it. He thinks that it would be a limitation of the divine freedom, if God cannot command, as good, what He will. But this would be making power, this physical attribute, outrank the ethical attributes. The Scriptures say not merely, "Be ye holy," but also, "for I am holy;" not only do they speak of a divinely-given law of righteousness, but according to them God also Himself loves righteousness. He who has conceived the thought of ethical good, *e.g.* of love, cannot do otherwise than think of this good as in itself good, hence also good absolutely for every one, even for God. The view of Scotus would lead to the conclusion that there is nothing good in itself, but that although we know this, yet in our subjective way of viewing things we look upon that as good which has been commanded us, and because it has been commanded us. But behind such an appeal to the divine power or arbitrary will lurked ethical scepticism. God could at any moment without a contradiction of His nature call even evil good; His nature would be indifferent to the distinction between good and evil. Both would be outside of His sphere and would belong only to that of the world; His own nature would then be mere power, and while there would be a semblance of exalting the notion of God by putting Him above morality, He would be merely conceived of physically, *i.e.* as below morality. Moreover to man also, for whom alone there would be any morality, *conscious virtue* would be an impossibility. For virtue must choose the good, because it is good and not the opposite. But if there is nothing in itself good, then also the good cannot be chosen as such, or because it is good and not the opposite,

but only because it has been in fact commanded, of which command the Church has information. Thus it becomes manifest how Scotism, which, in order to exalt God's authority, keeps the good out of God's nature, condemns man to a merely legal status, in contradiction to John viii. 32, xv. 15. Unless the ethical is to become subordinate to the physical, it must claim admission into the very essence and being of God.

But morality has, moreover, not a merely potential existence in God.[1] For then *either* it would become actual only through the development and growth of the divine perfections, *e.g.* wisdom and love. But this would be a contradiction in God, because the eternal actuality of those *perfections which must be predicated of Him would be wanting to Him;* and this would be inconsistent with His absoluteness. Also, over a God thus conceived of, morality would have to be conceived of as a law or rule to which He would be subject and under obligation gradually to approximate. *Or*, God would have to be designated as the moral law; but this has been above already refuted. Since the good is of absolute worth and tends by its very essence to existence, then if God were not in His whole actual being absolutely *good*, as *eternally* as He *exists*, only the impotence of His will could be to blame for His being deprived of absoluteness, whether a restraining power, dualistically conceived, be outside of Him or within Him. So this position must be adhered to: not only that God knows and wills the morality which is for *us*, but that it makes a part of His very essence; and, moreover, that morality belongs to God's being as an eternal fact, although in human morality obligation must precede the real perfection. The ethical principle itself requires to take this course in the temporal world, and disclaims having immediate perfect reality in order to the existence of a world really distinct from God, and capable of a moral progress. But in God such a disclaiming of perfection is not conceivable; there is no moral growth in Him. If morality is at first not perfect as a fact in the world, so much the more must it be such in God. The idea of morality cannot have an empirical subjective origin, but points back to an origin in eternity. In God morality

[1] As Rohmer thinks, *Gott und seine Schöpfung*, 1857, and similarly Eduard von Hartmann.

has an aboriginal existence, it has a place where the actual is eternally perfect; and therefore it can become for the world obligation or law. As law, moreover, the good does not float and flit around in the universe without a vehicle or real substratum, but eternally rooted in God it seeks to spread out and to become fruitful in the world also by means of a process of growth.

3. The third point is the relation of the ethical nature of God to the other distinctions which we ascribe to Him. These are in part physical or metaphysical, as omnipresence, eternity, life, and omnipotence; in part logical, as intelligence. This question, too, is important, because the order of these attributes in God must be archetypal for man made in the image of God, and for the order of man's faculties. But there are three possibilities conceivable: either the ethical distinctions in our idea of God are *subordinate* to the non-ethical, or all the divine attributes are *co-ordinate* with one another, or finally, the ethical element in God is *superior* in rank to all the non-ethical attributes, and at the same time is to be regarded as the bond of union for all the divine attributes.

It might seem to tell in favour of the priority of the non-ethical attributes, that if God did not have first of all absolute being, life, intelligence, and so forth, we should have no vehicle for the ethical qualities, and that without this prerequisite an ethical God would be out of the question. But it is quite consistent to hold that what in one respect must be thought of as a prerequisite of morality, is yet not on that account the source or principle of morality, and must not be conceived as higher than it. The non-ethical distinctions in the nature of God are related to the ethical as means to an end; but the absolute end can lie only in morality, because it alone is of absolute worth. The ethical principle is the ultimate reason for the fact that God eternally wills Himself, or is the ground of Himself, in all His attributes.

It is probably most frequent to conceive of the divine attributes as *co-ordinate*. But in that case there would remain unlimited room for an arbitrary order; conceived of as real potencies, the attributes would be atomistically separated from one another. Where then would be their intrinsic connection with one another? where the unity of God? There

must be in God a dominant principle which embraces them all, and brings them into harmonious relation one to another, in that it makes them all relate to itself. This regulative principle is presented in morality, which alone is an ultimate end, and hence is paramount to everything else.

The only supposition remaining, then, is that all the other attributes of God are *subordinate* to the ethical. By the fact that the ethical principle, or the divine mind's absolute mode of existence, presupposes them and uses them as means, they themselves are also in their way necessary, and participate, at least mediately, in the teleological system; they have a secure place and an eternal foundation in the fact that the absolute ultimate end desires and demands them eternally for its own sake. These other attributes are thus also in a sense necessary; but ultimately they are so for the sake of the ethical in God, who, in order not to be a lifeless ethical being, but to have eternal possession of Himself as an ethically living God, eternally wills them, and through and in them all eternally asserts Himself as ethical.

Note.—Fruitful results of the foregoing for Christian ethics. If morality is that which is good in itself, and not made good only through the absolute authority of God, and if, moreover, man is made for morality, then he is also made for that which is in itself good; and the same good which is in God is such for us also, although it has only in God aboriginal existence or aseity, and the manifestation of this morality in us, who are created by God, is other than in God Himself. Furthermore, if morality occupies this predominant position, all attempts to regard it merely as a product or blossom of nature are definitively excluded. But the consequence following from the foregoing which is of especial importance concerns the relation of the divine omnipotence to human freedom. If the ethical nature of God requires a free world, omnipotence cannot hinder this; the meaning of omnipotence is not that it does, or must do, everything without exception which it can do; rather omnipotence itself is subserviently subject to the ethical nature and will of God. The above-described subordination of the other divine attributes to the ethical, is already taught in the Old Testament. While the heathen stop short with the immortal life of the gods, with their power, beauty, or intelligence, as their highest predicate, according to Prov. viii. God's power is subject to the divine wisdom, which, however, wills good ends—ends which in their ultimate reference are moral. The ethical element

itself is in the Old Testament as yet predominantly conceived of as holiness, and the power of God as the arm of this holiness or righteousness; and since man is conceived of as the image of God (Gen. i. 26, 27), in God is given also the prototype for the relative rank of the faculties of man. That the good which is valid for man is likewise the good which is valid for God, is made, still more than in the Old Testament, prominent in the New Testament, where the person of Christ in a holy human life completes the revelation, and reveals the inner character of God. The difference remains nevertheless, that God alone has absolute and also ethical self-existence; that man exists only on the ground of being created by God.

4. What has hitherto been said gives to morality, as an independent good, towering in its height and grandeur above everything else, a firm position, and that in God Himself. It is a necessary *thought* of reason as such; it is really conceived only when conceived as also *existent*, and as existent in the divine essence; yes, in this essence it is the *centre, the inmost principle*, God in the Godhead. For at the same time with it the *personality* of God is conceived of, since in an impersonal being morality cannot exist. Thus originally the good is God; and God is both that which is aboriginally good and *He who* is aboriginally good. Now, too, it may be said that morality, according to the idea of it as realized in God, is not merely one reality among others, but the power above all realities, the highest measure of all worths, therefore the reality of realities; it is that which is intrinsically fixed and eternal, of immovable permanence; and in this sense Fichte names it the "substantial." How much power and reality, what form, things other than itself shall have, ultimately depends solely on itself.

Note.—Against the proposition that God in Himself, and even irrespective of the world, is the ethical being, objection is made on the part of those who grant indeed that God is to be conceived of as ethical, but only in relation to the world. Morality, they say, requires that something else be existent; for love consists in an impartation, an act; but impartation cannot take place without a world; God can give nothing to Himself; but if God is one who imparts Himself to others, then He is not love in Himself, but only in relation to the world. So Rothe, and similarly Schleiermacher. This question can be fully answered only through a closer consideration of the nature of

morality in God and in the world; here only the following need be said in confirmation of our proposition, that morality belongs to the inmost nature of God. It cannot be in Him mere accident or caprice, that He wills to be self-imparting love; but loving impartation is not possible without a loving disposition and will, which makes the recipient its end; hence in God, independently of other existences, there is already a loving *disposition*. To be sure, *actual* impartation presupposes another being, but actual impartation is not the only form of real morality. Even without another object already existent, the inward willingness or inclination to impart—in short, the loving disposition—can already exist. The mere gift would not be at all appreciated as love, if the disposition did not put itself into the gift. Morality, therefore, cannot exist, either in God or at all, merely in the form of acts; it must have, before all else, the form of the personal power of a good and conscious will, in other words, the form of a real existence.

§ 7. *The Nature of Morality, primarily in God.*

(Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, i. § 24–27, 31*b*, 32.)

The essence of morality in God consists in an unchangeable, but also eternally-living, union of a righteous will and of a loving will, in the narrower sense of love; in other words, of divine self-assertion or self-love, and of a self-imparting and participating will. The two together and inseparably one constitute *holy love*. God is personal; He is not merely that which is aboriginally good and the absolutely highest Good, but also the aboriginally good One, who eternally wills and asserts Himself as the One that He is. But this self-love, as holy zeal for His majesty,—His ethical majesty also,—and for all which this demands in Him and out of Him, is not selfish. Rather, God in loving Himself, the aboriginal seat of goodness, also loves goodness in general, which by its own nature requires to have universal validity and sway. Since, then, God's self-love loves the good in general and as such, and not merely so far as it remains His own possession, it is not contrary, but correspondent, to His self-love, that He is also the love which

multiplies the life of love and propagates the good. By virtue of His holy love He is the absolute personality, absolutely ethical—the power and the will to be Himself while in others, and while Himself to be in others through participation and impartation.

1. In indicating the nature of morality, we cannot aim at a definition which would derive it from a higher generic notion, for there is no such higher generic notion from which it could be derived. Yet, on the other hand, we are not without an intuition, a provisional notion of it, which is capable of description. Only the ethical God is truly God, and thus is verified that saying of the Bible (1 John iv. 8), *ὁ θεὸς ἀγάπη*, which again is not a definition, but aims to express merely the highest Christian knowledge of God. The Scriptures do not say that God is the absolute, infinite being, omnipotence, or wisdom, but that He *has* in Himself power to have being and life from Himself; He has wisdom, but He *is* love. Hence love *has* self-existence, power, wisdom, and so forth. But if it be further asked, what is love? human words indeed will not suffice; they seem to us tame and bald in comparison with that which we have in the ethical intuition of love.[1] Let us consider, first, the main attempts to express its nature. But, before doing so, let us listen to those also who look upon it as absolutely incapable of being mentally conceived and comprehended, because it is, as Kant thinks, only something affectional; or something poetical indeed, but only an indistinct, though emotional, state, to which the fancy has access; or something so high that only vague feeling, but not clear thought, can grasp it. If Christian ethics, however, must find its life in the principle of love, it would at once abandon its claim to be science, by assenting to one of these judgments. Chalybæus justly says: Love is the stone which the builders (especially the philosophers) have rejected, but which is destined to become the corner-stone, since logic and metaphysics can only be perfected by means of the science of final causes.

2. There are especially three views of love, which we will consider before coming to our positive statement. It is

[1] A poet (Wolfgang Menzel) says of it: "The more thou seek'st to strip the rose of leaves, the more it seems with leaves to fill itself."

conceived of as *amor concupiscentiæ, complacentiæ,* and *benevolentiæ.*

(*a*) The *amor concupiscentiæ* seeks to supply some deficiency corresponding to which there is a desire for the lacking good, and seeks by supplying it to gain the agreeable feeling of completeness. But if another person is employed only as a means of enriching or supplementing one's self, this is possibly only a mode of seeking one's own,—a sort of selfishness; and the same would be the case if the person having the desire wished to be not a receiver, but even a giver, provided he only gave in order to rid himself of an oppressive superfluity. For then also the other person would be only a means, whereas the end would be for the giver only he himself. Plato in his *Symposion* has invented a beautiful myth concerning Eros: He makes him the child of πόρος (plenty) and of πενία (poverty). But if, on the one hand, πόρος or giving, on the other, πενία or receiving, were only selfish, then from the double selfishness, however contrasted in its manifestation, there would not as yet issue love. Where a relation of love is to be brought about, an abundance on the one side, a deficiency or an unsatisfied suceptibility on the other, may be necessary as *prerequisites.* But the prerequisite is not the thing itself; love is something which exists for its own sake, and only uses the prerequisites according to its own nature. What is, then, the love itself, which must have a place both in him to whom the wealth, and in him to whom the want belongs? It is at any rate something else than mere care for one's own interest, whether for a lower or for a higher interest. So long as it is a matter only of one's own interest, we remain confined to the natural realm, in which self-love, the being centred in one's self, holds sway, and makes self its end, and into which only adumbrations and premonitions of love fall. This mistake is avoided by the conceptions of love as *amor complacentiæ* and *benevolentiæ,* by which something other than one's own self is treated as the end and aim, and of which the first relates to the intelligence, the second to the will.

(*b*) *Amor complacentiæ.* The love of complacency, whether æsthetic or intellectual complacency, gives itself up to an object in recognition of its worth. It can pass over into the

concupiscential love which would possess the object, or also into the *amor benevolentiæ;* but as such, the *amor complacentiæ* reposes in mere contemplation of its object, and simply appreciates the intrinsic worth of the object, without letting the will, in the form of desire, participate. Of this sort is intellectual love as it appears in many forms of mysticism, and as treated by Spinoza, where the losing of one's self in contemplation and in self-surrender to God is put as the highest love. As applied to God, that style of thought would belong here which accounts for the origin of the world thus: God, absorbed in the image of the world as it stood before His mind, lost Himself in it and imparted His essence to it in a sort of falling away from Himself, or an ἔκστασις, which is described as superabounding love. But such loss of self in self-surrender could not be called real love. If the world which originated in such loss of self should also on its side have love resembling God's, then it again must lose itself in God, and so on both sides love would consist only in self-annihilation, or in an absorption of the loving one by the loved object; and this would involve the end, or self-destruction, of love. But that would just as little be love as the absorption of the object by the subject deserves the name of love.

(*c*) It sounds better, therefore, to describe *amor* as *benevolentia.* For well-wishing expresses the inclination of the one person to make the other an end, in order to cultivate with him an active operative relation of love, especially in impartation. This is not merely a contemplative giving of one's self to the other, but a practical making of one's self a means for the other,—a voluntary relation. This explains why it has become almost customary to regard the essence of love as impartation, or self-impartation. So Schleiermacher, Rothe, *et al.* Against this, now, Schöberlein urges that love is to be conceived of, not merely as impartation, but likewise also as participation in joy and sorrow; that it is not described till both together are included. Certainly in each there is an essential function of love; in participation, however, not in the sense that participating love, like the *amor concupiscentiæ,* is concerned with getting possession of the good things which belong to the other person, and with sharing with him. Loving partici-

pation, on the contrary, is, strictly speaking, a giving, an imparting of one's self to the other person in sympathy, for the sake, as it were, of continuing and enlarging his personality, which is treated as being an ultimate end. Loving participation therefore belongs properly to imparting love, and both are included in the seeking of fellowship, in self-disclosure made for others, and in devotion to them as an end.

But is now *benevolentia*, as communicative love, the adequate description of love itself? Impartation would be an act in which another being would have to be already presupposed in order that there may be love; whereas (see above, p. 67) love as an inward faculty and disposition can already exist quite irrespective of its manifestation towards the objects of the love. Otherwise God could not out of His eternal love call a non-existing world into existence. The description of morality, or love, as mere impartation, would furthermore not secure it against the conception of an unethical loss of self. For the impartation would have to be in some sort self-impartation. The bare impartation of gifts, while the *ego* holds itself back, would not amount to love. If, on the other hand, the divine love were conceived as disclosing itself, but *only* in the form of self-impartation, that would bring us back to the notion of a pantheistic self-loss of God; God would be, so to speak, selflessly dissolving goodness, and this again would be unethical. True love, therefore, must not fail to have the seriousness, sternness, and inflexibility of self-assertion, in order that it may not become selfless expansion or profusion,—in a word, become of a physical nature, like the elements, fire, light, heat, water, air, which have a natural tendency to expansion. This sternness and seriousness, however, is not expressed in *benevolentia* as such. Summarizing we say, therefore: Self-impartation and participation, by their nature closely allied to one another, stand on the one side, the side of self-disclosure or self-devotion; but these in their one-sidedness, or of themselves, would not amount to real love. Love conceived of as *amor concupiscentiæ*, however, has the opposite defect, in that it serves only the *ego*, making itself its own centre. The two taken together will help to put us on the right course.

3. *Positive statement of the nature of morality.*

The definitions already considered are directly opposed to one another. For, according to the first, love is only a seeking of one's own, a making one's self the centre and end; and this was its defect. According to the other two, love is conceived of as only devotion to something else, either in an intellectual or a practical way, this something else being the objective good or end, for which the agent is only the means; and this was their defect. This indicates that, in order rightly to understand the nature of love, these two elements must be united, and must be viewed as forming together a solid unity of blended opposites, viz. the choice of self, which we may call self-love, and an opening out to others in participation and impartation. Morality, true love, is not something merely single; there is in it a union of opposites which it brings into co-operation with each other. It is a thing by itself, a unique essence, *ens sui generis*, as much so as any other distinct species of existence. But it unites microcosmically in itself what otherwise appears only isolated, or in one-sided preponderance,—existence for one's self and existence for others. In nature, in the case of the single material forms or bodies, the ruling impulse is self-concentration, the force of gravitation, reference to self; in the case of other things, as especially light, it is expansion,—an existence, as it were, for others. Now love is a more composite thing, an infinitely higher power. It does not consist merely in acts, which are only its outward manifestation; we must also at the same time fix our eye upon its inward power and essential activity; for the manner of love is to reveal the inmost and best, to make it transparent and accessible. In morals the outward manifestation has import only when it points back to an inner source in love. Accordingly we shall indeed have to consider love in relation to its immanent law of life, and to the essential functions whereby it is what it is; but in doing this we must not resolve love merely into a kind of action, and deny to it the possession of an inward reality, a state of being, which, as a living disposition, also reveals itself in action. This is the mystery and the marvel of love, that, on the one hand, when we fix it by itself, as being in itself an inward reality, it insists on revealing itself;

for it would not be love if it did not seek to show itself. And in this aspect of it we behold, just in the depths of its inwardness, the purest propensity to the apparent opposite, to the most energetic outward manifestation. But, on the other hand, just this full revelation, into which, as it were, it has put itself, and in which it has come forth from its inwardness, points most surely back into its unfathomable depth that, even in self-manifestation, remains unexhausted, not losing, but asserting itself. Just by means of its intense outward expression we are most surely guided back into its inner depth, its pure free essence. Thus we have present at the same time both its distinctly marked manifestation in its single acts, and its fulness and depth neither circumscribed nor exhausted by these single manifestations. Both, however, are held together by love, which is the true bridge, the living bond, between the ideal and the real, between the eternal and the historical. There is no power outside of love which can imitate it in this. Of the forces of nature it may be said that they lose themselves in their manifestation; they have no inward being, no depth, even though they may have secrets still unknown; they exhaust themselves in their activity. Mind, on the other hand, as only a thinking and feeling power, has merely an existence in itself; though, as will, it has at other times only a striving to get out of itself in the direction of action or deed. In love alone is the real and most thorough blending of these opposites; in a word, it is *the power of being, at the same time, within one's self and out of one's self in another;* it unites, as it were, transcendence, or self-assertion, and immanence in the world, or self-surrender and impartation; and by the union of these two it becomes holy love. The pantheistic and the deistic conceptions of God are thus left behind. For in God self-assertion and self-devotion are absolutely united, but are not therefore identical, as we shall presently see.

4. *Distinction between self-assertion (or self-love) and self-impartation, with the inward conjunction of the two in holy love; or the distinction and the connection between righteousness and love in its stricter sense.*

The distinguishing between self-assertion and self-impartation, together with the recognition of their inner connection,

is a vital point in order to an understanding of the full conception of holy love; therefore we are first of all called upon to maintain that distinction against objections, and to establish its necessity.

a. Against distinguishing between the two there are objections raised from respectable sources. These are directed against the propriety of associating the notion of self-assertion and of self-love with that of self-impartation, while no one disputes the rightfulness of making love involve self-impartation. It is said that the love of God wills continually to become active, but that God Himself cannot be the object of His own love; that love is only conceivable as love of another; that self-love does not at all deserve the name of love. If this were correct, we could speak of love in God (as indeed is so frequently the case) only as self-imparting, but not also as righteous, love; righteousness would be no objective attribute in God, but at the most a subjective conception. The reasons urged against our position, that righteousness and love (in the narrower sense) belong essentially together in the true conception of love, yet without therefore being identical, are reducible to the suspicion that self-love must be something selfish. Hence some would have only the *world* regarded as the object of the love of God, *i.e.* of the self-imparting love, which is all that they regard as tenable; so Rothe and Schleiermacher. Others, as Sartorius, think by resorting to the idea of the Trinity to be able to avoid the notion of self-love. But if the divine distinctions or hypostases belong to the divine Being or self, and do not exist each for itself separately, but only when taken together constitute the one absolute divine Person, then the love of the triune hypostases to one another is also divine self-love; and only Tritheism, which regards the three as constituting no unity, could regard the love of the Father to the Son, for instance, as not being self-love. As to the world, however, it cannot be the primary object of God's love. It can be worthy of love only as destined for love, or because *love is worthy of love.* But why now should love be worthy of love in the world indeed, but not also in God, while yet it can be worthy of love only through its prototype, the God worthy of love, and through love to Him? If God is worthy of love *in* Himself, He is also worthy of love *for* Himself, and thus in

His self-love there is nothing to be seen except the righteousness of His love.[1] The *appearance of selfishness*, which Sartorius finds in divine self-love, would be more than a mere appearance only in case God in loving Himself thereby loved merely a particular being. But as God is distinguished personally and from everything possible and actual by His self-existence, which is, however, at the same time the ground of *universal* possibility and existence, He is also the aboriginal and necessary seat of good in general—of the *καθόλου ἀγαθόν*. With the eternal universal idea of good of which, as of all eternal truths, He is the aboriginal seat, His absolute personality has consciously and voluntarily, eternally and indissolubly, joined itself. Hence if God loves Himself, He loves not merely an individual personality, but His own unique personality, with all its potencies and attributes, all, however, as above described, in harmony with the dominant principle in Him, the ethical, and for the sake of that. He is thus in self-love not merely love to His own self, irrespective of the ethical principle, but He is at the same time *amor amoris;* He loves the ethical principle in general, both righteousness and communicative love. And thus selfishness in the divine self-love is out of the question, because in loving Himself He also loves and wills what is universal, what is in itself and necessarily good. This of course is original in Him, and must eternally fall within the circumference of His being; but to this universal ethical principle belongs likewise necessarily the self-assertion which we call righteousness. Even without self-impartation, God is love to the goodness or the holiness, which He Himself is.

If righteousness be not regarded as a particular aspect of the full conception of love, the gravest consequences result.

[1] [The argument here may perhaps be made more clear by a little expansion. God's love, Dr. Dorner argues, cannot consist merely in a going out of Himself towards another distinct object. For why should He love the world, except as it is worthy of love? And what is worthy of love except that which can exercise love? The world can be the object of divine love only in so far as it contains personal beings capable of loving God. And there can be such beings only as God creates them. Their capacity to love is the product of His capacity to love. He is the prototype, they the copy. God, therefore, cannot be conceived as loving the world unless He recognises His own capacity to love as worthy of love. Consequently self-love in God is necessarily involved and presupposed in love to the world.—Tr.]

This is the case if righteousness, even as retributive or punitive, be regarded only as one form of love, love itself being conceived of as consisting only in self-impartation and self-devotion. It is equally the case if the divine love be more consistently regarded as a force productive of that which is good, and if in righteousness nothing else is seen but the consistency and persistency of this love which aims to produce and impart good, that is, to realize the end for which the world was made. The consequence of denying that the divine justice is a particular element of God's ethical nature, would be the destruction even of ethical self-impartation, yes, of the ethical principle in general. If, that is to say, God should be conceived of as self-communicating love, but without the self-assertion which constitutes righteousness, then God would be wanting in power over Himself, and so in power to control His self-impartation according to the intrinsic susceptibility or worthiness of the object. But in that case there would remain in Him only the irresistible impulse to self-devotion which would have to operate in a physical way; and this would no longer be *voluntary love*, but God would be pouring Himself out into the world, to use Philo's figure, like an overfoaming goblet, till He had lost Himself in impartation or self-impartation. In that case, further, the freedom of the creature, the distinction between good and evil, in the world would be disregarded. Consequently such profuse goodness would tend to obliterate all distinctions of worth. We should have therefore only the heathen conception of goodness, even though this conception might conceal itself under the Christian *name* of an overflowing abundance of self-forgetful love. The New Testament speaks, indeed, of self-forgetful love, and requires that we should lose life in order to gain it (Matt. x. 39; Mark viii. 35); but that means that we ought to renounce, not our personality, but only the making of our finite selves the centre, the shutting of ourselves up against God and our neighbour. There is, therefore, a place in God for conscious ethical reference to Himself, or for self-love; and God's assertion of Himself as the absolute personal Good, this guarding of His honour, is God's immanent righteousness. Even the Old Testament conceives of God's righteousness as His self-assertion and the protection of His honour. Who-

ever would pass over justice, and emphasize the importance of love, imagining this to be the New Testament conception, unavoidably falls back below the plane of the Old Testament; there remains for him only a physical goodness of a utilitarian sort, that is, a heathen counterfeit of love.

β. The foregoing discussion serves to prove the necessity of conceiving the divine self-assertion or righteousness as a distinct thing, as a particular objective quality of the divine nature. Yet definitely as this has been shown, it may seem difficult, yes, impossible, *to maintain this separateness and distinctness as over against self-impartation* in the oneness of God's ethical nature. It might seem as if self-assertion and self-impartation would have to become one again, because each must include the other. For suppose now it should be asked, As what does God's holy love assert itself? what is the object of its self-assertion? In reply, it could not be denied that God wills and asserts Himself even as self-imparting; and *vice versa,* God wills so to impart Himself as to impart also the power of self-assertion which is in Him to living beings, although in most diverse measure. But the divine will of self-impartation has nevertheless its limits; for not everything in God is communicable; the self-existence which runs through all the forms of our conception of God belongs to Him alone; and so the very affirmation of His aseity or self-existence is a kind of self-assertion in God which is not at the same time self-impartation. The will to impart Himself does not, in God, come merely from His self-assertion; self-impartation has in God a living source of its own, which is, however, protected and cherished by the divine self-assertion. God, further, in willing and asserting Himself, wills Himself not merely as self-imparting. His self-assertion is the maintenance or preservation of all His attributes, but of these attributes as means for ethical ends. It is a maintenance both of His self-existence and of His glory and majesty—of all eternal truths, but also of righteousness, of Himself in the distinction which, to thought and in fact, exists between Him and the non-self-existent world, the creation. It is a guarding of the difference between Him and the world, even while He imparts Himself to it, and wills to be self-imparting. Agreeably to His uniqueness, God is not merely the general,

universal being, the source of everything possible and actual; He is, by virtue of His self-existence, also a particular being, distinct from everything possible and actual. But this, His particularity, does not make Him finite; for the very essence of it is that He, and He alone, is the absolute source of all other things possible and actual. According to this, it is quite possible, without confounding self-assertion, or righteousness, with self-impartation, to conceive of both together as elements of God's inner essence, so that God wills and asserts Himself even in self-impartation, and so that, in asserting Himself, He tends to impart Himself; only the self-impartation must not be so indiscriminately conceived of that thereby His self-assertion is impaired.

γ. And no less is it possible to conceive of God as *holy love, or capacity of love, even irrespective of any outward manifestation of it.* As the *capacity* of holy love, God is the actual aboriginal love, the actual Good and the highest Good. He is in Himself the absolute Good, not merely in that He is infinite fulness of life and of powers, that He is will, intelligence, and the union of all potencies in the form of personality, but also in that this His personality has eternally and absolutely grasped the ideal Good and, as it were, clothed and identified itself with it. All the divine powers stand in eternal perfection and unity by the very fact that the Good, or the love, for which they all exist, is the inner law of life in God, His conscious and chosen condition of life. By virtue of love the divine life is perfect symmetry or *eurythmia*—absolutely worthful, self-satisfied, blessed harmony, and eternal Sabbatic repose. God, as the eternally perfect, actual, *aboriginal love,* is the *blessed* God. But God's blessedness is, even irrespective of the world, not to be thought of as inactive rest, but as living reality; not as mere potency, and also not as coming to be, but as perfect reality, having command over itself, and being eternally active; in His activity He is evermore the blessed God. The first activity (*actus primus*), however, is not *a cosmical working, but inner activity,* or ethical life. For God, in so far as He is goodness, does not conceive of Himself merely as goodness fixed and perfect once for all; but the good which He is He is conscious of being, and wills consciously to be. He is not merely a physical good, but what He is

He is eternally through His will; He affirms and asserts the goodness, the holiness, which He is, and the inviolable symmetry of all His powers. So also God eternally asserts His *love* both as a *capacity* and as a *disposition*. This self-assertion is the immanent righteousness in God, which must be conceived of as not merely our subjective notion, but as an objective existence. But the loving *disposition*, the *bent* to self-impartation, is *in* God different from righteousness, although not separate from it. This bent, too, must not be indulged at the expense of self-assertion or righteousness, otherwise it would lose its ethical character. The divine self-love is the impregnable basis and the necessary pre-requisite of self-impartive love. The divine self-love, too, wills to maintain the immutable distinction between God and every possible thing outside of Him—His infinite majesty, rooted in His self-existence, which is not communicable, but is a well-spring of life, of communicable good. This self-love wills also His personality eternally distinguished from everything which He is not. The self-assertion guards the possibility of self-impartation, *but is not the source of its reality*.[1]

5. We have seen, then, that absolute self-love and self-communicative love, like two opposite poles, reciprocally and indissolubly connected, but not confounded or identified, together constitute absolute morality in God. This being so, we have now more particularly to consider the essential *self-manifestations* of the impersonated good which God is.

First, (*a*) *The self-manifestation of the divine holy self-love:* the assertion of His intrinsic honour, כָּבוֹד, δόξα, holiness, or ethical goodness absolutely maintaining itself in its absolute

[1] [The author's meaning is to this effect: 1. There must be self-love, self-assertion in God. 2. By virtue of this self-love God asserts the distinction between Himself and all other things possible, and at the same time wills to be the source of impartive love, yet so that He maintains this distinction in love itself. 3. Impartive love, which, even irrespective of the world, is in God as a *loving disposition*, is not derivable from self-love, but is a principle of its own in God. But it is also not without an element of self-love: (*a*) so far forth as God wills Himself as a loving being, wills His loving disposition; (*b*) so far forth as the loving disposition does not fail to maintain the incommunicable distinction between Him and every other possible thing. Thus in the inmost being of God there is found the union of righteousness and love as the *capacity* or *disposition* of love, as also in the actual self-impartation the loving *disposition* is the vital matter. See below, § 5 (*β*). Cf. *Syst. of Christ. Doct.* i. p. 456.—Ed.]

right.[1] This is especially prominent in the Old Testament as the zeal of God, yes, as jealousy for His honour, Ex. xix.; Isa. xlii. 8.

Before we treat of the essential functions of righteousness, it is in place, considering the difficulties in the conception of it, to premise some *historical* observations.[2] In the whole ante-Christian world, the Hebrew not excepted, justice is the leading moral conception; it even sometimes embraces all morality, according to the saying of Theognis which Aristotle quotes: "Verily justice embraces the perfect circle of virtue." And justice occupies a similar position in the Old Testament. Yet it is easy to understand that the ancients directed their attention more towards the manifestations than towards the essence of righteousness. Furthermore, a law is presupposed as a standard of what is to be regarded as just; and this law is at first conceived of in a purely empirical and positive way. Right is what the laws of the commonwealth regard as right (*νόμος τῆς πόλεως*), although they, as is known, may be even bad. Through the *Sophists* this formal definition of justice, adapting itself to accidental laws, became filled with immoral elements; for according to them, if one has only possessed himself of the highest power, which gives the laws, he can also determine what shall pass for just, and make his own advantage become the supreme law. Then might — this

[1] Cf. on this, *System of Christian Doctrine*, § 23, 24.

[2] Cf. Hildebrand, *Geschichte der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie*, vol. i. p. 123 sqq. Leopold Schmidt, *Geschichte der griechischen Ethik*, 1881. Trendelenburg, *Historische Beiträge*, iii. 399 sqq. Allihn, *De idea justi qualis fuerit apud Homerum et Hesiodum*. Ed. Platner, *Ueber die Idee der Gerechtigkeit bei Sophokles und Aeschylus*, 1858. Hirzel, *Ueber den Unterschied der δικαιοσύνη und σοφροσύνη in der platonischen Republik*, in *Hermes*, vol. viii. 1874. Ogienski, *Welches ist der Sinn des platonischen τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν?* 1845. [On Plato's view of justice, see also W. Jahns [*De justitia in Platone*], Breslau 1851. Fechner, *Ueber den Gerechtigkeitsbegriff des Aristoteles*. Prantl, in Bluntschli's *Staatswörterbuch*, i. 342. Diestel, *Idee der Gerechtigkeit im alten Testament*, in *Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie*, 1860, Heft 2. *Heiligkeit Gottes*, *ibid.* 1859, Heft 1. Zimmermann, *Das Rechtsprinzip bei Leibnitz*. Hartenstein, *Rechtsphilosophie des Hugo Grotius*, in *Abhandlungen der sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, vol. i. 1860. Stahl, *Die Philosophie des Rechts*. Hinrichs, *Geschichte der Rechts- und Staatsprinzipien*. Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik*. F. Dahn, *Rechtsphilosophische Studien*. *Vernunft im Recht, Grundlagen der Rechtsphilosophie*. Schuppe, *Grundzüge der Ethik und Rechtsphilosophie*. Cf. the literature on p. 28 sqq.—Ed.]

physical thing—would be the source of right, a doctrine which still later is defended also by Hobbes and by Spinoza [and with reference to the derivation of right from God, by Duns Scotus, according to whom also right can have only a positive character, since it has its origin merely in the arbitrary power of God—Ed.]. This is the definition of Thrasymachos in Plato's *Republic*, in which work the philosopher makes Socrates investigate the notion of justice, and not stop short with merely formal definitions, because, he says, there is something that is good in itself, accessible to the reason of the cognitive person through self-knowledge. The definition of Simonides is also rejected, who advocates the *suum cuique*. For here the question remains: What is that which belongs to each? The sophist, who makes might supreme, could also take advantage of this definition. Besides, the *suum cuique* could also be interpreted: To your friend, good; to your foe, evil; even though the friend be bad, and the foe good. The description of righteousness as truth in speech and faithfulness in requital is evidently too narrow. Worthy of mention also is the definition of Pythagoras, who makes the essence of justice consist in the fact that an ἀντιπεπονθός takes place; in this an important function of justice is pointed out, namely, the retributive, or punitive. The thought is: for a suffering that one has caused a counter-suffering is the just thing. Yet Pythagoras took ἀντιπεπονθός in a wider sense also; in the case of benefits the ἀντιπεπονθός, or justice, is the recompense made by gratitude. So with him justice is the restoration or completion of harmony, and that in a productive way. For beneficence demands gratitude; gratitude, again, is active, works well-doing towards the benefactor; and so there is formed, as it were, in living mathematical movement, according to the principle of a proportionate reimbursment of one good deed by another, a circuit of active benevolence. In this is shown the connection of righteousness with the mathematical basis of the world; and it seems that Pythagoras applied his principle also to the matter of traffic or exchange. Right is represented as something elastic which, when it has sustained an injury or pressure, puts forth a counter-pressure or impulse. If an

injury sustained by the right is to be balanced by means of a corresponding compensation made by the violator, this leads to the *jus talionis;* and therein is shown the connection between justice and mathematics.

Plato takes especial pains thoroughly to confute the view of Thrasymachos. He maintains in opposition: If justice were only what is imposed as law by the stronger, what is pleasant or profitable to him, then there would be nothing at all that is in itself just; right would not be right in and of itself, but only something absolutely indefinite and mutable. Thrasymachos having made use of the comparison that the sheep are for the shepherd, who can therefore shear and slaughter them at will, Socrates replies that this comparison does not fit the case, and does not answer to the relation of the governing to the governed; that the shepherd as such protects, but does not slaughter, the sheep; that every art exists for the benefit, and not for the injury, of its object. He further urges that, according to Thrasymachos, the right of the strong would be wholly different from that of the weak; that for the former to rule, for the latter to suffer, would be just; whereas, rather, right exists just as much for the weaker as for the stronger, and makes one care for the advantage of others, under some circumstances even at the cost of one's own. He says that the thesis of Thrasymachos is to be reversed: that justice is the necessary condition of power and strength, while injustice engenders strife and works dissolution. And so Plato seeks to represent justice as the bond of the world. To the State, which is for him like one great person in the well-ordered membership of its parts and in their harmonious co-operation, justice serves as the universal rhythm, the music, which runs through the whole and keeps each part in its time and measure.

In opposition to the derivation of justice from might, and also in opposition to the vague definition that it represents the *suum cuique,* Plato contrived to come to a definite point by saying that justice is harder to be discerned in individual life than in the State, but must be one and the same in the State and in the individual, for which reason he would have it learned, as if written in large letters, from the nature of the State as being a magnified individual. The civil

community is brought into existence by means of division of labour on the ground of variety of capacities or virtues. Three classes are requisite thereto: the labourers or tradesmen, the watchmen or warriors, and the rulers or philosophers—the classes to which belong the three functions of nourishing, guarding, and governing. Each of these three classes has, in exercising its function, a particular virtue to represent: the three are moderation, bravery, wisdom; the fourth cardinal virtue, justice, is, according to him, not the virtue of a particular class, but belongs to all. It is the virtue whereby each fills his post, is what he ought to be in his place in the whole, —*τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν* in opposition to *πολυπραγμονεῖν* or *ἀλλοτριοπραγμονεῖν*. It consists, therefore, in the individual's living and acting in accordance with the character of his own circle, but in the spirit of the whole; it is for him, as a part of this whole, the subjective principle of virtue, which therefore becomes the bond or living soul for all the members of the body politic. The groundwork for this picture of the State, however, is the Platonic psychology, which distinguishes between the three things, the corporeal life, the *θυμός*, and the *νοῦς*, and by means of this distinction makes it possible to speak also of a justice and an injustice even in the individual as such; for the subjection of the physical to the *νοῦς*, *e.g.*, is just; and the violation of the *νοῦς* by the supremacy of one of the others is unjust.

Aristotle, on the other hand, understands by justice only the virtue which is suited to the commonwealth and to its positive laws; in his view the just is the *νόμιμον*. To be sure, the laws in one State are different from those of another; therefore justice does not agree with actual morality; only in the perfect State will justice and morality coincide. By reason of his empirical starting-point Aristotle does not get so far as to investigate what is just *in itself*, but only so far as to eliminate from the given material mutually contradictory things, and to hold fast those which agree together. Plato goes beyond him in this respect also, that he connects justice with the Godhead; the *Δίκη* he places by the throne of Zeus, which calls to mind the word of the Psalmist: "Righteousness and judgment are the foundation of Thy throne" (Ps. lxxxix. 14). Finally, it is peculiar to Aristotle that, in the Nico-

machæan ethics, he is willing to speak of justice only in relation to others,[1] but not like Plato in relation to one's self; he quotes the saying of Bias: Justice is a good which belongs to others, that is, it points out the rights of others and one's duty toward them. And it is to the same effect when he says, that no one can do himself an injustice. On the other hand, Aristotle, as compared with Plato, shows some advance in the apprehension of justice; first, in relation to its classification, and secondly, especially in relation to the *ἴσον*. He distinguishes justice as *διορθωτική* and as *διανεμετική*. The former is the justice of equalization or restoration, and includes the *justitia commutativa*, or the justice of trade, where for the surrender of property the indemnification lies in a corresponding increase of property by what is received from the other person. Here the moral character of the person is indifferent. But to this *διορθωτική* belongs, according to him, punitive justice also. The *διανεμετική* is the *justitia distributiva*. In the State inheres the right of distributing property. The question arises now whether, in order to be just, the distribution is to take place according to the principle of the *ἴσον*, which Plato stops short with. Aristotle denies this. First, because, according to him, the State has to recognise such a distribution of things as has become historical by the nature of the case, or by custom; and secondly, because also in relation to the things which the State disposes of, as honours and offices, the principle of the *ἴσον* is insufficient, since according to it all would have equal claim. He censures Plato for stopping short with the notion of the *ἴσον* as constituting distributive justice, according to which there would result an abstract equality of all men (*τὸ ἴσον cuique*),—which would lead to democracy or ochlocracy. The *ἴσον*, he says, is only the opposite of wanting to have too much and to endure too little, and so denotes only the supreme rule, that every one must receive his own according to justice; and consequently there remains room for great differences. If all persons, A, B, C, were related alike to all things good and bad, *α*, *β*, *γ*, then democracy would be the result, and every human being would have to claim the same as every other. But this mere mathematical equalization is to be rejected, because it dis-

[1] Otherwise in the *Magna Moralia*, i. cap. 33.

regards the difference in merit in A, B, C. To apply simple equalizing lets the *δίκαιον* be lost in the *ἴσον*, and that would be a sort of tyranny. Rather, instead of a mere equalization a proportion is to be laid down: By so much as A has greater moral worth than B and C, by so much must he have also a greater share of good things and a smaller share of evil. On the other hand, Plato excels Aristotle in that he makes it a vital point to investigate what is just in itself, depicting the just man stripped of all power, honour, and wealth, laden with disgrace and obloquy, in order to portray the irresistible impression of justice in itself considered. He excels him also in that he connects this justice with the idea of God; whereas Aristotle stops short with experience, which can set up as justice very different, or even opposite, things, according to the customs and laws of different people.

Nevertheless Plato too has confounded the juridical and the ethical, and identified justice and goodness; and as with Aristotle logical and mathematical conceptions are especially prominent in justice, so with Plato morality is not yet distinguished from knowledge. He holds that after the knowledge of good, after the apprehension of the idea of it, the doing comes of itself. At the same time also justice is substantially made to appear in the form of beauty, that is, it is looked at from an æsthetic point of view. In this is seen a resemblance between him and Leibnitz in their treatment of the subject of justice.

Leibnitz makes justice rest on a logical or intellectual foundation. According to him, justice is the wisdom of the governing person; and that is just which is wise, but that is wise which is salutary for the whole. What, now, is salutary? If it be said, it is that which promotes well-being, this view may result in utilitarianism, so that justice again receives its standard only from experience, which ought rather to be regulated by justice. It is no wonder, therefore, that the philosophy of Leibnitz in the eighteenth century became the forerunner of popular philosophical utilitarianism. He attempted to classify justice according to degrees. 1. The *jus strictum* prescribes only: *neminem læde*, in order that every one may not lay claim to the right of the state of

nature or of war. On this first and lowest stage justice in commercial relations has its place (*justitia commutativa*); this, too, is strict justice; under it there is exchange of the *idem* or the *tantundem*. Justice in private traffic rests on an equalization, according to the principle that the thing bought is of as much value as the price paid, and *vice versa*. But in this kind of justice the moral world of personal beings does not yet come to view; all are regarded as equal; only those differences come to view which flow out of the question of right in the transaction itself. 2. On the other hand, the *justitia distributiva* has to proceed on the principle of *suum cuique;* hence it does not stop short with simple equalization, but advances to a proportion according to the formula: As A is related to B (moral worth to lot in general), so *in concreto* is C related to D. The lot of Caius is to the lot of Titus as the worth of Caius is to the worth of Titus. 3. The third grade of justice, according to Leibnitz, is that of the divine *jurisprudentia*, which leads over into theology. The *voluntas superioris* is to be reckoned as justice. But God is by nature the highest Being; hence His positive laws are to be held as of force. From this he further infers that what is stipulated by compact is to be reckoned as justice, and likewise as *pietas*. His *methodus nova jurisprudentiæ* lays down, as the three grades of justice, *strictum jus*, *æquitas*, and *pietas*, or juridical, political, and ethical *justitia* (the last embracing morals and religion). He would let theology pass only as a species of the genus jurisprudence, as treating of the equity and the laws of the republic of God—in the case of ethical theology, of the divine law which is valid in private relations, whereas the first two belong to the realm of public justice, but remain included in the highest of the three grades. In his *codex juris diplomaticus*, however, he makes legal and political justice also find their ideal in God, who is absolute justice. There he describes justice as the leading virtue of the affection of love, or of the benevolence which makes our neighbour's happiness our own. In this way justice is identified with practical wisdom. The proper object of love, according to him, is the beautiful—that which in itself it is agreeable to contemplate even when it yields no advantage.

It is true, morality and beauty have this in common, that both are pleasing in themselves; but this would bring us only to the realm of æsthetics; nor are we brought beyond it by the fact that he distinguishes love to dead works of art from love to beauty in living beings which are capable of happiness, so that they can become objects of benevolence. The definition of love, that it is delight in the happiness of others, or that it makes this happiness one's own, likewise makes the enjoyment of happiness, *i.e.* an æsthetic affection, the supreme thing; and ethics thus remains the science of eudæmony, in which love holds the position of means, without being recognised as something good in itself—as an ultimate end. But justice is regarded as only the determination to maintain a wise government, not as the choice and maintenance of that which is intrinsically worthy.

In more recent times Kant has manifested a particularly strong sense of justice, as is shown especially with reference to atonement in his "Religion within the Limits of mere Reason" [and no less in his theory of punishment: The offender ought to be punished "because he is an offender;" the office of justice is the protection of moral freedom, which in itself is a valuable good.—Ed.]. Hegel, too, has a strict notion of justice, which shows itself particularly in his defence of the so-called absolute theory of punishment [and though this theory is grounded ultimately on logical necessity, which is the central point with Hegel, yet it is characteristic that the logical necessity leads him to the absolute theory of punishment.—Ed.]. Schleiermacher, on the other hand, hardly finds room for justice as distinct from love; justice, with him, is not an objective attribute in God. And also with reference to the world, to which he denies moral freedom and, with it, guilt in the stricter sense, the notion of punishment is for the most part subjectively applied, and thereby weakened. Yet he posits a connection between collective sin and collective evil, a connection which Ritschl wholly denies, since according to him everything which might be regarded as punitive evil is rather to be regarded as only natural evil. Ritschl does not recognise objective justice as a divine attribute. Justice, in his view, has significance only in relation to the State. But one has no right to say that retributive

justice, especially punitive justice, has value for the State, but can have no application to God and His action. Rather, the State itself does not have the right and the duty to administer justice, even punitively, except as right is itself a divine idea, and is divinely necessary. It is both logical and just, that morality be not powerless and weaponless, but that the physical creation, which as to its very origin occupies the position of a means for moral ends, should be subservient to morality. Let it be granted that, in order not to vitiate moral motives, it is requisite in rewarding and punishing to use only with caution physical means for promoting that which is good; still the idea of morality does not tolerate that the malefactor who defies it should not have to expect a punishment corresponding to his responsibility. The denial of punishment would call in question, with the *punishableness*, also the blameworthiness, of evil. If the divine justice did not lack the power, yet if it lacked the *will*, to punish the malefactor, then we should have to infer indifference to the honour, and even to the validity, of the good. It is said, indeed, that God is not indifferent to good and evil; that although because prevented by His love He does not punish sinners, yet God, being faithful or just to Himself, will, as a *logical consequence*, overcome evil through good. The annihilation of sin, it is said, moreover, answers better to the idea of good than an annihilation of the sinner does, even though it be only a partial one. So might one speak, and so might one be able to conceive of the divine agency, if there were not in man moral freedom of choice, which can oppose a continual resistance to the production of positive good and to the annihilation of evil. Also God cannot treat alike the *persons* who are good and those who are bad. It would be a depreciation and disparagement of goodness, if the end of the matter were that the world of reality could belong to evil just as well and safely as to goodness.

[*Note.*—The conceptions of justice mentioned by the author are, as he has presented the subject in its main points in his lectures: 1. "The *physical* view, in which justice appears as an outcome of power (the Sophists, Hobbes, Spinoza, Duns Scotus)." 2. The one-sidedly *æsthetic* view, which appears in Pythagoras in connection with mathematics, and is in some

measure, too, represented by Plato and Leibnitz. Here justice is the source of harmony, and serves it as the ultimate end. 3. The *logical* or intellectual view, found to some extent in Aristotle, in empirical form ; also in Leibnitz, to whom justice is the wisdom of the ruler, *i.e.* the means for the end to be attained by wisdom, viz. happiness (cf. the *prudentia dei rectoria* of Hugo Grotius) ; and in Hegel, who makes it a form of the revelation of the immanent logic of the Absolute. 4. The resolving of justice into *love*, so that it is no longer something by itself (Schleiermacher), or is made the logical consequence of love (Ritschl). 5. The conception of justice as a *good valuable in itself*, found to some extent in Plato ; also in Kant, and not less in the Old Testament. Here justice is no longer merely good for the sake of something else—a means of power, or of harmony, or of logic or wisdom—or resolved into love. But, on the other hand, a connection subsists between the physical world and justice, inasmuch as the former is serviceable to the manifestation of the latter ; justice uses power as its means. "Justice has also relation to the natural world, so far as everything in it is conceived of according to rule and order, and that which belongs to each is assigned to it. This thought is carried out in that there is created in the things of the world an immanent order, an inherent law of life for each according to its kind, from which they cannot wholly break away, because it constitutes an essential part of their existence, and which man alone becomes conscious of. But in man there is not merely, as in the natural creation, a law of his being through which he continues to be what he is. Man has a law for what he is to become, for what he ought to be. He exists for a history and a historical goal, and in this even nature takes part through the human spirit. In man there is a law for his freedom, a moral law different from natural law ; and this moral law especially it is which is rightly traced back to the *justitia dei legislativa*. In his dissertation on the relation of natural and moral law, Schleiermacher says indeed, that even in nature there is an analogy to the moral law, since nature produces its formations according to a type which represents a sort of obligation, from which likewise there can be, as in the moral realm, a falling short. But to none of the occurrences of this sort in the natural world shall we be able to apply a moral judgment. The possibility of such a judgment does not begin till a law exists which by its nature is under the necessity of making absolute claim to validity, and till actions are presented that are to be judged according to this law. Such a law or objective *right* has its unconditional worth and its claim to validity by virtue of its contents, which are, in general, the

good, absolutely worthy in itself and therefore holy. But if righteousness is in itself worthy, because it represents the self-assertion of the good, it is not thereby denied, but rather implied, that the physical world should receive *its fitting place.* Thus righteousness becomes also the source of order; and it is likewise most intimately connected with logic, since it is logical that everything should be determined by the ultimate end." Cf. *Glaubenslehre,* i. pp. 262, 263, 270, 283, 284. In Eng. *Sys. of Christ. Doct.* i. pp. 276, 277, 283, 296, 297.—Ed.]

In *Theology* justice is ordinarily divided into *justitia legislativa, distributiva,* and *rependens.* The foundation is legislative justice, which has its source not in God's mere omnipotence, or even arbitrary volition, but in His holy nature, in which all powers are eternally willed in their mutual distinction and order. The two other divisions of justice are only applications of legislative justice; the *justitia rependens* is subdivided into the *vindicativa* and the *remunerativa.* The most objections are raised against the *vindicativa.* If, however, God should not regard evil as punishable, but should assume towards it merely a reformatory attitude, the consequence, even if it were not a total obliteration of moral ideas, would be to make the distinction between good and evil a matter of indifference—to destroy the intrinsic worth of the good.

From the foregoing follows a principle of great ethical importance, namely, that justice is the indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*), the necessary prerequisite, of the reality of positive morality or of self-imparting love; and in general, that the duties of right precede the duties of love. The reason is, righteousness is that which makes possible a self-impartation that is ethically normal and does not confound moral distinctions. If love is to endure, that which makes it possible will have to endure also. Nitzsch rightly calls righteousness the bulwark of holy love; there can consequently be no love without righteousness or contrary to it. On the other hand, there can doubtless be an exercise of righteousness without loving impartation. These two, which in the ethical nature of God are inseparably joined, in the world are separated. A susceptibility for the divine impartation of love may be wanting, and the consequence cannot be

loving impartation, but, according to circumstances, a refusal of it, or even punishment. A loving impartation made contrary to righteousness would bring everything into disorder, might turn the moral world upside down; the supremacy of righteousness, therefore, must not be suspended; it guards the foundations of the whole moral order of the world.

β. We come now to consider the second essential manifestation of divine love, namely, as self-devoting love. We have already seen (*vid.* above, Nos. 2, 3) that love is a power whose very essence it is to will to reveal itself. But its self-manifestation tends to take the form of impartation; pleasure and delight in this constitute the love; it would not amount to love, however, if the person merely bestowed something else, but did not reveal himself, giving himself up for others. The other gifts are indeed symbols of love; but the most precious gift, the aroma, as it were, of the gift of love, is the loving person himself, who gives himself with the gift. Not every act of giving amounts in itself to the bestowal of love (1 Cor. xiii. 3); it is such only when the bestowal is attended with pleasure in bestowing upon another, for whom love makes itself a means, or whom it puts as its end and takes into itself, in order to have companionship with him, and in order to offer itself to him for the expansion of his personality, and in order also in turn, for its own sake, to draw him out. Therefore love can be said to be in gifts only when love already precedes the giving; the very heart of the love is the giving of the heart. This self-forgetfulness in devotion to the loved object is the magic of love, as every one knows from the experience of family love and of friendship. In that it devotes, and, if needful, sacrifices, itself in self-abandonment, lies its wondrous, conquering power, as has been shown in the love of Christ. Such love makes the impression of having original divine life, of being a power stronger than even death; and it is capable of transfiguring everything about it.

Even Greek mythology conceived of Eros as a primeval power and as a hypostatic, that is, substantial being. This self-subsistence [*Selbstständigkeit*], or, to borrow Jacob Böhme's phrase, aboriginal subsistence [*Urständigkeit*], of the love which God is, cannot be destroyed by loving. For

though love is impartive, yet, as above shown, it asserts itself even in loving; the self-forgetfulness of holy love forgets neither righteousness nor love, and self-assertion and self-impartation are not two separate acts, although distinguishable. The one divine, holy love consummates in impartation the act of self-assertion also, and, so far as in it lies, even in self-assertion tends towards impartation. In short, it is the characteristic seal and privilege of love, that it is what no other force besides it can imitate—not nature, not thought, not will—namely, the power and the desire to be one's self while in another, and while one's self to be in another, who is taken into the heart as an end.

§ 8. *Transition to the World* (cf. *Christian Doctrine*, § 33).

God, as being holy love, wills that there be, distinct from Himself, a world designed for morality, as also morality is designed for it.

1. Our thesis makes the transition to ethical cosmology and anthropology. Against the proposition of the thesis it is maintained, to be sure, that if God is already perfect and blessed in Himself without the world, and does not need it in order to the perfection of His being, then there is no longer any reason for the origin of the world. For if perfection already exists without the world, why should the world be added as a bad copy or imperfect likeness? Therefore, it is said, the world is to be arrived at only by assuming a defect in God, which is supplied by means of the world, whether this defect consist in a superfluity or in a deficiency. This error of pantheism, that there is a deficiency in God and a growth towards perfection, is, from our point of view, confuted by saying that aboriginal morality is to be conceived of as an existent reality, ontologically, not as mere obligation; and God, therefore, not as a process, but as being eternally perfect.

2. But must we not agree now with those who, because God is to be conceived of as self-sufficient and perfect, regard the world as purely accidental, and deny that there is any rational ground to be given for its origin? This opinion loves

to put on the garb of appearing to defend God's honour and majesty; the world, they say, proceeded from the free good-pleasure, the groundless *arbitrium*, of God. But to make such a groundless good-pleasure the supreme thing in God would be assuming that arbitrary will, *i.e.* a natural attribute, mere absolute power, is the highest thing in God; but this, ethically considered, stands on the same plane again as pantheism. In that case, too, the world would be without worth for God; it would not have been made by God as a worthy end, but would occupy only the position of a means, serving as the sport of His caprice.

3. To be sure, there belongs to the world a relative fortuitousness; first, in the sense that the reason for its being lies outside of itself; secondly, because it is not necessary to the being and independence of the perfect God that there should be a world. But it is not absolutely fortuitous, for if so, it would have also in God's eyes absolutely no worth (contrary to Gen. i. 31); and it would have to be for us also absolutely fortuitous, provided we have the true apprehension of the case; moreover, we should have to treat it as something indifferent, worthless in itself, *i.e.* treat it unethically. The correct solution lies in the recognition of God as holy love; neither from a physical necessity of His being, nor from the mere arbitrary will of His omnipotence, is the world to be derived, but from the divine freedom, which is in itself ethical, and is a true divine freedom, by virtue of the fact that it is united with that which is ethically necessary or good. Thus also it becomes possible that the world should be not a mere means, devoid of selfhood, attaining, as related to God, only a seeming reality. For because God is already in Himself perfect and blessed, and does not need the world for the sake of His own existence, He can will a world which *in itself* has a worthy object. But in His love He is perfect and blessed. The love is, indeed, primarily directed towards Himself, but so that God as love, or because He is love, wills Himself. By virtue of His self-love He necessarily loves love in general; and, wherever it is found, loves Himself as the original seat of the absolute *amor amoris*.

The self-love of God or His righteousness, therefore, since it loves love as such, does not exclude the possibility of God's

creating a good distinct from Himself. On the contrary, God cannot love Himself without also loving Himself as the possibility of something else, provided this can exist as an object of love. And the case is similar respecting God's self-consciousness. To distinguish His self-consciousness perfectly from everything which He is not, must also be to distinguish it from every possible thing which He is not; it therefore implies something else as possible. To be sure, we have so far only the *abstract possibility* of another being besides God. But this world of abstract possibility, at the *impulse of love*, and through God's intelligence or wisdom, which is love's master-workman (Prov. viii. 30), becomes the image of the world, the idea of the cosmos; and, upon the same impulse of love, omnipotence, joined with wisdom, calls the world out of non-existence, or mere possibility, into existence.

Furthermore, the divine love, in accordance with its singleness, makes the loved object a worthy end, in that it destines the world for love, and thus for what is highest and perfect, although this can be attained only by a gradual process, inasmuch as God alone has aseity. But by virtue of this moral destination there is guaranteed to the creature a relative independence, a vital force, and a causality of its own. God's self-impartation does not overflow the creature, as it were, in an unrestrained giving of Himself away; for then the creature would be swallowed up and would not come to a being of its own. Rather, the first thing is that to the creature is lent a capacity of existing by itself and of asserting itself, whereby it becomes a relatively independent copy of the divine self-assertion. Thus the world becomes for God Himself a new reality. Only by virtue of the distinction between God and the creature in its living independence and self-assertion is there given the possibility of a real interchange of love between God and the creature.

On the basis now of this relative independence a continued impartation of divine love is also possible, so that not only has the creature a moral destination, but also the aboriginally ethical, the divine, is designed for it. Although the divine love imparts many and various blessings, yet the ethical God has made the creature an end worthy of love only by assigning to it the best thing, viz. by imparting to it the spirit of love.

So then God decrees the world for a moral end, to realize the idea and honour of the good, which He loves absolutely in Himself, which, however, must not remain exhausted in His person, but which is in Him a potency for something else distinct from Himself. He decrees a world outside of Himself for the establishment of an intercourse of love and for the diffusion of the life of love; but just on that account He wills morality as the world's law of life, and as its nobility and its honour, by means of which it can be an ultimate end for God, the very image of God. In the divine will that there be a world are inseparably joined the willing of the δόξα of God, *i.e.* ultimately, the glorifying of the good which is identical with God, and the willing of the δόξα of the world, in particular, of the rational creature on the earth, man.

§ 9. *God's Ideal of the Ethical World in general.*

In order to will an ethical world, God wills a natural world, and a rational or personal world, including a multiplicity of persons, who are distinct and relatively independent, but connected together by the idea of morality. The natural and mental multiplicity of the individuals does not annul the common element in their moral endowment, but gives to this endowment the double character of universality and of individuality. Accordingly, in order to constitute an ethical world there must be, first, nature; secondly, rational personality, both of these in the double character of likeness and of individuality; thirdly, the union and blending of the natural element with the reason, which is designed to be dominant. The attainment of the last, which is the goal, will be conditioned upon *a moral process*, in which, by means of *moral agency*, nature and spirit gain their perfection and strength each for itself, and also their right relation to each other, or their union, which is inseparable from their normal outworking. But in order to the possibility of a moral process, the factors of

the moral world can be united at first only in a separable form, in order that there may remain room for a growth of this union. An ideal sundering of the elements thus loosely bound together is brought about by the consciousness of an obligation, or of the work to be done; yet this sundering as such does not involve an opposition between the two factors, neither an actual separation nor a spurious combination, but only the possibility of an abnormal development.

Note.—In the thesis religion is not expressly mentioned, but it has its place in the rational nature of man. From this point of view it will appear that the ethical goal is the union of subjective reason not merely with nature or with other rational natures, but also with God, the objective universal reason.

1. The thesis aims to give a survey of the factors which constitute the fundamental part of ethics, and which, collectively taken, involve the divinely-decreed possibility of the realization of an objective moral world. First, in the three main points which go to constitute the moral world, answering to the Christian idea of man as made in the image of God, the analogy with the nature of God will be evident. For in God there are physical categories or attributes, and on the other hand spiritual, which, however, by the righteous self-love of God are maintained in harmonious unison, in such a manner as eternally to mediate God's holy and blessed life of love. So, likewise, the world can be meant to be a moral world, only as it has in itself (1) a natural side; (2) in relative opposition to this a spiritual, personal side; but (3) the destination and capacity perfectly to unite the two, or, in other words, to reach the point where the ethical power more and more gets the mastery of the whole man, although, to be sure, only by a process mediated by cognition and volition. Morality in God cannot be essentially other than the morality designed for the world (§ 7). The derivation of the latter from man's resemblance to God, which was argued in § 7 and 8, is confirmed by the general conception of morality as we have defined it in § 2.

2. In the first place, a necessary factor of morality in a

world is *nature*. This is so not merely in the wider sense that man is first of all a being made or born through natural forces, that even man's first form of existence is itself nature, since he is not yet an ethical product (except as proceeding from God), but possesses only the possibility of producing what is ethical, and also of becoming himself an ethical product. Rather, this also is meant, that a nature external to man must be given him for his ethical purposes, a nature, as just said, not already made ethical, but yet a nature capable of being moulded and put to ethical uses by the mind. If the mind did not have in nature a material on which it could act, if it were without nature, then minds acting on one another would have to be treated as mere matter; and that would encroach on freedom. By the fact that created minds have also a nature in themselves, it is possible to exert an influence on them which does not simply determine them and reduce them to passiveness. For now the influence is directed immediately only upon the natural side of the mind, and is deposited in this as in an indifferent medium, which is not the centre of the personality, but only its periphery. And so the impression from without can indeed work upon the spirit by way of solicitation and incitement, but without determining it compulsorily.

The same law also governs the relation of God to men: God's Spirit works upon the human spirit through outward objective things; the means of grace have a sensuous element in them; this is for Protestantism an important principle, in opposition to all the subjectivism of so-called enthusiasts or fanatics. Furthermore, if there were only minds and no nature, then minds could objectify themselves only in minds; and *works*, as the aim of action, could not come to an outward independent existence; work and workman would not come to be clearly, permanently distinguished. On the other hand, nature furnishes the concrete basis for a world of objective works, of products of an impersonal sort, but serviceable to personal beings—for a connected series of works, and for a systematic exercise of love. Nature accomplishes this, to be sure, only by its capacity of expressing what is spiritual, both in that it influences man, and conveys to him, to his intelligence and fancy, something to occupy and

stimulate him, and also in that it is a susceptible material which can be wrought upon by the plastic faculty of the mind, by its representing and organizing activity.[1] Although, therefore, in relation to morality, nature is to be always merely a means, yet, from what has been said, it is evident how the domain of morals is enriched by it. And although nature, in its empirical character, cannot be deduced *à priori*, yet it is plain both that, in order to ethical activity, an object on which the mind can work, a material substance, is necessary, and also that the nature which we know from experience answers to this need. Ethics long remained dry and lifeless in relation to everything which goes beyond interior ethics, because a spiritualistic depreciation of nature and of the body was dominant. If the real facts of moral life are to be profitably portrayed, ethics must also take in the material world, as one element in relation to what morality has to accomplish,—in relation to moral action and work on earth,—although we must not go so far as to regard ruling over nature, or the transforming of matter into spirit, as *the* thing which morality is to accomplish. Nature is itself an ethical product of God, good, that is, metaphysically good; and this its metaphysical goodness stands in intimate alliance with the ethical good which is to be worked out with its help. In nature the ethical element in mind can at any time make itself a conscious reality, in that mind elaborates, organizes, assimilates it, and makes it subserve ethical ends, according to its divinely-ordained purpose.

[1] [These terms are borrowed from Schleiermacher, who classifies all moral activity as *reinigend* or *wiederherstellend* (purifying or restoring), *verbreitend* or *erweiternd* (extending or diffusing), and *darstellend* (representing, exhibiting). So especially in his *Christliche Sitte*. The phrase *organisirend*, used here by Dorner, is also taken from Schleiermacher, who employs it in his *Philosophische Ethik* in a sense similar to that of *verbreitend* in the other work. Dorner elsewhere uses *verbreitend* and *erweiternd* also. The *reinigende Handeln* refers to the activity whose aim is to purge away the impure elements that inhere in the moral life. The *verbreitende Handeln* denotes the activity by which the ethical community works by way of propagating the moral life. The *darstellende Handeln* denotes that sphere of activity whose aim and effect is to *manifest* the inward moral life; this embraces, *e.g.*, outward acts of worship, religious art, etc. *Bildend*, above rendered "plastic," is used also by Schleiermacher in his *Philosophische Ethik* as = *organisirend*, and as contrasted with the *erkennende* (cognitive) function. It embraces the *verbreitend* and the *darstellend*. Cf. § 82.—Tr.]

Note. — Schleiermacher, in his *Monologues*, enthusiastically eulogizes the independence of nature and the outer world which belongs to the mind in its moral self-culture, and holds that the mind can for its development dispense with the outward world, if the latter is unpropitious, since it is able, by means of its fancy, to represent to itself the most manifold moral relations, inwardly to take a position with reference to them, and thus to increase its moral strength. In this it is to be recognised, as a merit, that he emphasizes mind as an independent thing over against nature. But the fancy, without experience, would not be able to imagine a multiplicity of moral relations. Again, such an inward attitude taken towards imagined relations could scarcely be called real moral activity. The will directed to this would hardly be distinguishable from mere thought or purpose. But inward purpose can by no means be made to take the place of real outward action. Moral strength is put to the test in the world of reality quite otherwise than in that of fancy; and so also the obstacles of a real sort to be overcome are of a wholly different nature from the difficulties which are merely conceived of.[1] In order that the good may not be a mere appearance, may not have a shadowy existence, but that the ethical spirit may be able to frame for itself a fitting body, yes, shape an actual moral world, there must be given to it an actual reality, an existent thing, which at first is not yet ethical, is not yet determined by man's will, but is *capable* of being determined—a pre-ethical substance, matter in the wider sense, which includes not merely the *materia bruta*, but also something living and *spiritual*, which, as being a created thing, is plastic. This pre-ethical reality, which can be, and is, moulded for moral ends, is therefore by no means something which, so far as morality is concerned, can be dispensed with. There must be found, even in this nature given to man, also a minimum at least of the union of nature and spirit, enough to constitute a ground for the susceptibility of nature to spiritual influence. The possibility of this lies in the simple fact that nature, even matter, cannot be absolutely foreign to spirit, for it can be transformed into thought.

[1] [This is not said in opposition merely to a pure idealism, which transforms nature into spirit, but, as is self-evident, it applies likewise to a psychological sensualism, which would recognise only "appearances" in the mind, and thus does not get to an objective world;—*i.e.* it applies to a "doctrine of the soul without a soul," as Ribot expresses it. For then, too, we have to do merely with phenomenal images in the soul, without being sure even that there is a soul. Of this nature also is the view of Hipolyte Taine, *De l'Intelligence*, so far as he does not embrace materialism, which he again, however, analyzes into sensualism.—Ed.]

3. The mental world in general.

Morality indeed would be still more out of the question, if there were nothing but nature, or even nothing but matter. Without reason, which represents what is absolutely good and morally necessary, there would be only either caprice and chance, or a necessity of a physical fatalistic sort, destitute of teleological import. But this necessity, being without a ground, would itself again be ultimately nothing but chance. In view of the spread of a materialistic mode of thought at the present time, it is perhaps suitable to dwell a little upon it, and consider, first, what it posits and aims at, and, secondly, what its scientific value is.

The *doctrine* of materialism is this: There exists nothing except matter, but no spirit as a specific principle distinct from matter. As Leibnitz holds the material monads to be dormant confined spirit, and Schelling holds them to be *esprit gelé, i.e.* only spirit in a different form, so *vice versa* the materialist would have it that only matter and not spirit exists. But matter he conceives of as atoms, or primordial particles of infinite smallness, which have been from eternity, and are always and indestructibly the same, but which when united with force—yet according to given conditions, for instance, the proximity or distance of other particles—produce various phenomena. For the comprehension of the world the hypothesis of these atoms or molecules suffices. Out of them everything which is builds itself up spontaneously, whether these atoms be conceived of as from the beginning individually different, with different affinities for one another, or whether they be conceived of as all in themselves alike, but endowed with an infinite variety of forces,—of possible functions, by means of which they can enter into the most manifold combinations with other atoms, according as a moving impetus is somehow accidentally given to them. The efficient causes which serve to explain single phenomena may, indeed, according to materialism, be inquired after, but not the final causes or purposes through which the things, the efficient causes or atoms, are regulated and set in motion, and also receive their direction. Teleology, or the notion of design, counts with it for a mere subjective conception and appendage. The objective state of the fact is only that

everything happens as it does according to physical necessity; that all things, just as they are, are to be looked upon as being good, or as of equal value; and that only a subjective valuation is left for us. Organism has come about only by the necessary activity of the atoms, and is a combination of them by virtue of general physical, mechanical, chemical laws.

Also for the explanation of the origin of vegetable, animal, and even human forms, materialism holds that it is not necessary to go back to a spiritual principle, which conducts a process according to a purpose, or which inserts itself into matter. It is not even necessary to assume a vital or physical force, different from mechanism, since it is hoped rather by means of the correlation of forces, to trace everything, heat, electricity, magnetism, galvanism, and life, back to mechanism. Man is, to be sure, also a thinking thing; but that means only that the body, especially by reason of phosphorus, is a thinking machine, which secretes thoughts as well as other things. The soul is not a substance existing by itself, but only an action of the material particles, a collective name for functions of matter. For mental action there is no other real substratum than matter; what exists is only the brain with its nervous vibrations. The whole constitution and history of individuals and of mankind is explained by the co-operation of air, light, and food,—in short, by changes in matter.[1]

[1] This is essentially the view of Karl Vogt, *Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft*, 1855. *Bilder aus dem Thierleben.* Jacob Moleschott, *Physiologie des Stoffwechsels in Pflanzen und Thieren*, 1851. *Der Kreislauf des Lebens* [5th ed. 1875–78]. L. Büchner, *Kraft und Stoff*, 1855 [15th ed. 1883]. E. H. Häckel, *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte* [7th ed. 1879]. *Generelle Morphologie*, 1866. *Anthropogenie*, 1874. Oskar Schmidt, *Descendenzlehre*, 1873. F. Albert Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung für die Gegenwart*, 1866, 3rd ed. 1876. Auguste Comte, *Cours de philosophie positive*, 1830–42 [4th ed. 1877], 6 vols. *Système de politique positive* and *Traité de sociologie instituante la réligion de l'Humanité*, T. i. 1851, and his most prominent disciple Littré, who has written his biography. Allied to Comte is John Stuart Mill, who again recognises a real Deity, but will accord to him neither omnipotence nor omniscience. [Against Mill, M'Cosh, *Examination of J. S. Mill's Philosophy*, 1866, 2nd ed. 1877. David Masson, *Recent British Philosophy*, 1865. Against Comte and Mill, cf. also Dilthey, *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, i. 132 sqq., 1883.—Herbert Spencer, *A System of Synthetic Philosophy*, Part I. *First Principles of a New System of Philosophy.* Spencer,

In forming a *judgment* of materialism, first, its scientific merit must be taken into view, and secondly, it must be considered what consequences follow from it with reference to the domain of morality.

(*a*) Materialism is an *inadequate hypothesis.* For it is not

however, is not a consistent materialist.—Ed.] Finally, Darwin, *Origin of Species* [6th ed. 1872]. Among the opponents of this materialistic drift are to be mentioned: Trendelenburg, who in his *Logische Untersuchungen*, 2nd ed. vol. ii. pp. 1–77, gives the most thorough discussion of the notion of design and of its rightfulness. [Janet, *Traité de philosophie*, 1880. *Les causes finales*, 1876. *Le cerveau et la pensée.*—Ed.] Further, Duke of Argyll, *The Reign of Law* [5th ed. 1870]. Wigand, *Der Darwinismus*, 1874. R. Schmidt, *Darwinische Theorieen*, etc., 1876. Lotze, *Mikrokosmos* [3rd ed. 1876–80], vol. i. Bk. iii. chap. 4 (on the life of matter as a phenomenon of the supersensuous; the independence of the soul; the want of independence in all mechanisms, which exist as the teleological framework for intellectual forces, especially morality).—Fabri, *Briefe gegen den Materialismus*, 1856. Schaller, *Leib und Seele, zur Aufklärung über Köhlerglaube und Naturwissenschaft*, 1856. Michelis, *Der kirchliche Standpunkt in der Naturforschung.* Huber, *Die Forschung nach der Materie*, 1877. Frohschammer, *Christenthum und moderne Naturwissenschaft*, 1868. Zöckler, *Theologie und Naturwissenschaft*, vol. ii., 1879, p. 397 sqq. Ebrard, *Apologetik.* Ulrici, *Gott und die Natur.* Harms, *Abhandlungen*, 1868, pp. 209–277. Snell, *Die Streitfrage des Materialismus*, 1858. Pressensé, *Die Ursprünge*, translated from the French by Fabarius. [On Darwinism, see also the literature below, § 10, 15.—Ed.]

[Addition by the translator. Of the above-mentioned works the following have been translated: Büchner, *Force and Matter*, translated by J. F. Collingwood (London, 2nd ed. 1870). Häckel, *The History of Creation*, translation, revised by E. R. Lankester (London 1876). *The Evolution of Man* (London 1879). Ed. Oskar Schmidt, *The Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism*, International Scientific Series, vol. xii., 1872. F. A. Lange, *History of Materialism*, etc., translated by E. C. Thomas (English and Foreign Philosophical Library, 1877). Comte, *The Positive Philosophy of A. Comte freely translated and condensed*, by H. Martineau (2nd ed. London 1875). *System of Positive Polity*, translated by J. H. Bridges (London 1875–77). Janet, *Final Causes*, translated from the 2nd ed. by W. Affleck (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1883). Lotze, *Microcosmus, an Essay concerning Man and his Relation to the World*, translated by Elizabeth Hamilton and E. E. C. Jones (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1885). R. Schmidt, *Theories of Darwin*, translated by G. A. Zimmerman, Chicago 1883: James M'Clure & Co. Pressensé, *A Study of Origins* (London 1883). The following among the many English works may be mentioned: B. P. Bowne, *The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer* (New York 1874). *Studies in Theism*, 1879. T. R. Birks, *Modern Physical Fatalism, including an Examination of Herbert Spencer's First Principles* (2nd ed. 1882). W. M. Lacy, *An Examination of the Philosophy of the Unknowable as expounded by Herbert Spencer*, 1873. Asa Gray, *Darwiniana*, 1876. James Martineau, *Modern Materialism*, 1876. Duke of Argyll, *The Unity of Nature*, 1884. Anonymous, *The Final Science*, a satire on materialism (New York 1885).]

able to explain important facts, which it must let stand, but which contradict it. A great part of the phenomena, and those the most important, it does not explain as it promised, but knows only enough to ignore or to deny them. Thus it is not able to explain how the unity of an organism remains identical amidst the change of particles, but must simply let life stand as an unexplained fact.[1] Since according to it all phenomena are built up from atoms, it must deny that living forms are self-contained and self-maintaining individuals. Just as little can it explain sensation, this relation of a living unit to itself; for it cannot recognise any such unit. The single atoms, phosphorus, oxygen, etc., have no sensation. Their combination, too, is according to materialism no unit which can be sensible of itself, is no reality in itself, but at the most a relation of single insensitive atoms to one another, from which again no sensation can result.

The case is similar with self-consciousness, which it has to let stand as an undeniable, though troublesome, enigma.[2] Lotze says justly, self-consciousness is never conceivable as the product of interaction in a multiplicity of things, but only as the utterance of an indivisible being. And suppose this knowledge of the *ego* in self-consciousness were an error, yet this error, being a universal mental fact, would need to be explained instead of being ignored. But in general, materialism is involved in the inconsistency of letting mental functions stand as facts, which again by its view of things it is logically required to annul. Carried out consistently, it is an absolute denial of mind; and yet it will not confess that it cannot set aside mental functions, nay, that without the function of thought, however perversely it may use that function, it itself would not be. In truth, it is in principle the denial of all mental functions, for it reduces everything to merely material functions; but in order to do this, it must eliminate from them what yet essentially belongs to them, especially the identity of the self-consciousness accompanying them in every change of material. Its own doctrine, moreover, it is not able to prove; it is down to its ultimate principles a mere

[1] Schaller, *l.c.* p. 158 sq.

[2] As Du Bois Reymond has acknowledged in his famous address; cf. Lotze, *Mikrokosmus*, i. pp. 176, 386 sq. [English translation, i. 158, 344 sq.]

hypothesis, which does not do what is to be demanded of a hypothesis, namely, explain the obvious facts. Only the senses are made the source of knowledge; yet the materialist's atoms themselves are not perceptible by the senses, but, because they are infinitely small, are apprehensible only by thought, and so far forth are only objects of intelligence; about their whence, whither, wherefore, materialism is able to make no scientific statement. In addition to this, it by no means follows, from the fact that matter is said to consist of atoms, that they alone exist, and no mind; there are also opponents of materialism, as Lotze, Sigwart,[1] who incline to the atomic theory.

(*b*) But almost more important is the significance of materialism in reference to the domain of morality. For it is obliged to deny human freedom, every universally binding moral law, yes, every universal truth, and to divest the world of everything in it that has value. Vogt says, there is no such thing as free will, hence, too, no accountability, such as moral science and the administration of criminal law would impose upon us; we are at no instant masters of ourselves and of our faculties, nor, therefore, of the so-called reason. Where free self-determination of the mind is impossible, there, too, punishableness and punishment are abrogated; in case of accelerated change of particles, too, punishment would not even hit its proper object. In place of the delusion of free self-determination, materialism exhorts us to put the consciousness of necessity, as if the consciousness of a necessity did not itself presuppose in turn the consciousness of a freedom.[2] For that which we must of absolute necessity do, would no longer appear to us necessary if we had no knowledge of freedom. To the doctrine that there is only matter and no mind, that man is wholly dependent on the motion of matter, even Plato, in his day, opposed the fact that man can set himself against his body and its impulses; if the soul were only the sum or the product of the body, and not an independent thing, how comes it, he asks, that the soul can rule the body?

According to Vogt, morality and its idealism become an

[1] *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, iv. p. 271 sq. *Zur Apologie des Atomismus.*

[2] Schaller, *l.c.*, Abschnitt iv. p. 43.

illusion, which he has no means of distinguishing from selfishness. Lange, Carneri, and others talk of an ethical materialism: benevolence, sympathy, social tendencies, they say, are founded in nature itself, as the very animal world shows. But these affections do not amount to pure love, but only to a higher form of selfishness. Materialism, engrossed with the details of sensuous functions, can recognise no universal, and absolutely valuable, spiritual good. It holds that to be good which is useful, and which corresponds to given conditions. But since materialism, according to its principles, must *deny the moral realm itself*, here is the point where it stumbles upon conscience, and, if it adheres to itself, becomes unmoral, becomes spiritual suicide, the murder of conscience. It is possible to attempt to discard morality, but morality does not let itself be discarded. It is impossible for man to be destitute of reference to moral good; the law is laid upon him that he must be connected with the idea of morality, at least in an immoral way, if he will not be so in a moral way. At this point there is only one moral decision—for or against. And materialism, according to its own principles, must also concede the power of the moral sense to decide us against materialism; for, according to its own theory, if we thus decide, we do so, as we do everything, of necessity. But if it demands of the will, as it also does, to follow it as a new evangel, it falls at once out of its role, and has recourse to a principle which overturns materialism itself. It has recourse to free will and a universal law, a universal truth, the knowledge of which is a universal duty, while at the same time it denies everything spiritual and universal.

The case is similar with other contradictions made by materialism. On the one hand, it denies all freedom, and insists on physical necessitarianism, and therefore would have to deem *tyranny* or *absolutism* justifiable wherever this is found; but, on the other hand, it is accustomed to wave the banner of extreme liberty. All *punishment*, even that for murder, it designates as an unjust invention of the majority made on their own behalf; on the other hand, the judges who pronounce sentence of death, it does not excuse, as according to its doctrine of universal necessity it ought to do, but actually calls them criminals. Likewise it preaches *progress*, the shaking off of all superstition and all fetters, and it imagines itself to

be in the front rank of progress. But in truth it is absolute stability; there is nothing left to it but the atoms and their aimless motion. By reducing everything to rotation and change of particles, it divests history of all meaning and aim. It will not be dependent upon ideas and ideals; therefore, instead of that, it must be in slavish dependence upon matter. For necessity is more degrading and depressing in materialism than with Spinoza. He secures to the individual, as over against other things, a sort of independence, by the dependence of everything upon substance, while materialism makes the whole man dependent upon matter and change in matter.

Materialism does not see what even the Pythagoreans saw when opposing the Ionic Hylozoists, namely, that the main thing in the cosmos is not matter, but the forming and shaping of matter — the formative principle. This principle might, with greater justice than matter, be called the essential thing in the notion of the world, since matter, as something material, exists for the sake of the self-manifestation of the formative principle. If, now, materialism does not insist on being simply silent about this which is of most importance, of most value, namely, the fashioning of the world, its harmonious teleological order; then, since design, if not universally, yet irresistibly, obtrudes itself, the materialist must transfer rational, mysterious purposes, the power of thought, to the atoms themselves, which are his efficient causes, and make them intelligences. If this is done in a monistic way, or so that matter in itself and as such is to have this power working teleologically, then we have in matter latent mind, the monads of Leibnitz, to which Czolbe would lead us. Or else, in addition to matter a second principle, force, must be required, which joins itself to matter—a force which, in order to explain the phenomena, must participate in intelligence; but *this* force is then itself again a substance, and only another name for soul.

To sum up all, then, materialism is equivalent to a reduction of the cosmos to what is absolutely elementary, to atoms or primordial elements which work aimlessly, mechanically, and yet necessarily, and which alone are supposed to have actual being. For with its mechanical way of thinking, it must simply ignore the living individual forms, which, amid change of matter, maintain their identity, and present themselves to us as units

ruled by a purpose. Just so with sensibility, thought, self-consciousness, will, the whole world of history; materialism annihilates the cosmos no less than in its way absolute idealism does, and there remains for it only a whirling chaos of atoms, without goal, aim, intelligence, without mind, without virtue, without God.[1] The attempts to derive something spiritual from motion, especially the so-called reflex motion and its various sorts, by which, according to the law of the equivalence of forces, the same matter, *e.g.* ether, is said to become warmth, electricity, magnetism, etc., furnish anything rather than evidence for materialism. They lead, at the most, to distant analogies, but in all these motions there is nothing of life, of thought, of self-consciousness.

So then materialism must recognise a formative principle lying outside of it; and that principle is mind, the thinking and acting force. Yet this force is not to be conceived of as being at bottom merely matter or nature; for then there would still be no real distinction between mind and nature; mind would be nothing but conscious and willing nature, and would itself be lost in being the consciousness and mirror of nature. If mind is to be distinguished from nature, it must also know itself as mind, and must be something as mind; it must be able to distinguish itself from nature, and to put itself over against nature. Not till it possesses itself as mind, and is itself the contents of its consciousness and will, does it cease to be overwhelmed by the nature which fills it. But it is a substance by itself, different from nature, if it apprehends itself not merely as turned towards nature, but also in its own independence, that is, if it is endowed with a world of ideas which can be developed by it—a world of eternal truths, to which also belong God and divine things.

4. By claiming both a natural and a spiritual side for the moral equipment of man, two fundamental heresies in morals are excluded—spiritualism or idealism, which would recognise

[1] With this agrees the academical address of Du Bois Reymond, *Die sieben Welträthsel*, 1880. Cf. *Deutsche Rundschau*, Sept. 1881, and Edmond de Pressensé, *Die Ursprünge*, übersetzt von Fabarius, 1884. [In Eng., *A Study of Origins*, Lond. 1883.] As unexplained enigmas Du Bois Reymond gives: The essence of matter and of force, the origin of motion and of life, the apparently intentional contrivances in nature, the origin of simple sensation, of thought and self-consciousness, and of freedom of will.

only the rational side as existent, and materialism. Rather, both sides belong together: but how? They cannot stand side by side indifferent and without relation to each other; in order to constitute the human unit, they must have an inward connection. On the other hand, they cannot be regarded as of equal value or co-ordinate, but, without losing their difference, must have rank and place appropriate to their essential character. But this is the subordination of the physical element to the spiritual, especially to the ethical. The inward connection is to be manifested in the fact that each of the two, the natural side and the rational side, is *by virtue of its own nature brought into relation to the other*. The rational side, which, by virtue of its moral destination, or by virtue of its very nature, first apprehends itself through law, points of itself to the natural side as that which is to be shaped by its standard. *Forma appetit materiam*. The natural side in man points of itself to the rational side: for, as plastic material, it awaits the activity and shaping power of the latter. *Materia appetit formam*. For the unifying of the two through consciousness and will is the moral work to be done; and this is attainable only by means of that full efficiency of the spiritual side of the personality which is the result of moral self-cultivation in fellowship with God. The perfection of both sides, however, and their complete union, cannot come immediately from nature through the act of creation, but is an ethical product, in which the act and freedom of man must participate. The union of the mind with nature and with God lies in man only as a possibility; and the rise of the idea of morality in the mind has by no means as its immediate consequence the realization of the ethical end; knowledge does not work necessitatingly upon the will. Nature and spirit do not immediately by physical necessity adjust themselves to the consciousness of law; and this fact is not to be regarded as an evil; for otherwise there would be no place for free decision in favour of the good.

The connection of nature and mind is therefore at the outset necessarily of that sort which still leaves room for not merely a single but a double possibility: for the normal one, foretokened by the very notion of nature and mind, and for

the abnormal one. The original union is merely a dissoluble union. The abnormal possibility is itself again of a twofold sort: either the divorce of nature from the rule of the mind, *i.e.* the dominion of nature over mind; or the estrangement of the mind from nature, a merely negative relation to nature. The latter belongs to the category of spiritualistic heresy, the former to that of materialistic heresy. Together with the possibility of the twofold abnormal development, however, the normal course is also to be considered; in this the progress of knowledge is followed by a progress of the will and of moral power, which is equal, physically and mentally, to the task of making ethical everything that is merely innate and, in this sense, merely natural.

5. The necessity of *manifoldness*, or the *principle of individualization* in the moral world. For a moral world there is needed not merely a multitude of natural and of mental objects, divided the one from the other. The multitude might be a mere repetition of one and the same thing. What real value could there be in making more than once what is wholly identical? With justice Leibnitz laid down the *principium indiscernibilium, i.e.* the principle of the identity of the indistinguishable. Nothing connected, especially no organism, could come from mere identity; mere identity would, instead of true union, only amount to the atomistic aggregation of a sand-heap. If every individual sought to be, or were, the whole, instead of *for* the whole (the outcome of the position of Kant and of Fichte), then an organic combination would be out of the question; there could only be disconnectedness, and the world would become an infinite repetition. To prepare the world to be a moral world, therefore, it is essential also that the single beings in the world, although relative wholes, be really distinct from one another, not merely distinct in space and time, but capable of supplementing one another. It is therefore an advance in ethics as necessary as it is great, when Schleiermacher accords to individuality, or personal peculiarity, an essential, objective, imperishable significance in the moral world.

But if, now, individuality should be emphasized so far as to leave nothing identical in the different individuals, then again the consequence would be precisely the same as if an exclusive

identity prevailed; the individuals would remain disconnected, for ever flying away from one another, repelling one another, incapable of entering into the relation of mutually giving and receiving. Thus again the unity of the moral organism would be destroyed, and even the very idea of morality itself. For it would no longer be possible to maintain that morality is one and the same thing in the multiplicity of persons, even on the assumption that this one morality may be most manifold in form. So then it is only when there is this antithesis of sameness and of individuality (which is by no means a contradiction, but requires a co-operation of both), that ethical life and an ethical organism are possible. The Apostle Paul has already taught this in 1 Cor. xii. and xiv.

We can now pass on to the syllabus of the first part.

B.—SYSTEM OF ETHICS.

FIRST PART. FOUNDATION.

§ 9*a*. *Syllabus.* (Cf. p. 51 sq.)

The *First Part* of Ethics treats of the divine order of the world as the antecedent condition on which the possibility of morality in general depends; and it falls into three divisions. (1) In creation God has in view a relatively independent moral world, a second world upon the basis of the first or *natural* world. (2) The *formal law* of the ethical activity of the created forces is to be described; and (3) the *practical* end of this activity—an end which not merely precedes the creation as a thought in God, but which is also innate in the world from the beginning as the end which it is to attain, and which in the form of requirement sets the moral process on foot. Accordingly—

DIVISION I. Treats of the order of the world in itself as established by God in creation, irrespective of the moral process.

DIVISION II. Treats of the order of the world as constitutionally adapted to a formal moral process.

DIVISION III. Treats of the moral order of the world as the practical goal of the moral process.

FIRST DIVISION.

OF THE ORDER OF THE WORLD ESTABLISHED ORIGINALLY, OR AT CREATION, AS THE PREREQUISITE OF MORALITY, AND CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO THE PHYSICAL, THE PSYCHICAL, AND THE RATIONAL NATURE, AS THESE THREE ARE PRIMARILY CONSTITUTED AND CONNECTED.

FIRST SECTION. That which is common in the moral faculties with which man is endowed.

SECOND SECTION. Individuality.

THIRD SECTION. The spontaneous working of the moral faculties towards union.

FIRST SECTION.

In the first section, in three chapters, that which is common in the moral constitution of man is to be considered, according to the above-named three aspects of his nature, as Physical, Psychical, and Rational.

CHAPTER FIRST.

MAN'S NATURAL OR PHYSICAL ENDOWMENT BY CREATION.

§ 10.

Man, although destined for a moral existence, is first made by God a finite natural being. But the moral end for which he is made is subserved both by the fact that he is a natural and finite being in general, and also by the fact that he has a multitude of powers, senses, and impulses, which have their centre in the oneness of his *ego*, or in his natural personality.[1]

[1] [Literature: Fick, *Physiologie und Anatomie der Sinnesorgane*, 1864. Wundt, *Lehrbuch der Physiologie des Menschen*, 1873, 3rd ed. *Physiologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen über die Menschen- und Thierseele*, 1863. Joh. Müller, *Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen.* [*Elements of Physiology*, translated by W. Baly, 2 vols., London 1837–42.—TR.] J. Ranke, *Grundzüge der Physiologie des Menschen*, 2nd ed. 1872. L. F. Helmholtz, *Die Lehre von*

1. *Finiteness* is often regarded as an imperfection, or even as an evil; indeed, many see in it the source of wickedness: for it constitutes, they say, at any rate a deficiency, whether it be through matter, or through the limitation which it involves. Ethics teaches, on the other hand, that finiteness is to be considered as a good thing, without which human morality would be wholly impossible, and God alone would be existent. We are finite, not for the reason that we are defective or connected with matter which is hostile to spirit. Neither inward nor outward finiteness is in itself a defect.

(*a*) The *inward* metaphysical ground of our finiteness lies in the fact that we do not have in ourselves the ground or principle of our existence, that we are not self-existent,—in other words, in the fact that we are creatures. The creature, made by God and not by itself, is given to itself; but that is neither defectiveness nor a cause of defects. It is true that this involves absolute dependence upon God, without which there would be nothing except God. Absolute dependence seems, indeed, to be not favourable, but opposed, to morality. For in morality the essential thing is the positing of one's self in willing and knowing;—it is one's own production of the shape or form of his moral life. But certain as it is that absolute dependence as such is not morality, it no less certainly forms the antecedent condition of morality, and is essential in order to the possibility of morality. This is so, indeed, only because the absolute divine causality and the absolute dependence of man do not exclude, but include, the self-positing of the created being, on the ground of his having been posited; as will be more distinctly shown later under the

den Tonempfindungen. [*On the Sensations of Tone*, translated by A. J. Ellis, 2nd ed., Longmans & Co., 1885.—Tr.] *Physiologische Optik.* Volkmann, *Physiologische Untersuchungen im Gebiete der Optik*, Leipzig 1863. Ribot, *Die experimentelle Psychologie der Gegenwart in Deutschland.* [Also *English Psychology*, 1873, translated from the French.—Tr.] Fechner, *Psychophysik.* Mueller, *Zur Grundlegung der Psychophysik.* Liebmann, *Analysis der Wirklichkeit*, 1876, Abschn. 2, 2nd ed. Ulrici, *Gott und der Mensch*, 2nd ed. 1874. Harms, *Die Philosophie in ihrer Geschichte*, 1876. *Psychologie*, 1874, especially p. 104 sq. Zeller, *Messung psychischer Vorgänge.* Lotze, *Grundzüge der Psychologie*, 1881. *Mikrokosmus.* [In English, *Microcosmus, an Essay concerning Man and his Relation to the World*, translated by Elizabeth Hamilton and E. E. C. Jones. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1885.—Tr.] Further literature, see above, § 9. 3, § 15.—Ed.]

topic of freedom. At present, only the following: Since God's creative activity is of an ethical character, and since He has made the world for morality, He has designed that the creature shall be a participator in his own self-production, namely, as an ethical creature. For morality requires conscious, spontaneous activity, and therefore the endowment requisite for it. But, on the other hand, this involves that just in order to have the dignity of an ethical being, man ought not to be at the very outset all that he can become and is to become. And however high he may stand as over against the rest of the natural creation, yet, in comparison with his destination, he must begin with a meagre reality, but at the same time be endued with an infinitely rich and pure possibility of self-development and self-culture. And even his original deficiency brings with it the advantage that he can as much as possible be a conscious and voluntary participator in the work of his own self-culture (1 Cor. iii. 9). This deficiency is a seal of his ethical destination, but no defect, although pointing to original want of perfection. Man is thus confined to temporal conditions, and is finite in respect to time. But this apparent deficiency, this gradualness of development, is favourable to the moral building up of our personality. For now we ourselves can determine and seize every factor one after the other in our progress; the growth can now be effected by means of ever newly-awakening desire after still further progress on the foundation of that which has been previously made.

Note. — We have already had to insist on the essential likeness of moral goodness in God and of morality in man. Now by way of supplement follows their difference. First, God alone has absolute ethical aseity, and it is only a copy of this which is found in the moral self-shaping of man. Secondly, God is holy love perfected *eternally;* what in man can be only successive, in God is simultaneously eternally present. Finally, although in man there is the fundamental disposition which as such wills the good in general, yet the realization of the good can be promoted by him only in one part of the total work; whereas God's good and holy will continually embraces in providential comprehensiveness the whole and every individual part, one in the other. His good and gracious will is compre hensively directed at every moment towards producing and preserving the whole moral organism of the world, or the

kingdom of God. For us, on the contrary, the limitation to one field is even a condition of mastership in every kind of ethical productiveness.

(*b*) Man, however, is finite, not merely inwardly and naturally, *i.e.* limited by his absolute dependence on God and by the necessity of growth. He is also limited in *outward* respects in a threefold manner: by his body, by nature, and by the human race. Only on the basis of individual corporeality does personality spring up; only through the medium of the body does the spirit come to an existence which is capable of manifesting itself and of working with power in the world. Nature is not the mother of mind; mind is not an efflorescence of nature; therefore, also, body is not mind or a potency of mind. But by means of mind, which has the power of life in itself, matter becomes animated and organized;[1] and by the fact that mind manifests itself as soul, matter becomes body. The soul upholds the body; but it is also in its state and activity conditioned by the body.

As over against *nature*, man is not merely limited in time and space, but he is also originally helpless, in need of nature, and dependent on it because of the nature which he has in himself, viz. the body.

Lastly, the finiteness of man is shown also in his relation to the race; not the individual is *the* man; others have what I have not: they are my limitation.

But this threefold limitation subserves morality and is thus a good; it is that which makes possible a threefold moral life in receptivity and activity. For first, the *body* is the organ of the mind; through it both other minds and also what is not mental are yet brought into relation to the mind. For the body is the vehicle by which the outward world can work upon the mind, and can be taken in by it. But none the less is the body the organ by which the mind can operate on that which it is not, whether nature or mind. In both these ways together it becomes, as it were, the abode, the mirror, and the visible copy, of the mind, and also the medium through which the mind attains reality. It is therefore not a mere limit, a bound; it is also a bond of union with the outward world; and it is thus capable of serving as a means

[1] Gen. i. 20 sq., 24 sq., ii. 7.

whereby the mind overcomes restraints and liberates itself in the exercise of thought and volition; it does not serve merely to limit the mind in relation to other things.

Nature outside of us, moreover, is a material, which on the one hand is to be apprehended, on the other to be acted on. It is capable of receiving the seal of mind, of symbolizing its ideas in sensible copies, *e.g.* in language; but it is also capable of becoming an instrument of its activity, an extension, as it were, of the bodily organ.

Finally, the limitation through *mankind*, the difference between us and other beings of our race, is the prerequisite of a social life, serving both to enrich one's own being and to supplement one's work.

2. We come now to consider more particularly *the universal or common endowments of men as finite individuals.* In this relation, it is true, man is only the acme of nature itself; but even as such he is something great, bearing not obscurely in himself the seal of his moral destination. For the whole sum of the faculties, which inhere in him as a finite being, is indispensable in order to an actual moral existence; and only in such an existence do these faculties attain their final destination, although even irrespective of morality they are somewhat in themselves. Even before the consciousness of something which has infinite universal worth is awakened or given, man is not merely a multiplicity of faculties, impulses, and sensibilities, but they are all centralized by the *ego* (Gen. ii. 7; 1 Cor. xv. 45). Man is not merely a union of body and soul like the brute creation, but a union of animated body and personal soul. And this centralization works in a reflex way on the body. The body also, on its part, even before the actual *ego* exists, yet, because united with a soul about to become a person, is a living centre in the system of natural life, and likewise presents a real prototype of the coming personality. The human body is the *specific organ for the personality*, and therein essentially different from brute body[1] (1 Cor. xv. 45).

The idea of the human body, which lies in the relation of the body to the personality, is directed towards making the body always in one respect the organ of the personal mind.

[1] Schaller, *l.c.* 217 sq.

Hence, though the differences between man and other creatures, *e.g.* apes, may seem slight in single instances, yet they run through the whole, and always in the same respect which has been specified. Though the brutes have eyes, ears, etc., yet they hear tones otherwise than man does; though they, as well as we, see pictures or flowers, yet they do not see in them the same thing as we. That the organs of man in comparison with those of brutes always point to what is truly human, is effected partly by slight variations; but just these variations show that the organs are intended for a person and for his purposes. This is illustrated, *e.g.*, by the position of the eyes, the ears, and the head; it has been shown that a slight variation in the external ear is that which enables us to perceive musical tones as such. But let us enter somewhat more into detail.

The whole bodily organism of man contains wonderful *teleological* contrivance. This is seen not merely in what is in it, but also in the absence of such things as the brute creation brings into the world as its ready-made natural equipment. The eye exists for the light, the ear for sound, and the lungs for air. To man is denied the instinct which makes other creatures early mature, but which also greatly restricts their perfectibility, and almost makes needless the task of self-perfection. Man is in each one of the single natural operations of his organism surpassed by other creatures—in strength by some, in speed or in keenness of senses by others. On the other hand, his organism has a flexibility, an elasticity, a capacity for culture, which make him capable of an unlimited development. By virtue of this unbounded perfectibility he is superior to them all. By Blumenbach the human race is designated as *inermis*, but the obverse side of the picture is given in Franklin's designation of man as the *animal instrumentificum*. His elasticity is illustrated especially by his ability to live in all zones, and to take possession of everything, although this is not done without bringing into play the flexible adaptability or accommodation which he assumes, for example, in the differences of the races, in order to maintain himself. He alone is intended to walk upright, as is shown by the structure of the organs of locomotion and the position of the organs of the senses.

Especially worthy of mention is the ingenious construction of the *hand*. The hand is the member in which whole ethical creations have set up their abode, *e.g.* the arts and industries; yes, it is the member which from the beginning helps not merely to symbolize, but also to produce, to mediate, all revelation of inner morality,—as is indicated by the etymology of the word "Handeln" [Eng. to act]. In the hand are united the ability to feel and the ability to work.[1]

The senses may be called the susceptibility of the soul for the outward world and its wealth. Among the various theories of perception, that, indeed, has the least in its favour which regards the soul as a blank tablet to be written on by the senses. Rather in the thinking mind is inborn an essential reference to everything which exists, since everything existent is itself also thought, namely, realized thought. The mind has from creation the capacity to know about existing things, but yet it is not furnished with innate ideas, nor with an innate knowledge of single things, which are undergoing continual flux and change. On the other hand, when the senses are stirred by the continually-present outward world, it comes to pass that, as by a stroke of magic, the image of surrounding things is produced by the sense-impressions, and is allured forth from the soul, accompanied with the consciousness that we have to do not merely with subjective conceptions, but with intuitions of reality, which present material for action.

The *voice*, furthermore, which is given to the higher beings, becomes in man the gift of speech. This gift is of the highest importance with reference to the position of man in the world, and it reacts to enhance the value of the senses. By means of speech, the ear, the most intellectual of the senses, first attains its higher significance; by means of speech, also, an exchange between the different senses takes place, a translation, as it were, from the one into the other. The word, which is properly for the ear, becomes writing by means of the hand, and is made accessible to the eye, for which the word itself is insufficient. The writing

[1] The *Bridgewater Treatises* contain an admirable dissertation on the ingenious teleological construction of the hand. Cf. also Giebel, *Die menschliche Hand*, in the *Zeitschr. für die gesammte Naturwissenschaft*, vol. xli. 1873.

is again translated for the ear by means of speech. Everything seen can be clothed in words, and thus be represented to the ear, in order to be an object for the mind, even when the immediate vision is inadequate to make it such. Thus it comes to pass by means of speech, which is, as it were, the universal mental medium of exchange, that the various senses take the place of one another; one undertakes the office of another, as, *e.g.*, even the blind can read by the sense of touch, and the deaf hear by the vicarious sense of vision, the prerequisite for all this being the existence of a general indifferent medium of exchange and of understanding.

By speech nature is, to the widest extent, mediately and immediately used for the world of thought and appropriated by the mind; from the fleeting word of the tongue, which wondrously weaves out of air a body for thought, and presents it for the moment an animate object, up to the written characters, in which thought lies rigid and enchained, but also acquires permanent fixedness, so that, being capable of a reawakening at any time, it almost divests itself of transitoriness, and can remain present for distant times; from this again up to the invention of the press, which conquers not only the transitoriness of time, but also of space, by investing with a certain omnipresence and perpetuity the thought and word which were uttered at one place and in one time, and by being able to collect together in every place the most important things that have happened scattered through all places and all times. The domain of speech is so great, indeed, because language is not merely a natural gift, but also a moral product; nevertheless, *everything* in it is only the evolution and the use of the endowments and faculties which are inborn and distinctively human.

Finally, let us glance at the natural endowment of man for self-preservation and reproduction. All living beings have the power of self-preservation, by which they keep their identity amidst all change of matter—a unity which therefore is something else than matter. The preservation of things is essentially involved in the creative will. But preservation is not possible without allowing a causality to them (Gen. i. 12, 22, 28). The first function of their causality is self-preservation, or self-reproduction. This takes place, first, by

continual assimilation of material, which repairs what is consumed, and incorporates with the organism and its vital process the matter which outside of this organism is inanimate. But the living creature also preserves itself as a *species*, which can be undying amid the change of individuals; the individuals are here the organs of the species which maintains and propagates itself through them. In man the capacity for this self-reproduction attains moral significance through the will, and is the foundation of important departments of morals.

In all these attributes, gifts, and functions comprised in the divine idea of man, in their normal character or soundness and vigour, and again in the harmonious vitality and beauty of this organism, are to be seen so many good things, which really deserve this name, and are in the sight of God themselves of worth (Gen. i. 31). There is something sacred in them; and wantonness which injures them is an encroachment on God's order; hence they are included in the moral world. The guarding of these good gifts, their increase and development, is a part of the ethical work itself; it is included in the process of reducing the world to moral order. It is true that the care and culture of them may possibly be destitute of the higher, central, ethical meaning, and may perhaps treat them not as means in furtherance of the highest general end. Nevertheless they also are comprehended under the general end as something to be cared for. Even if there is as yet no moral disposition to protect their normal sacred order against caprice and disturbance, yet they already form a part of what morality has to deal with. Hence also even in this lowest sphere there is a physical analogue of virtue, namely, that *efficiency* of the bodily organism which is to be gained and guarded; and in this self-preservation of normal nature the creative will is affirmed and confirmed by the human will; and the latter is in the exercise of this function good in its kind, although not yet possessed of moral character.

Note.—From the high position we must give to nature and corporeality, it cannot be inferred that the importance of the ethical process in the world's history consists in general, as Rothe makes it, in the subjection of matter, or in the production of spirit, as the union of the real and the ideal. The final cause

of the world is rather the production of love, which, however, needs nature in order to its expression and dissemination: Love, in its treatment of nature, affirms the laws of the first creation, takes them up into its will, and treats all things according to their several kinds, but for its own end. The ethical process must indeed adapt itself to the immanent laws of the normal movement of life in nature, but it does so only so far that thereby the manner is determined in which love, which fixes the goal and directs the process, shall attain its own goal.

CHAPTER SECOND.

THE PSYCHICAL ELEMENT IN MAN'S MORAL CONSTITUTION, IRRESPECTIVE AS YET OF REASON.

§ 11.

The natural personality is a unity which persists in the midst of the alterations of the bodily organism, and remains identical with itself by virtue of the *soul*. The soul is fitted for morality by its so-called fundamental faculties in general; but in particular by the capacity which these faculties have of being determined by one another; and further, by the soul's capacity of existing both as an *agent*, having the power to act, and as a state, involving the possibility of *character*.

1. From the Physical we pass to the Psychical. Since it is necessary to assume that the body and the soul are two things (§ 9), but it is not sufficient to assume a mere dualism, the question arises, how the connection of body and soul is ensured. The middle term, essential on the side of matter, is its susceptibility for force, life, soul, etc. Matter, therefore, is not merely that which is inert, at rest, impenetrable; it is also that which is susceptible of force, or is the power of receiving life, soul, etc.; and by its susceptibility it points to the higher thing by which the susceptibility is to be satisfied, and awaits it as the determining power. And so we see how, from the lowest stages where life and force seem to be still overpowered by matter, nature rises to ever freer, higher

forms,—to plants, which already appropriate matter to themselves and elaborate it for their growth, and from plants on to animal life. Though the animal soul has more ability to govern the body, *locomotio*, still the brute is not able to contrast the soul with the body. His soul has, as the object of its perception and desire, his body and its affections. No higher stage in nature is reached till the ideal principle in it has come to such strength that it can set itself over against everything which is not itself. But the soul can do this only by being first of all something by and of itself, by being able to set itself over against itself; without this it could not oppose other things to itself. The product of this act is the *ego*. If self-consciousness exists, then there is given a fixed point which in the change of things and of perceptions remains the same. Thereby man, instead of being lost in the outside world, can rescue himself from its current.

By this consciousness of identity, now, there is set up, as it were, a fixed mirror in which the changing multiplicity of things reflects itself, and is even brought together as in a permanent point of union. In this way consciousness, which can take in all possible things, acquires the character of universality, and, as a susceptibility for everything existent and perceptible, stretches out beyond the individual *ego* and becomes consciousness of the world. And the development of this universal side of the *ego* is of importance in relation to the will and its freedom of choice: by virtue of the fact that the soul, as *ego*, has a universal character, containing in itself infinitely numerous possibilities of volitions, it can rescue itself from the sensations and impulses, can draw back from their immediate power into its own universal being, can set them over against itself, check them, deny them, or will something different from that to which they may impel.

2. With the *ego* is connected the consideration of the further psychical character of man. The one soul, as human or as *ego*, has *three forms of existence*, called also fundamental faculties; they are sensibility, cognition, will. The details belong to the province of psychology; in considering man's ethical constitution we are concerned chiefly with the capacity of each of the three to be determined by the others, and especially of them all to be determined by the will. Feeling, will,

cognition are indeed not absolutely separated from one another, but rather are from the beginning comprehended by the natural personality as their centre of unity. Yet they are not on that account one and the same; they are at first even relatively separable; they may be unequal in their development, they may even oppose one another. Perfect interpenetration or oneness is what they can and should attain by a process of moulding one another; and this is a work which morality has to do, for which work indeed a rule is requisite that shall fix the manner in which this reciprocal moulding is to be effected. They are also not perfect each by itself at the outset, but can become so only in connection with one another, by mutual influence and determination. Thereby the original union, which is at first, as it were, only prefigurative, typical, and superficial, is to become affirmed and established as an intensive, living union through the will. Hence, under this aspect, we consider these three —sensibility, cognition, will—up to the point where they are directed towards the infinite. In its coming forth from itself in order to exercise itself, the soul is *will;* in taking an outward thing into its inmost self, it is *cognitive;* in the mean between these two opposite functions, but at the same time connecting them, are the *feelings.* We here somewhat anticipate the doctrine of the moral process (Div. II.), in order to take a survey of the psychical traits which make the moral process possible.

3. *The Feelings.*—Even in the brute the soul has a sort of selfhood; but this is a sense of having such and such an organism—a sense of life. The state of the organism is reflected into the sentient soul of the brute, but this soul does not *possess* itself in its selfhood; man does, however. And so his selfhood comes to be of a personal sort—feeling in the narrower sense; it is not mere sensation, and also not mere immediate feeling, but the perception that the feeling of the physical and mental condition is his own. This is in the first place a *feeling of self,* in which that which is felt and that which feels are one and the same subject. But the feeling can also have something else than the *ego* for its object, though, to be sure, only so far forth as the *ego* is inwardly affected or moved by it. So far forth as this other object can be an object of thought, we call the feeling of this other thing an

intellectual feeling, directed towards truth. Although as yet the modification of the *ego* by the object is the predominant thing in what takes place,—for it is feeling,—yet this feeling forms the transition to objective conception and thought.

The second thing is the *practical feeling* of the value of the object, as an object of the will—not merely of its value to the individual *ego*; for the practical feeling can also rightly express a determination of general objective value; the feeling appealed to by the value of the object has likewise a universal side to it. That which is agreeable to the practical feeling of the soul becomes an object of pleasure and desire; that which is repulsive to this feeling is what excites displeasure, is an object of repugnance or abhorrence. If the feeling is of a sensuous sort, but joined with *impulse*, while knowledge or clear thought still remain in the background, there arises *appetency*. The practical feeling can be directed towards anything whatever which can have value for a person,—towards happiness and its advantages, towards beauty, but also towards truth so far as it is regarded as a valuable good, and towards moral good properly so called.

Although this judgment of value can be expressed in pure objective thought, or conception, by which the valuable object becomes an *end*, yet the seat of the apperception of worth is in the feeling. This feeling is the perception of the prearranged harmony between the object and the person's own nature, *i.e.* the perception of the enhancement of his own being by means of this object. Also this feeling of value cannot cease when the valuable thing becomes an object of thought or choice; but it runs all through these as an accompaniment, and lends to them both their intensity. The *thought*, into which the valuable object is taken up as an idea, secures clearness and permanence, and guards the feeling itself from relapsing into merely passive sensation. But the practical feeling is directed primarily towards the *will*. The feeling, laid hold of by the value of the object, impels the will to become practically united with the object; and inasmuch as thus the feeling becomes a soul for the will, it is called *incitement* [*Triebfeder*], whereas *thought*, in so far as it would move or determine the will, is called *ground* or *reason* [*Beweggrund*]. But yet the thought, or reason, becomes an

actually moving force only by passing through the feelings, that is, by becoming likewise an incitement; and this union of reason and incitement may be called *motive*. The feelings can also determine the *will* immediately, without first passing through the medium of thought, that is, determine it unconsciously as in *appetency;* but thought cannot conversely determine the will without the feelings. The unconscious incitement is merely the union of sensation and impulse [*Trieb*], that is, appetency.

By flowing out in thought and will, feeling does not lose itself; the soul always returns into itself, into its inmost self, or feeling,—into the simple, primary totality of the mind. But it is only by means of will and thought that feeling becomes morally educated feeling,—a fact of the highest importance, *e.g.* in the matter of piety. It is frequently thought that one has no control over his feelings, that they cannot be determined by the will; they even seem to have worth only so far as they are free natural feelings. But from an ethical point of view it must be insisted on, that even feeling is an object of education, that there is an educated moral feeling. The training is accomplished, to be sure, not directly in a positive way; yet it is not merely negatively that one can influence the sensibilities, or repress them, instead of yielding, *e.g.*, to one's moods; the sensibilities can also be positively, at least indirectly, educated, by the will and cognition familiarizing themselves with ideal realms, in which the feelings also are interested. And as feeling can be excited and fixed by the objects of cognition and will, so too these can determine the feeling by the *state* of being which they must attain (see below).

4. *Cognition* or *Consciousness.*—In the sensation and perception of an outward object, the soul is primarily determined only by the senses; this is therefore passive cognition. But yet even this comes to pass only by means of a reaction of the cognitive function against mere passiveness, that is, by means of activity; and the more, now, the consciousness is determined by the will, which on its part carries in itself a feeling of the worth of things,—*i.e.* the more cognition is made, in the wider sense, ethical,—so much the more is a progress in cognition at once manifest. Consciousness thus

becomes freed from passiveness, from being merely given up to the sense-perception; consciousness comes to be actively passive, *i.e.* to *will* to be determined by an object, *e.g.* in *attention;* and this alone is receptivity which is living—not merely immediate, but determined by the will. The will, directed towards the consciousness as sense-perception, projects out of itself the object of the sensuous impression, or more strictly, the image or conception of it, puts this before itself *of its own accord*, and directing itself towards this fixed conception, analyses it, according to its characteristics, in the exercise of *judgment*, but brings these characteristics again into relation to an underlying unity, embraces them in a generic *notion*, and appropriates the object to itself, or comprehends it. Thus consciousness is *thinking* consciousness.

To the world of conceptions, in which the will is already active as a plastic and creative will, although in the character of consciousness, is next joined the cognitive activity in the form of *imagination* and *fancy*. This activity freely uses these conceptions and perceptions as its own material, and freely combines their objects. Here the idea of *beauty* finds its domain. The forms thus produced are primarily only inward, without objective independent existence—affections of the conceiving soul itself, and not disengaged from it till the will comes in more powerfully, and, being seized by artistic feeling, gives to the pictures of fancy an objective outward existence.

But when now the plastic will, which unites with consciousness, and causes it to create ideals, is animated, not merely by the idea of beauty, but by that of truth, then the shaping and creating of ideals takes place beyond the world of forms and of art in the sphere of *independent thought*. The highest stage of this independent thought is the cognition of universal truth, the thought of that which is *à priori* necessary. It is comprehension no longer in a mere empirical sense, but in a higher sense, to which belongs not merely cognition of the What, and of actual existence, or the That, but also the cognition of the Why. It is not merely perception and notion, but also the grounds for both. Thus we have the three categories of reality, possibility, and necessity. Thinking which is shaped by the will, or by personality, is the intellectual activity of the mind. The intellect is neither merely passive

nor merely the play of consciousness, as imagination may be; it receives its direction from the love of truth, from the choice of truth; but it must follow this direction according to its own law, the necessary law of thought.

Finally, when cognition is occupied with what has value for the will, then we have practical, purposing cognition. In its purity and power it is essentially conditioned by the purity of the practical will, and even of the feelings; for all volition, even that directed towards cognition, is animated by the feeling of the worth of the object of volition.

5. Conversely, however, the *will* is more and more educated, and is raised to higher degrees, both by cognition (consciousness and self-consciousness) and by the sensibilities. For impulse is characterized by blindness and want of freedom, because the person who has it cannot as yet distinguish it from himself, so that he is impelled by the impulse, and even continues so absorbed that he has come to be only, as it were, a living impulse, but does not impel *himself*, does not *will*. But while this is so, yet, on the other hand, as soon as the *ego*, or the recognition of self, arises, then the distinguishing between the person and the impulse can also begin; and instead of being overpowered by the impulse, the personality becomes able to set itself up over against the impulse, so that the *ego* can will or not, can sustain a voluntary relation to it.

But the more the cognition becomes enriched in its contents, and is accompanied by the feelings in their attribution of worth to the objects cognized, and by the consciousness of these objects as an end, so much the more is the will able to make progress from being mere caprice to being an intelligent will with a fixed tendency; so much the more does the culture of the will flourish. More particularly, the progress is accomplished thus: The person by his own act, upon receiving an impulse from the self-consciousness which holds the object before him, and from the feelings which are stirred by the object, *opens* [Germ. *erschliesst*] himself to this object, and allows himself to be determined to lay hold of it. This is *resolution* [Germ. *Entschliessung*, literally, unlocking, opening]. It includes, in the first place, a judgment of the voluntary agent concerning the object and its relation to the agent. In the second place, there is in a resolution, although it moves as

yet in a purely interior sphere, nevertheless a reference to the outward world, to action in the world, to a determination of it by means of the mind. With the thought which is to be realized the will joins itself in the resolve, in order to make itself and its organism *a means towards the end*, or in order to lend to thought the power of realization, whereby it can become a cause. *For the thought which wills to become causality is called end* [purpose, Germ. *Zweck*]. So much concerning the so-called powers of the soul as conditions of morality, but as yet apart from the apprehension of the infinite.[1]

6. *Action.*—These faculties, however, are all intended for activity; and in particular, the blending of them together, which has been considered, does not take place of itself, but through acts of the person, by his *action*, in the broader sense of the term. Aristotle likens action to the logical relation of reason and consequence, and to the ontological relation of the cause and the effect of a principle. Yet the principle from which the action emanates, as consequence or effect, is, as Aristotle sees, of a different sort from the principle of logical thought, or from the principles of things in nature. For, he says, in the case of both these the consequence or effect proceeds from its ground or cause necessarily; whereas *that* ground which becomes the cause of action does not produce this effect necessarily, but is a ground which contains more than one possibility. Man in respect to action is *ἀρχὴ κυρία*; and that is the basis of the imputation that strictly he might act otherwise than he does. Rothe designates action as the function of the human personality as such.[2] This holds true if action is taken in the widest sense, according to which every function of the human person when awake is action. Action is to be distinguished from the mere *happening* of something through the participation of the will and the con-

[1] [German: "noch abgesehen von dem Vernehmen des Unendlichen." There is here an allusion to the etymology of "*Vernunft*" (reason), it being derived from *Vernehmen*, to apprehend, perceive; reason being regarded predominantly as a perceptive faculty, perceptive of the higher, infinite objects of thought, especially God, necessary truth, and eternal morality. Cf. the heading of this chapter, and the next chapter, where this conception of the reason is developed. —Tr.]

[2] Ed. 1, i. § 194 [ed. 2, ii. § 222].

sciousness, that is, of the personality. But the powers of the soul do not work like the mere forces of nature; it is not the faculties of the soul which act, but the person acts by means of the faculties, entering into space and time out of his own interior being.

Action is distinguished, not only from occurrences, and from the working of mere natural forces, but also from all other conceivable psychical emotions, blind impulses, or sensations, in which the personality does not co-operate by way of assenting or determining, and so does not form a constituent part. Inasmuch as personality is the union of self-consciousness and will, and in every human act the personality must be present, it follows that every act must involve consciousness and will, though with the greatest variety of degree of participation. But as only persons, and not brutes, can act, so conversely every act of a person is of a moral sort in the equivocal sense, *i.e.* normally moral or not. But from action in the wider sense, with which the ego has some association, we must distinguish action in the *narrower sense*. For although we speak of acts of consciousness, nay, though the mind is a reality only by virtue of acts, which cannot take place without the will, yet acts in the narrower sense are only those acts of the will which have a *deed* as their goal, and which the acts of consciousness or the emotions of the sensibilities subserve only as means; but not those acts in relation to which the will constitutes only a means of cognition, and cognition is the goal. These acts of the will which aim at deeds may, with Fichte, be called *Thathandlungen* [deed-acts], and they are of the most immediate importance with reference to ethics.

In a complete act, feeling, cognition, and volition work together; but the important point is to discern how they work—to analyse the act. The *first* factor is the *practical feeling*, which relates to the worth of the thing which may become an object of the will; it is the feeling which estimates worth. Yet this feeling of pleasure or displeasure may possibly only advance as far as appetency, which carries the will along with it; in that case there is as yet no freedom, because there is no clearness of consciousness. But the course may also normally proceed further; and then, *secondly*, the practical feeling of the worth or worthlessness of the object takes shape

in the *consciousness*, which is active in the character of will, *i.e.* which forms concepts for the will—forms ends. For an *end* is a concept which is addressed to the will, and which presupposes the valuation given in the practical feeling. But starting with the consciousness of the end, the will passes through several other stages before reaching the voluntary act [*Thathandlung*], viz. the stages of *desire*, of *resolve* with *purpose*, and finally of the *deed*. For, *thirdly*, the end recommended by the feeling of worth and fixed by the consciousness awakens in the *ego* a desire for the good which is conceived. Desire is not mere appetency, but it is also not action; in desire the will only opens itself to the alluring power of the good, or the end, which is conceived, and which is ideally present. It is, indeed, not merely passive, and also not yet productive, but receptive, ideally conceptive, in relation to the object, whether good or evil.[1]

When, now, the will inwardly combines with the end which is conceived, and which recommends itself as worthy of realization,—when the will so surrenders itself to the end as to make itself the means of accomplishing it, this is *resolution*, the result of which is *purpose*, resting on the incitement that has grown out of the valuation which the practical feeling and the understanding have exercised. A resolve is no longer a simple desire or longing, mingled with involuntariness, but it is a higher, an inward volition, which involves another subsequent volition, namely, a volition which is to realize the end, a volition of the deed. This is a volition of a volition, a volition in the second degree. The resolve is the volition of a volition which shall not remain inward, but shall be so vigorous and decided that the will becomes a cause, and realizes the end. The resolution forms a fixed point in the present, a conclusion of the wavering, scattered functions of the feelings, of deliberation, and of the will. But all this belongs as yet to the inward sphere; the resolution is an ideal union of the will with the end, but already with inward reference to the future and to the outward realization of the ideal by means of the deed of the active will. The end must all the time remain present as an object of thought and volition, if the act is to be an act formally complete. The

[1] Jas. i. 15, ἐπιθυμία συλλαβοῦσα.

end, as an end placed before the conscious will by virtue of the resolution to realize it, is *purpose* [Germ. *Vorsatz*]; an act is a purposed or deliberate [Germ. *vorsätzlich*] act when it takes place on the basis of a preceding resolution which ended the deliberation, or of a resolution in which the end is set before the present will as an end to be realized in the future. But from the deliberate act is still to be distinguished the *intentional* act. The act is intentional, not merely purposed, when the self-consciousness, consciously conceiving of the end as one that is willed, is *held fast*, together with the means, by the will which is directed towards the attainment of the end.[1] We see from this what a progressive, composite operation a complete act is.

The final factor, *after* the desire (which itself rests on the feeling of worth and on the consciousness which fixes upon the ends to be aimed at) and after the decision, is the *deed*. The end, having taken the form of purpose and intention, receives in the deed its embodiment through the person. The end having become operative as a cause through the will, the process is relatively finished in the product, which now becomes a subject of judgment or valuation. The finished deed is followed by a state of repose in one's self, in which the doer is alone with himself, becomes conscious of himself as such, and the deed returns to the doer. The actor returns to a state of calm self-consciousness or feeling in such a way that the product of the act is taken in as a part of the feeling, and so the feeling which assigns value again finds a place. In pleasure or pain the *ego*, as now modified, has an impression of itself, of its deed, and the worth of the deed. The estimation extends to the productive deed, to the product, and to the agent with whom the deed, as being his own determination, is connected. For the agent has put himself, as a conscious and voluntary causality, into the deed; and now there ensues, with reference to such a complete act, also a complete *imputation*, which is at the same time a taking account of himself by the agent, a referring of the deed back to the *ego* as a unity, as

[1] Rothe, ed. 1, § 196 [ed. 2, ii. § 226]. Herrmann, *Ueber Vorsatz und Absicht*. Aristotle distinguishes purpose and intention (προαίρεσις and βούλησις) thus: the former never aims at the impossible, while the latter may; the former includes also the means, while the latter is directed only to the end.

a conscious and voluntary cause. Yet the reckoning can establish, on the ground of the single deed, only a relative result, since the total worth of the person does not depend merely on a single act.

7. *Relation of the soul as an activity to the soul as a state.*— To the moral constitution belongs not merely the capacity to pass from potentiality into activity, and further into act and deed [cf. p. 130]. It is also an essential part of it that this putting forth of one's self reacts on the faculty which enables what has been acquired in the process of feeling, thinking, and willing to abide as a possession in the form of a state. This is an important element in the moral endowment, without which there could be no actual progress, no connection in self-culture. The activities of the soul are not mere isolated movements, passing away without a trace, like dying coruscations; else it would be necessary always to begin absolutely anew. On the contrary, the earlier acts become steps for the later acts, in that they leave a deposit behind them. They pass over, especially when they form a series, into a state, either of a permanent or of a transient sort. The state after the act is no longer merely a state of repose in one's self, as before the act; but rather the sensibilities after the act receive, through the quality of the act, a modification which, when it is of a more transient sort, is called *mood*. The mood constitutes the groundwork on which cognition and volition impress themselves anew, and it continues to make itself felt in them.

But not only does the totality of the man thus show in his sensibilities an after-effect of the acts; cognition and will also, as faculties, receive in reaction from the acts of cognition and volition a modification of a permanent kind. The soul in the exercise of cognition and will becomes characterized by its own acts. The thing perceived and willed comes, especially after repetition, to be a possession and property, belonging after a sort to the nature of this faculty that cognizes and wills. The volition which has become a nature is *habit;* the cognition which has become a nature, a permanent possession of one's own, is *recollection* and *memory*. Habit is the memory of the will; memory is the habit of cognition. The blending of consciousness and will, which has

become a persistent thing, or a state, is *tendency* or *bent* [*Richtung*]; the blending of feeling, consciousness, and will, when it has become a state, is *inclination*, in which the liveliness of feeling is preserved.

CHAPTER THIRD.

THE RATIONAL ELEMENT IN THE MORAL CONSTITUTION

§ 12.

Man's rational constitution consists in his being destined for that which is infinitely worthy (ultimately for that which is divine), this also being destined for him, primarily for his soul, which thereby becomes reason or spirit. As having sensibilities fitted for immediate fellowship with God, the soul is endowed with the religious reason; in so far as it is addressed by the infinite in the form of truth, the soul is endowed with the intellectual reason; finally, so far forth as that which is absolute for the will, that which is absolutely good, is unconditionally obligatory for it, the soul is endowed with the moral reason. The faculties of intellectual, religious, and moral reason have, notwithstanding their common ultimate source, a relative independence of one another, and are in time dissolubly connected; but yet intrinsically they so belong together that only with and in the others can each attain its full development, so that a circuit of the mental functions is required. The rudiment of the constitution of the ethical reason lies in the moral *feeling*, which unfolds itself into the moral *sense* and *impulse*. But not till the moral sense has become *conscience*, and the moral impulse has become *free will*, not till there is this antithesis between moral necessity and freedom, the members of which are intrinsically related to each other (correlates), is the complete moral constitution actually given.

1. The rationalness of the human soul, however it may be defined, can yet be found only in the relation of the soul to the infinite, or in the fact that the infinite is for the soul and the soul for the infinite. But man is a rational being in every direction of his mental capacities; the infinite is for them all, for each according to its kind. The infinite, *i.e.* God, as related to the sensibilities, produces religion or piety; as related to cognition, ideal or rational knowledge; as related to the will, the possibility of the ethical realm. Schleiermacher, indeed, thinks that the Infinite, or God, can be apprehended only by the feelings, not by cognition or by the will, because, as he says, these two imply an antithesis between the personal subject and the object conceived or willed, whereas God is elevated above the antithesis. But there is no reason to deny that the antithesis between finite and infinite exists for God also; for He knows Himself to be infinite, and the world at the same time to be different from Himself. But, further, the religious feeling apprehends God as objective, not as subjective; and if it be said that man, when he knows and wills, is finite, absolutely inadequate and incompetent to apprehend God, it is to be replied: man is finite in feeling too. Conversely, since Schleiermacher does not deny that morality is of infinite worth, and can yet be an object of will and thought, it is clear that finiteness does not hinder one from being, throughout his whole spiritual nature, susceptible to the Infinite, or God, *i.e.* from participating, as to one's susceptibility, in the Infinite.

But though now there is given the natural endowment in man for piety, for morality, and for the apprehension of truth, though they all subsist in a certain unity in the rational constitution, yet this unity does not obliterate their difference. They are, in fact, in their formative period only dissolubly connected with one another, and *have, in relation to one another, a certain self-subsistence and independence,* although they all, each for itself, come to perfection only with and through the others. We consider this especially with respect to the relation between the moral and the religious side of the rational nature.

2. It might be said that the ultimate source of morality, as well as of religion, is God. The two are, it may be

thought, so intimately connected, that where there is faith in God, there must be morality also, and that where the mind has taken a sceptical or even negative attitude towards the idea of God, there too all morality must be wanting. But that the two, religion and morality, are distinct, is clear from the fact that faith in God does not of necessity immediately lay hold on the will and the cognition; and this is so not merely where the conceptions of God are imperfect and untrue. For a low degree of morality may co-exist even with comparatively pure conceptions of God, and a high degree of morality even with imperfect knowledge of God. Furthermore,—a fact to which Rothe and Ernest Naville direct attention,—persons are observed, especially in the cultivated classes, who have in their inmost being no fixed or clear religious conviction, rather, at the most, a God concealed from their own consciousness, who yet manifests Himself as operating in them in their integrity and social virtues. Such instances occur especially in times when widespread doubt has become a prejudice, and has, as it were, deposited itself upon the consciousness, though this deposit has not penetrated into the depths of the soul. There are persons whose religious convictions have become ruins, while their conscience still remains, like a solitary column, as a monument of a demolished structure; they may still have a lively sense of what is noble and pure, a disgust at everything bad and low. The sense of duty may still continue for a while in man, as a sense of the nobility of human nature, after its religious support is lost. Something similar is seen where a religious culture has not yet been reached at all, but where there is an ethico-humanitarian culture.

Shall we now say, perhaps, in order to solve this enigma, These persons, too, have religion; or even, They are unconscious Christians, since Christianity consists in morality as well as in piety? Is their virtuous life, their devotion to a supersensuous rule of duty, to be regarded as religion? Or, on the other hand, shall we, instead of thus identifying religion and morality, say, There is no essential connection between the two; perfect morality is conceivable without religion? Neither, we answer. In the *first* place, the

identification of the two is excluded by the fact that they can become separated, and can maintain a certain independence in relation to each other. And this independence has its objective ground. Ethical good is, in the conscience and in the ethically constituted reason, an innate possession of the soul, and in such wise that it requires realization, as being that which corresponds to the reason and dignity of man. This is a possession of the practical reason even without *conscious* regress to the primary ethical Being, or God. The opinion can, at least for a time, be held, that the conscience is not a derivative source of moral truth, but the sufficient source, not needing a deeper foundation. If, now, the knowledge be wanting that conscience has its foundation in religion, then there is indeed a religious blindness, that is, a deficiency, which hinders the will from having recourse to the primal source of moral power; but the moral law and the consciousness of it may exist in man even when he does not know their origin. God has indeed a connection, not only with the world in general, but also with those who do not thank Him, or who even deny Him. Yet everything good which they do, they do through His power. But man is able to disregard this relation of God to him, and to dwell in the sphere of that morality or absolute worth which is merely secondary. The relative independence of *religion*, however, is clear from the fact that piety and the interest in it may have advanced in a man farther than the interest in the other departments of morals. Moral sense and moral impulse may be comparatively sluggish and undeveloped.

But, in the *second* place, the *essential connection* of the two is nevertheless just as certain (Matt. xxii. 37, 39). It will always be a stumbling-block to a healthy feeling, when a person who especially emphasizes piety shows himself in moral relations lax, selfish, quarrelsome, censorious, destitute of moral delicacy. The fact remains, that morality belongs to piety, if the piety is at all of the right sort. For piety must be living fellowship not merely with the omnipotent, majestic, righteous God, but also with the God of holy love, so that it is a defect in piety itself, if it is not conformed to morality.

But morality likewise can be neither perfect nor pure,

unless it includes in the love of goodness also the love of the primal source of goodness, the personal God—in other words, is, or becomes, piety. This is requisite not merely for moral culture and intelligence, but also especially for the reason that, if that secondary form of the good which exists in the consciousness and will of man should be assumed to be the highest and best, the necessary consequence would be self-deification, that is, a want of the virtue of humility. But this want disfigures even the goodness which may already exist, being a sort of selfishness, even though a comparatively intellectual form of it, as is shown by the pride of virtue among the Stoics. Finally, it would be an error to suppose that morality has as firm a basis, without reference to God, as with it. If the atheist denies this, then the objective sacredness and absolute inviolableness of the good itself will become unsettled, and that solitary column will fall amid the temptations and storms of life. But if the atheist seeks to hold fast the absoluteness of duty, he cannot be satisfied with looking upon himself alone as the binding authority; he must recognise the good as a power independent of himself; and this must lead him, if only he developes his consciousness on all sides, back to God as the supreme sanction of all obligation. Thus it appears that a morality without religion after all rests only upon an obscure view of things, which needs to be clarified and thereby come to a decision either for religion or against it.

Similar to the relation between morality and religion is the relation of *cognition* to both. Knowledge, too, does not always keep equal pace with these, and is therefore relatively separable, whether going before or lagging behind; but it remains as the province of the will to blend true knowledge with religion and morality: for wisdom too is a virtue.

3. Morality shares with knowledge and with religion the relation to that which is of infinite worth. But the *peculiarity of morality*, as over against these two, consists, according to what has been said, in the fact that in the case of morality that which has absolute worth is put under the category of the will; it is the absolute for the *will* which is primarily had in view. But morality, together with the will, embraces all realms, including religion and

knowledge, and is in turn embraced by these; it embraces them, however, in its own way, from the point of view of the will. But the moral will on its part can operate only upon the condition that there is a consciousness of what is morally good, and that the feelings are stirred by an ideal delight in the good. Neither the consciousness nor the feelings need for this reason to necessitate the will; especially the moral feeling must not be allowed to become of itself an overpowering impulse; but, first of all, the good in its majesty and sacredness must be brought to consciousness, in order that the personal will may assume an attitude with reference to it. This consciousness, in which the moral sense and the conscience become active, represents a necessary principle, but necessary in the sense that it is addressed to freedom, and in such a way that, by this very consciousness of the morally necessary, the personality is invested with its rights as a free personality. But the manner in which in the temporal life the moral faculties gradually manifest themselves in coming to their perfection, under the continual agency of God, cannot be discussed till we come to the Second Division. In the moment of a man's creation, freedom and conscience do not as yet actually exist, but there is a susceptibility in the man for having that which is absolutely obligatory and worthy further inwrought into him.

4. *The Moral Feeling.*—We consider here somewhat more closely the moral feeling, which issues in moral *sense* and *impulse*, reserving the more extended discussion of it for Division II. The moral feeling is fundamental in the constitution of the ethical reason; it is originally the emotion excited in the rational creature when the idea of morality moves or strikes the heart, that is, it is a practical feeling of the worth of things (§ 11. 3). It is not mere sensation, it has reference to an object; it is a feeling of the good which ought to be, and which by its value awakens ideal pleasure, as also ideal displeasure is awakened towards its contrary. The ideal displeasure can co-exist with sensuous pleasure, and ideal pleasure with sensuous displeasure.

That the moral feeling forms the foundation for the moral development is, however, disputed, especially by Kant, who

denies that the ethical nature has its original existence in a feeling which comes to be moral impulse and moral sense. Feeling, according to him, is something only pathological and physical. But there are also mental feelings and impulses, which belong to the reason, and are not merely of an animal sort; in the impulse to get knowledge, also, the animating principle must be the intellectual feeling of the value of truth as a good. For sensuous feelings are rather mere sensations. And the fear is unwarranted, that from the sensibilities danger is threatened to freedom, since it is certain that morality in the strict sense rests on self-determination, and, further, that the will must influence feeling and cognition also. But the existence of a moral constitution, antecedent to morality, must form the prerequisite of all ethical self-culture. It may be called the natural constitution, if by nature is understood the immediate product of creation, which, however, is not merely a finite φύσις, but the starting-point of the moral being, without which there would be no connecting link for any further moral development. For if the moral sensibilities were wanting, then all subsequent imposition of law would be without any necessary or intrinsic conformity to the nature of man, and would for ever exhibit the appearance of caprice and externality, being necessarily foreign to the inmost nature of man. But the consequence of this would be, that he would be incapable of discerning the truth or inward excellence of the proffered good, and hence could not pass over from the state of servitude into the state of freedom. The consequence of exaggerating the independence of morality, as over against everything natural which is innate, would be, accordingly, that no way would lead beyond caprice and bondage into a moral perception of one's own.

But, we still inquire, is not feeling dangerous to freedom? It can, on the very contrary, be only promotive of free will. We are not speaking of sentimental feelings, enfeebling to the will, but of the moral feelings. How can the free will be impaired by our having the power to make present to the mind, in ideal pleasure, the worth of what is good, and, in displeasure, the worthlessness of what is evil? The ideal pleasure consists perfectly well with freedom, is indeed itself a proof that the good is something which is not foreign to the

nature of man, but is in harmony with his inmost being, and really sets his freedom free. Where there is pleasure, there is freedom from obstructions to life, even if these be only something foreboded. Nor does it contradict this pleasure and this freedom, that with them may be connected the consciousness of the ideal necessity of the good, since the good is the truth of one's own nature. This moral feeling, of which the sense of right is only the one negative side, and which forms the starting-point of conscience, makes itself known at first on occasion of coming into contact with a single good thing that awakens pleasure; and it is not necessary that it immediately come to a definite conception of God. Nevertheless this must take place in course of time. As the religious feeling is perfected by becoming also a consciousness of absolute dependence having an ethical character, so it is essential to morality that it be not merely love to a single good thing, but rather that in the single thing that which is good be itself seized and chosen, yes, that the primordial good, the personal God, be loved in the single good thing; and thus morality becomes religious.

Note.—The New Testament also speaks of the ideal pleasure of the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος in the good, thus recognising the moral feeling (Rom. vii. 22).

SECOND SECTION.

INDIVIDUALITY IN MAN'S MORAL ENDOWMENT (§ 9*b*).

§ 13.

In addition to the endowment common to all men, there is that which belongs to every individual singly, or, in other words, *peculiarity*, in consequence of which mankind appears in the form of a manifold variety of beings, and by which alone a real ethical cosmos is rendered possible.

Note.—Three points are of importance in this section:—

1. To recognise the necessity of individuality.
2. To discern wherein the general essence of it consists.
3. To notice its chief sorts.

1. The Sacred Scriptures recognise both the existence and the necessity of individuality in the most express manner; and the Apostle Paul especially has devoted magnificent passages to it. Cf. especially 1 Cor. xii. 4 sqq.; Eph. iv. 11; Rom. xii. 4 sqq. Here belongs the figure of the σῶμα and the multitude of μέλη, which serves to promote the prosperity both of the whole and of the parts. The distinctions of individuality are constituted by nature itself, but are not effaced by Christianity; on the contrary, to the Holy Spirit is ascribed the twofold office of being the source of variety in the charismata, and of forming the bond of their union (1 Cor. xii. 4 sqq.). The twelve different precious stones, also, each of which has its own colour, and which belong to the foundation of the city of God (Rev. xxi. 18 sqq.), are to be reckoned as belonging here.

2. The *necessity* that that which is individual coexist with that which is common, obvious as it seems, has yet not been distinctly recognised till the most modern times. The ante-Christian times, in which even personality recedes behind nature and the objective regulations of society, were still further from grasping the notion of individual peculiarity. Within the Christian era, the Roman Catholic Church likewise has fostered individuality but little, it has aimed more at a uniform ecclesiastical type of character, but has not striven to make each person free, and certain of salvation; the Church, rather, is the all-dominating moral personality. In a perverted way, to be sure, individual peculiarity has found place in this Church, in the distinction between common virtue and a higher virtue. And even when individuality was tolerated, it yet was not in theory approved as something to be cultivated. The ethics of the Church treated of right action as if it were only a manifold repetition of one and the same moral ideal without difference, as if duty related only to that which is common to all. On the other hand, a uniform ecclesiastical ethics could not possibly embrace everything individual; so the obverse of this strict uniformity was a realm of things morally indefinite and given over to option or caprice.

Individuality is a fact, whether it be ignored and resisted, or recognised. A system of ethics which would have only

what is common to all regulated by duty, acquits and absolves from moral rule a whole section of personal life, and abandons it to itself, or else tends to impair and obliterate individuality by a uniform rule. In the first case, we have a domain of that which is held to be not morally imperative, where the so-called permissible or optional actions are said to belong, which at the most can only be the subject of advice from the *consilia evangelica*. But then the moral law, as an imperative authority, would have no right to assert itself always and everywhere in human life; there would be a sphere lying too low to be ethically affected—a sphere below morality, below duty—which is to remain given over to the free pleasure of man, because morality lays no claim to it. But there immediately connects itself with this, as the obverse of it, that which is above duty, supererogatory. For when a man so uses his right over this sphere which is at his disposal, that he of his own free choice (*i.e.* caprice) sacrifices what he would not be bound to sacrifice, then he gains for himself a merit for doing more than duty requires. Thus the realm of morals suffers a double loss; what is below morality, and what is above morality, fall out of its sphere. So closely connected with great moral errors is the failure to recognise individuality as something willed by the Creator, and hence to be guarded as a matter of duty.

The *Reformation*, it is true, emphasized personality and personal assurance of salvation, as also the unity of all in faith, and the equal rights of all the members (Gal. iii. 28; 1 Cor. xiv. 14–26). And the evangelical principle of faith, according to which we are all one in Christ, by no means implies the extinction of all individuality, the reduction of all individuals to one and the same pattern. The meaning of this principle is, rather, that, however different in other respects believers may be, they themselves, in their God-given individuality, have equal worth. Nevertheless the Evangelical Church has long enough held fast only the negative side of this truth, namely, that "in spite of" individual differences there subsists an equality in the worth of persons; but it has not held that this subsists by and in this very individuality itself. Spener, likewise, does not get beyond this. The philosophy of Kant and Hegel also is not

favourable to individuality; they see in it only a limitation, not the condition of the realization of the moral cosmos. Only Leibnitz and Schleiermacher form an exception; the first work of Leibnitz treats *de principio individui*, and his doctrine of monads seeks to give a metaphysical basis to individuality.

3. The variety of different individualities becomes an ethical cosmos. It might be urged against this variety, that the likeness of all, rather than diversity, would seem to be favourable to unity and love, and that it would be better able to make all into one connected whole. But distinction need mean neither contradiction nor separation; and on the other hand, a uniform sameness is not to be confounded with a living oneness. Plainly, an organism is not possible except through a variety in the mutual relation of members, through a union of what is common and of what is individual. Only an organism which is not a mere continuity can be called a unit possessing life.

But against the necessity and the moral right of individuality, it might also be urged, that every single individual is meant to become perfect (Matt. v. 48), and that, if every one should become perfect as the Father in heaven is perfect, there would be no room left for a diversity of individualities. For, it may be said, this diversity is possible only in case each has something which the others have not; and this, accordingly, would imply the general imperfection of the different individuals. But we reply: If it belonged to the Christian notion of perfection that every individual should have just the same excellences as every other, then it would follow that at least in the state of perfection all individuality must give place to uniformity. But this would be in direct contradiction to the high importance which, as just shown, the Bible ascribes to individuality, and which does not allow it to be regarded as only a transient thing. With perfection (τελειότης) in the Christian sense it is entirely compatible that the individuals should have and keep different individualities. The moral goal which is for all, and which can already be approximately attained by Christians, is not opposed to a manifoldness of individual character, but to that which is still inconsistent with the νόμος τέλειος of the

Christian, and to the indolence which has as yet kept men from making their own the excellences which belong to the perfection of the individual. There are, besides, other excellences quite conceivable, which do not at all belong to the ideal of every man, and the want of which, therefore, is not to be regarded as a defect inconsistent with perfection. Certain faculties may be stronger in one individual than in another, provided only all the other faculties are harmoniously adjusted to these, whether it be by an intensification of them, or by a different mutual relation of the faculties in general. Thus for each individual that perfection is possible which is required by the moral ideal that is applicable to him.

Therefore we cannot concede that it is only in the uniform perfection of all that the bond of unity is secured which binds individuals firmly together. On the contrary, if all had everything alike, if each one were the whole, and so in no need of being supplemented, there would be, instead of living unity, only co-existence side by side like that of atoms. Then it would be to the whole a matter of indifference whether a part were lacking to it; while to the individuals it would be no less a matter of indifference whether a part were lacking or suffering. What would love have to exchange, moreover, if all were alike in everything? Therefore creative love, because aiming at a living unity, has willed the apparent opposite of unity, viz. diversity, but yet has willed it for the sake of the unity, and accordingly so that the variety is embraced and controlled by a higher principle. This involves that the many, in spite of their diversity, are yet all so constituted that all can be for all, that is, at least have universal susceptibility for all the varieties which inhere in the individuals. For, of course, there are not various species of reason, as nature exhibits a variety of species; there is only one species of reason, and this bears the character of universality, so that everything existent may be for it—if not for it to produce, yet for it to receive. And thus the necessity and the right of individuality consists perfectly well with the fact that all, however different, are made for mutual fellowship.

4. *On the general nature of individuality.*—Even in the

Middle Ages, which otherwise did little justice to individuality, inquiries were made as to what in general it rested on, as Leibnitz sets forth in detail in the treatise above mentioned. Various possibilities may be adduced. (*a*) It is, of course, evident that diversity of place and time cannot constitute the characteristic feature of individuality. For if we assume only a plurality of one and the same being, with difference of place and of time, then it would follow, that two individuals who exchanged their place would be transformed into each other; and also that they would cease to be different, if they existed at the same time and were of the same age.

(*b*) It would therefore be necessary to add that the difference of place and time brings with it different influences of the outward world, especially of the world of humanity, and that thus differences of individuality arise. But, as to this last point, whence come, in the world of humanity itself, the different influences? The question would be only carried farther back. And, in general, we should be assumed to be purely passive in our individuality, dependent on something outside.

(*c*) Others, taking as their starting-point the essence of humanity in general, suppose that individuality comes about by means of differences in the division, limitation, or privation of human being. The essence of mankind, it is said, although in itself homogeneous, is in some persons more, in others less, limited. Each individual is therefore different from the others purely by reason of a different quantity of human being. But underlying this is the supposition that properly it is involved in the idea of every individual that he ought to be the whole, by which again of course variety would be abolished. Besides this, it is not satisfactory to treat of mind as mere quantity.

(*d*) Especially common is the opinion that individuality is derived from the body, or from the sphere of matter, as representing existence in its divided state in the world. So the Arabic Aristotelians, also Albertus Magnus.[1] Diversity, it is

[1] Ritter, *Geschichte der christl. Philosophie*, 1858, i. p. 635 sqq. Rothe also says, individuality has its original abode in the material side of human nature. *Theol. Ethik*, 2nd ed. § 131, 165, 167, 174, 176, 215, 219.

sometimes said, cannot come from mind, mind being that which is identical in all, while yet mind is variously determined by the various admixture of material elements. But the assumption that mind is in itself everywhere one and the same thing, while yet it would still have to be the province of this identical mind to subjugate matter and impress upon it the stamp of mind, would again lead to all individuals becoming alike in the state of perfection. Variety would last only so long as mind had as yet failed to make itself completely felt; this, therefore, leads back to the assumption of the transientness of individuality.

(*e*) In order to escape the error which makes not merely mind in its utterances, but also individuality in its essential nature, dependent on matter, we may try, with Origen, to derive, conversely, individuality from the mind itself, namely, from its freedom. All souls were, according to him, created alike; they have become different only by the different use of their liberty,—a good or a bad use. Upon this inner history depends, further, also the bodily organization or the individuality. But according to this, if all made an equally good use of freedom, they would become the same; there are, however, other individual differences than that between good and evil with their degrees. We find, consequently, that the one-sided derivation of individuality whether from mind on the one hand, or from the body on the other, leads to the same result, namely, that individuality would be destroyed by perfect culture. But this is in plain contradiction with experience. Just where the mind is least cultivated, as among savages, the greatest resemblance is observed even in respect to the body; culture makes the individual stamp more sharply defined; culture is to be carefully distinguished from the mere polish of culture.

We cannot, then, find the sufficient principle of individuation in anything merely external, in mere limitation, or in quantitative distinction; and freedom also is inadequate to account for it. If this be so, and if we recognise it as being for the good of the permanent universe that the individual differences among mankind should be permanent, then only one opinion is left to us: namely, that individuality has not arisen from empirical causes, merely as a subsequent

effect; it is a creative thought of God, and is incorporated, as an eternally abiding factor, into the very notion of the human race itself. Mankind was not conceived of by God as a unit having no individual parts, but only as consisting in individuals, even though the realization of the creative thought may not be brought about except in temporal history and through secondary causes. The spirit of the whole can nevertheless, as regulator, govern all the individuals; and so much the more, inasmuch as the idea of each single individual within this unity of mankind involves in it that, in a certain way, each has, besides his own, also that which the others have, at least in the form of susceptibility (they are, as Leibnitz puts it, all microcosms); but each in a different manner from the others. And since the individualities can be neither merely spiritual nor merely corporeal, but present themselves in both forms, it follows that, as Leibnitz expresses it, every being is individuated in its entirety (*totum ens in se toto individuatur*).

Schleiermacher expresses himself in a similar manner;[1] he assumes, to be sure, that through its connection with the body the soul has a peculiar modification; he also sees a ground for individuality in the relation of the *ego* to the *non-ego*,—to the world, in respect of climate, food, nationality, education, religion, etc. But the psychical peculiarity, he says, must nevertheless be implanted, predetermined, in the rudiments of each individual; each has his peculiar soul. The outward coefficients govern only the form, or sort, of the activity of that which is already fixed inwardly (the potential individuality); otherwise self-activity would be as good as null. He sums it up as follows:[2] The peculiarity of the individual is the perfectly definite shaping of the relation between the different vital functions in reference to the totality of things. We say, therefore: each person is both physically and mentally a peculiar combination of the faculties belonging to the genus; and the whole of humanity individualizes itself in each one in a particular manner. Mankind, according to the divine idea, does not exist except as a variety of peculiar persons, who, however, belong together by

[1] *Christliche Sitte*, pp. 58 sqq., 65, 111. *Psychologie*, pp. 266–71, 499, 500.
[2] Pp. 499, 500.

virtue of their very variety. But if, now, individuation thus runs through the whole essence of humanity, in what way is the divine will concerning individuality realized? And what are its principal sorts?

§ 14. *The actual Genesis of the chief kinds of Individuality.*

In inquiring after the origin of the multitude of possible individualities, it is to considered—*A.* That germs for the production of various peculiarities of human nature are found even in one and the same individual, namely, in the necessary variety of his *moods* at different times (§ 11. 7). *B.* But the possible individualizations of human nature come to full expression only in different persons; and here are to be distinguished: 1. The differences which relate to *condition;* and 2. Those which relate to *activity.* 1. To *condition* belong: *a.* The *difference of sex,* this original differentiation or individualization of human nature. *b.* From this results, in connection with the difference of physico-psychical moods, the difference of *temperaments,* which express a fundamental mood permanently held, and, as it were, impersonated. *c.* From the varieties of this permanent fundamental mood, different *races, nations, peoples, tribes* may be derived. But there are also, 2. Peculiarities which relate to *activity;* these are the *talents,* which form the basis for individual vocations.

Note.—We have, moreover, to distinguish between differences which are or should be transient (of age, of good and bad), and those permanent differences of definite individuals, the germ of which becomes only more strongly developed by education.

1. The realm of diversity is indeed immeasurable, and human science cannot boast of having made a general survey of it, much less of having studied out the wisdom of the Creator as it extends down to single individuals. Yet we must seek to outline, so far as we may, the realm of individualities, in order that we may come to know the factors

which make so great a diversity possible, and in order that we may be able to regulate this diversity in a rational way. These factors are, as it were, the alphabet, out of which the creative thought of God composes as many independent words as there are individuals. But at the same time we must disregard that kind of diversity which ought not to exist, which has arisen through mere abnormity and sin, and which tends to destruction, that is, to the uniformity of death. Furthermore, to the diversity of the human race, as it constantly exists, an immense deal is contributed by the mingling of classes of persons of the most different ages who are living at the same time. One and the same person thinks, feels, and acts otherwise in childhood than in youth or in manhood. But inasmuch as the child becomes the boy, the boy the youth, etc., the differences of age mark only different stages of one and the same being. But this diversity forms in itself no ground of difference of individuality. The several periods of life constitute only distinctions which every one as he advances in years goes beyond, which therefore form no essential distinction, but rather are involved in that earthly self-reproduction of the individual which belongs to the essence of a living being.

The self-reproduction, which in this aspect of it establishes no permanent distinction, is, however, in another aspect, that is, as the reproduction of the species, the foundation of a real individuality of a permanent kind, viz. the difference of sex. Then again, perhaps this self-reproduction, in connection with the necessary change of moods, furnishes a clue for understanding the differences of other individuations. Having eliminated evil and difference of age from among the sources of individuality, we are to consider two main kinds of factors of individuality: (1) The difference of temperament and of race—men considered as wholes, as existing in a certain state; (2) the difference of talents — men considered as active, as tending to produce. These two main kinds of individuality must always be in some way blended, since each person is also made for action, so that, from this connection of different modifications of condition with modifications of action, new grounds of individuation again result.

2. *Difference of sex.*—The species, which as such nowhere

appears by itself, exists only in the duality of sex; the species differentiates itself into this duality, in order to reproduce itself in new individuals. But just this differentiation draws the two sexes together again; both seek each other, in order to find their complement in each other, and out of the difference to reach the point of exhibiting the species as a unity and as a totality. And thereby they become the instruments of the self-reproducing species.[1] The one human life divides into two poles, *strength* and *beauty;* with the one, through a moral process, there comes to be connected ethical dignity, with the other, ethical grace. But this difference is by no means merely physical, it extends even into the mental nature of mankind; for Christ by no means says[2] that this difference will be utterly obliterated, but only that the conditions of marrying and being given in marriage, of this earthly, physical marking of the difference of sex, will be removed.

The essential characteristic of the *masculine nature* as such consists in courage, which guards and keeps the honour of his independence with all physical and intellectual means, and determines the whole natural peculiarity of the man as such. To the masculine nature, however, belongs not merely courageous self-assertion, but also aggressiveness. Man copes with the outward world; and this places him in advance of woman in the world of *will* which aims at action. But also on the side of *cognition* his nature operates in such a manner that, instead of dwelling in himself in immediate self-consciousness, or giving himself up to contemplation, he sets himself more distinctly over against himself, and thereby over against the world. Reflection is more peculiar to the man; therefore there is in him greater clearness of self-consciousness; he views himself more objectively, and also the world as it objectively is in itself, and not only as it affects him individually. Finally, the same thing is to be seen even on the side of *feeling*. For the masculine nature reacts more in the form of *deed* against modification from without, and especially against suffering; feeling in the man passes over more into a thought-picture, which makes definite the object of feeling, whether it be pleasant or unpleasant, and which, connected with the conscious feeling of value, excites the impulse to produce or

[1] Gen. ii. 23, 24. [2] Matt. xx. 30.

to act. The feminine nature, on the other hand, dwells more in the feeling itself, floating in the sense either of pleasure or of displeasure, opposing to that which causes suffering or displeasure the feminine bravery, which consists in endurance. Passive devotion is not contrary to the feminine nature. This nature is not determined so much by reasons as by impulses (§ 11. 3). But the man should have reasons as well as impulses. Sentimentality and mere passiveness in becoming conscious or in being influenced are unmanly; they are even a degenerate form of femininenes, *i.e.* effeminate.

The fundamental *characteristic of woman*, in contrast with the masculine spontaneousness and capacity for production, is rather receptiveness, which, however, is very different from passiveness. Since in the feminine nature subjectiveness predominates, the woman dwells more in her undivided being, whereas the man enters far more into the several functions of willing, reflecting, or thinking, nay, as it were, for the moment is merged in them. There are, to be sure, in the feminine nature also those differences of the mental faculties with their different functions; but they come only in the masculine nature to distinct manifestation, and thereby to full reality. But as the woman *is* not in herself so divided as the man, so she does not *recognise* the distinctions in herself, nor does the outward world stand so objectively before her. Woman's ideality is far more intimately connected with her reality, *i.e.* her body and her world, than that of man is; for which reason the development of the man has far more to do with opposites, whereas the woman, both in good and in evil, dwells more in the concentrated unity of her nature. Since beauty is nothing else than spirit and soul appearing in bodily form, and since the woman keeps the body in far more immediate union with the spirit, the soul in her shines more immediately through; and so the female sex exhibits human life on the side of *beauty*. The more woman is in herself an expression of simple, spontaneous harmony, and the more she has the impulse to make the outward world share in her self-manifestation; so much the more does she *cultivate* beauty outside of herself, so much the more importance does she attach to the outward, in order that it may not disturb the harmony, but that the outward may correspond to the conception which the soul has of

itself. Not till the outward world is severed from the inward, not till the appearance tends to assume importance independently of the soul, does the fault begin, to which the feminine nature is especially exposed, namely, the fault of vanity, or further on, that of dissimulation.

The concentrated unity of the feminine nature gives to women especially the vocation of being the bearing sex; in devotion, in self-sacrifice, the genuine feminine nature finds its blessedness. Nothing has power so to spread peace over a household as maternal love and its benign, sustaining sway; while the virtue of man is rather that of producing, providing, and ruling. The same concentrated unity, however, is also the cause of the easy vulnerability and delicacy of the feminine nature; injured in one part, it feels itself injured throughout; for the soul predominates, and the whole nature is, as it were, present in every point. The same unity of nature accounts for the fact, further, that the chastity, modesty, and maidenly pride which protect maidenly honour with the whole strength of noble self-regard, are in woman a sort of natural endowment, identical with self-preservation. For with the loss of feminine honour the whole individuality of woman is degraded, as is the case with man when he loses his honour in another direction.

If we turn now in particular to the intellectual side, the woman is constitutionally more inclined to religion, the man to morality; the woman is more fitted for attachment, the man more for independence; the woman has more of the poetry of the feelings, the lyrical element, the man rather has a calling for more objective poetry, as the epic and dramatic. The feminine *understanding* and the feminine *judgment*, moreover, are of a wholly different kind from the masculine; the woman judges by a sort of tact with the understanding of the feelings, yet without confounding different things; often the woman sees through what is foreign to her far more quickly than the more conscious masculine understanding which gives its reasons. For general impressions determine her judgment; from a general impression the whole nature of the woman, so to speak, answers a question directed to her concerning a definite relation. It might be thought that, according to this, the judgment and understanding of woman, although, as is

well known, she does not like to deal with reasons, must be more circumspect and considerate than man's, must take into view more the totality of relations. But however decided the feminine judgment is wont to be, especially as woman is more emotional than man, it is yet to be noticed that she judges as her *feeling* directs, which, although intellectual, is yet subjective; and the thorough culture of that, therefore, is the urgent thing.

This leads us to the volitional side of woman's nature. She is, to be sure, perfectly equipped for those spheres in which the whole person, as a unit, comes into view; and there she is capable of a sound judgment. To those spheres belong the two extremes of the ethical community, viz. the family and the Church, in which the totality of the person comes to view; for active life in these spheres requires the devotion of the whole person. But between these limits lie friendship, the State, art, and science; all these spheres and their culture require a far more objective consciousness and self-consciousness than is peculiar to woman. They are in themselves one-sided spheres; and hence the feminine nature has little judgment and aptitude for them, is continually inclined to apply to them a foreign standard (especially to the State and to science), and so is not endowed in such a way as to be productively active in them. And in this matter women's universities and attempts at the so-called emancipation of women will not alter anything, but will only attain the result that women will seem less amiable to us men, at least so far forth as we are not so selfish and vain as highly to esteem only that for which we have special aptitude and skill. On the other hand, woman is admirably endowed for guarding the masculine nature and the spheres especially entrusted to it from such one-sidednesses as are inconsistent with a comprehensive spirit and with harmonious unity. For women, over against all such one-sidednesses, into which the masculine nature is apt to fall, represent universal human nature.

This difference of the two sexes is at the outset unconscious, although present as a fact. Children of both sexes play together. But later there must follow, where the development is normal, a period of estrangement between two sexes, coinciding with the coming on of puberty. At this period each

sex comes to a consciousness of its own peculiarity, and consolidates itself therein; and the creative will which has ordained the difference of sex is not perfectly realized except through this estrangement. But since the duality of the sexes cannot be an ultimate end, this separation and estrangement only serves to intensify the antecedent conditions of a union which is all the more intimate. But of this we treat in the next section.

§ 14*b*.—*Continuation.*

3. *The Temperaments.*

LITERATURE.—Alexander von Humboldt, *Kosmos.* [*Cosmos: Sketch of a Physical Description of the Universe.* Translation by A. Prichard, begun 1845, also by E. Sabine, 1846.—TR.] Daub, *Moral,* ii. 1, pp. 144–49. Wirth, *Philosophische Ethik,* ii. 22 sq. Haug, *Allgemeine Geschichte,* Heft 1, p. 68 sq. Also, the *Anthropologie* of Kant, Burdach, Waitz. Werner, *Christliche Ethik,* i. 161. Rambach, *Die christliche Sittenlehre,* 2nd ed. 1738, chap. viii. p. 680 sq. Rambach recognises only three temperaments; the melancholic supplies, according to him, also the place of the phlegmatic. From innate qualities of the soul he, like Stahl, derives the qualities of the body. Daub distinguishes the temperaments according to the elements, water (phlegma), air (sanguine T.), fire (choleric T.); the melancholic is disease. On the other hand, he says, there might be laid down, as a fourth, the terrestrial temperament, the boorish or Bœotian, which, living from the soil (*humus*), has humour, wit, and understanding; this, according to him, is the Germanic temperament. Jürgen Bona Mayer, *Philosophische Zeitfragen,* 1870, p. 185 sqq., distinguishes light or heavy (quick or slow), and also strong or weak, mobility of feeling and of will; slowness and weakness of sensation, he says, belong to the phlegmatic; quickness and intensive strength to the choleric; slowness joined, however, with strong susceptibility, to the melancholic; quickness, joined with weaker intensity of feeling and will, to the sanguine; but each of the two, sensibility and will, may be either slow or quick, strong or weak, that is, each differing in a fourfold way, whence new varieties result. Rothe, i. § 128 sqq., 2nd ed., finds the original seat of the temperaments in the material side of man,—in sensation and impulse, which precede the personal life, wherein they become feeling and desire, *i.e.* begin to have an object. He distinguishes the temperaments into two pairs: first, those marked by the understanding, as excitable or com-

posed (sanguine and melancholic temperaments); secondly, by the will in like contrast (choleric and phlegmatic temperaments). According to Rothe, these two pairs exclude each other; yet he concedes that there are also mixed temperaments, and that their right management by the person is possible (§ 131, 165, 174). As faults he designates (§ 215, 131), on the side of the understanding, disproportionately weak receptivity (dulness), disproportionately strong excitability (frivolity, giddiness); on the side of the will, disproportionately weak spontaneousness (inertness), disproportionately strong excitability (hastiness, passionateness). Schleiermacher also goes back to receptiveness and spontaneousness, quickness and slowness of emotions, as the basis of the distinction of the temperaments. Strümpell, on the other hand (*Vorschule der philosoph. Ethik*, p. 138 sq.), who finds the grounds of individuality in the psychical and corporeal nature, and their action on each other, sees the psychical cause of differences in the quality of the mental *impressions*, on which again the feelings and desires depend. But also the quantity of the impressions and thoughts, their scope and their strength, are to be considered, and, moreover, the manner of combining the thoughts in series, their connection and their arrangement, and the interpenetration and compactness of the groups of impressions. The defect, with Strümpell, lies in the fact that he derives the differences of individualities only from outward influences, and consequently treats individuality in its psychical centre only as receptivity. Lotze finally, in his *Mikrokosmus*, ii. 352 sq. [English tr. vol. ii. pp. 26–39.—Tr.], is inclined to trace back the temperaments to the four periods of life. [In his *Grundzüge der Psychologie*, on the other hand, pp. 82, 83, he understands by temperaments nothing more than the formal and gradual differences in susceptibility to outward impressions; in the extent to which impressions when excited reproduce others; in rapidity in the change of impressions; in the strength with which feelings of pleasure and of displeasure connect themselves with the impressions; and in the ease with which outward actions connect themselves with the inward states. The temperaments, in his view, are various beyond measure; but the most definite types are the four well-known ones: the sanguine, with great rapidity of change and lively excitability; the phlegmatic, with little versatility and slow reactions; the choleric, one-sidedly susceptible, with great energy in single directions; the sentimental, sensitive to the value which all possible relations have to the feelings, but indifferent towards mere facts.—Ed.]

Temperament denotes the physical, *i.e.* corporeal and

psychical, fundamental mood; the original and peculiar constitution of the sensibilities in themselves and in their relation to the objective world. From of old it has been customary to enumerate four temperaments; and little as this number has been construed as necessary, yet the great unanimity in the matter is remarkable, and indicates that it has been gathered from fact. Although the temperaments may in fact no longer be frequently found pure, but rather almost always mixed, yet that does not hinder us from detecting by analysis the four fundamental forms, which lie at the basis of the mixed temperaments also. These four are the phlegmatic and the sanguine, the melancholic and the choleric.[1]

If we describe these four, first, according to their corporeal aspect, then, as has been conjectured, in the phlegmatic the vegetative lymphatic system dominates; in the choleric, the arterial system; in the melancholic, the venous system; in the sanguine, the nervous system. But the difference in the habitual fundamental mood is so deep that we need to adduce also the psychical element. And so we must say that, even irrespective of sin, four different moods are possible in human nature, into each of which, at least for the moment, every individual may, and in the course of his life must, pass, so that all temperaments are found in all persons. But, on the other hand, these can also become habitual and permanent in such a way that one of them is the predominant one, that is, forms always the point of departure for the transition into others, and hence in them also continues to operate; as, *e.g.*, the anger of a phlegmatic man is of a quite different sort from that of the choleric or of the sanguine man; and the sorrow or joy of the sanguine man is of a different sort from that of the melancholic man; and none the less, too, the taking up and treatment of the same task will be very different in different temperaments. And as each person sets out from the fundamental mood as the foundation, so there will always

[1] These four may be illustrated by a figure like a Greek cross, having four arms; they form, as it were, two axes cutting each other at right angles; the two poles of each axis form a direct opposite to each other, the choleric opposite to the phlegmatic, the melancholic opposite to the sanguine. Between the poles of each of the two axes, the poles of the other axis form an intermediate.

be an inclination to return into it. Now the particular natural fundamental mood, thus maintained, we call the temperament.

This habitual mood may be, *in the first place*, that of repose and stability, which has the natural tendency to preserve the equilibrium between the outward and the inward with reference to immediate consciousness, and to exercise patient endurance in doing and suffering. The *phlegmatic temperament*, which we have thus described, is not a favourite; one does not like to possess it. But as to the names of the temperaments, we must not forget that these are taken from an experience which already shows connected with the temperament something abnormal, not belonging to the essence of it. In itself considered, that which we have designated as the phlegmatic temperament, is not more one-sided than any other, but is to be designated, according to its strict idea, as the temperament of continuity in itself or of identity with itself. It represents an element, therefore, which, remaining one-sided, and coming too soon to permanent sway, hinders progress, but which, on the other hand, not only must present itself to the mind as an end to be aimed at, but is also the natural starting-point for development. In this development itself, however, it represents an element without which no progress would be possible, but, at the most, empty motion in a circle. This element is *stability*, the assertion of the identity of the person with himself in doing and suffering, in taking in and giving out.

A *second* habitual fundamental mood or temperament is the *sanguine*, an open, buoyant, and self-surrendering susceptibility, a state of natural connection with the objective world,—a state in which one is easily moved to joy or to sorrow by outward things. In cognition it manifests itself as a restless thirst for knowledge; in will, as an impulse to form ideals; in feeling, as social excitability, quickness of apprehension, and love of change; but oftentimes also in volatility, moodiness, and fickleness.

By the side of these two temperaments, however, two more are possible. The *third* temperament is characterized by a tendency to subjectiveness, to abstraction from the outward world, to retirement into one's self; this is the *melancholic;*

while the *fourth*, the *choleric*, is radically inclined to go forth out of itself, reacting against the outward world and moulding it. As the two temperaments first mentioned manifest themselves, in all the main directions of mental activity, differently in the different sexes and at different periods of life, so the same is true of this second pair.

For the *melancholic* temperament shows itself not only in feeling, but also in the world of thought and of will. In feeling it inclines one to solitary withdrawal into one's self, and, with reference to religion, to mysticism. In thought it is indicated by a tendency to profoundness, inwardness, and speculative occupation. In the realm of the will it involves such a dissatisfaction with previous things as is favourable to progress, and involves also the critical talent, and abstraction from the solid world of present reality. But it may incline to pessimism, just as the sanguine temperament to optimism. If the melancholic man should stop short with this abstraction instead of advancing to action, he would, as it were, relapse into that which is the degeneration of the phlegmatic temperament, against which, nevertheless, the melancholic, by the critical element inherent in it, is fitted to guard him. It would become in that case desponding resignation, just because it is deficient in that which is the true characteristic of the phlegmatic temperament, namely, repose in one's self, comparative satisfaction and security of mind.

Finally, the *choleric*, drastic, the temperament of active opposition to the imperfection of things, the impulse to shape the world courageously and energetically according to a set purpose, runs through all the faculties of the soul. To feeling this temperament lends fervour, with a tendency to passion, not to the æsthetic passion of enjoyment as in the case of the sanguine person, but to the practical passion, or the passion for action. In the moral sphere this fervour becomes *enthusiasm*. To thought the choleric temperament lends the energy for creating and shaping the ideal in art or science. To the will, finally, it lends the τόνος, the elasticity, which copes with the outward world. Thus the choleric and melancholic temperaments seem to be able to show themselves in perfection in the masculine nature; the other two

more in the feminine nature. In the melancholic and choleric temperaments spontaneous activity prevails, in the former inward, in the latter outward, activity; while excitability of the psychical life is characteristic of the sanguine man, but in the case of the phlegmatic is less prominent.

However different or even opposed may be the temperament of abstraction, and that of connection with the outward world (the melancholic and the sanguine), or, on the other hand, that of stability and sameness, and that of restless progress (the phlegmatic and the choleric), yet it cannot be said that the excellences which each of the temperaments represents exclude each other. For that would bring a contradiction into the moral constitution. Rather, transitions from the peculiarities of one to those of another are possible and actual; partly involuntary, through change of moods in the same person and through difference of age, partly produced by the will and moral self-culture. For they do not exist for the sake of fortifying themselves against each other. Each, without elements of the others, makes a one-sided, imperfect person; therefore a blending of them needs to be brought about. As that which is one-sided and divisive in the difference of the sexes can and should be overcome, so far as mind is concerned, each individual in his moral development appropriating to himself the mental excellences of the other sex which do not by nature belong to him, so the same holds good also of the temperaments.[1]

To this process of mutual permeation nature itself points in its normal course. For, physically considered, childhood presents more the vegetative life in identity with itself; in boyhood and youth the sanguine temperament has its natural beginnings; in manhood there is generally seen in every one somewhat of the choleric; in old age, the time of involution, generally somewhat of the temperament of abstraction. But

[1] Rothe, *l.c.* 2nd ed. § 219. After showing that the affections take different forms according to the temperament, the melancholic inclining to fear, the choleric to passionateness, the sanguine to rash hope, the phlegmatic to indolence, he says (§ 220) that as affections of the temperament, fear and passionateness are conquerable, and so are transformed into reserve and indignation, in which case they have laid aside the involuntary element in them.

this blending, in order to be of a moral character, must be accomplished consciously by the will and by continued self-culture, so that, *e.g.*, age does not need to lose mental youth. Uniformity ought not to be aimed at by this blending of temperaments; the diversity arising from differences in strength, in liveliness, and in the mingling of elements still remains; also the original difference continues to operate. For that diversity conditions the order in the succession of the elements of a normal combination, and also the goal to be aimed at; and that difference of order involves also the overcoming of corresponding temptations. Each of the temperaments, to start with, has a natural tendency to excellences: the sanguine, to kindliness, courtesy, joyousness, pleasure in the ideal; the melancholic, to seriousness and self-concentration; the choleric, to courage, aspiration, enthusiasm; the phlegmatic, to equipoise and repose. But each of them has also a natural tendency to faults: frivolousness and superficialness threaten the sanguine; gloominess, narrowness, and unsociableness, the melancholic; passionateness, pride, ambition, and revenge, the choleric; indolence, coldness, and stupidity, the phlegmatic.

From the foregoing it is also plain why only a few individuals exhibit simply and one-sidedly but one temperament. For, as already said, a certain combination is given by nature itself, and by culture also, and up to a certain extent may be hereditary. By this concession the existence of fundamental types of physical and psychical nature, which are the source of certain fundamental moods, is not denied; but by these numerous combinations, which may also reappear in homogeneous groups, the infinite manifoldness of human nature becomes comprehensible. Moreover, it is to be insisted on, that, ethically considered, all the temperaments are equally good; none is sinful in itself, although each by itself is imperfect. But the imperfections of each, and the faults connected with them, will be remedied by the factors of the others. The temperaments are not the ground of any natural virtue by reason of the good which they have in them; but they also excuse no sin by the imperfections which they involve. Since the difference in the starting-point for moral culture, and the difference in the course of the individual life therewith involved, stamp character permanently, and thus have

lasting after-effects, we must not go so far as to say [1] that moral character is above, that is, outside of, all temperament. Character is in the temperament. That opinion would also not be in agreement with the fact that the temperament is the appropriate soil in which the spirit is to develope itself.

§ 15. *Continuation.* (*Cf. System of Christian Doctrine*, i. § 43.) *The Races and Nationalities.*

[LITERATURE.—Blumenbach and Cuvier. [J. F. Blumenbach, *System of Comparative Anatomy*, translated from the German by W. Lawrence, 1807, 2nd ed. revised and enlarged, under the title, *Manual of Comparative Anatomy*, by W. Coulson, 1827. *The Anthropological Treatises of J. F. B.*, etc., translated and edited from the Latin, German, and French originals. By T. Bendyshe. Anthropological Society, London 1863, etc. Cuvier, *Lectures on Comparative Anatomy*, translated from French, London 1802. *The Animal Kingdom*, etc., London 1858.—TR.] Latham, *Man and his Migrations*, 1851. Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, 2nd ed. 1883. *The Origin of Species*, 6th ed. 1872. Häckel, *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte.* [In English: *The History of Creation*, London 1876.—TR.] *Anthropogenie.* [In English: *The Evolution of Man*, London 1879.—TR.] Von Hellwald, *Culturgeschichte.* Kriegk, *Die Völkerstämme und ihre Zweige*, 5th ed., revised by Hellwald, 1883. Lubbock, *The Origin of Civilisation*, 3rd ed. 1875. Huxley, *Man's Place in Nature*, 1863. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 1871. *Researches into the Early History of Mankind*, etc. [3rd ed. 1878. *Anthropology*, London 1881.—TR.]. Wallace, *Natural Selection.* Owen, *Derivative Hypothesis of Life and Species.* J. C. Prichard, *The Natural History of Man* [4th ed. 1855. *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind*, 3rd ed., London 1836–47.—TR.]. Ratzel, *Vorgeschichte des europäischen Menschen.* Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus*, 2nd ed. [In English: *History of Materialism*, 1877.—TR.] Caspari, *Vorgeschichte der Menschheit.* Burmeister, *Geschichte der Schöpfung*, 7th ed. 1872. Fr. Mueller, *Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Ethnographie*, 1873. Peschel, *Völkerkunde.* Gloatz, *Speculative Theologie*, i. 1, p. 200 sq., i. 2, p. 772 sq.

Rud. Wagner, *Zoologisch-anthropologische Untersuchungen*, 1861. Rütimeyer, *Die Grenzen der Thierwelt*, 1867. Virchow, *Menschen und Affenschädel*, 1870. [In English: *The Cranial Affinities of Man and the Ape*, 1874. In Estes's *Half-hour Re-*

[1] Wuttke, *Sittenlehre*, i. 387. [Eng. ed. vol. ii. p. 72.—TR.]

creations in Popular Science, Series I.—Tr.] *Rede in Wiesbaden,* 1873. A. W. Volkmann, *Ueber die Entwicklung der Organismen,* 1875. Aeby, *Die Schädelformen der Menschen und Affen,* 1867. A. v. Humboldt, *Cosmos,* Schaller, *l.c.* p. 209 sq. Rothe, 1st ed. i. § 120, p. 237, regards the races as grades. Waitz, *Ueber die Einheit des Menschengeschlechts und den Urzustand der Menschen, oder Anthropologie der Naturvölker.* Gerland, *Anthropologische Beiträge.* Pfaff, *Schöpfungsgeschichte,* 2nd ed. 1877. *Die Entstehung der Welt und die Naturgesetze,* 1876. Quatrefages, *Unité de l'espèce humaine,* 1861. *Theories transformistes et evolutionistes. Darwin et ses precurseurs Francais,* 1870. *The Human Species,* 1872. Rudolf Schmid, *Die Darwinischen Theorieen,* 1876. [In English: *Theories of Darwin,* etc. Chicago 1883.—Tr.] Lotze, *Mikrokosmos,* ii. p. 99 sq. [1st ed., 3rd ed. p. 102 sq. English translation, vol. I. Book iv. chap. v.—Tr.] I. H. Fichte, *Anthropologie,* 2nd ed. 1860. Ulrici, *Gott und der Mensch,* 2nd ed. vol. ii. p. 146 sq. Zöckler, *Ueber die Speziesfrage in ihrer theologischen Bedeutung, Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie,* 1861. Heft 4, pp. 659–714. *Theologie und Naturwissenschaft. Die Lehre vom Urstand,* 1879. Wuttke, i. 360 [English ed. vol. ii. p. 73 sq.—Tr.]. Agassiz, *Schöpfungsplan.* [*Structure of Animal Life.* Six Lectures delivered in 1862, 3rd ed. 1874.—Tr.] *Essay on Classification.* [Essay I. of *Contributions to the Natural History of the United States.*—Tr.] Hugh Miller, *Footprints of the Creator,* edited by Agassiz, 1861. Von Baer, *Studien aus dem Gebiete der Naturwissenschaften,* 1876. Duke of Argyll, *Primeval Man,* 1869. Reusch, *Bibel und Natur.* John William Dawson, *Nature and the Bible,* 1875. [*Fossil Men and their Modern Representatives,* 2nd ed., London 1883. *The Story of the Earth and Man,* 8th ed., London 1883.—Tr.] M'Cosh, *Christianity and Positivism.* His paper before the Evang. Alliance, 1873, and in Edinburgh, 1878. Huber, *Zur Kritik moderner Schöpfungslehren,* 1875. Frohschammer, *Ueber die Genesis der Menschheit und deren geistige Entwickelung,* etc., 1883. Al. Braun, *Ueber die Bedeutung der Entwickelung in der Naturgeschichte.* St. G. Mivart, *Genesis of Species,* 1871. Ebrard, *Apologetik.* (Cf. likewise the literature above given, § 9. 3, § 10, and *System of Christian Doctrine,* i. § 43.) Erdmann, *Nationalitätsprinzip,* 1862.

Comparative Philology: W. v. Humboldt, *Kawisprache,* 1832. *Sprachphilosophische Werke,* 2 vols. 1883–84, edited by Steinthal. Jacob Grimm, *Ursprung der Sprache,* 1851. Steinthal, *Abriss der Sprachwissenschaft.* 1 Thl. *Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft,* 2nd ed. 1881. *Ursprung der Sprache,* 1858 [3rd and newly-revised edition, Berlin 1877.—Tr.]. *Charakteristik der hauptsächlichsten Typen des*

Sprachbaues, 2nd ed. 1860. L. Geiger, *Ursprung der Sprache*, 1868–72. August Schleicher, *Die Darwinische Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft*, 3rd ed. 1873. [*Darwinism tested by the Science of Language*, translated by A. V. W. Bikkers, London 1869.—Tr.] W. Bleck, *Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache*, 1868. Ludwig Noiré, *Ursprung der Sprache*, 1877. [*Max Müller and the Philosophy of Language.* Translated from the German, London 1879—Tr.] Fr. Mueller, *Grundriss der allgemeinen Sprachwissenschaft*, 1876. Bastian, *Sprachvergleichende Studien.* Max Mueller, *Lectures on the Science of Language*, 1861–64. New ed. 1880. Wm. D. Whitney [*The Life and Growth of Language*, 1872. *Language and the Study of Language*, 4th ed. 1884.—Tr.]. *Oriental and Linguistic Studies*, New York 1773, against Schleicher.—Editor.]

§ 15.

The races and the nationalities seem to have their foundation in the differences of temperament, in connection with the influence of nature and of history.

1. The difference of races and of nationalities is more difficult of treatment than the temperaments; for it is necessary, side by side with the differences, to hold fast the unity of the human race, and correctly to define this, as well as the differences. The Bible gives some general statements; it affirms the unity of mankind, and in the form of the actual descent of all from Adam (Rom. v. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 22; Acts xvii. 26; cf. Gen. i.). The peculiarities then spring up in the case of the three brothers, Shem, Ham, and Japheth, from whom three great groups of races descend; and further in the case of the twelve sons of Jacob (Gen. xlix.), where Jacob's blessing indicates the peculiarities of the sons, and glances also at the peculiarities of the tribes springing from them.

2. *Character and limit of the differences of race among men.* The first question is, whether the notion of kind or species is applicable to the differences among men themselves, or only to man in distinction from other living beings. He who assumes the unity of mankind, that is, supposes that mankind as a whole answers to the notion of a species or genus, allows to the differences among men only the significance of derivatives and varieties of one and the same species, with the transmission, indeed, of a permanent type. He, on

the other hand, who holds the races to be original, must designate them as different species or genera of men. The unity, further, may be conceived of either as only sameness of nature, sameness of the hereditary qualities, or also as a genealogical unity. The differences of race some naturalists, as Kant, find in colour; others, as Blumenbach and Wagner, in the form of the skull; Häckel, Fr. Müller, in the quality of the hair. The naturalists differ likewise concerning the number of the races, of which Blumenbach assumes five, Cuvier and Waitz three, Pickering even eleven, others still more. But the question which chiefly concerns ethics is, how much importance is assigned to the soul with reference to the differences of race.

(*a*) Some naturalists (and a short time ago the majority of them) have thought the differences in the human family so radical that they have felt obliged to assume the races to be originally different human genera. The lowest of the races were then placed about on a parallel with the highest classes of brutes. This would involve the denial not only of the genealogical unity of all men which the Bible affirms, and which can be neither proved nor disproved by natural science, but also of the essential unity of mankind, which might be still maintained even if there were many original pairs, provided only that all had, and transmitted, the same type.[1] In the case of this entire denial of the essential unity of mankind, various strata or grades of men have been assumed, the first of which were still wholly allied to the brutes, and had no notion of religion; thus Schelling.[2] But this view so destroys the unity of the human race, that even the unity of the moral constitution and of moral duty can no longer be maintained. Assuming that there were, or had been, such beings as were human in outward appearance, but absolutely without rational faculties, then these beings could not properly be called men, and would therefore here concern us no further. But the existence of such tribes has not as yet been demonstrated. In defence of slavery especially it has been attempted to prove that the negro is a different

[1] This essential unity is assumed by A. v. Humboldt.

[2] A kindred view was expressed in the seventeenth century by Peyrerius in his hypothesis of the pre-Adamites.

species of man derived from apes or relapsed into them. But these and similar attempts have all been failures.

(*b*) To this view, which magnifies the differences of race till it destroys the unity of mankind, has been opposed, in the last few decades, a contrary view, at present very widely spread. This later view not merely combats the specific difference of the races, but would trace back all the difference of the various species to the mere variation of a few original types, or even of only one. This is the hypothesis of Darwin, carried yet further by Häckel. The followers of Darwin refuse to recognise different acts of creation, or specifically different classes of created things. Rather, they would regard the vegetable, the animal, the psychical, only as varieties of one and the same essence, and would reduce them all to mechanism. In the course of millions of years, differences originally slight are thought to have developed themselves into the variety of beings which we now see. According to the law, that in the struggle for existence the stronger conquers, and also the law of natural selection, of adaptation, of heredity, and the like, it is said to have come to pass that higher and higher grades of beings have been developed, all of which, however, have taken their origin from what was originally the same. This view is favoured by the more recent naturalists in increasing numbers; and it recommends itself also by its endeavour to see all the variety of things in this world in their unity and connection. For instead of utterly abandoning the unity even of the human race, Darwinism sees in the world one chain or ascending series of beings, of which the lower—by a process immeasurably long, to be sure—are raised to the highest which has been developed up to the present time, *i.e.* to the human being. But looked at more closely, the Darwinian view, although it regards with favour the unity of man, yet in that which is of most weight is at one with the first-mentioned view. For it too abolishes, only in a different way from the former view, the specific difference between brutes and men, and is therefore opposed to the ethical idea of man. The ground of this agreement in the same error, in the case of theories otherwise opposites, lies in the fact that both in defining the nature of man disregard the soul.

(*c*) Hence both these views are opposed by a multitude of the most eminent naturalists and philosophers, as Alexander von Humboldt, von Bär, Agassiz, Braun, the Duke of Argyll, Wigand, Steffens, Schubert, Schaller, Planck, Waitz, Lotze, Ulrici, Harms. A large number of noted naturalists assume both the specific difference between mankind and the brute creation, and also the unity of the human race, which is regarded as forming a single species, so that the so-called races may be looked upon as the variation of one and the same work of creation. Blumenbach showed how, in the case of brutes and of men, the same laws determine the variability of types; men, he says, cannot be called more than one species, since among brutes of one and the same species there can be shown variations in respect to size, colour, hair, form of skull, etc. (produced by climate, food, manner of life), which are as great as the differences among the most different races of men, and even greater than these. Waitz has discussed this question in detail, in an especially thorough and instructive manner, in opposition to the first view. By examination of the single peculiarities, even of the negro race, he has arrived at the result that all differences of race may be explained as variations of one human species. As to the black colour, for instance, a moist, hot climate with little shelter from woods has, he says, the greatest influence on the colour of hair and skin, and occasions, in particular, that more carbon from the vegetable food remains in the organism, without becoming burnt up and consumed by oxygen, and is deposited under the epidermis. And Rudolph Wagner has shown, by numerous examinations, that the human brain, even when it is not specially distinguished by weight, has as its peculiarity the great number of its convolutions. Even Burmeister acknowledges the specific difference between the negro and the ape; and the recently discovered ape, the gorilla, competed with the human species only for a short time, till his habits were better learned. He warms himself, to be sure, at the fire which the negro has abandoned; but he does not even know how to feed the fire, and has fewer convolutions in the brain than other apes.

But against Darwinism it has been justly urged that neither

the struggle for existence nor heredity explains how differences arise, but rather only how they maintain themselves and successfully spread when they once exist. The diversity of creative thoughts and acts is denied only at the cost of putting mere unthinking chance in the place of a creative wisdom that aims more and more at perfection; but this involves a far darker enigma than faith in divine activity working with an aim. In Darwinism there also prevails a very unsatisfactory notion of unity. The unity of the world is made to consist merely in the likeness of the matter governed by mechanical laws. But what sort of a unity would there be, if one and the same substance should separate into an endless variety of forms, accidental and made by outward influences, without this variety itself being again combined into a unity by an inward connection? The world can be apprehended as a unit only when it is conceived of as a living organism. But this is a union of things different. If we go back only to *sameness* of matter and its mechanical laws, a combination of diversity and of unity in the world is not to be found; this is found only in teleology, or tendency to an end. Braun has rightly attempted to find the union of these by assuming a thought or type which nature in its gradations is tending towards (the idea of man). The earlier structures, according to his view, in part foreshadow this type, in part prepare the way for it. It is the rule or law of the teleologically advancing creation, and so holds together in unity both the endless diversity of forms and the multiplicity of material substances. This conception lays the chief stress on the distinguishing form or the shaping thought, not on matter. A similar view is held by Von Bär, who seeks to prove that there is in nature a tendency to an end. But this is possible only on condition that the infinite variety of forms is subject to a divine plan, by which the variety is produced and held together.

But the chief argument which serves to overthrow the two opposing theories is found in the fact that man's peculiarity lies mainly on the *spiritual* side. But this Darwinism does not explain; it does not take into account that by the difference in mental traits animals and human beings are held apart as two specifically different genera. The spirit in man is explic-

able only as being a new impartation made by God to the animated dust, after the time had come for the appearance of man. Man in relation to nature is supernatural, a miracle, referable to God's creative omnipotence alone. There is therefore no reason for departing from the Bible, which, with reference to the manifoldness of creatures, includes, according to Gen. i., the notion of species in the original thought of creation and in its realization.[1] Likewise it is possible successfully to maintain the essential intrinsic unity of mankind, so long as for human beings the chief stress is laid upon the psychical nature and the rational constitution. The essential faculties of the soul, which are found in all men, make possible a common culture and a gradual overcoming of even profound differences which have arisen through abnormalness. The descent of all mankind from one original pair would indeed prove most cogently the unity of the human race. This unity cannot, however, be decisively proved by a natural science that is conscious of its own limitations; but it is only recommended, first, by the Biblical records of the Old and New Testaments, and next by historical indications, as common traditions, legends, affinities of languages; finally, the gaps in the evidence which, after all this, still remain can be supplemented by the considerations which it is the province of dogmatics to urge.[2]

3. Having limited the significance of the race-distinctions so far as is necessary for ethics, let us glance further at the nature of them in their connection with the unity of man. The differences of race may perhaps be brought into connection with the doctrine of the temperaments; and it may be assumed that the four permanent fundamental moods which are possible in human nature, and which may manifest themselves, not only in individuals, but also among large masses of men (§ 14*b*), furnish the principal ground of explanation for everything essential in the differences of race and of nationality. This view commends itself especially when we recall the above-mentioned physical basis of the temperaments; for, 1. In the *phlegmatic* temperament there is found a lym-

[1] Gen. i. 11, 12, 22. He created each thing according to its kind, so that it has its seed in itself, in order to propagate its nature.

[2] See Dorner's *System of Christian Doctrine*, i. § 43.

phatic constitution, a predominance of vegetative life, of the cellular and glandular system. But the same is found also in the *Ethiopian* race. 2. The arterial constitution is the *choleric;* it is found especially in the *Caucasian* race. 3. The venous constitution, or the predominance of the venous and ganglionic systems, prevails in the *melancholic* temperament, and is met with in the *Mongolian* race. 4. The nervous or *sanguine* constitution has perhaps in the *Polynesians* the most striking representatives. The actual origin of the races may then be conceived of in the following way: The four possible types of habitual fundamental mood into which the life of individuals can pass, are germinally involved in human nature itself. What the fundamental mood or temperament of the descendants shall be is especially dependent upon the constitution and mood of the parents at the time when they become parents. As, now, this fundamental mood may have been more and more widely transmitted, so these differences, if the descendants of like kind sought and found an outward nature in affinity with them, may, in the course of hundreds and thousands of years, by geographical and climatic conditions, by men's associating predominantly with those of their own sort, and finally, by the operation of abnormal influences, have been developed and confirmed to the degree which the most marked races now existing present. Thus viewed, the races would be, as it were, temperaments or fundamental moods of human nature, fixed, though manifesting themselves in most manifold degrees, and to some extent in combinations.

In agreement with this are both the organic differences of the races and also their psychical peculiarities. There is the most unanimity in regarding the *Caucasian* and the *negro* races as separate races; psychically, too, they correspond most clearly to the *choleric* and *phlegmatic* temperaments, and they stand on the globe opposite to each other, like north and south. To the *Caucasian* race belong most of the peoples of Europe, the whole Indo-Germanic race, *i.e.* the Greeks, Romans, Germans, Celts, Slavs, also the Persians, the inhabitants of Western India, and the Egyptians. To the *Ethiopian* or negro race belong most of the peoples and tribes of Africa; their territory extended formerly, being called that of the Cushites, far into southern Asia, until the Aryans crowded

in. Among the other races the *Mongolian* is distinguished by marked characteristics; to it belong Eastern India, China, Japan, the Mongols, Huns, Kalmucks, Lapps, Finns, and Esquimaux, and also a part at least of the original population of America. They correspond, not only physically, as to their straight black hair and dark-yellow or brown skin, but also psychically, as to their depressed and gloomy nature, most nearly to the *melancholic* temperament. The least numerous, so far as can be known, are the representatives of the *sanguine* temperament, with their lively excitability and volatile enjoyment of life. We have, however, no right to assume that these differences developed themselves or became fixed in the very first generations of mankind; for human nature has still, everywhere and always, more or less the ability, even if it be only for the time being, to pass over into the different fundamental moods, and to be productive in them. In every nation are the various temperaments, and likewise such tendencies towards the various races as under favouring circumstances may develope themselves; and with this may be connected the fact, that even now, *e.g.*, in European families, there sometimes suddenly appear individuals who possess a number of the peculiarities of a foreign race, and who thus probably have also a psychical tendency in the same direction.

Furthermore, the differences of race must not be viewed as differences which are in themselves to continue for ever in their absolute one-sidedness. It is rather a part of the moral mission of the human species that the races and nations should appropriate one another's excellences, as far as the perfecting of their own individuality allows it or requires it. It is an end in the history of the world that the nations should not be left to their *natura*, which may in itself be very poor and imperfect, but that by combinations which, as is well known, may take place with fruitful results among all races, they should exhibit more varied and more permanent national peculiarities, in which there is no danger of uniformity, but rather a tendency to so much the richer diversity. Thus almost all the nations which stand highest in the world came to their national character, as it now is, through the different strata of nations gradually depositing themselves one upon another, and undergoing a process of physical and mental

assimilation. This process produced a mutual improvement, and called forth a nationality which did not originally exist of itself, but was the result only of history and of the influence of spiritual forces. If the historical spiritual factor is disregarded, one may come, in his enthusiasm for nationalities, to a sort of naturalism that undervalues the spiritual side of man, which has a tendency towards universal exchange, although nature must be guarded as the basis and starting-point for the universal receptiveness. The English nationality, *e.g.*, to which no one ascribes deficiency in sharply-defined traits, has become historically what it is by the commingling of the old-British, Gaelic, Roman (Latin) type with Anglo-Saxon, Danish, and Norman elements. The case is similar with the German, the French, and Spanish nationalities, as the consequence of many hundred years of continued migrations; the case was similar even with the Greeks and the Romans. Perhaps, too, there remain in the present nations race-distinctions which have already been in some measure overcome by historical agencies. Thus the Gaels, Basques, and Irish are perhaps remnants of a preponderantly *sanguine* race; the Mongolian race, likewise, shows in the Hungarians and Turks an improvement upon the original type. The negro seems, indeed, to be more stereotyped on account of his dulness; but it is not till recently that he has begun to come again into the general intercourse of nations; formerly also he occupied a higher position, at least in some respects. Even before the Caucasian race came upon the stage of the world's history, negro kingdoms were formed as far as into Asia; and even at the present time there are (according to Barth, Livingstone, Vogel, and others) large, well-ordered, agricultural negro states in Central Africa. It is especially the European slave-trade which has so degraded him on the sea-coasts, and even there, where it is most degraded, the negro race shows plasticity, susceptibility for culture and for Christianity; and by both these, as well as by amalgamation, it will be able to attain a higher grade of existence.

4. The difference of races has doubtless not come to its present extreme without the influence of sin, and would be, under normal development, more nearly the same macrocosmically that brothers and sisters in the family circle are

microcosmically. And a similar analogy again may be found in the nations of the same race as they are related to one another. On account of this abnormal influence of sin, it cannot belong to us to deduce *à priori* what the variety of races and nations may become. It may also be doubted whether the nations, as collections of masses of individuals of a more homogeneous sort, are destined to permanent continuance. And although, for the course of history, the existence of mankind in distinct nations is warranted; and further, although the national spirit has also a determining and enriching influence on every individual singly, and on the development of that germ in him which is eternal; yet the right and the value of nationality ought not to be overestimated. Else there would be danger of a naturalism which might be disposed to assert itself in opposition to the ethical work which it is the part of history to accomplish, and in exclusiveness or even enmity towards other nations, and also in opposition to the ends which the universal fellowship of the Church and of the kingdom of God must aim at. Christianity proclaims, There is neither Greek nor Jew, neither barbarian nor Scythian, but all are one in Christ; hence Christian ethics, especially in our day, must admonish against an exaggeration of the value of nationality, and of a patriotism founded upon it. In the state of perfection, the distribution of individuals will not be, as now, according to the principle of nationality, but according to the principle of spirituality. Tongues shall cease; and everlasting continuance is as little promised to the German or to the English nation, as to the Turks or the Russians. But yet for the moulding of the life and essential nature of man on the earth, there must be assumed (1) a collocation of peoples and of countries according to their vocation in the world's history (Acts xvii. 26); (2) a necessity, at least for a time, that such great homogeneous masses abide together, since it is only as a peculiarity takes on a distinct form among great masses that each main peculiarity can really become strong, and can exhibit its nature in life; (3) the significance of national distinctions even for the individual peculiarities which are destined to immortality.

§ 16. *The Talents.*

The second main class of the sources of individuality, that, namely, which relates to activity, affords a variety, large indeed, but yet limited; for there are definite talents for particular individual moral spheres, and they thus constitute the subjective foundation for the individual vocation, which is ethically determined by one's talents. The family and the Church are general, and not particular, moral spheres; whereas the other moral departments belonging to the earthly manifestation of a moral universe furnish also the basis for classifying the chief varieties of talents. An especial affinity may indeed exist between certain constitutional temperaments and certain talents; but the talents are directed towards self-activity, it being only by exercise and activity that they acquire force. But that they are connected with the constitutional condition is shown by their being hereditary, as is perceived in the case, at least, of such talents as are more closely connected with nature.

Note.—Heredity is manifest, *e.g.*, especially in reference to the talent for the comparatively low departments of music and mathematics; but less in reference to a gift for statesmanship or for science.

1. What nature has denied to one nation, while it has furnished it to another, seems to be incapable of being in any way retrieved by the first, but to involve for it a permanent inferiority in comparison with others. But this is not the case. The products of eminent talents can be for the good of all; and even for that for which one has no productiveness he has yet the susceptibility. The moral process, while it also developes susceptibility, often, when this has been satisfied, has the effect of eliciting productiveness, although the productiveness is modified in its individual forms by the variety in the starting-point of the development. And though indeed, at any given time, different nations are

distinguished for different talents, *e.g.* in ancient times the Roman, in modern times the English, for statesmanship; the Greeks formerly, the Germans in modern times, for science; yet, too, one and the same nation at different periods of its history can by virtue of special talents do successful work in different departments. Thus the Italians, the successors of the unartistic Romans, have cultivated art; and thus in recent times the Germans, together with the culture of art and science, have made advance in statesmanship also.

2. The absolute worth of the personality is dependent upon its moral worth, and not upon talent, which is primarily a natural gift; but talent does decide what is the correct manifestation of the moral personality. Furthermore, talents have an abiding significance, when they are made eternal by means of moral consecration; and this holds true not merely of the talents which lie immediately within the realm of mind; other talents also can express a definite mental character, as it manifests itself in apprehension, in production, and in mode of execution. But all natural gifts, in order to the full realization of the creative thought, may be laid hold of by the Divine Spirit and be consecrated as charismata; as even in the Old Testament the plastic and poetic arts, as well as wisdom, are traced back to the Spirit of God; yes, it is in accordance with the Bible when we conceive of charismata, like those of a Paul, or of an Augustine, not merely as limited to the earthly life, but as shining eternally in unfading splendour.[1]

3. What has been said stands opposed to the falsely *democratic*, and to the falsely *aristocratic*, conception of talents. According to the former, the justice of God demands that all individuals in themselves be naturally alike, and each be able to become what the others can become; it holds that great men have become great only through their opportunity; that the differences have been brought about only through outward circumstances, culture, and training. Connected with this also is the false principle, that whatever a person may contribute that is new is to be explained from his surroundings. But in that case the constitution of the universe, as divinely planned, would be very uniform, and the question

[1] Dan. xii. 3; Matt. xxv. 15 sq.

as to the origin of the differences would only be postponed. We cannot see, either, how an inequality originally ordained should be more unjust than one produced by outward circumstances. It betrays a want of culture to have no appreciation of the moving of an original spirit in such creative natures as have revolutionized their times by somehow adding to that which was already existent the power of a higher unifying principle.

On the other side, no less false is an *aristocratic* conception of talent, which is inclined to assume that geniuses are emancipated from the ordinary moral law, and to make them the objects of a sort of worship, as if they were superior beings. A certain equalization of the differences between favoured minds and the masses lies in the very fact that the superior gifts of the former exist for the masses, who are by this means to be elevated. All rule in the realm of mind is service; all have need of all, and are conditioned by one another; no one can say, I have no need of thee.[1] All have talents, and these differences will last. During the period of development it may happen, now, that one person feels himself to be poor and empty in comparison with others, and would rather have a different individuality, or would like to exchange it for another. But then he does not know either what his own, or what the other, individuality is; indeed, he is in bald contradiction with himself; for on the one hand he would like to continue to be, and has a wish for this continued being, and on the other hand he wishes to be that which would involve his own non-existence. There is in each individuality a sacred, eternal germ, which should be guarded and developed, but can be neglected and dwarfed. Hence it is both abnormal and wicked, not to be willing to be that which is the divine thought of one's own self. The passion for imitation does a work of destruction, let another's individuality stand ever so high. Absolutely universal is only one —Christ; in all other persons we may indeed imitate that which is common, but not that which is individual, as, *e.g.*, in a Paul or a Luther. The opposite fault is that of shutting one's self up in one's own individuality, in a separatistic way, or of affecting singularity in straining to be original.

[1] Matt. xx. 26; 1 Cor. xii. 21 sq.; Matt. xxv. 21; Luke xix. 24.

Note 1.—However great may be the variety of individualities resulting from the above treated sources of individuation (§ 13–16),—peculiarities which are permanent, too, by reason of the different starting-points and of the order of the factors which enter into the structure of the personal character,—yet this multitude is not one that continues to expand itself indefinitely. As our race had a beginning, so its procreations will also have an end, when the full number is attained which belongs to the notion of complete humanity. But this full number is a definite one, otherwise a teleological place for it would be excluded. Only thus, too, can each person have his definite place within the sphere of humanity.

Note 2.—We have considered that which is common in the moral endowment, and then that which is individual, into which the common branches out. Now, however, in a third section we have to see how even in the natural constitution are also contained principles through which these diversities and divisions are brought back into a unity, although not at once a perfect unity.

THIRD SECTION.

THE IMMEDIATE OR NATURAL UNION OF THE DIFFERENCES IN HUMAN NATURE.

§ 17.

The diversity of the moral faculties, thus far considered, and the differentiating of human nature, is happily balanced by a natural tendency of these faculties and differences to come together, both in individuals and in the race,—by an inborn unifying force, which is effectual to form a natural counterpoise against disunion and confusion. But this natural union can have been implanted only as a provisional one, and does not exempt from the duty of uniting the faculties ethically. This natural union, being at first merely a loose one, awaits the free moral action which comes after moral duty and moral good are recognised. Just on this account it is also exposed to dissolution and confusion through arbitrary choice. Nevertheless by this natural action of the innate unifying power, by

means of the forces that it sets in motion, there is produced a prototype or outline of the future ethical shaping of the world—a prototype which constitutes the starting-point and actual foundation for the conscious ethical process.

Note.—The thesis aims to set forth (1) how in man, as naturally constituted, notwithstanding the variety in each one's faculties, and notwithstanding the differences of different individuals, yet the unity also makes itself felt, and how this, as a natural unity, exhibits another important and efficient element in man's ethical endowment. But next (2) it is to be shown that this natural unity is only an antecedent condition of morality, but is neither moral in itself nor productive of morality, because, and so long as, that which is addressed to the will, viz. absolute and unconditional worth, has presented itself neither in the consciousness nor in the will. How early the ethical factor itself makes its appearance is not here affirmed; for the present purpose it is important only to see what the natural equipment can accomplish in and of itself, even though not from ethical motives. For by this means it becomes plain what can be done simply and alone by the moral principle. It is accordingly not meant by this to deny that the moral element makes an entrance, at least sporadically, even though not at once dominantly, into the beginnings of humanity. But evidently there are many living who are not clearly determined by the idea of morality, since they get no farther than the stage of natural eudæmony, as, with Chalybäus, we may briefly designate it.

1. The *natural beginnings* of human civilisation resulting from the principle of *self-preservation*. All the endowments of man, both common and individual, are directly unified or united in man's natural personality. The person, as a natural unity, has them all, although they wait to receive their moral stamp first from the act of the free person. This unity, the natural person, is normally active even without the free act of the will conscious of moral duty. For it is created as a *living* personality, consequently one that preserves itself, as respects both what is physical and what is mental, both what is common and what is individual. There takes place a natural co-operation and interpenetration not merely of the faculties of the bodily organism, but also of those of the mental being (§ 10. 2, § 11, § 12. 1, 2). There is also a natural tendency

and endeavour after union among the differences of the different individuals, so that human nature, after having developed into variety, seeks out of this variety again to restore itself to unity, and does so in a measure. By force of natural impulse human nature manifests itself as a unity, but so that everything aims at *self-preservation* only, not as yet at history and moral development; for to this end a conscious ethical goal would be necessary. But mere self-preservation makes a large circle of activities necessary, and even brings with it a certain culture. These rudiments of culture produced, as it were, spontaneously, let us consider, then, with reference to man himself as he is related to nature and to social life.[1]

The self-preservation of the *natural personality* requires food, clothing, and shelter, especially on account of man's helplessness at the beginning of his existence; the food must be sought, prepared, and preserved. This, as well as clothing and shelter for protection from the elements, requires reflection and the exercise of his inborn faculties. But the psychical faculties of man also demand nourishment on their part, for instance, cognition, or the satisfaction of the love of knowledge. The circle of this desire enlarges more and more, and by means of it the soul is filled with knowledge of nature both outward and inward, and of the laws according to which it needs to be treated.

2. Nature (outward nature) was given to man for him to have *dominion* over (Gen. i. 28); nor was this gift revoked after the fall (ix. 2 sq.; Ps. viii.); he has also impulses and faculties answering thereto. Man naturally, by a necessity of his being, from need and impulse, appropriates nature, nay, even to some degree moulds it. Man takes possession of nature (Gen. ix. 2, 3, iv. 22); and that is the beginning of property, that is, of *that sort* of possession on which the stamp of the natural personality is imprinted. Man uses nature, as he finds it, for his own ends, whether it be by appropriating the land to himself only temporarily, as the nomad (Gen. iv. 20) and the hunter (Gen. x. 9) do, or permanently, as in agriculture and cattle-raising (Gen. iv. 2). The latter lead nearer to civilisation, for by them the

[1] Cf. the origin of human society in the Book of Genesis, in Plato's *Republic* II., and in Aristotle's *Politics* I. (τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκα.)

nature which is taken possession of is also actually cultivated. The instability and irregularity of nomadic life become exchanged for the settled life of agriculture; and this reacts on the habitation, clothing, and sustenance. The fixed order and regularity that characterize climatic relations and change of seasons become a natural discipline, which accustoms man to forethought, order, and frugality; harvest comes only after seed-time and care of the crops.

Quiet rural life and its leisure next give rise to inventions subservient to man's necessities and well-being (Gen. iv. 22) — a beginning of manufactures, by means of which new portions of nature are one after another drawn into the realm of human industry. The heaped-up stores, however, require protection from violence and artifice, and there arise enclosed cities with acropoles (Gen. iv. 17), strongholds, and burghers as distinguished from countrymen. Naturally there is produced in the cities a particularly high type of culture and of industries, the branches of which support one another. While the nomads gradually disappear, side by side with the peasants appear the citizens with their trades, which not only make demands on the hand and its dexterity, as in the case of the handicrafts, but also on the mental faculties, *e.g.* on the understanding, which seeks or invents what is fit and useful; also on the taste for art, and on the fancy, which seeks to make the world comfortable, harmonious, and beautiful, — in short, to make life happy. So too with reference to architecture, horticulture, and the strictly plastic arts. In all these relations the unity of the natural personality actively asserts itself. It unites the faculties for its own ends, which although only finite are yet normal, being suggested by innate impulses. In these ends the actual *framework* for a moral world is built up,—the framework, not the realization of the highest end. The Cainite line, according to the Bible, made this sphere of happiness — this development of the worldly sense — the highest aim of their efforts (Gen. iv. 17, 22).

3. Added to this are, thirdly, the beginnings of a social life prearranged in nature, a *relation of men to men.* The numberless differences which cause the human race to branch out into a multiplicity find, irrespective of the religious and

moral factor, a natural counterpoise in the *race feeling*, which, as much as these differences, belongs to the nature of each individual, and by virtue of which the race remains an undivided power. By the operation of this factor it comes to pass that just through the more strongly prominent differences there is produced an incitement to form companionship, or rather, a multitude of companionships. The variety of the differences is just the mediating principle by which particular classes of companionship are founded.

(*a*) *Sexual love, the analogue of marriage.*—The two sexes, the more independently they diverge from each other, strive so much the more for reunion both physical and psychical; the productive sex needs to be met by a receptive one; the two enter into a relation of reciprocity and mutual benefaction. Strength craves grace; tenderness craves firmness; when these are met together there is natural love, not merely physical but psychical. Where this takes a normal course, there is introduced a community of work and a psychical interchange, which at once adds more permanence and stability to the relation, by the mere operation of a healthy nature. In this conjugal association of the sexes there is a prelude or analogue of *ethical wedlock;* the fellowship grows in intimacy through the products added to the race. Even the higher brutes show a ray of mutual piety in the relation between the old and their young; this is still more decidedly the case with human parents. The care which natural parental love takes for the children, who are their extended *ego*,—their common, dearest possession,—cements the companionship of the consorts. Just as naturally the love of the child turns back to the parents; the child has a natural drawing towards those from whom it proceeded.

(*b*) *Relationship of blood and lineage as analogues of the ethical family spirit.*—The common origin of a race of descendants, however different they may be, operates again as a bond which unites the differences. Blood-relationship is sacred among all nations by virtue of a natural propensity; this continues to operate also when the family becomes enlarged into tribes and nations. What blood-relationship thus loses in intensity by expansion, is made up by community of customs, language, and traditions; and when the

connection seems to have become loosened, it yet shows itself immediately operative in the contact with other tribes or nationalities. To be sure, this mere love of tribe has in it something narrow, or even selfish; for the elective affinity which produces a closer union within the tribe operates as a divisive force in relation to other tribes or peoples.

(*c*) The *customs* and *habits* of the tribal community form at the same time a prototype of the *State*. The endeavour of a tribe to assert itself as a unit against others calls forth the need of organization, which at the outset is borrowed from the family type. At first, the father is the head of the family; later, the first-born son; until, even though by means of a one-sidedly aristocratic, democratic, or monarchical constitution, as the case may be, the people are divided into rulers and subjects. However widely different the regulations of tribes may be from those of a State, we yet see in them already something higher than a republic of ants or bees.

(*d*) *Comradeship, the analogue of friendship.*—The difference of temperaments is of great importance in the domain of *free social intercourse*. At first this intercourse may be of a rather accidental, atomistic character, and for mere amusement (comradeship); but it also assumes stability the more it is connected with *activity*, and the more it has regard not merely to enjoyment, but also works in connection with the tendency next treated of.

(*e*) *Division of labour*, difference of talents, and associations resulting from identity in respect to them,—the *analogue of civil society*. The natural race-feeling lays the foundation also for associations resting on talents. Through variety in talents a division of labour is naturally brought about; *non omnia possumus omnes*. But because each one, in order to subsist, needs the help of others, as the others need his, and so on in an unending circuit, therefore the difference of talents becomes a strong bond of union,—a union which has become such deliberately. The fellowship is primarily one of *traffic*, which effects an exchange of the products of labour. Instead of the simple having and possessing, there begins a mutual giving and receiving, in which each gains, because each exchanges what he can dispense with for what is to him more desirable. The oldest and most direct form of traffic is *barter*; but there

is soon found a neutral medium of value—money. With the traffic there become connected bargains for mutual services of a personal and a material sort,—bargains which are not yet guarded by the idea of right, but by that of the advantage of all.

But as from the diversity of talents, so also from their *identity*, or from the interests arising from it, there result a multitude of associations or unions among those of similar callings. Here, growing out of the difference of generations, belong the relations of master and apprentice, of teacher and pupil, that is, combinations made for the purpose of equalization by those who are in the relation of inequality. Then again there are combinations of those in the relation of equality, *e.g.* trades associations; also the relations of service, so far as these depend upon compact,—in compact the parties stand over against each other as equals,—and so far as they aim at giving help in common work; or again, combinations of those who are alike in individual tastes, *e.g.* combinations for artistic and scientific purposes (so far as science and art begin to become active), of masters among themselves, or of learners among themselves.

§ 18. *The Defects of the Rudimentary Civilisation that springs up naturally.*

The natural unity of the faculties, together with the associations which they evoke, is by no means ethically worthless, but still is in itself as yet only ante-ethical. It is in many respects imperfect, and exposed to dissolution and confusion through caprice, so long as the sound, normal order of nature is not sanctioned and preserved by a higher principle.

1. We have seen whither human nature normally tends, even apart from the really moral process. We have seen that it leads not to a mere division, or confusion, of the faculties of the individual, and not to a mere separation of the one species into a multitude of antagonistic individuals,—in a word, not to a chaos, but to a connected whole, having adaptation to an end, and exhibiting marks of design. In

the single natural individuals as such, and in their relation to one another, there is also implanted a healthy, efficient unifying power, which, valuable in itself, is also productive of what is valuable.

2. But if, now, we consider the worth of the products which are possible at this stage, two views are to be excluded. (*a*) A *spiritualistic* ethics, which despises all this, because there is still wanting to it the ethical soul, namely, conscious freedom of will and a moral disposition. Kant goes so far that he treats the object or actual thing which is chosen as entirely unessential to the notion of moral good. He requires that this be disregarded on the ground that the essential thing is not what is chosen, but how, and with what disposition, the choice is made. Only in this way does he think he can avoid justification by works, or mere legality. Furthermore, say others, what is done without conscious free choice can be called only a product of nature, consequently falls entirely outside of the realm of morals, and is without significance for an ethical world. Both views involve a serious error. Against Kant it is to be maintained that if the morality which it is the part of human beings to reach depends only upon a good disposition or a good will,—not at all upon what is willed, but only upon how one wills,—this would lead us to the principle that no objective thing can be morally commanded, but that rather anything can be chosen at pleasure, if only the disposition, intention, or end be good. But this is a Jesuitical principle, which abandons the assumption of all necessary connection between the inward disposition and the outward work, and thus imperils the whole process of building up a moral world. It must rather be insisted that choice be made not merely in the right moral way, but also of the right thing. What the right thing is could not be affirmed, if morality hinged merely upon that most inward thing, the bent of the will. But in that case the personality or the *ego* would be conceived of abstractly, as separated from all its concrete qualities, by which alone, nevertheless, it becomes a living being—one that not merely thinks, but also chooses and does something. With nothing but a disposition, the person would remain only the form of a person, always and for ever willing only the same thing, namely, the good con-

dition of the will. But this goodness would come to no development; the disposition would remain powerless to effect any positive ethical manifestation.

Accordingly the whole domain of the natural exercise of the faculties — the above-mentioned spontaneous products of human nature—has after all a great significance for ethics. Although it antedates real morality, it is yet the indispensable condition (*conditio sine qua non*) of the building up of a moral world; it is the scene and material on which morality operates; it is indispensable to the manifestation, and to the reality, of the ethical principle. By mere thinking we could not come into fellowship with others; in order to this, we must utter what is within us. But this is not possible without a physical medium by means of which minds come into contact with one another. Without the objective reality constituted by the natural faculties and endowments above considered, there would be wanting both to the individual and to the race the needed fulness and wealth,—the supply of means for mental (and also moral and religious) self-manifestation and expression. And in the fruits, already considered, of the natural exercise of the unifying force, so far as they have come about normally by virtue of innate impulses, the thought of the Creator has continued to realize itself. He has thus created an actual order of the world which, although not as yet fixed by man's free act, but only through his instrumentality, is to be the starting-point of the moral process, and a prototype of that which is to become an ethical product. The normal unity, as well as the variety, of the active faculties at the outset, is a type of the future moral system. To preserve these faculties, and in their normal connection or unity, will be not only the first, but also a continual, moral duty. From the high position which we have here assigned to corporeality, to nature, and to the subjection of it, it must not, however, be inferred that the significance of the whole ethical process through which mankind passes—that is, the significance of human history—is merged in the conquest of matter and in the subjugation of nature.

This leads (*b*) to the more frequent error, the one opposed to the spiritualistic, that, namely, of *overvaluing the worth* of

this natural union of the faculties and of their products. Human life, if limited to these natural manifestations in individuals and society, is as yet very incomplete. It is often asserted that by these excellences, without any moral process, an existence noble and worthy of man is attainable or attained. But although the products of these faculties, as well as the secure possession of them, the means of enjoyment, etc., are certainly good things, yet they are in themselves only of *finite value;* man limited to them would be with them alone not as yet a rational being. In these finite spheres there might, it is true, be *ability*, but not *virtue*. Furthermore, all these things are in themselves as yet of an equivocal nature. As means, they are subservient to the best disposition, but also just as much to the worst; as when, *e.g.*, the ultimate aim is only pleasure, whether coarser or more refined, but an aim having absolute worth has not yet appeared above the moral horizon.

If, now, all this, namely, the harmonious play of the finite faculties in the midst of the plenitude of the products of culture, is regarded as the destination of man, as a false humanism would make it, then we have *hedonic ethics;* and when this eudæmony, these objects of finite worth, are made absolute, there is presented in morals the complete counterpart of the worship of false gods in religion. In the last analysis that would be only selfishness, and we should get no farther; the ruling principle would be only shrewdness, which weighs or regulates the pleasures and their correct succession, and devotes energy to the procuring of the means for gaining them. Duty would be as much a thing out of the question as right in the stricter sense would be; duty and right in that case would together sink into the notion of that which is not regulated by a moral standard. Everything which pleases would be permitted; ability, power, would be the measure and the limit of lawfulness; or rather, might would take the place of right; that is, in that case caprice would have the freest scope. And even if to this caprice limits are always in turn set by the salutary order of nature, whose violation is punished with evil by a reaction of that salutary nature, yet sagacity would teach one to avoid such evil; but guilt, punishment, and sense of punishableness would be out of the question.

3. And not only is the individual life of the natural person, so far as it can shape itself without a strictly ethical process, as yet very imperfect, but so also are those *communities* which are formed purely spontaneously by natural impulse aided by sagacity and intelligence. Mere sexual or conjugal association is not, properly speaking, wedlock; if only the natural impulses, of a physical or of a psychical sort, draw individuals together, mutual pleasure and complacency will preponderate, and will be the real bond; but in that case the consorts are means for each other, and not an end in themselves,—not the other *ego*, but only the extension of each one's own *ego*. But pleasure is an equivocal bond of companionship; for the same thing which now connects may at another time work to separate. If elsewhere there is more pleasure to be hoped for, the person governed by physical or psychical affinity will turn thither; and this would not even be blameworthy, if the mere force of natural impulses may be decisive, and no healthful order exists in the form of duty or law. If, now, we imagine that in the case of both consorts, after a period of mutual attractiveness, the same love of pleasure which joined them together works again to sever them, then the family also, in its unity and coherence, is destroyed (Gen. iv. 19, vi. 1–6). Where stability is wanting to the marriage bond, there can be only progeny, *proles;* but the *family* relation is out of the question; just as is the case with brutes, that do not know, or soon forget, to what parents they belong. But if the family relation is not attained, then men do not even get so far as to form tribes and tribal regulations, but only a chaotic multitude, a conglomerate human horde, which will never be elevated till family life, above all, marriage, stands fast as a sacred ordinance.

Temperament also, and *natural constitution*, cannot as such form the ground of a stable companionship. For here, too, it is possible that another person is sought not as an end in himself, but only as a means, whether it be for entertainment and enjoyment, or for the purpose of work. This, however, does not deserve the name of friendship, but only of comradeship, which lasts only so long as the interests do not cross, but run parallel. The same holds true, finally, of the *unions* which

are formed on the ground of difference, or resemblance, of *talents*. The *division of labour*, although it is for the interest of all, can be so made that indolence, inordinate love of enjoyment, or greediness gets control of the serving and working classes, or, on the other hand, so that the faculties of some are simply taken advantage of by the others.[1] So, too, traffic in itself can be taken into the service of selfishness, can minister to fraud, avarice, and dishonesty, and thus become its own enemy. For where credit and confidence are wanting, mercantile intercourse comes to a standstill.

Without a moral process, strictly so called, *a code of justice* and *a State* are out of the question. For even an agreement presupposes the mutual recognition of the duty to abide by it. All the deficiencies, perversions, and disorders above mentioned become unavoidable, if we do not count on ethical forces in social bodies, and do not feel that it is necessary to care for these forces, which after all are in the interior being what the spring is to the watch, or the soul to the body.

4. What has been already said shows that the unity in the faculties of individuals, and of members of the species, which is, as it were, prearranged in the salutary order of nature, can be only a foretoken of the true ethical unity, but not this unity itself; it is rather only something defective and even equivocal. All this acquires still more importance from the fact that in man instinct does not have the same power and significance as in brutes; while, on the other hand, he has the power of voluntary choice. That natural salutary unifying power is indeed not without effect; it has as its ally also the arrangement of the world, which manages to make even egoism its ally, so far forth as egoism finds its account, in the long run, only in preserving the healthy order of nature. But it is not a compulsory power; it does not draw man irresistibly into its healthy ways. On the other hand, sensuality and passion make men imprudent also, make them rush inordinately in a direction that for the time being promises the greater pleasure, dazzled by which they forget the consequences. In man, indeed, dwells also the ability to draw himself back from all impulses into his own *ego*, which

[1] *E.g.* when labour is taken advantage of by capital, this is as yet a state of nature.

holds concealed an indefinite multitude of possibilities. But without *law* we yet have in all this only the power of choice, which is able to break away from the sound normal impulse of the order of nature, to give itself on the other hand unreservedly up to lawless impulses, and thus to destroy God's salutary order of the universe. The brute, although denied the endowment of reason, remains in his healthy natural state by the force of instinct, which warns against what is injurious. For, in the brute, instinct is, as it were, the surrogate of reason, being furnished with the immediate power of an efficient impulse; it is for the brute, as it were, the conscience of the collective organism, as over against single impulses which would lead to excess; although even the brute at times also makes a mistake. But in man that overpowering force of instinct is wanting; on the other hand, he has free choice, which is not *obliged* to make itself the ally of the unifying tendency of the sound order of the universe, as over against the sensual impulses and the excitement which comes from the diversified outward world. How easily, in that case, it may happen, especially when one persuades himself that by the gratification of his own bent he will not only remain well off, but will augment his enjoyment of life, that this unifying tendency, since it does not work compulsorily, will be neutralized both in individuals and in the community (Gen. iii. 1 sqq.).

According as free choice gives the reins to one of the impulses, abnormalness and disorder will enter, affecting both individuals and communities; and the obverse of overpowering impulses and desires in certain spheres will be impotence with reference to others. The disorder will involve both the physical and the psychical nature. The ungoverned impulse for possession becomes greed and avarice; the unregulated impulse for honour and power will, in the form of pride, ambition, and thirst for dominion, work injury to others whom it brings down. The consequence in the case of weaker natures will be envy, servility, and cringing; while, in the case of stronger natures, pride and love of power act contagiously; and so there are enkindled strife and warfare, which threaten society with dissolution. In like manner the unbridled impulse for enjoyment, especially the ungoverned sexual impulse, destroys, together with the subject of it, the

objective advantages of companionship, marriage, family, and social life.

In a word, man has, answering to his microcosmic nature, such many-sided susceptibilities and impulses, that, especially considering the weakness of his instinct, he could not find his way without mistakes, but on account of his powerful passions and capacities would soon become a chaos, if a higher light did not break in as a standard of order and harmony. As a *merely finite being he is not a perfect whole;* he is too much and too little, so that it is impossible that at this stage his creation can be finished. Endued with an opulence of faculties, possessed of free choice in alliance with cunning and sagacity, there he would stand as an enigmatical terrible being, almost demoniacally equipped for the destruction of the world and of himself, if there were no higher principle for him, able to guide and to govern his physical and spiritual being, namely, *the law of ethical Good*, of which he must have knowledge, unless he is to continue a mere natural creature. And yet, if such a law of Good were simply implanted in him as a higher power having the mastery over him, he would be merely a natural creature of a higher sort. For then, again, he could not participate in the act by which he is constituted an ethical being. Accordingly, the equivocal unity or harmony which is a natural growth cannot be man's goal; nor is this attained by the simple natural exercise of his innate faculties; but this natural stage must be transcended by means of the *moral process.* This, however, comes actually to pass only by man's receiving a knowledge of obligation, of moral Good,—a knowledge, however, which does not operate compulsorily upon the will or the being.

SECOND DIVISION.

OF THE MORAL PROCESS IN GENERAL, OR OF THE DIVINE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE AS THE LAW OF ACTION FOR THE MORAL FACULTIES.

§ 19.

On the basis of the physical and mental faculties of a common and of an individual kind, which have been considered in the First Division, the moral process is initiated. This is done by the separation of the moral *feeling*, which is the beginning of the rational human existence, into moral *sense* and *impulse*, and at a higher stage into actual *conscience* and *freedom*. This separation takes place in order that the *objective moral law* may make its claims in a clearly conscious way upon the free will. By the moral process, however, the simple or natural unity of the rational human constitution is broken up relatively only for the sake of seeking a higher form. Accordingly this Division is subdivided into the doctrine of *law*, of *conscience*, and of *freedom*.

1. The necessity of an ethical process, in order to raise man above the plane of mere nature, is sufficiently evident from the foregoing, as also the necessity of the breaking up of the original unity in order that there may be an ethical process. *Three factors* will have to co-operate in order to constitute this process. The first is the *law*. The word "duty" is often used as synonymous with law; but the word has reference rather to some single concrete thing, having more definite regard to the obligation of the individual than the notion of law has, which is limited to pure objectivity. But the necessity of taking the first of these three factors as a starting-point will be plain from what follows. The connecting of ethics with the idea of God, which we found to be necessary, has fruitful results for our system of morals only when we take, as the starting-point for our sketch of the ethical process,

nothing else than the moral law. It might be thought, indeed, that, since we know of morality only through the moral feeling, conscience, and the moral consciousness, therefore the moral feeling, etc., are the only source of moral legislation; that is, that the moral feeling, conscience, etc., are to be regarded as the first, fundamental factor of moral existence in general. But such a view regards only the subjective process rather than the objective fact itself, which is that neither moral feeling nor moral sense and will would be possible without law; that, rather, man without it would remain shut up purely to finiteness. If we do not go back to an objective moral law which, because it is in and of itself true and certain, is independent of subjective feeling, sense, and conscience, then these things themselves would be incorrectly conceived. Moral feeling, conscience, etc., are not absolutely autonomous; only in case they were so could they be regarded as the ultimate source of the moral law. On the contrary, the objective law is the source of the moral feeling, sense, and conscience; and so there belongs to the moral feeling, sense, and conscience itself, the consciousness that morality is independent of the knowledge, yes, of the being, of the individual. The objective divine reason and truth it is which forms itself in the human soul and first brings it to rationalness. The law is made secure in its sacredness and objectivity only by our treating it in its connection with the ethical idea of God as the first fundamental factor of the ethical process. "Law is the rock on which ethics rests, and it reaches down to the lowest depths."[1] Of it, therefore, our first section is to treat. But not only the objectivity of this law must by all means be secured, but also its entrance into the spirit, primarily into the intelligence, which, recognising morality in its truth and absolute authority, brings it home to the will. There must be implanted in us, as our own, a knowledge of the Good as such, or as the truth; without this knowledge we could not do anything for the reason that it is good, but only for other, that is, non-moral, reasons. But like human development in general, so also this apprehension of the divine law is gained only gradually.

2. The commencement of the process is in the *moral*

[1] Schmid, *Christl. Sittenlehre*, p. 346.

feeling, in which are included moral cognition and volition, at first still in undivided unity. The moral feeling is (§ 12. 4) a feeling of that which has absolute worth as addressed to the will; and in it is involved (*a*) the being affected by the ethical idea as one which demands reverence and obedience. And the being thus affected is, moreover, not a merely subjective sensation; the moral feeling is a feeling for something objective and in itself sacred. If, now, the object of the moral feeling is fixed by itself, that is, if the thing felt to be of worth is grasped as such by the cognitive faculty, then there arises a moral conception: and the feeling becomes a sense of what is sacred and morally imperative, as distinguished from the *Nefas*. (*b*) But, on the other hand, there is in the moral feeling, besides the perception of dependence upon a necessary something, upon a higher, sacred order, also a germinant consciousness of freedom. For in the moral feeling there is an ideal law, together with inward delight in it; but the ideal feeling of delight is the feeling of an at least possible freedom. The feeling, being moral, presages the gaining of a higher existence through the working of the power by which the feeling is stirred. The beginning of freedom, however, is contained in impulse, and, further on, in the will. Thus the analysis of the moral feeling shows the possibility of its transition into moral sense and impulse.

3. But the breaking up of the original unity is also necessary. Feeling is in the first instance only a simple primary modification [*unmittelbare Bestimmtheit*] in man, neither posited nor shaped by his will. But in the moral world the will, the self-determination, forms the centre; and this holds true even in relation to receptivity and feeling, for there is also such a thing as *willing* to be moved and determined. But the will must *will something*, and this can come to it only through the intelligence, which sets before the will the object to be chosen. Therefore, in order that there may be a moral process of the will, there must be developed, first of all, moral intelligence, *i.e.* moral sense, and further on, conscience. Thus the object confronts the will, is held before it as something to be done. If the will were determined merely by the feelings, the will would be without clear consciousness, hence also without freedom. Therefore cognition and will must

separate; this is the condition of their independent development. The next thing is the separation of the moral feeling into moral sense and impulse. But moral cognition, in the form of a mere sense and vague apprehension, is not yet objectively definite and sure enough; no less true is it that the will, so long as it is simple impulse, is too much moved by feeling and nature. Hence the independent development of both must proceed farther, till the moral sense and vague apprehension become clear and fixed conscience, and till the moral impulse becomes freedom of will.

Thus the moral feeling is separated into the two poles of the morally necessary [*i.e.* imperative, Tr.] and the morally free, both of which, however, stand in intimate relation to each other. Conscience is a knowledge of that which is necessary; of that, however, which is morally necessary, addressed to freedom; that is, it recognises freedom, and even incites to moral self-determination, but does not necessitate. Rather, as that which is morally necessary is independent, in relation to that which is free, so the free is independent, as over against the morally necessary, and exists already in the form of power of choice, before all higher development of the intelligence. But, as we soon see, it is only through the consciousness of moral necessity that freedom gets its higher meaning, and is given to itself as the power of a decision of infinite importance; and now freedom, whether it will or will not, must enter into a relation either negative or positive to that which is morally necessary. For even the failure to make an unconditionally-required decision is itself a decision. But with the decision the moral process comes into existence.

If, on the other hand, the character of the decision were not left to free choice, but were forced upon one, for example, by the necessitating power of the consciousness of what is morally right, then, again, the stage of morality would not be reached; moral responsibility and moral personality would still be unattained. If, for example, even love to God were fixed by God without possibility of resistance, then such love would have no moral worth. To this actual antithesis of moral necessity and freedom, which is in no way a contradiction, every rational nature comes; thus even Christ speaks of an ἐντολή of the Father, a moral δεῖ, as applying to Him; and

the knowledge of this duty is the knowledge which conscience has. Accordingly, it cannot be said with the little book *Deutsche Theologie* [*Theologia Germanica*], that only we men have conscience, but Christ and Satan have none. This would be correct only if conscience were either the effect of sin, like the so-called evil conscience, or the cause of sin. The antithesis spoken of between freedom and moral necessity in no way involves even the least element of contradiction between the two.

4. On the other hand, the rational constitution, as it actually exists, must not be deistically conceived of as a mere self-unfolding of the human faculties without the continued operation of God. Rather God's causality is operative in it. His creative will it is which first perfectly realizes the moral constitution, since He clearly and vividly evokes also the consciousness of the objective moral requirement. And with reference to the will also the deistic view is none the less to be excluded. The power to exercise a good volition comes from above; by God and His revelation that which is good can be put before man in an alluring and attractive, although not in a compulsory, way. There is besides this the connection of the feelings and the will. This connection continues on also in the moral process, and like a soul, like an ideal inspiring delight, can permeate thought and volition; and out of the acts of thinking and willing there must be always a return into feeling again. But in feeling the soul in its totality is capable of being affected or determined by God, and the human will can doubtless participate in this; it can *choose* to let itself be determined by God and His Spirit. Therefore in the feelings is to be found the inmost source whence, when the intellect is darkened and the will is powerless and bound, help can still come to man. There, too, the longing after light and after emancipation from bondage is still possible, and it can impel man to apply to the divine source of life, in order that human impotence may be removed by power from on high.

Note.—In accordance with what has been said, our Division subdivides itself into three Sections: the doctrine of the *Divine Law;* of the *subjective Apprehension of the Law*, or of *the Conscience;* and of *Freedom.*

FIRST SECTION.

THE BINDING CHARACTER OF THE OBJECTIVE MORAL LAW.

§ 20.

The good which is eternally realized in God's being and will He wills as the law, or binding rule, or obligation, for the world. The law of the moral world is essentially distinguished from the law of nature by its character of intrinsic necessity, absoluteness, and universality. As an obligating power, it embraces the faculties of knowledge and volition and the state of being,—both what is common to all and what is peculiar to each,—yet not without adapting itself to individuals.

Cf. Schleiermacher's treatises on *Naturgesetz* and *Sittengesetz*, and also on *Das Erlaubte*. Schmid, *De notione legis*, and *Sittenlehre*, 140, 156, 260–280, 345 sqq. Heinrich Merz, *System der christl. Sittenlehre nach den Grundsätzen des Protestantismus im Gegensatz zum Katholicismus*, 1841. [Martensen, *Christl. Ethik*, 3rd ed. i. 441 sq., ii. 1, p. 25 sq. Zeller, *Ueber Begriff und Begründung der sittlichen Gesetze*, 1882. *Ueber das Kant'sche Moralprincip und den Gegensatz formaler und materialer Moralprincipien*, 1879. (Both treatises now in the third volume of his *Vorträge und Abhandlungen*, 1884.) Köstlin, *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, vol. xiii. p. 383 sq., xiv. pp. 25 sq., 464 sq. *Studien über das Sittengesetz*. Cf. also, *Die Aufgabe der christl. Ethik*, in the *Studien und Kritiken*, 1879, p. 581 sq. Cf. note, p. 204.—Ed.]

1. Conscience is not the ground, but the perception, of the moral law; the *principium* not *essendi*, but *cognoscendi*. It is God who implants the principle of morality in the human spirit, and that necessarily only as an idea. God's creative activity (*voluntas*) is not to be identified with His legislative activity (*præceptum*). A new life of love could not be directly posited as a finished thing, for a world different from God was to move freely and with an activity of its own. The creative will could at the outset implant only the possibility, not the actuality, of the good. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the good is not existent. Rather, because

it has its reality in God, it acquires through God an existence for or in the intelligence of man. This existence is ideal at first, being the thought of that which ought to be in the world, that is, law. Since now God is in His essence holy love, it may also be said, according to this derivation of law, that it is nothing else than holy love as obligatory (Matt. xxii. 37 sqq.; Rom. xiii. 10). God, who is love, wills that He, as love, be acknowledged and have sway.

By thus going back to God, not only is the objective character of the law, independent of all subjectivity, secured, but also the character of necessity, absoluteness, and universality is conferred upon it. In these three predicates the difference between the moral law and everything physical is expressed, and especially opposition to all utilitarian theories of morals. The moral law is to be derived neither from divine, nor from human, arbitrary choice, but is a revelation of God proceeding from His legislative will. It demands the realization of the divine image for which man is created. "Be ye holy, for I am holy" (Ex. xix. 6; Lev. xi. 44; Matt. v. 48). It proceeds from God's spiritual essence (Rom. vii. 14). Hence it is eternal, and can never be changed by human will, being the mirror of the divine essence. Only so does the question, what is good, cease to be merely a historical question, dependent upon external authorities; the good has its own authority with itself and in itself. This the Evangelical Church, conscious of its own principles, in opposition to the ecclesiastical positivism of Rome, has always held fast. The *Formula Concordiæ*[1] says: *Lex proprie est doctrina divina, in qua justissima et immutabilis dei voluntas revelatur.* But Melanchthon says not merely that law is the divine will, but also *lex dei est sapientia æterna et immutata in deo et norma justitiæ in voluntate dei,* which brings to mind the doctrine of Augustine, that the law has its ultimate root in God's *sapientia prima,* in which also lie the principles of all arts and sciences, as well as of life, that is, the principles of logic and of mathematics, of æsthetics and of ethics. This law now, immutable in God, *transscribitur in sapientes animos.*

2. When we pass on to the separate characterizations of

[1] 592. 3; 713. 17.

the moral law as to its formal side, the first attribute we have to consider is (*a*) *necessity*. There are, it is true, many kinds of necessity. There is physical necessity, which rules in nature, and to which belong coercion and force. But this is out of the question here, because the ethical realm claims freedom for itself. A second sort is logical necessity, or the necessity of the sequence of ideas. Of this also it is to be said, that it does not concern us here, because it belongs to it irresistibly to determine thought alone, but not the will and the being. The moral law is compatible with freedom. Its necessity lies, in the first place, in its origin, *i.e.* in the fact that it emanates from God, and that not fortuitously, but by virtue of the divine nature. But just on that account is to be ascribed to it a necessity as to its intrinsic essence; while in the case of everything physical, even when necessity governs its movements, it may yet be asked, To what purpose? It is not fitted to be an end in itself, but only a means. Its necessity, therefore, is only a hypothetical one, conditioned upon something else, which is the end. And similarly also logical necessity is a hypothetical one, inasmuch as the consequence holds only in case the proposition from which it flows is granted; but in the proposition it is by no means needful that there inhere an intrinsic necessity, that of being an end in itself. Morality, on the other hand, is in itself absolutely valuable and good; in the conception of it the inquiry after the Why must cease; it has thus a teleological necessity. Nevertheless it is law, namely, the law of freedom, and therein also different from natural law. It is necessary to moral law not to necessitate, not to compel; but, on the other hand, no rational being can evade it. It is of force for man, whether he will or not, because it is in itself good and necessary. That relation of law to the person, now, by which a binding force is imposed upon him, is called *obligation*, while the thing as commanded is called *duty*, whether it only seeks to be realized, or whether it is already in process of realization; for obligatory actions also are by many moralists called duty, as by Rothe, Werner, and Bruch.

(*b*) To the law belongs, in the second place, the character of *absoluteness*. It has for rational beings not merely a hypothetical significance; for although it also includes that which

is subordinate, as, for example, the means to an end, yet on account of this end what is subordinate participates in the absoluteness. In this absoluteness is guarded all that is true in Kant's *Categorical Imperative*. There is something absolute for the will, which has absolutely the right to demand recognition, and which cannot be willing not to be and to have validity, if man would be, or would remain, rational. From its absoluteness follows the intrinsic necessity of the law to obligate absolutely. This obligatory power it owes purely to its innate right, its intrinsic majesty. The recognition of it is no merit, but a duty ; the failure to recognise it, however, is guilt.

This character of absoluteness comes especially to view when we contrast the moral law with natural law. Schleiermacher, in his celebrated academical treatise in the year 1828, sets forth with acuteness the relationship of the two, but not also their unlikeness. Even nature, he says, has a law, an inner force and rule, for its growth and formation. Natural things, too, do not always turn out according to this rule, as we see is the case also in the human world. Yet, he says, in nature, too, the ideal type remains, to which she seeks to conform, even though through obstacles. So also, he says, there is in man an ideal type, a standard which seeks to regulate the moral life, although the world of reality acts as an obstruction. The moral law is for Schleiermacher simply a higher form of natural law, that is, a law for intelligent beings.

But just this makes a deeper difference than Schleiermacher admits, as relates both to substance and to form. As a spiritual, that is, rational being, man is open to that which has *infinite* worth. Nature has objects of only finite, not absolute, worth. The worth of the forms it takes depends, in the last analysis, upon that for which nature exists or is the means, namely, moral good, which absolutely ought to be ; and for this reason the moral law alone, so far as relates to the form, makes an absolute requirement. Nature may indeed succumb to obstacles and produce ugly things ; still the unæsthetic is not utterly objectionable, as wickedness is. In addition to this there is the further difference that the spiritual nature of man is duplex, consisting of intelligence and will. The ideal type, in the case of man, must, before it passes over into actual being, first be mediated by the will ;

and to that end this norm at first appears only as an idea addressed to the intelligence, and seeking entrance into the will. In nature, on the other hand, the ideal norm does not as such address itself to the will, but passes over straightway into reality, even though amidst outward obstacles. In man so little does this transition take place immediately, that he can by his will oppose even inward obstacles to it. In man a purely ideal existence of the good precedes its realization, —it is an *esse* in the intelligence, while at the same time it is a *nondum esse* in the will. There *præceptum* and *voluntas* do not coincide. Moreover, although nature has its own law different from the law of morality, yet this does not rend asunder the unity of the world. For the two are not co-ordinate, but the moral law is the higher, and by virtue of its character of absoluteness it obligates and authorizes us to treat everything, even nature, as being for the sake of morality and intended to subserve it.

(*c*) The third attribute is the *universality of the moral law.* This has reference to the circuit which it embraces with its claim. This predicate of universality might be questioned, since God's will embraces not merely the moral world, which is only for rational beings, but nature also; by the moral law the unity of the world might even seem to be threatened. But the natural world was not decreed as a finished whole, as a kingdom which has nothing to do with the moral world. On the contrary, the very fact that the moral law is a law of the spirit, implies that the spirit is that which is to rule over nature — that nature is not independent, still less, dominant over the spirit; hence the moral law is just that which guarantees the unity of the world. Hence it may be said, that morality is the supreme universal law, which includes in itself, and disposes for itself, the whole universe— the law which assigns to everything, even to nature, its proper place. To be sure, the law with its binding power addresses itself immediately and directly only to rational beings. But indirectly it embraces nature also. For not merely is it man's part to have dominion over nature, but also nature is the indispensable means of all concrete moral relations, since without it they could not at all exist. So far forth it may be said that the moral law is nothing else than the ideal image

of the world itself as it should be, *i.e.* as it should become through the will governed by moral considerations.

Of this ideal of the world as to its *contents* we have to speak in the *Third Division;* here we treat only of its *formal* side, or of *obligation.* As applied to man, now, the *universality* of the moral law implies the universality of the obligation which it imposes; and this relates (1) to all earthly rational beings (mankind), (2) to every moment of their conscious existence, (3) to all their powers, but in such a manner that the person, this unit, is always that which is placed under obligation.[1] The law draws all the powers into its binding power; its validity for them is unconditional, and it tolerates no restrictions within the rational being of man. Together with the reason the ethical idea awakes in man; but rationalness is designed to be in man a permanent state. It demands to have not a merely temporary existence in him, not merely to shine into him from time to time, and at other times to let him keep becoming a brute again, to which, as it were, everything is allowed that lies in his power and that his impulse leads him to. On the contrary, the ethical idea, when once it has risen in one's consciousness, involves the demand that the whole conscious life, without exception, be continually subject to it; and against this claim neither the weakness nor limitation of man on the one hand, nor the superior force of nature on the other, can make any valid protest.

From the foregoing it follows that the moral law in its way embraces also the other fundamental forms in which the moral element exists, viz. virtue and the highest good; but it embraces them in its character of a *requirement.* It insists not only on being in the intelligence, but also on dwelling and ruling in the will; it demands an existence even in the fundamental disposition, and requires that the ethical faculty, or virtue, shall not remain a latent faculty, but shall manifest itself actively. It demands that the good, by means of good or right actions and works, shall acquire a subjective-objective form of existence, that is, shall attain, in the character of the highest good, a fixed habitual state, while yet it remains a living power. The moral law requires that

[1] Matt. xxii. 37 sqq.; Gal. vi. 2; Rom. xiii. 8 sq.

the good exist in all these three forms, and that there be a progress from one to the other. It insists upon being the controlling centre of one's thoughts, words, volitions, actions, and works,—of his feelings, his states, and his activities. It insists on being continuous and omnipresent in the human life.

But although the moral law embraces everything, yet this does not require an absolute uniformity of the world or of the activity of the will. Love must indeed be the ruling principle in all the functions; but the manifestation of it must be governed objectively by the circumstances, subjectively by the faculties, of the individuals. On the other hand, everything *in its way* is wholly embraced by the moral obligation. In this respect the law divides itself into many members; and, being thus multiform, it comprehends the world, primarily man, and indirectly also nature.

Against this statement of the characteristics of the moral law, objection is made from various sources.

§ 21. *The Denial of the Formal Fundamental Attributes of the Moral Law.*

We must set aside not only the denial of one or another of the above-developed fundamental attributes of the moral law, but also the distinction between half, or imperfect, duty, and whole, or perfect, duty. We must also reject the Catholic distinction between an imperative and a merely advisory part of the moral law (*Consilia Evangelica*), together with the assumption that there are actions which are morally indifferent, or merely permissible, and not obligatory, for the person in question. Finally, we must reject also the doctrine that the duties of love stand higher than the duties of right, and are therefore to be preferred. On the other hand, the universality of the moral law, the subsumption of the whole life and of all one's powers under the moral order, must of course not be so understood as that all the duties which form the contents of the moral law

unconditionally require to be fulfilled by all men and in every moment of their life alike, so that all would be under obligation to do the same thing at all times. Rather, the universality of the moral law means only that the law, in itself consisting of various members, embraces the whole world with its many members, so that each individual, with his own peculiarities, has at all times, in the moral organism of the world, his special place assigned to him, which he, in due regard to his circumstances, is to occupy with his powers in such a way as shall accomplish the most for the progressive realization of the Good, or of the kingdom of God.

1. The *objective necessity* of the moral law follows at once from the idea of moral goodness, and is consequently questioned only by utilitarians on the one hand, and by Scotists on the other; the former making the moral law to be dependent on subjective caprice, the latter, on the *supremum liberum arbitrium* of God.

More frequent, however, is the denial of the *absoluteness* and *universality* of the moral law. Against the doctrine that moral goodness has an absolutely obligatory claim, and one that affects the whole personal life, the *Roman Catholic* Church sets up the proposition, that there is that which is morally good, but which nevertheless is not unconditionally commanded or universally binding. The meaning is not that there is moral excellence, which yet must not be treated as a debt due or as a legal duty; for example, there is much which is in itself good, but which the State cannot and ought not to carry through by force; deeds of benevolence it must leave to the free will. Nor is the meaning that there is a sphere of individuality (§ 13–16), which others can never wholly see through, for which reason they also cannot define how the individual in all particulars must act in order to comply with the duty which, though absolute, yet adapts itself to individuals. The Roman Catholic Church, as we know, is not very indulgent to the peculiarities of individuals. The meaning rather is, that there is a kind of goodness which, even in the view of God and the enlightened

conscience, is not duty, because, although good, nay, even a higher species of good, it does not come into the category of duty, this being too low for it. Here belongs the doctrine of the so-called Evangelical Counsels (or the *consilia perfectionis*), which, to be sure, in their consequences, prove to be very unevangelical, and even lead back, in their own way, to a constrained and painful service of works. The doctrine holds that, besides what belongs to common morality, there is an uncommon, higher morality which God has not commanded, but which confers perfection—*opera supererogatoria*, something superobligatory. By such *opera*, many say further, a *thesaurus operum* is filled up which is under the control of the Church, and contains merits which are transferable to others, and so make indulgences possible. According to this, not the whole life and all its powers are embraced by the law of duty, which, though unconditional, yet is modified according to the individuality; but rather there is one part reserved for man which he can dispose of arbitrarily. If, now, with reference to what he is under no obligation to do, he restricts or gives up his freedom, *i.e.* his right of arbitrary conduct, for the sake of the perfection which can be a matter only of advice, he acquires for himself a merit.[1] To this higher, optional excellence belong not so much certain good works recommended by the Church, such as fasting, alms-giving, mortifications (except in so far as they reach a very unusual degree), as rather, particularly, the so-called vows of poverty, of chastity, and of obedience, which involve the renunciation of property, of marriage, and of personal freedom. Of course it is assumed that those who make the sacrifice of these three things do not fall behind others in the realm of common duties. But this realm is unduly limited; for example, the duty of faithful management of property is swallowed up by

[1] Cf. Bellarmin, *de Controversiis fidei chr.* tom 2, lib. ii. cap. 9; J. A. Möhler, *Symbolik*, ed. 6, pp. 159, 213 sq. [*Symbolism*, etc., trans. from the German by Jas. B. Robertson, Lond. 1843, pp. 181, 240 sq.—Tr.]; C. T. Werner, *System der christlichen Ethik*, 1850-52, vol. i. pp. 368, 408; Martin, *de Consiliis quæ vocantur perfectionis*, 1850; Julius Müller, *Lehre von der Sünde*, vol. i. p. 64 sq. ed. 5 [In English: *The Christian Doctrine of Sin*, trans. by W. Urwick (Clark, Edin. 1868), vol. i. p. 52.—Tr.]; Schmid, *Sittenlehre*, p. 441; Rothe, ed. 1, vol. iii. p. 90; Wuttke, vol. i. § 81 [*Christian Ethics*, vol. ii. § 80.—Tr.].

the pretended perfection which rejects the possession of property as being worthless for the development of personal morality.

In defence of this doctrine of the *Consilia Evangelica*, both exegetical and intrinsic reasons are adduced. As the foundation of the whole doctrine of the Evangelical Counsels, Luke xvii. 10 is given; while, for the vows of poverty and of celibacy in particular, Luke xviii. 22, Matt. xix. 11, 12, 21, 1 Cor. ix. 14–17 are adduced. Möhler understands Luke xvii. 10 thus: Christ, he says, calls it unprofitable when one does not do more than it is his duty to do; consequently the Christian must do more than is his duty. But the passage does not say that: it says rather that with respect to whatever he can do the man ought to say, "What I have done is no more than it was my duty to do; I have therefore no merit, no rightful claim to reward. On the contrary, I am an unprofitable servant; I have brought to God no profit which He is bound to requite;" just as the master spoken of in the context owes the slave no thanks. The passage, therefore, means this: With reference to whatever of good we have done we ought to say, We are unprofitable servants; we have only done what it was our duty to do. And this requires that we regard also the so-called good of the *Consilia* rather as something due, that is, as duty. We are unprofitable all the more, since we are all to regard ourselves as sinners, who have rather to beg forgiveness than to demand a reward. If the meaning were that, when the common duties are done, the man remains still an unprofitable servant, then, in order not to be unprofitable, he would be under *obligation* to strive after perfection; and thus too out of the counsel results duty and command. Besides, the whole passage is directed against Pharisaic self-righteousness; to this a back-door would be opened, if Jesus meant to exhort us to do anything more than our duty, that is, anything meritorious. How would the universal necessity of redemption consist with this? Christ means to exhort us to humility, and through humility to faith (vers. 5 and 6). Finally, Jesus does not say that any one has done everything, but only supposes the case, and even in this He declares that there is no room for merit or self-congratulation.

In Matt. xix. 21, where the renunciation of riches is spoken of, Jesus does not concede to the young man that he has kept the whole law from youth up; for this law forbids even evil desires. He does not say, as Martin affirms, that, since the young man has fulfilled the law, he only needs, in order to perfection, also to give up his possessions. For Jesus regards him as not yet righteous and pleasing to God, as not yet a member of the kingdom of God; but He regards him as still standing outside of the kingdom of God, for He says, after the youth has gone away sorrowful, "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God!" Otherwise how could He call on him to lay up treasure in heaven and to follow Him? Jesus' words rather are designed to help the young man to a knowledge of himself, to make him see how much his heart still clings to earthly treasures. If his desire to attain to the kingdom of God was earnest and victorious, he followed after Jesus,—a service which then involved outward separation from his home,—and was able to become perfect; as we all through Christ can, and should, become perfect (Matt. v. 48). The requirement that he should divest himself of his outward possessions, was the test whether his heart clung to his wealth as the highest good; and to be able at first to stand this test inwardly was for this particular youth the condition of discipleship.

When in Matt. xix. 11, 12 those are spoken of who for the kingdom of heaven's sake refrain from marriage (as, *e.g.*, Paul did on account of his work), and when it is added, "He that is able to receive it, let him receive it; all men cannot receive this saying, but they to whom it is given," it is most distinctly affirmed that it is not left to man's mere option whether he shall refrain from marriage, but that that depends on a special individual gift. He to whom "it is given" has in this gift, as in everything to which he is entitled, a talent for which he is responsible; just as he who is personally fitted for marriage is fulfilling his vocation when he lives as a married man. In all men should dwell the spirit of love, which wholly devotes itself to the interests of the kingdom of God, according to the requirements of one's vocation and individual characteristics. Whether this unselfish devotion requires marriage or celibacy, is to be decided by that

wisdom of love which must give directions for the right use of freedom, that is, must seek the place in which this freedom can exert itself most fruitfully.

These passages certainly teach that the one universal and absolute fundamental duty of love adapts itself to individual characteristics and circumstances. The same love uses the different individualities in wisdom; this, however, does not open to them a domain of caprice and option, but rather each individual is embraced by the one law of many members, which requires for love a rich and manifold, but not uniform, manifestation. What is duty for the individual, in view of his individuality, others cannot decide; it can also not be determined by any abstract rule. Ultimately in every act something must be left to the *conscience* of the individual, but so left that under like circumstances every one would have to do the same that is the duty of the individual. In 1 Cor. vii. 17, 20, where Paul speaks of marriage and celibacy, he lays down the general rule, "Let each one abide in his calling," that is, in consideration of his individual characteristics which decide concerning his calling. 1 Cor. ix. 14–17 does not at all bear upon the matter in question. For when Paul says that it is his privilege to live of the gospel, but that he refrains from doing so for the gospel's sake, this does not mean that, because he has a claim on the Christians to be supported by them, and yet makes no use of it, therefore this is optional with him in the sight of God also. Rather Paul believed that, in God's judgment, he had no right to do otherwise than he did. But the most convincing confutation of this whole doctrine of Evangelical Counsels is found in Jas. iv. 17, cf. Luke xii. 47, "To him that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin." Therefore what the *Consilia Evangelica* advise is either not good but the contrary, in which case failure to do it is duty; or it is something good, in which case failure to do it is sin, and the performance of it is duty. But the positive side of the confutation lies in the fact that the law is the law of love, which is the ἀνακεφαλαίωσις of the law. For according to this there can be nothing good which lies above it or beneath it. Love itself, however, is what absolutely all men are required to exercise; it is not merely the duty of certain individuals. Since,

therefore, love claims all the faculties for itself, there is left no place for the *Consilia Evangelica.*

There are *intrinsic* reasons, however, adduced on the Roman Catholic side for the *Consilia Evangelica.* Möhler says: The love which dwells in the Christian is infinitely superior to the law, since it is able to discover more and more tender relations to God and to the world, and never satisfies itself. But this implies a very low conception of the law, even as to its positive contents. Inasmuch as love comprehends all the commandments, all of them being fulfilled in love, how shall one go to work in order to do anything beyond what the law of love requires? Or shall we say that love itself is not commanded? How can one by loving accomplish anything that is superior to love? Just here it becomes very evident how pregnant with evil it has been for the Roman Catholic doctrine, that its teachers have not grasped the doctrine of the law and the gospel as found in the New Testament and set forth by the Reformation. The *Consilia Evangelica* are an ethical monstrosity, full of contradictions, which can be cleared up only by a correct apprehension of the difference, and of the oneness, of law and gospel. In the doctrine of the Evangelical Counsels the Roman Catholic ethics tends, on one side, towards the Evangelical standpoint. For therein the feeling asserts itself, that the universality of the moral law cannot be taken in the sense of the uniform sameness of the law for all men, but that there must be a place for individual freedom; hence one person may properly engage in a worldly vocation, while another may remain a monk. But the freedom which the *Consilia Evangelica* allow must not be confounded with the moral attitude which grows out of personal peculiarities. For though these peculiarities find a sort of recognition in the *Consilia*, yet the counsels are not regarded as duty for the individual just as he is.

Again, it cannot but be seen that in these counsels the feeling asserts itself, that in general the legal standpoint cannot be regarded as the highest one in morality. An attempt is made, however, to find, above the law, a special region which is practically quite other than that of the common moral law, and is of a nobler, or, as it were, more heavenly sort. But

the contents of the moral law retain even under the gospel their immutable holiness; and the legal stage cannot be left behind by dissolving the contents of the law, or by making them less binding through the introduction of a higher element. This can be done only by the person's assuming another attitude than before, viz. the evangelical attitude, towards the holy and imperishable law. Then the law does not merely stand over against the will in such a way that, even when the will does the required deeds, these are done not from love, but only from impure motives, or at the best only out of regard for the law. Rather, in love man's freedom and the immutable imperative demands of morality become perfectly blended. Now through an optical illusion it comes to pass that the person, instead of looking for the defect in himself, *i.e.* in his attitude towards the law, looks for it in the law on its objective side. Instead of giving its rightful place to the all-comprehending law of love, which is also freedom, he lets another sort of law, a merely advisory rule of conduct, enter in, which is made subject to free choice, *i.e.* to pure option. The truth is overlooked, that the genuine Christian freedom consists in one's being bound by the Spirit of God, and must not be identified with option and caprice. The moral law is looked upon as something enslaving, that is, as opposed to freedom; and it is not seen that it is, rather, a law in favour of freedom,—a law that is seeking an embodiment, and finds it in that most exquisite and free delight which sees and loves, in the law of the good, nothing but that which is truest to one's own nature. In a word, in the view under consideration, ethical necessity and ethical freedom, both of which demand of course to be recognised, fail to become united and blended, because an incorrect conception of both prevails. The necessary and the free are, rather, assigned to two different classes of men. Freedom is reserved only for the disciples of the *Consilia Evangelica*, who pass for a spiritual class morally higher than others, and are thus led to cherish the conceit of spiritual elevation above the law and a false notion of the autonomy of their free will; while the other class does not get beyond a servile, constrained attitude towards the law.

Note.—The force of these arguments is not evaded by Werner

either (vol. i. pp. 393–407). He concedes that for common duties, even for duties of right, a spirit of love must be required. He concedes that poverty, obedience to superiors, and celibacy, and in general all outward works, apart from a loving disposition, fail to constitute perfection. He even says (p. 407) that the *Consilia Evangelica* are also to be regarded as duty. But if so, they would cease to be mere *consilia;* and the apparent concession is to be explained by the fact that he regards the *Consilia Evangelica* as duty only for those who already stand in these relations and are bound to them by vow.

2. Something of this Roman Catholic mode of conception has penetrated the ethics of Protestants also. This may be said of Ammon, when he speaks of degrees of obligation, and lays down a distinction between *perfect* and *imperfect* duties, reckoning especially duties of right as belonging to the first class, and the others as not belonging to it. Similarly Kant says that the violation of strict duty, or the duty of right, involves guilt, whereas that of duty in the wider sense, or such duty as constitutes virtue, does not involve guilt, but only the absence of moral worth, while the fulfilment of them involves merit. Love, which he elsewhere sets aside, here tries again to find a place; and this indicates a vague feeling that there is a higher moral stage than the legal one. But the way by which Kant comes to it is objectionable. It is incorrect not to regard love as duty, and the neglect of it as guilt. To him that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin (Jas. iv. 17). And Paul says, "Owe no man anything, but to love one another." Degrees of duty, in themselves and objectively considered, are out of the question. For duty is something in its nature unconditional (Rothe, 1st ed. § 834); but the unconditional has no degrees. It is only in a subjective sense that we can speak of degrees of obligation, in so far as there are different degrees in the clearness of the moral sense, or of the consciousness of obligation, as *e.g.* in the case of an oath. An oath does not increase the obligation of veracity (this exists without the oath), but it does sharpen one's own consciousness of the obligation. But the same is true of all duties which have an absolute character. Therefore neither is the duty of rectitude a more perfect duty than the duty of benevolence, nor *vice versa*. It is true that in the execution of anything, that which is the foundation or neces-

sary condition must precede the structure itself. The duty of rectitude is the foundation. But the foundation and the morality built up on it are both alike commanded; in the proper benevolent disposition which must also be required for the duties of rectitude, both of them, indeed, are at once willed and united. Amongst the manifold things which are necessary to the accomplishment of the moral end for which the world exists, there is a distinction which has a logical and real importance: That which is means to the end must be chosen first. But the obligation to choose it is not therefore any greater.

3. More difficult and disputed is the question whether, besides obligatory things, there are permissible[1] things respecting which one can act purely according to option—a view taken by not a few moralists, among them Chalybäus. On the one hand, it seems in the highest degree objectionable to give up to arbitrary free will a sphere which it may seek to fill up with meritorious deeds, and such as transcend, as it were, moral obligation. Upon the assumption that there is a sphere of being not affected by duty, and, so far forth, beneath morality, there may be built up only too naturally the assumption of something that is above morality. If the moral law covers everything, and if it knows nothing but unconditional requirements, it cannot grant permits to rove about ἀνόμως at pleasure. On the other hand, it does not seem as if it could be demanded that every action of a person should be regarded as duty; *e.g.* that in walking I take the first step with the right foot and not with the left; that in eating I lay hold of this and not of that article of food. If everything were subsumed under the category of duty, would not one's whole life be decomposed into atoms, and, through continual reflection, all ease and freedom of flow in the moral life be lost? To use Kant's language, would not the whole moral world be strewn with the traps of duty? An ethics which would bring together everything, the smallest as well as the greatest, under the notion of unconditional duty seems certain to result

[1] Schleiermacher, *Ueber das Erlaubte*, *Werke*, vol. ii. p. 418 sq.; Hartenstein, *Grundbegriffe der ethischen Wissenschaften*, p. 346 sq.; Chalybäus, *Philosophische Ethik*, i. § 74; Rothe, 1st ed. vol. iii. p. 24 sq.; Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, § 133 sq.; Köstlin, *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, vol. xiv. p. 464 sq.; Wendt, *Ueber das sittlich Erlaubte*, 1880.

in over-strictness, and to favour scrupulousness and a morbid development of the conscience. The solution of these seeming contradictions will be found, if we take our start from the correct conception of moral action, as well as of the permissible, including the so-called morally indifferent.

As to moral action, we must distinguish between it and a factor of the action. Every action, as a relative whole, is subject to the law of duty; but there is not a special duty for every factor in such an action. There are also functions of a physical or psychical kind, which constitute no action of the person, but are only accompanying motions, or such as, according to the character of the organism, act a subservient part. It is an action, *e.g.*, when I carry out a resolution to take recreation by walking in the open air. This volition, now, works on of itself in every step, and takes the organism, as it is, without special further reflection, into its service. The case is similar with the whole realm of amusement and enjoyment. This also is embraced by the law of duty, but by no means so that the free pleasure and movement must be hampered by reflective and anxious legality. Duty and moral law have, it is true, the decisive voice in the resolution to indulge in recreation, sport, and enjoyment; they have likewise the right to demand that in all this nothing impure shall be admittted. But this is possible without a legal, anxious watching of one's self. The agent can, and should, attain freedom, not *from* duty and law, but *in* them; he should acquire a moral tact, the product of a matured faculty for virtue; and this tact, without any troublesome reflection, and by virtue of a naturally indwelling moral perception, will hit upon that which is proper objectively and for the individual.

Now, as to the notion of permissible, or morally indifferent, actions, here likewise we must premise that moral or immoral actions are out of the question, until the consciousness of duty or of law is awakened. Certainly the right to the exercise of one's freedom cannot be denied to man, even before the awaking of the moral consciousness. In this sense, therefore, there will indeed always be things permitted, because neither commanded nor forbidden; but this does not give us permissible moral actions; for these are ante-moral acts, which are

not as yet subject to moral judgment. It is true, even after the moral sense is aroused, it may happen that the agent sees before him various possible things, respecting which it is not at once clear to him whether all of them are possible consistently with morality, or whether one or another among them is so. When, now, one must nevertheless take action, it may be said: The one thing is, in a moral respect, as possible as the other, *i.e.* they are all equally permitted. But it is plain that here, too, there is lacking an element essential to the notion of a moral action, viz. the consciousness of the power of the law to take in also this other action. [One does not even know in this case whether the law commands, forbids, or only allows it.—Ed.] But now, are there not morally indifferent actions? That could be the fact only in case the *moral law itself* laid down various moral, and equally excellent, possibilities, according to the principle that different means or ways may lead to the same end. But what is indifferent in one respect will yet not be so in another, because every definite act of a person will have its peculiar relations and effects in other directions. Accordingly nothing but want of a clear perception of these relations can be the reason why in this case a variety of morally indifferent actions is sometimes assumed. Absolutely morally indifferent nothing can be; because the moral law is authorized to embrace and sanction everything.

§ 22. *Oneness of the Moral Law, and Conflict of Duties.*

However manifold the moral law may be, in reference to the actions and works which it requires, it cannot stand in opposition to itself; for we must ascribe to it perfect oneness in and with itself. Hence there can be no objective conflict of duties.

Literature.—Rothe, 1st ed. vol. iii. § 854, 856, p. 63 sqq. Von der Goltz, *Ueber die Ursachen der Collision von Pflichten*, in the *Deutsch-Evangelischen Blätter* for June 1879. Frank, *System der christlichen Sittlichkeit*, § 22, p. 393 sq. Cf. the literature, § 20.

1. The oneness of the moral law has, in the first place, a negative meaning. It is not discordant in itself, and cannot

contradict itself. For if the moral law is characterized by necessity and absoluteness, there cannot be opposite things which are both at once absolutely obligatory, because in that case the one would nullify the other. But the more emphatic meaning of the unity of the moral law is the positive one: It constitutes a compact unity or totality, not merely in the formal sense that it all has the same source and authority, but in the sense that it is one in itself, amidst all its manifoldness, which comes from the one duty being divided into a multitude of actions and operations. By virtue of its oneness the whole is present in its parts, and affirms itself in them; the consequence of which is, that no part of the whole duty can be willed without the whole being implicitly willed also, and likewise that the moral law, even when violated only in one part, is yet even in this part violated as a whole. This is the sentiment which runs through the whole Epistle of James (ii. 10, iv. 12). Inasmuch now as this one law at the same time embraces and dominates everything, even nature included, whose place is fixed by the law, how can there be place in it for self-contradiction?

The proposition, that there can be a conflict of duties only in appearance, Protestant moralists can, of course, more strictly maintain than the Roman Catholic can; although Roman Catholic moralists also, like Schreiber and the most evangelical of them, Hirscher,[1] would also like to have a part in defending it. Not only does the Roman Catholic Church admit the Scotist doctrine, according to which there may be one kind of morality for man and another for God's action; but also within the world of human beings a twofold species of morality is said to be constituted by the *Consilia Evangelica* — that is, beside the common morality, the morality of perfection. Although modern writers, like Martin, Werner, and others, try to call this a misunderstanding, and to reduce the difference of kind to a difference of degree, this is not satisfactory. Logically the *Consilium Evangelicum* would have rather to be made a universal duty; because it must be duty to overcome every defect which makes one come short of perfection. Again, it is the characteristic of things distinguished only in degree, that

[1] *l.c.* ii. 199.

the lower are included and preserved in the higher, but not excluded by them. But how shall one exercise himself ethically with reference to possessions, freedom, and marriage, when he sustains towards these things the purely negative attitude which the *Consilia Evangelica* recommend? We must therefore insist that these *consilia* involve a relative depreciation of important departments of moral life, while yet they extol this depreciation as perfection. A part of morality, viz. religious life, is here brought into collision with the rest of morality, and tries to live at its expense. That purely negative attitude could be called moral only in case the Manichæan view of the good things of creation were correct; but in that case again it would be a universal duty to renounce them.

2. Against this notion of the solidarity of the moral law, or of duty, doubts and difficulties are raised, derived in part from the nature of morality itself, and especially from the antithesis between the general and the particular. How is a conflict of duties avoidable, ask Daub and Marheinecke, when yet, on the one hand, man, limited in time and space, can at each moment choose only a single thing; whereas, on the other hand, the law, this ideal organism, comprehends *all* good, and, moreover, everything is absolutely *eternally* binding, and does not first become duty in time? This difficulty applies not only to individuals, but also to communities. For example, the Church should grow intensively; but it should grow also extensively, through missions. The individual should work for others, but he should also constantly grow inwardly by means of self-culture. Both prayer and labour are duties. How much time may each lay claim to? What shall be done in all these cases? Every discharge of duty is in a certain respect a solution of the problem of a conflict of duties, because many things require to be accomplished at once. But how is this solution to be found? Schleiermacher intensifies the problem by the further observation, that moral action, in each of its three forms, namely, of action which portrays, action which purifies, and action which propagates, presents an infinite work to be done, so that if the accomplishing of the work is begun with one of them, the others will never be reached.

One might here attempt to evade the difficulty by saying that obligation is out of the question so long as one has no *knowledge* of that to which the law obligates him; that this knowledge, however, is a growing knowledge which he does not have from the outset. This evasion is not valid; for knowledge goes farther than the mere discharge of each duty as it arises. It goes before the action, and early embraces the whole man, and a multitude of duties which cannot all actually pass at once into actions, although they are yet obligatory. Daub and Marheinecke try to distinguish between obligation and duty, making the former a latent thing embracing also that which will not need to be realized till the future, while duty is made to be that which points to something to be done now. But this does not sufficiently guard the unity of the moral law. A latent obligation would be for the moment no obligation; and yet it exhibits a certain vitality in the very fact that there is a moral knowledge concerning it; this knowledge is a knowledge of duty. Moreover, it would imply mutability in the law, if what before was not duty, but only obligatory, should become duty by means of *time*. Rather we must say: If there is a consciousness of obligation, it must be seen that the thing which it requires can also be undertaken.

The correct solution is given by Schleiermacher: The unity of the moral law is secured by the very fact that when I will to do a single thing, I can include in my volition the sum-total of morality, by undertaking what I have to do in the manner prescribed by wisdom. Every individual thing is to be chosen as a part of the whole; and, therefore, with this choice of the whole, which is implied in the moral choice of the individual thing in question, there begins already the accomplishment of that which takes its turn later, as a thing to be done, though it presupposes the previous thing as its foundation. Moral wisdom discerns in the moral law also the appropriate, logical order of succession contained in it, so that there cannot be several incompatible duties contending to be done at the same moment. Thus, righteousness logically precedes the positive manifestation of love, being necessarily presupposed in it. He who is in debt should first think about getting out of debt, and must not deprive himself of

the possibility of doing so by liberality; for this would rather be a taking away from others: giving would be a wrongful show of right doing. Schleiermacher also observes further, that in all moral actions all the three kinds are involved—that which portrays, that which purifies, and that which propagates, so that though one may preponderate, yet the essential unity and connection is preserved.

Those, now, who affirm the reality of an objective conflict of duties urge that through sin an objective derangement has come in, and that the world which was made for harmony is put out of joint.[1] Through sin, it is said, discord enters into the objects of moral choice, and therefore into the purposes of action. Thus arise a multitude of objective conflicts of duties, among which especially deserve to be named the duties which one owes to himself, and towards God and men,—the duty of labouring for the kingdom of God, and the duty of caring for one's self. Furthermore, there are the ethical communities, each of which can, through sin, come into dissension both with itself and with the others. Frank, now, unhesitatingly assumes that, from the derangement caused by sin, a condition of things results in which real duties are opposed to each other and yet contend to be done at the same moment. The ground of the conflicts, he thinks, is not to be found merely in a subjective lack of moral wisdom; consequently wider knowledge would not resolve them. It not seldom occurs, he says, that the discharge of one duty violates another duty, which, being a real one, also expresses the divine will. He would, to be sure, accord to the Christian (p. 416) the hope of solving the problem of the conflict of duties, in so far as he is in fellowship with Christ, in whom, as regards principles, a complete solution is presented. But, on the other hand, he regards it (pp. 417, 418) as possible that, even where the impulse comes to a correct decision, according to the relations to the highest good and to absolute duty, it may thereby in another direction come "to an apparent or real" violation of duty. He even not indistinctly recommends (pp. 422, 423) that, in certain exigencies, when there is a conflict between the duty of love and that of veracity, an

[1] Frank, *System der christlichen Sittlichkeit*, first half, 1884, § 22, pp. 393, 406-423.

untruth should be told, *e.g.* to a passionate or insane man, who may be threatening the life of another; and he says that it cannot be regarded as wrong, when the would-be murderer is looking for the other man's hiding-place, intentionally to put him on a false track, instead of merely preserving silence towards him.

The matter is still more complicated in other cases, as when something has been neglected at an earlier point of time on which something at a later point depends. The deficiency caused by the former guilt has, as its consequence, that now, at one and the same moment several requirements are made to which one's capacity is unequal, and of which each one excludes the other, inasmuch as they cannot all be fulfilled together; while yet the fulfilment of all of them is duty, being the divine will. So, for example, it is in communities. If, in the State, poverty and immorality constitute a mischievous circle, each being continually the cause of the other, the question arises: Which task is first to be attempted, the removal of the poverty or the removal of the immorality? But the solution of the contradiction is here plainly possible; for by means of the division of labour both tasks can be undertaken together. In the individual life, however, the beginning must be made with the moral cognitions, and the aim must be to produce virtuousness. Frank must himself concede that for Christ there was no objective conflict of duties. This involves the admission that in the world, in which Christ as well as others had to live and work, sin causes no such derangement that an objective conflict of duties, all obligatory at the same moment, can necessarily result from it. The derangement or confusion of moral relations caused by sin has indeed an effect on the course which the moral process takes; but the realm of duty itself does not therefore come into contradiction with itself. It asserts itself in reality, in spite of the confusion, by the fact that it indicates the possible remedy and the way to it. A correct moral perception finds the order in which can be accomplished the fulfilment of duties which seem to demand simultaneous attention.

3. *Casuistry*, by dissolving the unity of the moral law into independent duties, has found a wide field for its acumen. It

sets the duties in opposition to one another, either in order to seek a decision and at the same time to revel in a dialectical exercise, or in order to lay the foundation of a moral doubt which shall have to be settled especially by the father confessors. On the one hand it is said, "Thou shalt not kill;" on the other, in war the command to kill is valid. A promise is made to do something which it is sinful to do; but while one must not commit sin, one must also not violate a promise. In such a case there seems even to be no possibility of finding a way out, consistently with morality. For there seems here to be sin in the very failure to sin, because this failure is a breach of promise; while also it would be sinful to keep the promise. Or conversely, the commission of sin involves the doing of good, viz. the keeping of a promise. In like manner the so-called lie of necessity says: Thou shalt sometimes lie for love's sake. In this case one duty is always selected as an abstract thing, and is set up as an individual duty absolutely in opposition to others; whereas it should be conceived of as a member of the whole, so that in the volition the whole must be willed, and not its opposite. Except for this error nothing which is right could be forbidden, and nothing which involves a violation of another duty could really assume the appearance of an obligatory command. The solution of such concrete cases of apparent conflict is possible only when we start with the recognition of the organic unity of all moral action, and of the intrinsic relation of the members of the moral world to one another. The basis for the solution of such cases lies, therefore, in the recognition of the relations of the moral spheres to one another.

Note.—Other cases of alleged objective conflicts of duty which are adduced would have to be accurately stated before they can be solved. The persecution of apostles and confessors was, as Paul after his conversion painfully saw, a grave sin. On the other hand, the persecutors may think themselves to be doing God service; accordingly, since it is duty to do good when one knows it, and in doing so one must follow his own conviction, even though erroneous, sin seems to be involved in the omission of sin, *i.e.* of the persecution. This case of conflict is solved by the consideration that what is not of faith is sin. A persecutor of Christians does not stand in the faith; whether he persecutes or fails to persecute, he stands in sin, that is, in opposition

to duty; and so here too an objective conflict of duties is excluded.[1]

On the other hand, *subjective* conflicts of duties are indeed not to be denied. It is very possible that a man through lack of wisdom, or, in general, of moral force, may sometimes stand still in perplexity, and not know which of several moral duties he is first to lay hold of. Here belongs the celebrated case of the plank which two shipwrecked persons grasp, while it is able to bear only one. Which of the two shall give way? This cannot be told, because the data for a moral decision are as yet too vague and abstract. In real life there will be always disclosed a difference in the claims, because there are no two persons entirely alike and alike situated; two such would rather be one, and so the conflict of duties would disappear. If the concrete data are given, the moral faculty, in the form of wisdom, can come to a decision. Rothe in this connection calls attention to the difference in individuals. If the individual is heroic, he will, without further consideration, aim to save the other. If he is governed more by the principle of caution, it will be allowable to deliberate which of the two shall die. Only it would be bad if one should stick to the plank for the reason that he regards himself as the better, or as more important for the kingdom of God. If the case is supposed that the claims of both are entirely equal, and no difference between them is discoverable, so that neither of them morally would have the right to give way to the other or to remain, then they are brought into a predicament in which both must perish or await death, in order not to act immorally in one direction or the other. By this putting of the case they are both with mathematical necessity destined to die; and that is a smaller misfortune than that either should intentionally kill himself or the other. The persons do not need, even in such a case, to be morally unproductive. The Christian in such a position, awaiting death, would still be able in prayer to realize his fellowship with God.

We still insist, after all, that *there can be no such objectively necessary conflict of duties as could not be solved by wisdom.* Even sin cannot affect this conclusion. For that would imply that evil may gain such a power that the good could be accomplished only by means of evil, and that, too, forbidden evil. Rather, the only effect of evil is, that the healing of the moral faculties, together with everything which makes that healing possible and actual, now enters into the circle of the duties; to seek this cure must be the first duty, because it is the prerequisite of the discharge of every other moral duty. For example, in the case

[1] Cf. what is said by the author lower down on the so-called erring conscience.

of a drunkard, the first thing required is nothing else than a state of sobriety; this furnishes the possibility of his coming to the consciousness of his general condition, and thereby to a real conversion. If there is a lack of moral power, what is done in spite of the lack is indeed not a matter of indifference; but it is not possible for him to take an actual part in the general moral work (Matt. vii. 17, 18).

§ 23. *Duty and Right.*[1]

From the notion of the moral law, which may also be called *God's objective right* (מִשְׁפָּט), there arises, first, that of duty, because the law involves an *unconditional Ought* which concerns all rational beings (§ 19 sqq.). But from *duty*, which, as being something *morally*, and not physically, necessary, is addressed to *freedom*, and presupposes freedom, there results also for man a right and a realm of rights. For out of the unconditional obligatory Ought there results, first of all, the primordial right, or fundamental right, of man to do his duty,—the right to be a moral being. There is no power which has the right to prevent this. For a right which should oppose this universal duty would undermine the very foundation of right itself. All actual human rights are derived from the law (*i.e.* the objective right) through the medium of obligation, and exist as objects of duty. They constitute the *possibility of the accomplishment of duty*, and this is the absolute ground on which they rest.

1. *Duty and right in general, in relation to the objective law, or God.*—The divine right is identical with the divine law, and has therefore been already treated of in the foregoing. The divine law can be called divine right because, on account of its intrinsic excellence, it has the right to make unconditional requirements, in order to put men under obligation to produce that order of human life which corresponds to it. But the point now is to discern how a right and rights also accrue to *man*, and that out of his duty and his duties.

[1] [Cf. Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, § 45; *vid.* the literature, § 33*a*.—Ed.]

True, the first thing empirically is not the consciousness of duty and law, but the power of the will to exercise itself in various ways; and the created being is entitled or authorized to exercise this inborn power. But this right is an ante-moral one, and has nothing to do with moral right until the consciousness of a law springs up; it therefore does not itself as yet stand fast as having the character of necessity. The moral law, moreover, cannot be derived from it. If we start from right and rights, instead of from duty and duties, we cannot reach a right which is worthy of the name. Right, when it is not based on duty, is identical with the permissible or the morally indeterminate; and nothing is more natural than that this option (that is, spurious freedom), once admitted, should seek to extend its limits more and more, and when the law makes its appearance, to hem it in as if it were an enemy. But in this way human right itself and the totality of human rights lose just their security. If right and the assertion of it are not deepened into duty, it has no absolute necessity; a person may behave as he pleases about it, and may treat national and public rights as private affairs; and where this becomes general it leads to the ruin of the whole, and to the ruin of the rights of the individual. But over against others also, right is in this case not secured. If my right is not founded in an objective law which becomes duty, it is itself not objective, my right does not obligate another person to recognise it, it is only identical with my power. And since the same is true of others with reference to me, there occur collisions in which the stronger prevails But the right of the stronger is as such no right at all. Right is the revelation of an absolute idea, and therefore something objective.

But *duty* also cannot stand as something fixed, unless it is allowed to constitute the foundation, that is, to occupy the first place, and not merely a secondary one, dependent on option. It might indeed be thought that even if we make right, or the rights of the moral agent, and not duties, our starting-point, we may yet attain to real duty and a common objective right by means of convention and agreement, and that thus marriage and the family relation, religious and political communities, may be built upon conventional agreements.

But without the recognition of the moral duty of faithfulness to treaty arrangements there can be no treaty rights established; and so again the priority of duty before subjective right is clear. Duty has no such ignoble origin that it must owe its existence to the option of moral agents. It is duty rather which first makes man actually rational; it is therefore to be recognised as the necessary foundation, and from it fixed objective right is to be derived. The person is to defend his personal rights as the organ of the moral idea, and for the sake of that idea, not from mere regard to self.

2. *Duty and right in the relation of man to man.* — As related to God, there is at first a duty, but no right, such as would make us co-ordinate with God. From the fundamental relation of obligation to God is also derived man's first right, namely, the right to fulfil duty. On the other hand, men are co-ordinate with one another; and in the relation of man to man the obverse of my duty to another is the right of the latter; and the obverse of my right is the duty of the other to recognise it. Unless this were the duty of the other man, then there would not be really any right on my part. That my right is the other's duty, the other's right my duty, makes right and duty correlative. The two thus stand conditioning one another; if one falls, the other falls also. But they can be correlates only in case they both spring from an objective law standing above them, which cherishes the true interests of all, being just in itself, and loving all alike—a law which both obligates all equally, and endows all with rights. Hence, in order to establish the reality of a system of human rights, that is, the relation of reciprocal rights and duties, we must go back to an objective right independent of the human agent,—to one which is founded ultimately in God Himself, nay, which is God Himself. This law is in itself the objective aboriginal right, that is, God's righteous order; and this becomes law and duty for the world. By the side of God's aboriginal right, or His righteousness, stands power, as the arm of righteousness, by means of which, against violations of His unconditional law, He maintains the law's honour, which is at the same time His own honour.

Duty is therefore for man the first thing. God has the

unconditional *right* to impose obligation, to require that His will shall prevail. God has created the world not only from love, but for holy love; hence the world is under obligation to do what is morally good; and just herein is also laid the foundation-stone of a human right, an objective and absolute right, which does not depend on treaty, or custom, or positive legislative stipulations, but stands as impregnable as a duty. That is, *man's primordial right, the true fundamental right, which results from his duty, is the right to be a moral being.* This is a great good, the *moral* honour, incomparably higher than the honour considered in the First Division.[1] Two elements are involved in this—a purely negative and a positive one. No human being can rightly be treated as if he were not designed for that which is absolutely worthy, and this for him. This, however, involves, positively, the right of this moral honour or moral destination to assert itself—one's right to exercise activity, but also one's right to receive from others. The latter is the prerequisite of the former, being that by which the real moral personality is *made possible.* Thus we have a firm foundation of right for the individual. It does not depend on the option of the human agent to surrender the right to be a moral being and the possibility of realizing his moral destination. This right is not at his disposal, because this right is also a right which the law has over him; in other words, it is his duty; and in this consciousness this right is to be maintained.

Note.—From the idea of objective divine right there results for the moral agent the sense of duty, which again on its part lays the foundation for the recognition of the mutual rights of persons. When this idea springs up in the consciousness, then the *State* takes its rise; and everything spoken of in § 17, all the natural excellences of individuals and all the associations which spring up naturally, being now placed under the aspect of objective right and law, attain a higher position. But they reach this higher form only through the moral process itself, and through what it has to deal with. Hence this cannot be discussed till we come to the Third Division. Having considered the doctrine of the objective law (§ 20 sqq.), we come now to the—

[1] *Vid.* above, p. 190. Cf. in general, § 18.

SECOND SECTION.

THE DOCTRINE OF CONSCIENCE.

§ 24.

Conscience, which is the one pole of our moral nature, § 19, is, considered in its origin, the voice of God, while at the same time it is also man's own knowledge, the voice of innate reason. As to its *form*, conscience claims the power of making all moral good unconditionally obligatory. As to its *contents*, it includes the knowledge of the distinction between good and evil in general, while in addition to this it also includes — in proportion to its degree of development — the special knowledge of what actions are good or bad. Conscience as legislative is called *antecedent;* as a motive power and as a witness of particular actions it is called *concomitant;* finally, in its character of critic or judge of actions that are past it is said to be *subsequent.* But in all its temporal forms of manifestation, conscience, although the representative of the ethically necessary, is an evidence of human freedom; it addresses itself to freedom, presupposes it as a faculty already existent, and serves to bring it to realization.

LITERATURE.—Stäudlin, *Geschichte der Lehre vom Gewissen,* 1824. Crusius, *Lehrbuch der chr. Sittenlehre* (treats more particularly of the motive power of conscience). De Wette, *Vorlesungen über Sittenlehre,* 1823, i. 2, p. 315 sq. *Christliche Sittenlehre,* i. p. 90. Daub, *Moral,* i. pp. 75, 377. Rothe, i. 262, § 147; 2nd ed. § 177, note 3. Passavant, *Das Gewissen,* 2nd ed. 1857. Schenkel, article *Gewissen* in Herzog's *Real-Encyklopädie,* and his *Dogmatik aus dem Standpunkte des Gewissens,* 1856, i. 135 sq. Güder, *Erörterung über die Lehre vom Gewissen, nach der Schrift,* in *Studien und Kritiken,* 1857, 2. Schlottmann, *Ueber den Begriff des Gewissens. Deutsche Zeitschrift,* 1857, Nr. 15 sq. Heman, *Aphorismen über das Gewissen. Jahrbücher für deutsche Th.* xi. 483 sq. Köstlin, *l.c.* p. 181. R. Hoffmann, *Die Lehre vom*

Gewissen, 1866. Delitzsch, *System der biblischen Psychologie*, § 4. Beck, *Umriss der biblischen Seelenlehre*, 71 sq. Gass, *Die Lehre vom Gewissen*, 1869, with an appendix on *die Synderesis*. Ritschl, *Ueber das Gewissen*, 1876. Martin Kähler, *Die schriftgemässe Lehre vom Gewissen in ihrer Bedeutung für christliches Leben und Lehren*, 1864, and the larger work by the same author, *Das Gewissen*, Part i. 1878. (These are elaborate grammatical investigations.) Cremer, *Biblico-theological Lexicon*, art. *σύνοιδα*. J. J. Hoppe, *Das Gewissen*, 1875 (a psychological discussion). [Ulrici, *Gott und der Mensch*, 2nd ed. ii. p. 366 sq. Sommer, *Gewissen und moderne Cultur*, 1884.—Ed.]

1. Conscience is one of the most important topics in the whole of ethics, and even in the whole of theology, especially evangelical theology. The characteristic of the evangelical standpoint with reference to the appropriation of Christianity is, that instead of following mere subjective opinions or the current of dominant human authorities, it both demands and promises that Christian truth be vindicated to the conscience itself, and is therefore in a position to hold up personal assurance of faith as an attainable goal. There is even a still plainer connection than this between conscience and the central truth in the evangelical doctrine of salvation. The announcement of justification as an act of divine grace, or the free forgiveness of sin, addresses itself to aroused and awakened consciences, for such alone are truly capable of arriving through repentance at that faith which is able to appreciate at its true worth the prevenient grace of God, and to appropriate the offered boon. Moreover, as conscience when it is angry and accusing incites us, if it be properly guided, to seek Him who is the divine atonement for sin, so it becomes, if this atonement be accepted in sincere penitence and faith, the abode of the peace of God. Yea, a good conscience now becomes the very soul of sanctification. This is the reason why the writings of the Reformers, Luther's especially and Calvin's, are so full of passages about conscience and its different functions, although it is true that they did not furnish a complete doctrine of conscience. Such a doctrine, indeed, we do not possess even yet. The post-Reformation theology, like that of the Middle Ages, treated conscience in a one-sided intellectual way—as a *Syllogismus practicus*. Even such as admit it to be an original and

underived faculty, and refuse to base it upon empiricism or reflection, are at variance among themselves on several points. They disagree as to whether it is most allied to knowledge, will, or feeling; and further, to say nothing about their differences as to the relation which conscience holds to religion, they are not at one as to whether it merely takes cognizance of past acts, and has therefore only critical or judicial functions to discharge, or whether it is legislative as well. Under these circumstances Rothe finds the problem so difficult, that he abandons the idea of a doctrine of conscience altogether.

2. *Biblical doctrine of conscience.* — In the Old Testament the word *conscience* does not occur, but its functions are alluded to in a variety of ways, as for instance in the case of Adam after his sin, of Cain both before and after his, and of the brethren of Joseph when they were seized with alarm in his presence (cf. further, Ps. vi. 2, xxxii. 1–5, xxxviii. 2–11, li. 19; 1 Sam. xxiv. 11; 2 Sam. xxiv. 10; Job xxvii. 6). It is certainly true that no special word for conscience is to be found in the Old Testament; nevertheless, not merely in the Old Testament, but also in the New, the *heart* is regarded as the focus of the spiritual life, and accordingly the functions of conscience are ascribed to it. We read of David's heart smiting him (הִכָּה) (2 Sam. xxiv. 10), and of a broken heart, that is, a condemning conscience (cf. 1 John iii. 19, *καρδία καταγινώσκουσα*). The word *συνείδησις*, having come into general use in Greek philosophy especially through the influence of the Stoics, occurs in the Book of Wisdom (xvii. 11), and is frequently employed in the New Testament by Paul and Peter. The four Gospels, it is true, contain no passage in which Christ makes use of the word. But too much stress must not be laid upon this, nor ought we to conclude, with Kähler, that Christ did not recognise conscience as a fact. It is erroneous to hold that Christ simply demands faith in His authority, and does not presuppose in man a knowledge of his own to which He appeals.[1] Were we to take such a view, we should have to ignore passages like John i. 4, v. 38, viii. 32, and to put a forced interpretation upon others, such as Matt. vi. 22 ff., Luke xi. 34, which speak of the inward eye of

[1] Kähler's book *On the Conscience*, 1878, p. 218 sq.

man. Kähler is also of opinion that in the Old Testament the entire moral consciousness of man is identified with his knowledge of the revealed law, or of the authority of the divine legislation. But although positive commands and external authority have more importance attached to them in the Old Testament than in the New, yet this fact does not completely describe the attitude of the Old Testament. In Deuteronomy, for example, the law is spoken of as being near, not the mouth only, but also the heart; while the Psalms. too, are full of inward delight and joy in the law.[1] The revealed law, moreover, did not remain a mere external authority, but awakened in man an increasing personal knowledge of morality, based on the original constitution of his nature.

In Rom. ii. 14 ff. Paul speaks at some length of the conscience. Here, as in most cases throughout the New Testament, reference is made to conscience in its critical or judicial aspect, and consequently to the relation of the subject to a moral standard, whatever the origin of the latter may be. Thus conscience is spoken of as bearing witness that one tells the truth (Rom. ix. 1, 2; 2 Cor. i. 12). As judicial it is either a pure, good conscience (1 Pet. iii. 16 and 21; 2 Tim. i. 3; 1 Tim. iii. 9; Heb. xiii. 18; Acts xxiii. 1, xxiv. 16), or an evil conscience (Heb. x. 22). In the latter case it is called a defiled or wounded conscience (1 Cor. viii. 7 and 12), or a seared conscience, to designate the torturing sense of guilt (1 Tim. iv. 2; Heb. ix. 9). Nevertheless the functions of conscience are not limited by the New Testament to criticism or judgment, but are also declared to be legislative, as when Paul speaks of the law which is written in the heart, as well as when he says that the Gentiles are a law unto themselves. Conscience is sometimes conceived of as the perception of the voice of God, and not merely as one's own consciousness or the expression of one's own judgment—this is seen even in Gen. iv. 6 f. Further, in 1 Pet. ii. 19, *συνείδησις θεοῦ* may either indicate knowledge of God as imposing commands and obliga-

[1] Kähler holds that the discovery and development of conscience, as a distinct faculty, are to be found in the heathen world alone, and that this did not take place in Judaism until after its contact with heathendom.

tions, or it may be the *genitivus autoris.* Similarly by the λόγος θεοῦ in man, spoken of in John v. 38 (cf. i. 4), conscience must be understood, while "the law written in the heart" (Rom. ii. 14 f.) refers us to a higher authority and to the divine origin of conscience which points to the tribunal of God. At the same time conscience is regarded in the New Testament as one's own knowledge, and even as a species of self-legislation. Man—it is said—is drawn by nature, by the νοῦς, to what is objectively rational, and so to the things contained in the law. And the νόμος τοῦ νοός is identified with the νόμος θεοῦ (Rom. vii. 23 and 25).

Further, the influence of history and education upon conscience is fully recognised. An increase in moral perception and wisdom is demanded in general (Heb. v. 14; Rom. xii. 2), so that the νοῦς as διάνοια (the understanding, which brings everything under its clear, analytic light) has its due place assigned it. In like manner the tendency and effect of the course of revelation is to unveil the law with ever increasing clearness, and at the same time in harmony with man's own moral perceptions. Further, these διάνοιαι, διαλογισμοί, are undoubtedly subject to error. And finally, it is also recognised in the New Testament that individuality enters into the formation of conscience (1 Cor. x. 29).

§ 24a. *(Continuation.) Thetic (Positive) Doctrine of Conscience.*

Conscience is not to be identified with religious capacity nor with the moral consciousness in general; it is a knowledge of moral good, and is not primarily an impulse or a mere feeling. It is moral consciousness characterized by originality and immediateness, and allied with a certainty that is not merely subjective, but both subjective and objective at once.

1. Schenkel confuses conscience with religious capacity. But we have already (§ 12. 1, 2) treated of the difference between religion, in which dependence and receptivity are the leading characteristics, and morality, in which the very opposite is the case. Conscience is frequently regarded as *moral impulse,* and assigned therefore to the will. According

to Reinhard,[1] conscience is the inclination to have one's actions determined by the thought of the Deity. Crusius calls it the *instinctus religiosus.* According to Rothe,[2] it is the divine activity in man under the form of impulse, operating therefore through sensible perception, and so bound up with bodily sensation. This impulse is followed by cognition. Kähler[3] holds the same view. But since impulse is the initial form of all volition, this would mean that the mere fact that the subject wills anything shows it to be morally good. And in that case morality would have no objective validity, since there are other than moral impulses in man. Further, in order that an impulse may be termed intellectual, and still more, moral, it must have an appropriate object, and hence the moral must be mentally present somehow, even if but vaguely, as the object of the impulse. And this is only possible by means of the intelligence, in some one of the forms which it can assume.

Others, like De Wette,[4] relegate conscience to the sphere of feeling, from which no doubt it derives its liveliness and immediateness as well as its personal character. Only the proviso must be made, that moral feeling must not be taken as mere self-perception on the part of the empirical subject. Rather is it the feeling of moral worth, the feeling of the ideal beauty and sanctity of moral good, combined with the perception of its relation to the ego, of its value for the empirical ego ; and thus we have here the germ of objective moral *cognition.* Feeling as such lacks clearness, constancy, precision ; and so the function of cognition must step forward on its own account. In addition to this, there is a germ of volition in feeling, no less than of cognition, and consequently, as we have already seen, moral feeling must be divided into two component elements, the one intellectual, or moral *sense,* the other volitional, or moral *impulse.* When this division is made, conscience belongs to the intellectual side of moral feeling, and appears in the first place as moral sense. This of course is not conscience fully developed ; since, however, it is no longer so immediately interwoven with feeling, but is

[1] *Christl. Moral,* 5th ed. i. 262.
[2] I. 265 sq. 1st ed. In the new edition he avoids the word as ambiguous.
[3] P. 26.
[4] *Christliche Sittenlehre,* i. 90.

directed to an ideal object, good in itself, it is the actual beginning of conscience.

Conscience, moreover, is not to be identified with *moral consciousness* in general. Not every form of moral consciousness or of moral belief deserves to be called conscience. Language itself connects conscience [*Gewissen*] with certainty [*Gewissheit*], and certainty means something else than merely holding particular opinions or echoing moral ideas that are not really our own. If the certainty possessed by conscience is real and not merely imaginary, then it relates to something objective, to a truth independent of the subject, and is therefore at once objective and subjective, since conscience is in direct contact with its object. By means of this contact there is implanted in the mind and imparted to it an immediate consciousness of the evidence and truth of the moral. Hence it is that Luther, with his fine linguistic sense, has also spoken of faith and the assurance of faith as the Christian conscience, in order to indicate that the immediate certainty of faith is not merely of a subjective, but of a subjective-objective kind. The word conscience itself [*Gewissen*] also implies knowledge [*Wissen*]. The prefix *Ge*, which in the case of substantives expresses association (*e.g. Berg, Gebirge—Wasser, Gewässer*), must not be taken, as Leo does, to mean that the moral verdict of *society* is the conscience of the individual, for this would turn the moral knowledge possessed by man as an individual, and its certainty, into mere dependence on authority. On the contrary, it seems to indicate the experience which man has after he has committed some—it may be secret—deed, that there is One present with him who is cognizant of his act, One whom he cannot escape, who sets Himself over against him as an enemy, and accuses him; an unseen witness who is not an empirical agent like himself, but who both comes forward as an accuser against him, and also impends over him as a judge, and passes sentence upon him. It cannot be an accidental circumstance that the word for conscience in a large number of languages expresses this "knowing together" or "knowing along with." Thus *συνείδησις, conscientia*, conscience (French and English), *samwittighed* in Danish. This sense of a witness to our actions makes itself felt most of all, and conscience shows its

energy most powerfully, in that mysterious act of the inner tribunal, when, after a sinful deed has been done, our moral unworthiness is suddenly disclosed to us as with lightning speed and clearness, when as in a moment the *accusation* goes forth against a guilt-laden "Thou," and our sense of guilt tells us that this "Thou" means ourselves, and makes us feel that we are standing at a judgment-bar.

But although it is from this wonderful function that conscience has derived its name in many languages, and although it is after the deed has been committed that conscience makes its voice heard most distinctly, yet we must not conclude that the *originality* and *immediateness* of conscience—the qualities which distinguish it from moral consciousness generally—refer only to *past* actions and their value; that is to say, we must not infer that conscience is only subsequent. It could not discharge the functions of an immaculate witness, accuser, and judge, if there was not inherent in it a sense of the distinction between good and evil; consequently it must possess a certain degree of self-legislative power. Were it not so, we would have to look elsewhere for a special faculty of self-legislation. It is also evident that the functions of legislation and judgment must belong to one and the same conscience, from the fact that so far as our consciousness of morality as such is concerned, it is relatively indifferent whether the act to which it refers be past, present, or future. If there is an immediate and original consciousness of moral good, in other words, a conscience, then the declarations of conscience, whether they take the form of demand, warning, or judgment, remain the same for all time; they are declarations regarding something that is *eternal and embraces all time.* If we regard conscience as being indeed the source of moral knowledge, but only in its form as consequent, then moral consciousness does not arise until the act has been done. But this would mean that the act took place unaccompanied by any moral consciousness whatever, and therefore that it is morally worthless. And in that case the act could beget neither the feeling of responsibility nor of guilt; at the most it would be felt only to be injurious and discordant.

The *knowledge given in conscience* is accordingly distinguished from other forms of consciousness, and even of moral

consciousness, by the fact that it does not depend merely on external prevailing tenets or authorities, nor on reflection or logical inferences alone, but bears the stamp of immediateness and creative originality. Of course this knowledge varies in clearness and richness, as well as in form, at different stages of progress. Conscience is an assured subjective knowledge of the objective validity and truth of that which in itself is good. Hence it is not to be wondered at that every department of life should seek to appropriate this word to itself; thus we read of a logical, critical, æsthetic and political conscience. But *that* conscience to which our science has the first claim, is distinguished from all other knowledge by its contents, viz. the good, the holy, Fas as opposed to Nefas, not merely what is useful or becoming (honestum) or harmonious (*καλόν*). This, the contents of conscience, inasmuch as it holds good for reason universally, and is absolutely necessary, concerns the inmost nature, the essential part of man.

2. A still wider difference of opinion exists as to the *origin* of conscience.

(*a*) Some derive it wholly from external influences, from the surrounding moral atmosphere and prevailing custom, in a word, from education in its widest sense. In support of this position, they appeal to the manifold contradictions existing in the moral ideas of nations, contradictions which go to such an extent that men are found making it a matter of conscience not to omit practices which are actually sinful (*e.g.* the sacrifice of children, burning of widows, etc.). It must be admitted that the customs which prevail within the circle of a nation's life exercise an extraordinary power over individuals, and also that sin has caused an enormous confusion in moral ideas. But missionary efforts among the heathen prove every day that these influences can be overcome, and this would be impossible were it not for the fact that an appeal can be made from perverted moral ideas to a better, indestructible moral sense, a true conscience, which lives underneath all these worthless accumulations. Those false notions can be separated from conscience just because nothing that is false, but only that which is true, can be really and indissolubly allied with the rational nature of man. Thus the fact just alluded to is sufficient to show that conscience cannot be derived from the

customs prevalent in a community. The same conclusion also appears when we consider that, according to this view, there would be no such thing as real moral knowledge at all, and that man therefore would will the good, not because it is good, but merely as something handed down to him, something foreign to his own nature. And this would deny the original moral determination of man altogether. What this theory calls conscience is only something which may be transferred to others by means of education, etc., and is therefore not conscience at all, but merely moral opinion, a number of ideas with regard to moral action that at some particular time hold sway within the community.

Accordingly, when Jesuitism seeks to implant in man a foreign conscience, in the shape of the moral opinions of a father confessor, or when there is voluntarily assigned to a fallible man the power of issuing decisions—with reference both to matters of faith and of morals—that are binding upon the conscience, then an injury is done to the divine constitution of human nature. A similar verdict also must be passed upon every attempt to make the Church the ultimate source of moral knowledge. The authority of the Church has been put forward in opposition to that subjectivism which frequently disguises itself in the garb of conscience. But the moral ideas which prevail in the Church arise also in part from fallible men. Having attained a ruling position in the wide circle of the Church, they assume a semblance of objectivity; in truth, however, they are of no more than subjective importance in so far as they come into collision with objective morality. On this account also, to appeal to the Church as the power which fashions conscience, and is authorized so to do, is merely to displace *one form of subjectivism by another*, for to bring conscience under the so-called divine authority of the Church can be nothing but a subjective, arbitrary act. Nor can conscience be produced by means of a merely *external* revelation. Every external revelation which seeks to impose moral obligations must presuppose some moral knowledge to begin with, upon which it can lay hold in order to be understood, and upon which it can base its claim to be received by man, in distinction from other external influences. For otherwise man would fall passively and blindly under any

power whatever. Even in filial obedience, although the child cannot recognise the moral necessity of what is commanded him, he must at least know *this*—that obedience to his parents is a duty. Hence man must possess a knowledge of his own with regard to the good; and by this knowledge alone is a foothold given to external revelations, and a basis afforded for the operation of those means by which our moral intelligence is cultivated.

(*b*) Now, while it is thus clear that it is through his own consciousness that man knows and posits the good, yet, on the other hand, we must not regard self-legislation on the part of man as constituting by itself the ultimate basis of moral knowledge and of conscience. We must not assert, with Delitzsch, that the law, as it appears in the Torah, is engraved on the human heart. It is erroneous to suppose that all moral ideas are innate in man in their complete shape, and therefore that in this respect there is no real distinction between the divine creation and legislation. All experience speaks to the contrary, and especially the confusion that is found in mankind with regard to moral ideas. Should it be maintained, again, that moral ideas are not innate, but are the products of reason and arrived at through reflection, then this would be at variance with the immediateness and originality, as well as the involuntary necessity which characterize the uninvited verdicts of conscience. Conscience is indeed a human faculty, but its acts do not depend upon the subjective will of the empirical human being; it is rather a power over man. It is not man who possesses conscience, so much as conscience that possesses man. The autonomy enjoyed by man is only secondary, not absolute; he cannot put the stamp of good or evil upon anything at his own pleasure. The primary fact is, that human reason has been brought into existence and constituted in a definite way. Reason is given to itself as reason, it is not the author of its own nature. And this points us to the ultimate creative cause.

(*c*) A third view is that conscience is *God's voice*. If this were taken as a full account of the matter, then it would be impossible to see how we could have a moral knowledge of our own with regard to the good-in-itself. Had we not in our own rational nature a faculty of moral perception, we

could never know that these inward utterances of God were good in themselves. Nevertheless we must recognise a certain truth in the description of conscience as the voice of God, although Delitzsch[1] denies this, on the ground that God does not hold intercourse with the sinful as He does with the innocent. For at all events God is the creator of reason; and further, He has not—as Deism maintains—withdrawn Himself after the creation, but continues to act as a present, efficient cause, even in the manifestations of reason. Now, if it is through God alone that we have at every moment a knowledge of the good, if we see light in His light (although we may not be directly conscious of the fact),—then it is evidently wrong to deny that conscience is the voice or word of God. In addition to this, we are aware that the voice of conscience impels us with a kind of sacred necessity, that in it God is making a claim upon us, and the Divine Spirit constraining us by His appeals.

(*d*) The three views which we have stated must therefore be taken together: (1) that conscience is God's voice; (2) that it is also the voice of our own inmost nature or heart, and even of our whole physico-psychical constitution; (3) that conscience must grow, and that external revelation as well as social influences contribute to its complete development. The first two factors are united in the same general way in which a creative and sustaining cause is everywhere united with a secondary cause.[2] That is to say, God's word creates, but does so for the purpose of sustaining the object created, and hence the latter must have a life and efficacy of its own, which must not be suppressed by the divine causality. The word of God creates, and its effect therefore is, that reason now speaks for itself in the language it has derived from God. But still, whatever reason says and knows is given it by God; for it says nothing that is absolutely new, but only reproduces that which is in the creative, ever-active will of God; it does not simply give expression to what lies latent in the rational nature of man, but rather to what is originated by the ever-present and living operation of God. The pure products of our moral nature must be regarded as being at the same time acts of God

[1] Pp. 99 sq., 155 sq. [2] Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. § 35, 36.

in man; all the more because God is educating man, and therefore accompanies every act of pure moral perception with the impulse of His Spirit, makes a claim upon and appeals to what is deepest in the nature of man. Accordingly we do not employ a mere figure of speech, but only indicate the essential basis of moral legislation, when we say that in conscience the voice of God speaks to man; and this also corresponds with what we have already found, viz. that the objective law must be the starting-point of the moral process. On the other hand, the causality of God only accomplishes this work of legislation by its not remaining the sole cause in the matter, but by its originating a secondary cause, which is really different from God, but which nevertheless—so far as conscience is truly developed—derives its knowledge of good and evil from its *connection with Him*. Finally, with regard to the third factor, history and society have their claims acknowledged when we say that conscience passes through a series of stages, has a growth, and requires to be cultivated like every rational faculty in man; and that in this growth it becomes more and more enriched with an increasing store of concrete material.

§ 25. *Stages of Conscience.*

In its *first* stage moral consciousness is not yet concrete moral knowledge; it takes the form of moral feeling and moral sense (§ 12. 4; 24*a*. 1), and is only conscience *in essence* to begin with, being no more than the perception of moral good in general, as distinct from evil and obligatory. On the *second* stage, this fundamental basis is still preserved, but an advance is now made to concrete moral material, partly through the influence of moral authorities, and partly through man's growing knowledge of himself and of the world. At the same time, the various concrete duties which now arise cannot as yet be connected with each other and with the fundamental moral knowledge of the first stage, so as to form a stable and connected whole. Hence, while there is an accumulating mass of rules and precepts,

the immediate certainty of their truth and moral necessity is still awanting. It is not till the *third* stage is reached that the concrete moral knowledge of the second can be combined with the elementary but fundamental moral knowledge of the first, in such a way that the multiplicity of the former is reduced to unity, while the unity of the latter is resolved into organized diversity. It is not, however, merely our initial stock of moral knowledge that is to be regarded as due to an act of divine revelation; for moral knowledge also in its concrete, more expanded shape (in other words, conscience) is only possible through continuous divine enlightenment and revelation —the latter keeping pace with man's growing knowledge of himself and of the world.

1. The necessity of a *growth* of conscience is recognised in Holy Scripture (Ps. cxix.; Rom. xii. 2; Phil. i. 9; Heb. v. 14). No one denies that wherever conscience exists, there is a knowledge of the universal truth that the good, whatever form it may take, ought to be done, and evil to be avoided. Now, should it be denied that a growth of conscience is nevertheless necessary, such a position can only be maintained on one of two suppositions: *either* that the development of conscience in the way of acquiring concrete material is of no moral importance, that its initial general knowledge is sufficient for all moral purposes; *or else*, that man is originally endowed by nature with the power of arriving at a clear decision on matters of concrete experience.

(*a*) In support of the *first* of these, it might be urged, that the only thing required is really to reverence the moral law in general, to have a good intention in all we do, to will the good from pure motives and without any self-seeking. When this is the case, it is all the same what we do. It is only the form of our acts that is of importance, not their contents.[1] But this would lead to the maxim of

[1] This is held even by Kant in his *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, ed. by Rosenkranz, *Werke*, vol. viii. (pp. 20 sq., 40, 76, 94). Ed. v. Hartmann gives an excellent criticism of this view in his *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins*, p. 322 sq

Jesuitism, and would obliterate the distinction between good and evil in everything that is concrete, whereas the good has no more than a mere docetic existence when disjoined from the concrete. The connection between the form and the contents of the good is so close, that the existence of a pure, good disposition or intention cannot be admitted, unless that which is willed be right. Christian wisdom is an essential element in good intentions and a good disposition. To say that it is indifferent what the effect of our actions may be, whether they benefit the world or not, would be equivalent to denying that there is one great moral task upon which all are engaged, and that the moral law is the world-ideal. In that case, all that would be left for man to do would be to maintain his abstract good intention, while he remained indifferent to everything else. This would be a subtle form of egoism. In addition to what has been said, practical life would be bereft of its guiding-star if conscience could never become possessed of concrete knowledge ; and since man must nevertheless act in some way or other, the subject, being deprived of all definite moral knowledge, would be at the mercy of fortuitous objective influences or of his own subjective inclinations.

(*b*) But just as little can we hold, with Fichte, that conscience is able, from the very first and by its own nature, to solve all the problems of practical life. We must not—as Hirscher does—regard even the subsequent conscience as fully formed at the outset. A conscience may be formed, but there is no such thing as one ready made. It would be utterly opposed to the way in which *man's nature is constituted in all other respects,* were he furnished from the first with complete moral knowledge, adequate for all circumstances,—circumstances which do not exist to begin with, but which successively arise and impose different duties as he passes through different stages of life. Not only is experience against such a view, but also the idea of the ethical ; for in this case wisdom would no longer be an ethical acquisition, in other words, a virtue. Moral knowledge must therefore be morally acquired, and conscience as given us by nature must undergo an ethical process of self-culture, depending upon reflection throughout. On the other hand, however, we do

not say that this work of self-culture implies that conscience with its originality and immediateness must *give place* to the knowledge which we acquire through reflection. If our increasing knowledge of the world, of ourselves, and of God be brought into close relationship with the idea of morality (and for this end the continued living operation of the Divine Spirit is indispensable), then the enriched and cultivated moral consciousness which we thus obtain will recover at each stage of its progress that freshness and immediate power which are the characteristics of conscience. And hence conscience will be able to issue its decisions regarding what is concrete with no less definiteness than regarding the general proposition, that good ought to be done and evil avoided.

Accordingly we have arrived at the following results. On the one hand, conscience is not fully formed from the first, requiring no cultivation. On the other hand, it is not confined to an immediate and assured conviction of the validity of the general proposition mentioned above; it is therefore not incapable of cultivation, and hence we are not dependent upon authority, probability and prudence alone to guide us in matters of concrete morality. Since this is the case, the full and adequate idea of conscience—an idea which cannot be realized at once, but only through a gradual process—must be distinguished from the *stages* of its realization.

2. We call the first of these stages that of *conscience in essence*, of the possibility of the concrete. Scholasticism designated conscience as it appears at this stage by the barbarous word Synderesis, a corruption of *συντήρησις* = conligatio, obligatio,[1] the bond of obligation by which we are joined to God, the essential bond between the Creator and the rational creature. This rudimentary conscience contains—although concrete circumstances are required to call it into play—the knowledge of the absolute obligation imposed by the good as such, whatever shape the latter may take. Of conscience in this form it holds good most directly, that it is the voice of God. The certainty it possesses is the type and standard of all moral certainty. Moreover, there is also given in it some-

[1] Cf. Gass, *Das Gewissen*, Appendix; [also, *Geschichte d. Christl. Ethik*, i. p. 383 sq.—Ed.]. Fr. Nitzsch, *Ueber die Entstehung der scholastischen Lehre von der Syntheresis. Jahrbücher für protest. Theologie*, v. p. 492 sq.

thing that has a bearing upon the concrete moral life. We learn from it that nothing can be a moral command which is not of an unconditional character. Thus conscience even at this stage possesses critical authority, though of a negative kind; it can offer resistance to mere desire, when the latter is in opposition to the good. Accordingly, even where conscience is still deficient in cultivation with regard to what is positively enjoined, the knowledge of what is forbidden may extend a long way. We know what is opposed to conscience before we know what is positively good. Scripture also recognises this form of conscience, and recognises it as still continuing to act amid the perversions of man's moral nature. It uttered its warnings previous to the fall (Gen. iii. 3, cf. ver. 8), and after the fall it still speaks (iv. 13, 14).

3. *Advance from the rudimentary conscience to concrete moral demands.*—As long as man remains without a *concrete* law, he runs the risk of taking a wrong direction, becoming bewildered, and falling a prey to his own capricious fancies. He may, for example, imagine that vehement, sudden and mastering desires are divine impulses within him, and thus derive his rule of action from mere natural inclination. But it is a still commoner occurrence at this stage for man to have recourse to purely objective authorities, in order to learn from them what he has to do and what to leave undone. This is the origin of the great influence exerted over the moral life of the ancient world, both private and public, by divination in the widest sense of the word, including the interpretation of dreams, of the flight of birds and passage of clouds, *extispicia*, *omina*, and above all — divination by *oracles*. The whole life of heathen nations was held by this practice as in a thick tangled net. We cannot refuse, indeed, to acknowledge that in it there is a moral element. In the endeavour to learn the will of the gods, we trace the sense which man has, that in order to be good he must follow not his own self-will, but a higher objective law. But now, instead of truly endeavouring to hear the voice of God and to hold communion with Him, man arbitrarily takes nature—as seen in the sky or on the earth—as his lawgiver or prophet of the divine will; he seeks to discover what result has been pre-ordained, and directs his actions accordingly, so that he is not exclusively

concerned about doing what is right, but about doing what is advantageous. And arbitrariness prevails to an equal extent in the *meaning* attached to omens, which are for the most part ambiguous in themselves. Hence it is only a semblance of objectivity after all at which man has arrived in this way; his self-will is disguised as it were, it has surrendered itself a prisoner to nature or to particular natural phenomena. It was for this reason that the *Hebrew law* absolutely forbade any attempt being made to find out by means of natural signs, stars, clouds, or birds, what ought to be done in matters of practical experience.[1] To do so was regarded as a relapse into nature-worship and idolatry. The law is bent upon setting men free from such bondage, which threatens to destroy the coherence and stability of moral life; it seeks to raise man above nature. Hence, too, we do not find in the New Testament a single instance, subsequent to the day of Pentecost, of the lot being used for the purpose of ascertaining the divine will; it is only before Pentecost that such an instance occurs (Acts i.).

Nevertheless, even in heathendom the progressive cultivation of the moral nature was not lost in this *abnormal* and confusing tendency. The New Testament does not say that only conscience in its initial form is to be found among the heathen, and that all concrete morality has fallen under the sway of self-will or accident. On the contrary, it is expressly recognised by Paul[2] that moral ideas and moral ordinances have arisen among the heathen. When we inquire as to the source of these, we must remember what has been said earlier, viz. that the objective divine law does not merely form an ideal organism in the divine mind; that the endowment of man, both physically and mentally, for moral ends does not exist merely as part of an ideal plan or decree, but has actually been carried into effect from the very first,—nay, more, that it has, up to a certain degree, been an operative motive power in man, from the beginning of human life on to the formation of natural communities (§ 10–17). This explains the Pauline *φύσει ποιεῖ* (*τὰ ἔθνη*) *τὰ ἔργα τοῦ νόμου*. For, that man is a unity created in

[1] Ex. xxii. 18; Lev. xix. 26 31, xx. 6, 27; Deut. xviii. 10–14; 1 Sam. xxviii. 9.

[2] Rom. ii. 12 ff., xiii. 1 ff.

the image of God, that in all the powers bestowed on him his moral destination has been kept in view, that these powers have been harmoniously ordered with reference to it, so that they cannot truly exist and flourish unless when morally regulated,—this is the *ἔργον νόμου γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις*.[1] The work which has to be realized through the agency of the will is from the first engraved upon the mental organization of man as something demanding fulfilment, and has therefore an innate tendency towards realization.

And now, if, in addition to this, there be present that fundamental moral knowledge which we have frequently alluded to, there arises of necessity a consciousness of ethical determination, and our moral consciousness becomes enriched from without, through reflection and experience. Of course this is by no means the same thing as a self-unfolding of conscience from within, it is not as yet allied with the certain consciousness of unconditional duty. Man's knowledge of himself and of the world is extended, he gains an empirical knowledge of the constitution of the world and of man, learns their powers and the laws of their harmonious operation, and becomes acquainted with the conditions which limit the sovereignty and energy of the will. Such knowledge, derived from his own personal experience, is increased by means of the authority and teaching of others whose experience is wider, such as parents and ancestors, and by the handing down of wise sayings, which, it may be, are collected and preserved as they were at Delphi. Thus we have, as sources of moral knowledge, maxims, proverbs (מְשָׁלִים), and didactic poems, and in addition to these, *ἔθη* and human legislation, both of which are of moral import. Thus mankind gradually accumulates a large stock of moral ideas for the different spheres of life, and this takes place even in the heathen world. But the materials thus collected contain many contradictions, through their being too strict or too lax. Further, they cannot lay claim to the character of unconditional necessity, or at least their claim is not indisputable, since they are not brought into connection with conscience, and are not recognised as good in themselves. Accordingly, they all have the tendency to take the tone of

[1] Rom. ii. 15.

mere prudence, or are simply counsels that never rise above the standpoint of eudæmonism.

We must realize to ourselves the confusion that prevailed among the heathen, even among the Greeks, with regard to moral ideas, the variableness of these, their instability, their fragmentary character (as depicted, *e.g.*, by the Platonic Socrates in his disputes with the Sophists and the common people), in order to receive a truly living impression of the great blessing which the law proved to the Hebrews. Then for the first time the unsteadily flickering flame of moral knowledge, threatened by all the storms of passion, became a steady and certain light, through morality being held aloft unwaveringly by the objective law. At the same time the law is not something alien to the inward nature of the Hebrew race; it expresses the true national spirit or idea, when it brings the individual and the whole people alike, both inwardly and outwardly, under the lofty and yet simple idea of holiness. Nevertheless, under the legal system man is very far from arriving at that peculiar certainty which belongs to conscience, with reference to the material commandments which the law enjoins. Accordingly, Christ says with respect to the Old Testament, that a servant knoweth not what his lord doeth; but whom the Son maketh free, he is free indeed.[1] The Israelite knew indeed that he was laid under obligation to the law by reason of its divine origin, and therefore by reason of the formal authority attaching to the precepts handed down from Moses. (The Roman Catholic Church still occupies, in principle, the same position.) But here the contents of the law are not yet brought into true union with conscience; man is not yet an independent being, conscious of his own true nature and therefore free; he is still divided, dependent on two principles which are not yet united, the one external only and authoritative, the other internal. This is the *legal* stage, on which man does not as yet perceive the unity of the numerous precepts which are given him. He may perhaps endeavour to discover among them one precept which is relatively the highest, but still he fails to see that this one is the *sum* of all good. As the heathen world came to recognise Zeus or Jupiter as the highest among the gods, so the Jewish

[1] John viii. 32, xv. 15.

world got so far as to perceive that love is the first, the perfect and most excellent command. But just as heathendom never got the length of recognising that the highest deity is also the only one, comprehending within himself everything that is divine, so Judaism always fell short of perceiving that all that is good is summed up in love.

4. It is no doubt true that on the stage of reflection an effort is made to overcome the contradictions and the fragmentariness in which moral knowledge is involved, by working up into unity the manifold of ethical material which has been gained through experience. As the result of such attempts we have the picture of the wise man, the picture of the true state, and codes of morals for the various vocations, for the sexes, and for the different stages of life. But these do not afford to man complete personal certainty regarding moral rules, nor do they reveal to him the inner unity of the law. The path which begins with the *rudimentary* conscience must lead farther than this empirical one does, if man is ever, conscious of his own true nature, to surrender himself in his concrete totality to the ethical idea. As his self-knowledge extends it makes him aware of active and receptive capacities which he possesses, and which are meant to be employed in the service of the associations that men form by nature with each other. These energies and capacities are now laid hold of by the legislative conscience on behalf of the several spheres of life, or in other words, for the purpose for which they were given. Man perceives that all these spheres have their foundations in the constitution of his own nature; and thus he can now recognise it as a real duty imposed by conscience, to become a member of them, and to conform himself to the laws of life arising out of the specific nature of each of them. The family and the State illustrate what has just been said. And although man's knowledge of these laws of life is originally acquired through experience, it can now be taken up into conscience, and thus merely empirical moral ideas can be transformed, up to a certain degree, into a knowledge properly belonging to conscience. For example, when man recognises that he is a *ζῶον πολιτικόν* (to use Aristotle's phrase), he also knows that in serving the commonwealth he does that which is rational and

good, that which corresponds with his own nature; and hence his duty as a citizen, which at first came to him only as the empirical demand of an external authority, can now become a *clearly recognised duty laid upon him by conscience.* And the same thing holds good with regard to the family and to friendship. But in how many ways does mere desire prove stronger than the objective right of these moral spheres—for example, in the case of marriage (polygamy)! Besides, the perception of the good is not yet accompanied with joyful pleasure in it and energy to realize it. Nevertheless, the more that the matter of experience is interwoven with the rudimentary conscience, or the more that conscience is developed, the more comprehensive it becomes, without its suffering any loss of certainty, or falling under the sway of mere external authority.

In this way, too, conscience becomes more and more a faithful mirror of that all-embracing ideal organism—the objective law. Regarded in another light, this is just the process by which conscience gradually assimilates the objective law of God. The former is no mere *tabula rasa*, but embraces potentially every matter of duty; while, on the other hand, without this inward act of enlightenment on the part of God, that is to say, without the revelation of the law, conscience could not grow nor even exist. It would want that immediateness which must always be accompanied by a divine impulse. Wherever concrete moral material is taken up and united with the rudimentary conscience, so that the result is true subjective-objective certainty, such a union must be ascribed to the ever operative and illuminating power of the Divine Spirit; it is the voice of God making itself heard within. Accordingly the complete development of conscience depends upon progressive revelations, both internal and external. More especially, the ἀνακεφαλαίωσις of the various moral commandments into unity can only be accomplished, and the several moral regions of life can only be brought into organic connection with each other by morality being linked to the idea of God, and by God at the same time becoming known, in the course of revelation, as that which is the sum of all morality—viz. as love. And this can only take place by His revealing Himself in deeds of

love. For love is known, not by words or by doctrines, but by actions.

The two religious communities which mark the greatest progress that has been made in the sphere of morality—the Hebrew and the Christian—both rest, in the most definite way, on divine revelation, although they do not maintain that God has left Himself without a witness to other men. They themselves, again, are of course very different. The Old Testament revelation did not get beyond the opposition between heathen and Jews,—an opposition which is much deeper than that between Hellenes and barbarians,—it never overcame heathenism, nor burst the narrow shell in which a universal principle lay hid. It was only the perfect form of revelation that could accomplish this. Both Hebraism and Christianity represent the idea of the unity of mankind; for both alike refer everything back to God, and are thus alone in a position to reduce to unity the countless contradictions of the world, and to cause, as it were, all natural differences to disappear. But it was only when revelation attained its final form in Christianity that it reached the idea of a unity which is higher than the merely natural one, and taught with perfect clearness that mankind as a whole had one great moral work assigned it. Accordingly it is not till the consummation of revelation that conscience is found in its highest form, objectively in Christ and subjectively in *faith*, which on its ethical side may be called the Christian conscience. The spirit of love, which proceeds from Christ and addresses itself both to the intelligence and the will, brings into inward unity the multiplicity of duties and precepts; it is thus a safeguard against all collisions of duties, and is the only power capable of enabling man to apprehend morality as an organic unity, so that in each single act which he does the whole is included, since he wills every act as part of the ethical whole or kingdom of God.

Hence the New Testament shows *no predilection* for establishing an *objective*, divinely-sanctioned order of life. It seeks to conduct man to an *inward personal* knowledge of *his own* regarding moral truth (John viii. 32). An objective order of life which leaves out of sight personal individual conviction, may, it is true, lay the foundation for the formation of an

objective community of a theocratic or political kind,—and this is the characteristic feature of antiquity,—but at the same time the rights of the individual as distinguished from those of the whole community are as yet imperfectly recognised. The New Testament, on the contrary, makes it its aim to form conscious, new and free personalities, morally responsible each on his own account. This is why it so often makes it a duty to strive after *moral certainty* (Rom. xiv. 1, 13–23; 1 Cor. viii. 7, 12, x. 25; Col. ii. 16; Heb. v. 16; Jas. i. 6–8, iv. 8). He who doubts is δίψυχος, whereas we ought to become ἁπλοῖ, τέλειοι through free, complete union with objective truth. Ἕκαστος ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ νοὶ πληροφορείσθω (Rom. xiv. 5). Hence we are enjoined to exercise forbearance towards weak and tender consciences (Rom. xiv. 13 f.; 1 Cor. x. 25). Hence, too, the rights of the individual conscience are acknowledged, and that even when it is in error (1 Cor. x. 29, viii. 10 ff.). The Christian as such has a personal knowledge of his own concerning objective good, allied with inward certainty; he carries in himself a higher than the merely subjective form of moral consciousness (1 Cor. iv. 3 ff.), something higher than the current opinion of the world; he has the spirit of wisdom, which invests him with γνῶσις, ἐπίγνωσις, and the αἰσθητήρια γεγυμνασμένα (Heb. v. 14). This σοφία comes from *faith*, in so far as the latter, formally regarded, is certainty of a divine yet human kind, and in so far as the contents of this certainty are derived from the moral archetype and principle of the kingdom of God which is given us in Christ (Eph. v. 14). United to Christ we are united to God, and therefore the Christian conscience is always in the presence of God and is manifest to Him (2 Cor. v. 10, i. 12; Tit. i. 15; 1 Pet. ii. 19, iii. 21).

§ 26. *Forms of the Manifestation of Conscience.*

According to the relation in which it stands to an act, three forms of conscience are to be distinguished—antecedent, concomitant, and subsequent. (Conscientia antecedens, concomitans, subsequens.)

1. The *antecedent* is its legislative form, and on this subject we have already spoken at sufficient length. Previous to the act it warns and dissuades more than it urges or commands us, it checks or prohibits our impulses. When the human will turns to the good and accepts it, there begins that union of moral necessity and freedom in which conscious morality consists. Still, more is required than that conscience should merely look on and keep watch from the outside. It must become incorporated with the will, in order that it may be immanent in it and serve as a light to it. The contents of a deliverance of conscience, however, are given us in the form of a moral impulse from above, which does not constrain us like a physical force, but comes forward in the shape of an unconditional claim.

2. The *concomitant* depends upon the antecedent form of conscience, and is the continuation of the latter. It may, however, become obscured and weakened in the course of the act which we perform, should that act be one which is opposed to conscience. In that case, conscience resists what we do, and our volition effects a division in our nature. On the contrary, we retain our unity and energy when what we will and do is at one with conscience.

3. Conscience as *subsequent* has three functions, which have been comprehended under the name of the *Syllogismus conscientiæ*. Here the major premiss is formed by introducing the moral law, the minor by its application to the particular case in point (imputation), and then the verdict and requital of conscience follow as the conclusion. Where no respect is paid to the major premiss in conscience, in its general bearing, we say there is an utter want of conscience; where the law is indeed recognised in general but not *in concreto*, we say that conscience is wide or lax; where imputation is awanting, and we seek to lay the guilt upon something outside ourselves, conscience is said to be partial; and where conscience or the moral consciousness upbraids a man with guilt when no guilt exists, it is called scrupulous. Nevertheless it is evident from what has been previously said that in no case is conscience a mere operation of the understanding. We shall dwell for a little upon conscience as it appears in the acts of *imputation*, *judgment*, and *requital*.

Imputation is the consciousness of the relation in which our causality stands to the law. It subsumes under the law that which has to be judged; it presupposes therefore a standard, and something to which that standard is to be applied, something submitted to moral evaluation, and therefore such a thing as the will can be responsible for. For that which is a matter of purely physical necessity, that which can in no wise be made subject to the will, whether in the past, the present, or the future, cannot without excessive scrupulosity be made a matter of imputation. Imputation presupposes freedom of will, although this does not mean that it is free at every moment. Through evil having become a habit, or through guilty ignorance, man may have deprived himself, for the moment at least, of freedom of action, without being on that account absolved from responsibility for what he does. Imputation, moreover, and moral judgment refer not merely to single deeds, but also to the character which they help to form. Imputation fastens on the individual act as that which brings it into play, but it is the person as a whole to whom the individual act is imputed. In imputation the evil deed is referred back to the inner totality of man in such a way, that it is declared to be his peculiar property, to be the fruit of his whole personality, and consequently to be something which burdens and pollutes the person as a unity. Since imputation is thus directed to man as a whole, there is directly associated with it a moral *feeling* affecting the *whole* man. Through the imputation of evil, man feels that he is in a condition wherein he is accused and has an evil conscience; and imputation, *guided, as it were, by the individual act*, goes back, when conscience is lively, to *the underlying character out of which the act arose.* Consequently guilt and responsibility are not escaped even when the act is preceded by a condition of relative unfreedom. And although this state of matters cannot at the moment be changed or avoided, still, absolutely regarded, it is avoidable, and it is the duty of man to effect the change. For evil remains as a constant contradiction to his eternal being. At the same time there are certainly degrees of imputation, according to the amount of knowledge and will-power that enter into the deed.

That general feeling just mentioned, in which the evil act

is referred to the person as a whole, marks the beginning of the recoil of evil against the evil-doer: evil is something *which now belongs to him as a person.* More or less plainly it seizes upon his existence as a whole, and this calls forth a reaction on the part of his true being, of his moral nature, which for its own self-preservation must now separate itself from the sin-stained nature and assume an attitude of accusation towards it (Rom. ii. 15). This accusation is followed immediately by moral *self-condemnation,* or an act of *judgment* on the part of conscience, in which an element of retribution is involved (1 John iii. 19, 20). In this way we have a *good* or an *evil* conscience; in the former case there is a pleasurable feeling, the feeling of peace associated with it, while in the latter there is the consciousness that evil is now something of its own, and this gives it inward torment. Evil deeds are like evil powers, now slumbering now roused into hostile activity against man; and hence we read of stings of conscience (1 Tim. iv. 2), and of self-condemnation (1 John iii. 20).

4. In conclusion, a word must still be said as to whether there is such a thing as an *erring* conscience, which we ought nevertheless to obey. Conscience in the true sense, not merely what *appears* to be conscience, cannot possibly err. For God's voice cannot contradict itself. In accepting what is false we cannot possibly have a *personal* conviction of its truth, although we may have a very lively trust in external authorities. For if a falsehood could invest itself with certainty just as much as a truth, there would no longer be any certainty with regard to truth. The same thing is clear from the fact that all erroneous moral ideas can be overcome. This can be done only because it can be shown that they are in contradiction to something better, something which may sleep but can be awakened. Neither can the opinion that erring consciences do exist find shelter behind Scripture. Paul, it is true, acknowledges that the conscience of each individual has its special modifications (ἕκαστος ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ νοὶ πληροφορείσθω, Rom. xiv. 5; 1 Cor. x. 29). He speaks too of weak consciences, Rom. xiv. 15, and demands, on behalf both of the individual conscience and the weak conscience, that no offence be given them. For example,

whoever has scruples about eating flesh, especially flesh offered to idols, ought—even leaving out of sight the fact that there are others whose consciences should not be offended—to abstain from eating; he must not, by doing that which his moral consciousness declares to be sinful or doubtful, assume to himself a higher degree of moral freedom and knowledge than that which he has properly attained. His duty is rather to devote his energies to growth in moral knowledge, before he exercises his freedom in such innocent matters. But although Paul certainly says that we ought *not to act inconsistently with the degree* of moral knowledge we have attained, he does *not* say that we *ought to follow the false* declarations and demands of an ostensible conscience when it asks us to do that which is *evil in itself*. A Jew, for example, may believe that he is doing God service in persecuting or slaying Christians, and a heathen may believe that he is permitted or enjoined by his religion to drown his child in the Ganges, but it is the duty neither of Jew nor heathen to do that which objectively is wrong. Wherever a spurious conscience would make something that is evil a matter of duty, the missionary must boldly demand that the supposed duty be not discharged, that a thing which is evil in itself be not done.

The only case in which it is a duty to follow the dictates of an erring moral consciousness is when our major premiss is correct,—viz. that evil ought to be avoided,—but an erroneous minor premiss has been brought under it; and even then this holds good *only* with reference to our abstaining from the exercise of a freedom for which we are not yet prepared. In such a case an erring moral consciousness may declare that it is morally doubtful whether we ought to exercise our freedom, and therefore that we ought to refrain from doing so; and here it cannot be said that it is sinful to abstain from using our freedom (cf. Rom. xiv. 1 ff.; 1 Cor. viii. 7 ff., x. 23–33). But when the matter in question is something evil which is enjoined by an erring moral consciousness, then we must say that it can never be so closely associated with moral certainty as to make its performance a duty. That evil should put itself forward as something good is in itself quite unnatural, and hence a truer knowledge

finds entrance into the mind when an appeal is made to a higher consciousness, to that which really is conscience and which affords true certainty, a certainty allied with that originality and immediateness which go with convictions of the highest kind. Accordingly there is a confusion of *conscience* with *moral consciousness* in general when it is held that we may speak of an erring conscience. We formerly saw that the moral consciousness, especially at its second stage, is liable to great aberrations, *although* it may, at the same time, have *a high degree of faith* in the trustworthiness and authority of its objective source. But such an erring moral consciousness *lacks that which is the special characteristic of conscience*—viz. *true, immediate certainty* with regard to morality in itself and independent of external authorities. Conscience, indeed, is often introduced into matters with which it has nothing to do; but this, even where it is done in good faith, is arbitrary autonomy, and in truth nothing but Antinomianism.

THIRD SECTION.

FREEDOM.

§ 27.

The doctrines which have been held regarding freedom range themselves historically under the antithesis of Determinism and Indeterminism; an antithesis which passes through various stages. The lower forms of both always incline to run into each other, a fact which proves that the members of the antithesis tend towards one another, each of them representing a side of truth which strives after union with the other side. Accordingly the goal to which science has to approximate is to combine both of them in a higher unity.

LITERATURE.—Plato, *De Republica*, Bk. ix. Origen, Περὶ ἀρχῶν. Alexander Aphrodisias and Ammonius—*de fato*—wrote on the fatalism, especially of an astrological kind, which was so widely spread in the first centuries. Ephrem Syrus wrote on the

other side. (Cf. regarding these authors the treatise of Joh. Conr. Orelli, Zurich 1824.) Diodorus of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Augustine, *De libero arbitrio; c. Faustum Manichæum.* Gemistos Plethon, cf. H. Grotius, 1648, *Philosophorum veterum sententiæ de fato.* Of writers belonging to the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas approaches Determinism, while Duns Scotus is an Indeterminist; Laurentius Valla and Thomas Bradwardinus, however, are predestinarians. In the age of the Reformation, we have Luther, *De servo arbitrio;* Erasmus, *De libero arbitrio;* Melanchthon's *Loci,* 1521; Calvin's *Institutio,* L. i. ii. Besides several treatises, Zwingli, *On the Eternal Providence of God.* Jonathan Edwards, one of the most acute of Calvinists, *An Inquiry into the Modern prevailing Notions respecting the Freedom of Will.* W. King, in his *De origine mali,* is, on the other hand, an Indeterminist.

On the philosophical side we may mention Spinoza's *Ethik,* the *Theodicy* of Leibnitz, who conceives everything as under divine predestination, and regards evil as limitation. Materialistic fatalism is defended in the *Système de la nature* of Baron von Holbach. The Indeterminism of Kant in his *Critique of the Practical Reason,* and his *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason,* forms the transition to Schelling's doctrine of the predeterminism of freedom. Daub, *Judas Iscariot,* 2 vols.; as well as his *Darstellung und Beurtheilung der Hypothesen in Betreff der Willensfreiheit,* 1834, and his *Christliche Moral.* Bockshammer, *Ueber die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens,* 1821. Franz v. Baader, *Begründung der Ethik durch Physik,* 1843. Herbart, *Praktische Philosophie* (*die Idee der inneren Freiheit*), *Werke,* vol. viii. p. 33 sq., vol. ix. Nr. 9; *Gespräch über das Böse,* 1847. Vatke, *Die menschliche Freiheit,* 1841. Zeller, *Ueber die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens, das Böse und die moralische Weltordnung, Theol. Jahrb.* v. 3, vi. 1, 2. Schleiermacher, *Ueber die Erwählungslehre,* 1819. Romang, *Willensfreiheit und Determinismus,* 1835. Sigwart, *Das Problem der Freiheit und Unfreiheit des menschlichen Willens,* in *Tübinger Zeitschrift,* 1839, 3. [Sigwart, *Der Begriff des Willens und sein Verhältniss zum Begriff der Ursache,* 1879.—Ed.] Heinrich Ritter, *Ueber das Böse.* Julius Müller, *Doctrine of Sin,* with a survey of the different theories. Luthardt, *Die Lehre vom freien Willen.* Rothe, *Ethik,* 2nd ed. § 86, p. 349. Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht,* 1860, p. 65 sq., § 43; *Hist. Beiträge zur Phil.* ii. 112; *Nothwendigkeit und Freiheit in der griechischen Philosophie.* Scholten, *Ueber Willensfreiheit,* translated by Manchot, 1874, and criticized by Gloatz, *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* 1874. [Hoekstra, *Vrijheid in verband met zelfbewustheid zedelijkheid en zonde.* Sécretan, *La philosophie de la liberté,* 1849. J. C.

Fischer, *Ueber die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens*, 1858. Stuart Mill, *System of Deductive and Inductive Logic*, vol. ii. Book 6. Liebmann, *Ueber den individuellen Beweis für die Freiheit des Willens*, 1866. J. B. Meyer, *Philosophische Zeitfragen*, cap. 8. Goering, *Ueber die menschliche Freiheit*, 1876. Fluegel, *Probleme der Philosophie*, 2 Thl. 1876. H. Sommer, *Ueber das Wesen und die Bedeutung der menschlichen Freiheit, Preussische Jahrbücher*, 1881, Nr. vi. Zart, *Bemerkungen zur Theorie der menschlichen Freiheit*, 1883; *Der christliche Glaube und die menschliche Freiheit*, 1880. Lotze, *Mikrokosmus*, III. *Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie*, p. 16 sq. Witte, *Ueber Freiheit des Willens*, 1882. Harms, *Metaphysik*, 1885, pp. 80–100. Cf. besides the literature given above, p. 29 sq.—Ed.]

A.—FIRST FORM OF THE ANTITHESIS. ABSOLUTE PHYSICAL DETERMINISM AND ABSOLUTE INDETERMINISM.

I. DETERMINISM IN ITS LOWEST FORM.

(*a*) The lowest stage of determinism is *mechanical* determinism, represented in antiquity by the atomists, and in modern times by Holbach in his *Système de la nature*. It may take a materialistic shape, denying the distinct existence of the soul, and regarding it as a mere quality or activity of matter, the highest form which matter assumes. Determinism of this kind has been already discussed (§ 9. 3). Substantially the same view is held when the existence of a human soul is admitted, but it is conceived as moved and determined solely from the outside, by surrounding physical things or forces, such as food, climate, or even social relations. But indeterminism now comes forward with its consciousness of freedom, and points with justice to the ignoble elements contained in this idea. It says: if man were moved solely and simply from the outside, if he offered no resistance nor counteraction to external forces, then he would be as good as non-existent, he would have no separate life of his own. For otherwise he would not be merely determined and conditioned by things external to him, but would himself be a conditioning power, in accordance with the constitution of his nature. And the very form of determinism which we are here considering must admit that man is such a power, since it holds that everything conditions every other, in an endless

chain of influence. Were man not a conditioning cause, he would be something less than nature. But he is spirit, and susceptible to the universal, and is thus raised far above mere dependence on the individual natural existences and forces which surround him.

(*b*) Should determinism concede this, as it must, it may nevertheless endeavour to maintain itself by assuming a higher form than the mechanical. Accordingly, when a more coherent method of thought is adopted, there arises the idea of a universal connection in nature, in which all natural forces are bound together in a necessary chain of cause and effect. Here it is asserted that the principle of this all-embracing and determining necessity is *εἱμαρμένη*, fate. Thus mechanical determinism passes over into *fatalism;* man is not subordinated to the external forces of nature, but is placed on the same level with them, and fate determines him as it does everything. But indeterminism again brings forward the sense of freedom in opposition to fatalism, and maintains that it is not only lowering, but also untrue to hold that we are dependent upon blind, unconscious fate, since we are conscious that there is within us a *causal power*. If by fate we mean that nexus of cause and effect by which the whole system of nature is held together, and which acts in the way of sheer compulsion, then in this sense fate cannot exist for man. For man is conscious that he has the power to acquiesce in or to reject the natural influences by which he is surrounded, and that in both cases he acts as a being endowed with will. The impulses which come to him from the side of nature—whether individually or collectively—only exert a causal efficacy upon him through the instrumentality of his will, and therefore, since he can take up an attitude of independence towards the whole of nature, they really derive their power from the spirit of man, so that the spirit never ceases to be its own master. The spirit is no mere unit among the things of nature, and accordingly it must not be taken captive against its will by any one of these; it can always retire from among them into the depths of its own universal nature, and through its power of self-reflection—a power which nature does not possess—take up an attitude of indifference to everything outside itself. This

is the rock on which every form of causality splits, which would determine the spirit from without.

(*c*) The deterministic mode of thought may now, in order to maintain itself against indeterminism, attempt to find from its own point of view a place for the causality of man. It may say—it is just when man realizes that everything outside him, and he himself as well, are dependent upon an all-embracing fate, that he becomes aware that in the last resort he is not dependent upon external things, but is independent over against them and free. They and the whole system of nature are powerless to affect him in opposition to fate, which assigns to him and them their measure of power and permanence, of right and law. Nay, more has been assigned to man than to nature. He is a spiritual being of a universal kind, and the spiritual world is his. Hence, collective nature cannot become master of this his universal and essential being. Thus he is free with respect to nature, but is undoubtedly subject to fate as the law which lays the whole universe under the bonds of necessity.

Here too *indeterminism* has its answer ready. Such a power of resistance and such an independence of nature is not yet the freedom which morality requires. If everything be determined by fate, if even the causative power of freedom, the consciousness and the exercise of it, be so determined, then freedom itself is denied, and also all independence and responsibility. Fate can never consist with freedom, since it is blind and, so far as its contents are concerned, mere motiveless chance, which affords no room for the stability of a coherent moral life. Accordingly indeterminism, which we have hitherto known merely as the critic of certain forms of determinism, advances a theory of its own in the following shape.

II. INDETERMINISM IN ITS FIRST AND BAREST FORM.

Here freedom is defined as the power possessed by man, in accordance with his universal nature, of—if not actually effecting, yet—willing or not willing whatever is possible; negatively, it is absolute freedom from everything like determination or specific character. For every determination, even

though originally it should take place through man's own will, would be a limitation of freedom considered as the faculty of willing or not willing whatever is possible. Duns Scotus, W. King (*De origine mali*), and Episcopius[1] approach most closely to this form of indeterminism. According to it, freedom consists in the mere infinite *ability* of willing, as opposed to every definite volition, and therefore in the capability of emancipating one's self from everything that determines volition.

But here determinism can now come forward, and point out with justice to this form of indeterminism, that it must yield although unwillingly to determinism, and must even swing round altogether into the latter. The indeterminism which, in the interest of absolute freedom or of the unlimited ability to will, holds that determinateness of every kind must be excluded, confounds the infinitum with the indefinitum.[2] Moreover, this indeterminism, which thinks that freedom must consist in complete exemption from every kind of determinateness, would also be incapable of any definite volition or action. The necessity would lie upon it, like a fate, of willing nothing at all, since every act must involve a definite, individual volition. Did freedom merely consist in the infinite power to will whatever is possible, then man, when he willed something definite, would for the time being lose his freedom. For he cannot, like God, will everything that is possible at one and the same moment, but can only will some individual thing, and this is not commensurate with that universal ability of which we are speaking, *i.e.* with freedom in the indeterministic sense. Since in every definite act of volition freedom must limit itself for the sake of some individual thing which is willed, the exercise of freedom would, according to the notion of it supplied by absolute indeterminism, be identical with its loss. So, in order not to suffer such a falling away from itself, freedom would have to take up a negative attitude towards all the demands that are addressed to it; it would *necessarily* remain merely an infinite possibility or potency of

[1] *Tractatus de libero arbitrio.* Cf. Rothe, 2nd ed. i. p. 354.

[2] The same fault lies in the proposition of Spinoza: *omnis determinatio est negatio;* and the systems of Schopenhauer and E. v. Hartmann rest on the same fundamental error.

volition, would never will anything at all, but would have constantly to abstain from willing. But a potency of volition which at the same time involved the impossibility of volition would be a contradiction. And this shows that absolute indeterminism does not attain to real freedom, and more, that by thus falling back upon mere ability it can never enjoy its freedom, nor assert its consciousness of it.

Accordingly, determinism is right when it urges that the following inferences flow from indeterminism. Since the latter thus stubbornly rejects all definite contents, since—in order not to shake, even for a moment, freedom as it conceives of it, *i.e.* the universal infinite possibility of volition—it excludes all and every determination, even determination mediated through the will itself, then it follows that not only *as a matter of fact is no exercise of freedom possible*, but also that if freedom of this kind is to be preserved, it must have imposed upon it like a *fate* the necessity of *willing nothing at all.* But such a freedom is immured within itself, is absolutely powerless, the very opposite of freedom. Hence absolute indeterminism swings round into its opposite. There is no constancy in it. In order that real freedom may exist, it must not be deprived of definite contents; just as the latter, on the other hand, must not abolish freedom. On the contrary, in order that there may be freedom, the form of free volition must be compatible with definite contents. Neither must freedom be made to consist in indifference towards and exclusion of definite contents. Otherwise it would merely be the power of exercising caprice. And caprice is just chance in a subjective form.

That must be a false idea of freedom which surrenders freedom—meant as it is for action, for exercise—to the necessity either of inaction or else of self-loss. Fatalism of this kind, in which absolute indeterminism has landed, is now opposed by *another* form of determinism, in which the mechanical stage has been recognised as untenable, which makes no attempt to exclude human causality either by means of a connected system of nature or by fate, but seeks to clothe itself in a higher form, a form which is able to meet the last objections advanced by indeterminism.

§ 28. (*Continuation.*)

B.—THE SECOND FORM OF THE ANTITHESIS. PSYCHICAL DETERMINISM AND THE INDETERMINISM OF INDIFFERENCE.

I. PSYCHICAL DETERMINISM.

As it is not by mere mechanical impulses that man is moved, or, as it were, driven, so too in what he is and does he is not dependent upon the caprices or irrational chance of a fate, which impels him now in one direction and then perhaps in the opposite direction. He is rather—says determinism of this new and more refined form—*relatively free* over against mundane forces, he has a causal energy of his own, and can work upon them and resist them. Indeed, the higher form of determinism lays stress upon the fact that man has a causal power of a constant, determinate kind, according to the quantity and quality of the energy which dwells within him. It must be possible—it says—for the will to be an actual determinate will, and yet to be free. What is definite or determined cannot be inimical to freedom. A really free character must also be a character specifically determined. But—it now continues—the will acts like all other forces; man chooses, decides, acts as a spiritual force in accordance with his essential nature, his *psychical constitution.* It is true that man with his receptivity and power of willing is not confined to a narrow range of things, like merely natural beings. Human nature is universal, and can therefore will an infinite variety of things. But in every individual, and at every moment, the choice which is made depends upon his whole previous disposition, and especially upon the state and bent of his psychical powers. Neither fate nor the constitution of external nature rules him from without. But the constitution of his nature as a whole, of his intellect and inclinations, all that he brings with him into the world or that he has acquired through culture, this it is which determines his will. And even moral impulses may arise from the habitual character thus formed. Man's energies and impulses have all a determining influence upon him. He is himself only their expression and executor; and thus every-

thing runs its naturally determined course, although the determination is of a psychical and not of a physico-mechanical kind. It is denied that there is in man a causal source of action, belonging to himself and independent of psychical determination. Freedom is denied as the ability to set in motion a new series of actions; consequently it is denied to be the cause of man's power to originate action; or in other words, it is denied that man is a causality in the higher sense of not only willing, but freely willing his volition. For it is held rather that the reason why man is and becomes a cause lies in the given psychical constitution of his nature. There is no such thing as a power of self-determination with respect to the inner source of action.

Thus the whole chain of actions and habits which makes up the life of man would be preformed from the very first, and the chain would unwind itself—although under the co-operation of external factors—just as leaves, blossom, and fruit are developed from a seed from the beginning onward. And this necessity from first to last would lie upon the wicked in their wickedness as well as upon the good in their goodness. They would have morally opposite dispositions; the one would be created for evil, the other for good.

But indeterminism now refuses, and with justice, to assent to this view. It now admits, indeed, that freedom must be able to will something definite without self-loss accruing, and even that decision, determinateness, is a necessary characteristic of freedom. But nevertheless it objects to psychical determinism that the latter fails to explain the psychological phenomena of shame, penitence, and especially of the sense of guilt, all of which point to moral freedom, and that it rather abolishes imputation and guilt altogether, since it denies the formal element of free-will. And it is further objected by indeterminism, that on this view the contents of an act of will can no longer be regarded as moral, but that since determination is conceived of after the manner of physical and not of ethical laws, these contents must remain morally indifferent or worthless. Determinism no doubt may reply—there is guilt wherever there is actual causation; for example, we say that bad weather is guilty of the failure of the crops. But indeterminism can justly retort—this is only

physical and logical imputation, the reference of a result to the nearest causality, and the latter may itself have something else as its cause, behind or above itself. In *moral imputation*, on the other hand, and in the strict idea of guilt, nothing of the kind is involved; but, on the contrary, it is implied that there is no determining power alien to man which makes him the cause of what he does; that he himself is responsible, is the *αἰτία* or reason of his will becoming a causal power. In short, moral guilt and imputation have only a footing where man is conceived as a causality of a higher kind than merely natural causes, where he is thought of as a causality in the second degree, as the ultimate ground—not indeed of his essential being, but nevertheless—of his acting as a cause; in other words, as having the power to make himself the cause of an act or not.

Further, indeterminism can justly confront determinism with its inability to assign any reason why some should be good and others evil, while morality nevertheless makes an unconditional claim upon all men, through the essential constitution of human nature. If the distinction between good and evil is absolute, psychical determinism must assume that different individuals have characters of an absolutely opposite kind. But in that case men no longer form one species of being, but two that are totally different, and we can *no longer* seriously assert that morality lays an *unconditional* claim upon *all men* alike. Good could not be really demanded of those who are psychically predisposed to evil. And thus from more sides than one psychical determinism would prove the ruin of the ethical idea. Now, should determinism take exception to this inference, on the ground that the ethical idea does come to realization in what is good, indeterminism justly reminds us, that if human action is necessitated by the constitution of man's nature and the disposition originally given him, so that there is no possibility of his acting otherwise than he does, then we cannot ascribe to him any *real share of his own* in the formation of his moral character, and thus even the good as viewed from the standpoint of determinism would contain no moral element properly so called. Moreover, psychical determinism is not altogether free of fatalism. For if everything be—even psychically—determined, the question arises, what is the determining power? It cannot be a

good being over all, for he would not determine men to what is evil as well as to what is good. Fate must therefore be posited as the supreme determining power, a fate to which the distinction between good and evil is indifferent, and which determines men aimlessly and blindly. And although fate, when looked at from without, is irresistible compulsion, the principle of iron necessity, still, inwardly regarded, it is in itself without goal and aim, it has no purpose of its own, but is hollow and empty. From an absolute point of view, there is no reason why it should determine some particular thing rather than the opposite; that is to say, fate regarded inwardly is *absolute chance.*

II. THE INDETERMINISM OF INDIFFERENCE.

2. It must be admitted that the objections advanced by determinism against indeterminism in its absolute form have not been removed. Now, when indeterminism acknowledges their justice, more particularly when it recognises that the idea of freedom must involve not a bare capacity, an impotent potency, but something actual, or that freedom must appropriate to itself contents of a definite kind, then indeterminism also reaches a higher stage. It now says: the cause of moral character must be in man himself; it lies in the ability to choose freely between one kind of contents and another; more particularly, in the capacity he has of giving the preference to good or to evil, without losing his freedom. After a choice has been made, freedom remains, without alteration or self-loss, the same that it was before; it is the faculty of choice pure and simple, which cannot be lost, and which always retains the power of making, just as readily, an opposite choice to the one it actually does make. By exercising its power of determination, it can of course limit itself for the moment to particular contents. But this only touches the surface of its nature; in its essence the faculty of choice remains ever the same, and maintains the same attitude of indifference towards all kinds of contents; it is the power of choice, the will making a selection and nothing more, or in other words, arbitrariness. Hence freedom in this sense goes by the name *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ.*

This idea of freedom is very common; many still hold that the special dignity of man consists in his power of arbitrary choice, a choice in which the contents are a matter of indifference. But against this conception of freedom also, many important considerations suggest themselves, some of which are urged with much force from the side of determinism. If the essential nature of freedom be exhaustively described in saying that it consists in the power of choice, then freedom must be incapable of *growth;* just as little can it be diminished; hence it can only exist in its entirety or not at all, and must consequently be complete from the very beginning. But such a freedom would be an altogether abnormal phenomenon in a world where everything is passing through a process of growth. Further, if freedom were no more than the *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*, and were nevertheless an abiding attribute of man, it would be impossible for any definite impression which he receives, even though it should be mediated through his own will, to become a *lasting* element in his character. For since freedom, considered as the bare freedom of choice, can admit of no such thing as determination, without ceasing to be in itself indifferent to all contents that would give it a permanent character, it follows that man would have the power, after performing a series of acts, to obliterate their effects at any moment. But *experience* shows that the opposite of this is the case. The actions of men leave traces behind them, they produce dispositions which exert an influence upon the whole future life. By this means freedom, as mere freedom of choice, is limited. And we must not regard this as implying a loss of freedom; on the contrary, man's freedom would give him no real power over himself, did its exercise not effect something permanent. And more than this, *morality* itself would suffer through such a conception of freedom. If the latter were absolutely nothing more than the power of choice, it would have to remain suspended, in complete indifference, over the object that is chosen; it could only graze it, as it were, it could never unite itself to anything firmly and reliably. If the will were merely an agile faculty, which could adopt some particular form of contents and then just as readily shake itself free again, what advantage would there be in that? How could a character grow up if

the self-determinations of man could not, when his act is past, continue to work on within him, if they could not make a lasting impression upon him? In that case there could never be any progress, man would continually have to begin from the beginning over again. Further, if the special dignity of man, the divine image, is to be seen in such a freedom, in this power of arbitrary choice, this freedom of indifference—then the question arises, Is God not to be regarded as free? He cannot enjoy such a freedom as this, which is simply arbitrariness, since He is not mere power; this physical category is too low for Him, and His power, on the contrary, is subordinate to His ethical nature. If it cannot be accounted as belonging to the freedom of God to be able to will what is evil as well as what is good, then the ideal of man, as a being created in the image of God, must lie somewhere else than in a merely external, ostensibly free but in reality *adventitious*, relation to the good.

Finally, the doctrine of indifference would also come into collision with the *moral law*. The latter demands that we will the good because it is morally necessary. An act in which we did what was good merely from arbitrary self-will or caprice, would be to trifle with the good, would profane it instead of rendering it homage. If man in himself and from the whole constitution of his nature were indifferent as to the contents of his self-determination, and therefore indifferent both to good and evil; further, if his will, from its essential nature, held the same relation to good that it did to evil,—then the law would have no essential connection with him, and could no longer be absolutely binding upon him. Such a boundless right of self-determination, moreover, would abolish man's essential determination for the good. Freedom can only be given us for the sake of the good; it is wholly inconceivable that a force should be admitted into the world which could never be anything else but mere arbitrariness, a force which could never afford the means of forming a good character, or even of performing a single good deed, but which would rather be the cause of endless confusion in God's world. Nor is it the case either, that it is indifferent to freedom whether it surrender itself to good or evil. It does not feel equally healthy or vigorous in both of them alike. On the

contrary, when it chooses evil it falls into contradiction with itself and languishes; it comes under the power of the natural, of irrational impulses, and sells itself into the kingdom of bondage, to what Paul calls *αἰχμαλωσία*. On the other hand, it is only when it chooses the good that it reaches complete harmony with its idea; it then rises out of the bare possibility of formal freedom into true and real freedom. In addition to all this, the theory of the indifference of freedom would have to assume that every individual is born in a state of entire moral indetermination, as a *tabula rasa*, whereas experience and Scripture alike recognise that every one has a natural tendency towards evil.

The controversy between these two opposing theories must convince their supporters that they are alike untenable in their second form also, and that another and a higher form must be sought for both.

§ 29. (*Continuation.*)

C.—THIRD FORM OF THE ANTITHESIS. THEOLOGICAL PREDETERMINISM, OR THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE PREDESTINATION;[1] AND THE PREDETERMINISM OF FREEDOM, OR FREEDOM AS TRANSCENDENTAL, AS BELONGING TO THE WORLD OF INTELLIGIBLE BEING.

I. THEOLOGICAL PREDETERMINISM, OR PREDESTINATION AS THE HIGHEST FORM OF DETERMINISM.

Determinism in its highest form admits the strength of the arguments brought against psychical determinism and attempts to remedy the imperfections of the latter by going back for the ultimate source of determination, not to a blind cause such as objective chance or fate, nor to any mere natural force even of a spiritual kind, but to the free, living God of Providence, who is guiding the world to a good end. It is now said that this free, all-determining will of God is even the ground of a possible change in man, of a conversion from evil to good, such as strict psychical determinism cannot admit. Hence determinism in its theological form can now deny, as well as indeterminism, that evil belongs necessarily to the

[1] Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. § 130 (ii. § 74, 75).

psychical nature of any human being. It can also assert the unity of the human race and its universal adaptation for morality, since it holds that all men, although they are sinful, are still capable of being acted upon by God, and therefore, that through the operation of a supernatural, creative energy they may make a new beginning of moral life. Theological determinism has appeared in three forms: the *Infralapsarianism* of Augustine, the *Supralapsarianism* of Calvin and Beza, and a third form in which it was held by Schleiermacher. These all start from the fact of universal sinfulness, of man's need of as well as his capacity for redemption, but they make the final character and fate of all to be determined solely and simply by God.

According to Augustine, God graciously bestows on a part of mankind the power of fulfilling the law, which is valid for all; the rest He passes by in this election, leaving them in sin, which leads to their damnation, although all were alike capable of receiving His grace. In this way the distinction between good and evil is explained by means of an act of election on the part of God, without assuming that in the human race, as it now is, there is any power of free choice. But in order to prevent the guilt of evil and the condemnation of a certain number of individuals from being due to God, Augustine teaches that in Adam the whole human race was morally free, and that in him all have sinned, so that no wrong is done to any one when election passes him over and he is left to condemnation. Here, therefore, determinism takes up into itself an element of indeterminism, a pre-existent act of freedom on the part of all men in Adam, whereby, of course, the system of purely theological determinism is at once shattered. But even then the riddle remains unsolved, how it can accord with God's love to refuse to some the help without which they must continue in sin, while others to whom help is given are no whit better than they. If a breach has to be made in the deterministic system by going back to Adam and the freedom of man as found in him, why should not the distinction between those who become believers and those who remain unbelievers be explained without this reference to Adam at all, by holding that the same freedom which he possessed is enjoyed by every individual. Or again,

why should theological predeterminism not be carried out in earnest? Why should Adam's fall be an exception?

The *Supralapsarianism* of Calvin and Beza seeks to carry out theological determinism with stricter logical consistency. It ventures to assign the *ground why* some are passed over by divine election. According to it, it is for the good of the world, which exists for the glory of God, that He should not only reveal His mercy towards some, but also His justice towards others. Hence, besides vessels of grace and mercy, there must also be vessels of dishonour. Hence, too, it believes that it can disallow any freedom in the fall of Adam and of the race in him, and can trace back this fall to an omnipotent ordinance of God, which by this means provided the material for the above-mentioned twofold display of the majesty of God, in the contrasted forms of mercy and justice. In the case of the elect, evil is ordained merely with reference to redemption. But this lands us in a still greater enigma. How can a revelation of justice be possible, if evil be based upon an omnipotent divine decree? How can the righteous God punish what He Himself has irresistibly ordained? And what would become of the inner connection between justice and love, were God to divide mankind in this dualistic fashion? Justice and love would be dissociated in God also, and would not exist in the divine mind in inward unity, since He would not, in all that He does, be *at once* just and loving, but would be loving to the good and just to the bad alone.

In order now to be enabled to maintain that the *moral determination* of all men is *essentially the same*, and that *love rules in all that God does*, Schleiermacher has brought forward *theological determinism in a third and more perfect form*. According to him, absolute divine determination prevails indeed without exception, but it is likewise the very means by which men are everywhere and without exception determined for the good. He holds that the *Lutheran* Church is right in teaching that grace is universal and offered to all, but he agrees with Calvin in maintaining that it is also absolutely irresistible and constant. Since everything is predetermined by God, Supralapsarianism is justified in asserting that evil has also been ordained by Him. Nevertheless,

God does not contradict Himself when He enjoins what is good and forbids what is evil. He is not indifferent to the distinction between them. For although evil is willed by God together with grace, it is willed merely as something that is transitory and destined to be abolished. It is simply the natural set alongside a still imperfect sense of God, and this preponderance or excess of the natural, which is ordained as the initial condition of man,—this actual disproportion between the natural and the spiritual,—is the flesh. In itself, however, or dissociated from its connection with the spirit, the natural would be innocent. At the same time man is a real and not merely an apparent causality, and hence guilt is rightly imputed to him. So, too, evil is avoidable, although not immediately, in the case of every man; for all are destined for perfection. Evil does not belong to the essence or the idea of man; regarded absolutely, it is rather something that is eternally condemned and avoidable—avoidable, that is, through God's grace, which in every age comes in to strengthen the knowledge of God which man has attained. In favour of this theory it must be said that it does not, like the indeterminism of indifference, conceive of freedom as mere caprice or as a given, completed whole, but as capable of growth. Schleiermacher's theory also recognises the fact that man is not born empty both of good and evil, but with a preponderating tendency towards evil.

But even this highest form of determinism is exposed to the objection, that if everything be effected through the irresistible power of grace, there can be no such thing as a moral process, but merely something that is essentially a physical operation. The world, even the human will, would be absorbed in the will of God. The world would be no more than a manifestation of the divine will, and would consequently have only a docetic existence. In the last resort, too, this form of determinism, like all others, would make evil the result of an omnipotent decree on the part of God. This indeed is defended on the ground that God wills a gradual process of growth, which necessarily involves imperfection in its earlier stages. But gradual growth does not necessarily include evil. Evil is a deviation from the normal movement; when it exists, there must be a

retrogression from the way that has been entered upon, a return to the right way of gradual growth; the latter does not admit either of deviation or retrogression. Finally, should Schleiermacher say that evil is indeed a discord or disturbance, but that it is ultimately resolved and disappears, since it was ordained in connection with redemption, he brings the divine will into contradiction with itself, for he makes God by an omnipotent decree ordain something which His law and His ethical nature alike condemn.

II. THE PREDETERMINISM OF FREEDOM.

Accordingly, *indeterminism* does not surrender to this last and highest form of determinism, but seeks to shape itself so as to be able to defy the weighty objections which determinism has advanced (*B.* II.). It now concedes, not only that freedom must not be sought for in mere arbitrariness, and must not exclude permanent characterization, but also that it does not exist ready-made from the very first or by nature, but is formed and fashioned by human action. It also concedes that freedom has an essential relation to the law, and consequently destroys itself when exercised arbitrarily; and that, on the contrary, it gains in strength when it unites itself to what is morally necessary. On the other side, indeterminism still maintains inflexibly that the moral condition of man must be due to an act of his own, that the entire constitution of his moral nature must have its ground in a free act of self-determination on the part of man, and not in any mechanical, psychical, or theological determination. Each one gives himself his own peculiar character. Indeterminism is now confronted with the following problem. It sees—what is evident on the face of things—that man is never a mere *tabula rasa*, but at every moment has a determinate character; more particularly, it sees that in human life an egoistic bias early makes its appearance, a tendency which cannot be derived from a fall, taking place in the empirical earthly life of each individual. Accordingly, to maintain its own point of view, and to explain the determination that so manifestly exists in the present actual world, indeterminism falls back upon a free act or free acts of man in an intelligible

world; and this logically leads to a super-temporal or pre-temporal mode of existence, or in other words, to the doctrine of pre-existence. In this intelligible region, it is held, freedom makes its decision by an act which gives to man the specific character that we see he possesses empirically, or on earth. This theory is held, in different ways, by Kant, Schelling, Origen, and Jul. Müller.

According to Kant, the visible sensible world is absolutely under the sway of the law of necessity. But the spirit has within itself an intelligible region, a kingdom of freedom in which it determines itself, above or, as it were, behind time. Since time has for Kant only subjective significance, he can conceive of this act of self-determination, which takes place in eternity, as constantly pervading and operative in the life of man. But if the whole external world and the empirical human life remain subject to the law of necessity, while freedom is adjudged to belong to purely intelligible being, then freedom is made utterly powerless, and morality is condemned to a merely incorporeal, spiritualistic existence. Moreover, when Kant derives the sinful bias with which we are born from an act of freedom, he thereby admits a connection between the intelligible and the empirical world, and thus introduces an inconsistency into his system. And a similar remark may be made when he asserts the possibility of a change in the intelligible character. For he thereby admits that history and therefore time has objective significance.

According to Schelling, every man has fixed his own specific character by a pre-temporal and super-temporal act of freedom, and enters upon his life in time with the determinate qualities he has thus given himself, so that all he does in the world is to live out this indwelling character. Thus the whole earthly life is held to be delivered over irrevocably to determinism. But if man had absolutely no power to begin a new series of actions from within outwards, he could no longer effect any moral change—either for good or evil—in his own earthly life. And thus there would be two classes of men eternally distinct, and the whole earthly life would be without real, intrinsic value. One act alone in man's whole existence would have moral worth, and *it*

would lie outside consciousness altogether. History would only have the semblance of significance. For man, in his time-life, instead of making some moral acquisition, could do no more than show or reveal what had been already implanted within him through his pre-existent act of freedom.

In reply to this it may be said, with Origen and Julius Müller, that the pre-existent act referred to does not determine freedom wholly and for ever; that, on the contrary, conversion, for example, always remains possible to man, and that freedom therefore continues to exist alongside of determination or necessity. This, however, is a virtual admission that no firm standing ground is afforded either by pure indeterminism or determinism. According to Origen, the souls of men have, as a punishment, been clothed with bodies, and sent to earth as to a prison. Jul. Müller dissents from this view, since it gives to the body an altogether accidental connection with the soul. He holds, on the contrary, that even apart from the fall altogether, human souls would have been destined to be united to a body for a time; and thus, according to him, men were at first created incomplete. But in that case it is all the more surprising that the human soul should be created so perfect as to be able to undertake, in its pre-existent condition, an act of such infinite consequence and so pregnant with fate. He fails to show how souls in the pre-existent, intelligible state, with no bodies and no consciousness of a world, could ever perform an act of this kind, which presupposes the existence of a high degree of freedom and self-consciousness, such as they could not possibly possess at their creation. Further, if we cannot go back to the idea of indifference as affording an exhaustive definition of freedom, what is required is, to show how the element of truth contained in determinism is to be incorporated with the idea of freedom, and how the latter is to be defined so as to do full justice to it.

If we now survey the two sets of theories which we have discussed, the result is as follows. The whole truth has not yet been found even in the third form either of determinism or indeterminism, although both of these have caught up elements of it into themselves, elements which belong originally to the other member of the antithesis. Never-

theless, the dialectical necessity of the matter in hand compels us to recognise that we must seek for a union of the two factors of necessity and freedom, and by this means raise the idea of freedom above bare indeterminism on the one side and bare determinism on the other.

§ 30. *Positive Doctrine of Freedom.*

The full idea of freedom can only be realized and can only be apprehended in a plurality of stages, which it must pass through in the course of an actual moral process. Such a process is recognised neither by pure Determinism nor by pure Indeterminism ; it is set in motion, on the one side by the opposition, on the other side by the intimate connection between the two factors of Freedom and Necessity. The *first* stage is that of freedom *in essence*, or *essential* freedom (cf. § 24. 25. 1, 2, 19. 1–3), corresponding to conscience at its earliest stage. It is only when the law becomes revealed in conscience (§ 25. 2) that the *faculty of moral choice*, which lies hid in this rudimentary form of freedom, is brought out into actual exercise; and then the *second* stage has been reached. Here a double possibility is set before man. He can suffer himself to be determined either by the good or by its opposite ; and therein he possesses freedom, as the power of choice between good and evil. But the ability to make a choice is not yet true freedom ; it simply marks the stage of *formal or subjective freedom*, and this can only be a transitional stage. The *third* stage and the full idea of freedom is only reached when man no longer makes a mere arbitrary choice, indifferent to what is morally necessary, but, recognising the good to be the true essence or the idea of his own personality, unites himself firmly to it, and thereby gives himself a definite moral character, so that through the emancipating power of love to and delight in the

good, it becomes more and more a moral impossibility for him to choose what is evil. This is *real freedom*—what the New Testament calls the glorious liberty of the children of God (so-called theological freedom). In it the faculty of choice is still preserved; but it is no longer a factor operating in isolation; on the contrary, it is taken up as an organic element into the will, now indissolubly united to the good. In this real freedom essential freedom attains to pure and efficient realization.

1. *Biblical Doctrine.*—Scripture teaches neither absolute determinism nor an empty *liberum arbitrium indifferens.* On the contrary, the idea of essential freedom is expressed in the phrase "the image of God" (Gen. i. 26, 27). Man was created in this image (בְּצַלְמוֹ). The essential characteristic of man is, that he is destined for God. But this his destination is not realized at once and without mediation. This truth is involved in the words which tell us that he was created *for* likeness to God (כִּדְמוּתוֹ). According to these words, man has an essential relation to the good or the morally necessary; and as long as he continues to be at one with the will of God, he is also in a happy state of harmony with himself, a state that accords with his true nature; although it is not till after the fall that he has a living experience of the fact. The power of *moral choice* is then called into play by means of moral commands. These commands appear indeed in a positive, external form, and their inward goodness is not at first recognised. Still, man knows that it is his duty to exhibit childlike piety and obedience, and this makes him a moral being. Accordingly, his consciousness of the law is gradually developed along with his consciousness of himself, of the world and of God, is strengthened by the moral customs of the patriarchal age, and is at last fully unfolded in a national form in the law of Moses. Even the Mosaic law is the friend of freedom, and the Hebrews did not fail to perceive that it was bound up with the very being and therefore with the freedom of the nation (Deut. xxx. 15 f.; Jer. vi. 16, xviii. 11; Sir. xv. 14 f.). Hence the

high praise that is given to the law (Ps. xxxii., ciii., cxix.). It awakens the consciousness of freedom, and summons man to moral effort. According to Deut. xxx. 15, good and evil are set before man that he may make his choice. Christianity also recognises essential freedom (Rom. vii. 22; John iii. 20, 21), and likewise freedom of choice between good and evil (Matt. xxii. 2 f., xxiii. 37; Acts vii. 51 f.). Still, mere freedom of choice by itself does not receive the name of freedom. *Ἑκούσιον* is used (Heb. x. 26) to denote man's spontaneity when it takes the direction of evil. It is self-evident, however, that the Old and New Testaments do not stop short with the subjective element in freedom; even leaving the effects of sin out of account altogether, every good gift comes from God the Father of lights, who must work in man both to will and to do (James i. 17 f.; Phil. ii. 13). In addition to this also, guilt and sin, which are imputed to man because of his freedom, produce a condition of bondage, of dominion of the flesh, and at the same time of fear and timidity before God. Even in Old Testament times this was perceived by the prophets, and hence they deemed a new covenant necessary (Jer. xxxi.; Ezek. xi. 19). Then the Son came, in order that from being bondsmen we might become free children of God (John viii. 31, 32; Rom. vi. 15 f., viii. 17 ff.). The divine agency that now comes into play has the power to determine man; but the determination which is given is wholly favourable to freedom, and James plainly says (i. 25) that Christianity is the *νόμος τέλειος τῆς ἐλευθερίας*. According to the New Testament, true freedom is to be found in the realization of the new man, made in the image of God (Rom. viii. 21; 2 Cor. iii. 17; Eph. iv. 23 f.; Col. iii. 9 f.; 1 Pet. ii. 16). There is no word in the New Testament of freedom apart from Christ; on the contrary, Christ says, Without me ye can do nothing (John xv. 5).

2. *Possibility and necessity of the faculty of moral choice.*— It is true that the Reformers Luther and Calvin believed that they must deny man's freedom of moral choice, not only on account of original sin and with reference to the *liberum arbitrium in spiritualibus,* but also in order to maintain the divine omnipotence. They were led to this view by their

opposition to Pelagianism. But the German Evangelical Church, following Melanchthon in this respect, has always sought to leave room for moral freedom of choice, and has refused to acknowledge the grounds on which its possibility is denied. And in fact, when it is said that God has created free beings, no limitation of His omnipotence is implied, since the idea of omnipotence simply describes His absolute power, but says nothing as to how it is exercised. God is indeed at every moment the sole ground of the being of His creatures. But if nothing higher could exist than creatures at the level of nature, that is to say, if there could not be free spirits, then the creative omnipotence of God could not become a cause in the full sense of the term. A causal power has not operated in the highest sense, and has not advanced beyond the relations of identity and substantiality, until it has produced something which does not remain absorbed in it, and in utter and helpless dependence upon it, but which has an existence by itself and leads an independent life. Now in nature the divine causality does not reach this form ; there life and its movements are everywhere determined by the will of God, and are the expression of that will. Accordingly, the creative causality of God does not manifest itself fully in nature : it can only do so when it calls free beings into existence. Further, the necessity for the existence of free beings is rendered still more evident when we consider not only the creative omnipotence of God, but also the ethical end for which the world has been created by an ethical God. God's omnipotence, in accordance with His purpose of love, wills, for the realization of the good, free and essentially self-determining beings. An obedience towards God that did not involve a capacity to resist His will, would not be free ; man would remain merely a higher kind of natural being, determined throughout by divine omnipotence. Also, he would not be an ultimate end, for whatever lacks independent existence can be no more than a means. But God wills a world that shall be of worth in itself, that shall live out its own life in the freedom of love, and not merely attain to a spectral existence over against His irresistible sway. It is indeed a great, bold thought, that man is so free with regard to God that he can withstand

God. But all the while, omnipotence remains as the power from which freedom derives its existence (Ps. civ. 29). Thus, then, God proves Himself to be a loving Father, by willing the existence of free children, made in His own image, with whom He can enter upon a free interchange of love. He wills that on the basis of the nature which He gave to man at creation, a new creation should now be built, in which a free, reciprocal fellowship of love can be formed between God and man.

Now determinism and indeterminism are *alike in this,* that on their showing *no actual moral gain* is ever acquired in human life, nothing really new is won for the glory of God and the good of the world. For, according to determinism, everything is given and complete in the divine decree; the future—whether it be good or evil—is all the same as if it were already present or past. Man, instead of being engaged by reason of his freedom in the work of building up a second moral world, becomes himself a mere manifestation of the absolute divine decree, in the web of which no distinct threads of human freedom are found. On the other hand, indeterminism possesses, in the notion of freedom which it advocates, a principle which never disentangles itself from the infinite, restless, and ever-shifting power of choosing an opposite course. But in this way, too, nothing fixed and permanent would ever be reached, as absolute motion is in fact nothing but rest. Freedom can make real progress, and can therefore arrive at full correspondence with its idea, only when a good and permanent specific character results from its exercise, only when it enters into such a connection with its apparent opposite—necessity—and submits to the influence of the latter in such a way, that the free and the morally necessary are indissolubly interwoven with each other. Or to express the same thing in other words: indeterminism and determinism, which claim to be the champions, the one of freedom, the other of the rights of the good on its divine side, never get beyond a barren fixity or *stabilism,*—in the one case of a subjective, in the other of an objective kind,—until on the one hand determinism conceives of the divine decree in such a way as to make room for the factor of formal, subjective freedom; and on the other, indeterminism

admits a process in which freedom is lastingly and enduringly determined by what is morally necessary.

3. *The stages in the realization of freedom.*—The process in which the idea of freedom differentiates itself, and in which it at the same time comes to full realization, demands (1) a *starting-point.* This is freedom in the form of *essential* freedom. It also demands (2) *mediation,* through an objective and a subjective principle, or through the good, as objective and divine, offering itself to man's free choice and decision in order to make him the subject of moral determination. Lastly, there must be (3) a *goal,* and this is freedom as it is destined to appear in the final result—viz. as the union of the free and the necessary.

At the *first* stage, man is a totality in which necessity and freedom are as yet directly blended with each other, although the bond of union is dissoluble. Here the element of necessity is seen in the absolute dependence of man's being or existence upon God, as well as in the original connection of his nature with the good, which, by reason of its obligatory power, lays him under unconditional claims. This connection does not act upon the will as a compulsory force, but nevertheless the effect of it is that freedom cannot thrive where it is in contradiction to the good. In addition to this, man is influenced by the individuality which God has given him, as well as by his environment and the natural relations which he holds to other human beings. Freedom, on the other hand, is hardly exercised seriously to begin with. The human individual is at first swayed almost entirely by objective forces or natural impulses,—although these may be good, as for example, natural piety,—he has not as yet got the mastery of himself, and it is only in the vaguest sense that he can be called a responsible being.

But such a simple, immediate union of the free and the natural—a union which may not be compulsion but certainly is not freedom — cannot be the final condition of man (§ 11, 19). Each of these two factors — necessity and freedom—must appear separately, in order that a conscious union of them may be effected through the human will. This separation is brought about by the knowledge of the moral law or of the morally necessary. The faculty of choice was

exercised at first upon purely finite matters, — *liberum arbitrium specificationis*,—but when the law entered, freedom was challenged and drawn forth into action. When freedom thus appears by itself, it involves the possibility of arbitrary choice, it is the faculty of choosing between good and evil. By means of the law there is opened up to man for the first time a serious choice between two worlds. Everything is now made to hinge upon a free decision of infinite worth (Matt. xvi. 26). Neither of these worlds acts in the way of compulsion. The agent decides to which of the two he will surrender himself, and his decision depends entirely upon whether he *wills* to be good or bad. Of this decision the will is the ultimate responsible cause; we must not seek for another cause behind the will and necessitating it, for the simple reason that no other exists. If there were another, we would have to deny moral freedom, and would again be landed in pure determinism.

The decision which man makes may be opposed to what is morally necessary, and may therefore be arbitrary. In the latter case it might seem as if he were enlarging his freedom; but, on the contrary, he falls into discord with himself and his moral energy is weakened, because he is in contradiction with his essential freedom, which involves the essential determination of man for the good. When man turns arbitrarily away from the good, instead of thereby gaining greater freedom, he comes, as has been shown above, into a state of bondage or servitude under an alien power; even his faculty of formal self-determination is gradually lost, and he yields to the forces of nature and to his own lower impulses and egoistic passions. Such a moral decision too is irrational; while, on the contrary, man's decision for the good is rational and not arbitrary, inasmuch as—so far as the grounds of determination are concerned—it is made on account of the goodness of the good. In an arbitrary choice, on the other hand, man sets himself in opposition to the good from a false desire for freedom, he seeks to become self-centred, to forget his dependence upon God, and to be — like God — self-sufficing. Man is indeed essentially destined to become like unto God, but the evil-doer perverts this by seeking to be a god alongside of God. But since God alone can be God, and

can endure no gods beside Himself, this false direction taken by man leads to an endeavour on his part to become an opposing deity,—an act of unreason of which the other side is, that man now falls into bondage under the powers of nature, since these alone can furnish the human will with concrete contents, when it disdains to accept the divine as its contents. Nevertheless, it is necessary even to the good that there should always be the possibility of evil. This does not merely mean that the will in itself must be able to will both good and evil, but that the possibility of evil must be definitely present in thought. For the good must be chosen for this reason, that it *is* the good and not its opposite; consequently it is only willed as such, if at the same time the conscious exclusion of its opposite is also willed, and therefore if, when good is consciously posited, evil is likewise posited as a possibility, but is rejected.

The *third* stage is that in which freedom surrenders itself to be taken possession of by the good, to be constrained by its attractive and inspiring power, and to be filled with desire for and love towards its glorious perfection (as manifested in a personal and living form in Christ). The good must not be a mere subjective product; it must present itself to man objectively, since his autonomy is only secondary. It must be given, first of all, in the form of a command of God, the primal Good, as something which He wills. Then, too, it is God alone and not man who invests the good with its beauty and attractive power. All that man can do is to suffer himself to be attracted and thus determined by the good. Hence if freedom is to correspond with its idea, it must be receptive towards the divine will, must allow itself to be inspired and determined by that will as the original source of good. Then only does it act in conformity with its creaturely position. Pelagianism and Deism, which isolate man from God and God from man, are excluded. The fact, too, that freedom must assume a receptive attitude towards the divine, in order to receive its proper character, forms an indissoluble bond of connection between religion and morality. Man does not attain to full, actual freedom until he yields himself up to the captivating, overpowering influence of divine good, surrenders himself to its ideal beauty, as revealed in all its

majesty in Christ, and allows its spirit to rule within him as a higher power. Then the will is no longer divided against itself, but enjoys a higher sense of freedom, since it has now found and allied itself with its own true and proper nature, which henceforth governs it, and comes to realization in it. Thus moral necessity has now reached its goal, since it rules the will; freedom, too, none the less, has reached *its* goal, since it has obtained possession of its own essential nature, has taken up into itself the element of moral necessity, and in unity therewith has attained realization. United to the good, man is now united to God and also to himself, to his own true nature, and is thus in a state of harmony. Hitherto man was in a state of dubiety, fluctuating in his choice, at variance with himself and hence unfree; but now he is in his element, and experiences for the first time the true energy and enjoyment of life.

The transition that here takes place must not be made *blindly;* although the transition to Christian faith is often demanded as an act of blind obedience. It must take place as an act of conscience, demanded morally, an act of moral *insight* which is rendered possible by the perfect self-revelation of divine good in Christ. As regards the *will,* moreover, this transition must not be effected by means of purely objective, compulsory forces. For in that case the will would no longer be true to its own nature, but would be alienated from itself, or lose itself in mere passivity. Just as little, of course, must the transition occur as an act of caprice, in which the distinction between good and evil is regarded as indifferent. A decision arising out of mere caprice would not be a decision in the right sense of the term. On the contrary, the transition must be effected through a fundamental act of will on the part of man, in which he decides against evil and for the good as such, for the good as the truth whose claims alone are valid—an act in which he resolves to shut himself up no longer, in self-will and self-sufficient folly, against the will of God, nor seek, under the delusion of imaginary freedom, to be a self-centred being. He must consciously and willingly allow himself to be united to the divine centre of existence, in order that he may be filled and moved by the Spirit of God, who is at the same time the spirit of the

moral order of the world as a whole. Hence, by so doing he receives his proper position with regard to the world and to the whole moral system of things.

From the foregoing discussion it will now be evident that the doctrine, "man can indeed produce evil of himself, but not good," is not refuted by the reply, "this would mean that while freedom is ascribed to man, one of its arms is cut off, and he is left only with the one which does evil." For although man cannot be said to produce good in the sense in which he produces evil, since God is the positive source of all good (Jas. i. 17, 18), he nevertheless possesses freedom in the sense that he can either reject the good which is offered him or allow it to operate. If he does not reject it, it can so attract and inspire his will that he can also do good of himself. It is wrong to suppose that man can only be called free, if he is able to do what is good entirely of himself and apart from God altogether, in the same way that he is certainly able to do what is evil by himself. For of course a human will is all that is required for the performance of evil, in which man retires upon himself in self-willed isolation from God and the good; whereas the good cannot be conceived of as existing in man apart from a conscious or unconscious communion with the primal source of good, or apart from a willingness to be determined by its objective truth and power.

But here a contradiction seems to arise, when we think of the completion of the development of freedom. If the factors we have described really belong to the full idea of freedom, then these must be preserved in the perfect form of freedom. This causes no difficulty so far as essential freedom is concerned, since concrete or so-called theological freedom is merely the realization of essential. But what of the faculty of choice or of free decision? If we hold that the faculty of choice still continues as an element in perfect freedom, then it looks as if we must say that even the perfect man is always liable to fall. Hence it seems as if perfect freedom must exclude freedom of choice. On the other hand, if we suppose that man when perfected is still liable to change and exposed to the possibility of evil,—as was held, *e.g.*, by Origen,—then the good has not yet taken secure possession of him, and

perfection is still lacking. The solution of the problem lies in the following considerations. The faculty of choice will indeed continue, but it will no longer operate in an arbitrary, isolated fashion, sundered from the other factors in freedom; it will no longer be dissociated from moral necessity, from the spirit of the good. It will continue to manifest its activity merely in discarding every false possibility and in choosing the good. When once man's free will has united itself with the divine will, and the latter has wrought in him delight in the good, and horror and detestation of evil, then his will having now received a determinate character, has lost its liability to fall, while evil has lost its power to tempt him. But what does continue is, that man consciously wills the good and rejects its opposite; the thought of evil, as the thought of what must be repudiated, serves only as a negative foil to man's willing of the good as such

---

THIRD DIVISION.

Cf. § 9*a*.

THE ETHICAL ORDER OF THE WORLD, AS THE PRACTICAL GOAL OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE MORAL PROCESS, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE MORAL IDEAL, WHICH IS REALIZED BY MEANS OF MORAL ACTION.

§ 31.

The contents of the Good,—which, in conformity with the purpose of creative love, have to come to realization through the co-operation of God and man,—or, in other words, the ethical goal of the world, which is in course of attainment in spite of the fact of sin, is the actual existence of the Kingdom of God or of an organized life of love in the world, in which nature also is made subservient to moral ends. It includes chiefly—(1) The realization of a living intercourse between God and man, in which man enters upon a filial relationship to God,

and his religious capacities thereby attain to full reality in holiness and blessedness. (2) The right regulation of the developed energies of man, so that they become virtuous energies. (3) The moral upbuilding of human life in moral communities, in which man's subjective moral capacities come forward into objective existence, while the very imperfect communities that originate naturally arrive at true reality.

1. In this division we will describe the end or result, which, in accordance with the will of God, is ever kept in view in the moral process, and which has to be realized by means of moral action. The question therefore arises—What is that imperishable product which is to be the outcome of the moral process? Thus the present division of our subject will contain the doctrine of the Chief Good, and that under the point of view of *Ethical Eschatology*. Moreover, the goal of this process is not only an object for idle contemplation; it is also a *task assigned to man*. And more than this, since the goal which is to be attained points out the road which leads to it, it at the same time lays down the particular task which belongs to each stage of approximation. For in this process, that stage must first be reached which is the condition or presupposition of what follows. Accordingly, in describing the world-goal considered as a task in which each one has his part to play, the *contents of the moral law* will also be unfolded. In our doctrine of the law and of conscience, it was the *formal* side of the law which we had to consider. For there we were concerned with a description of the factors, by means of which in general a moral process can take place. But at present the contents of the law must be definitely dealt with, and that under the aspect of the moral ideal of the world—an ideal which, as has been shown, is the world's task, necessary, unconditioned and universal, but which also takes organic shape, that is, resolves itself into every variety of individual form.

2. Now with regard to the goal which has to be attained by means of the moral process, very *different views* have prevailed both within and without the Church.

(*a*) The *old classical world* knows of nothing higher than the *State*. Here all moral culture and moral action are made to conform to the idea of the State and its interests. In particular, since the State accomplishes the subjugation of nature to the largest extent, the goal of humanity is conceived of as consisting in this, that mankind should, as a State, acquire full dominion over nature.[1]

(*b*) In the *Christian* era, the *Church* in its Roman Catholic form now comes forward in opposition to the State, claiming that she is the chief good, and that everything outside her pale is worthless, or else intended wholly and simply for her service. She takes up, as a spiritual institution, the role which the State played in the old world. The very predicates of unity, universality, necessity, and unconditionally binding power, which belong to the moral law, she applies to herself as being herself the contents of the true law of the world. What is not connected with the Church is unspiritual, and is treated fundamentally as worldly, profane. Thus, between the pre-Christian ethics of the classical age and the ethics of Roman Catholicism there is a fundamental opposition, as regards their estimation of the natural in its relation to the human spirit. Both, however, are at one in this—that in their ethical representation of the world the individual personality is everywhere thrust into the background, behind the universal. Individual rights are absorbed in the whole, which in the one case is the State, in the other the Church. The consequence is that the Roman Catholic Church unites a false *this-world view* of the chief good, that is, of the *Church*, with a false *other-world view* of it as regards the *individual personality*. On the one hand, the Church in its official capacity adapts itself even to worldly forms, and seeks to be the supreme power on earth, over against the individual as well as the State; while, on the other hand, he who is concerned about the assurance of salvation, which is the highest personal good, is pointed away to another world, where salvation is

[1] In Christendom, Theodore of Mopsuestia was the first to adopt this point of view; after him the Socinians. According to Theodore, man's similitude to God consists in his having dominion over nature; as God is the ruler of the world, so man is destined, as a subordinate deity as it were, to become lord of the earth.

held out in prospect and has to be won by meritorious works, chiefly of the nature of self-abnegation and renunciation of the world.

(*c*) With the *Reformation* a new antithesis appears. Personality assumes its rights over against the universal in both its forms; at first as against the Church, afterwards as against the State as well. In agreement with the gospel, the Reformation transfers the assurance of salvation, and therewith the supreme personal good, the ζωὴ αἰώνιος, back to the present world; but it must be admitted that it does so in such a way as to attach leading importance to individual ethics. Through the assurance of salvation the individual receives a position of independence over against the Church. The moral spheres of life are released from the guardianship of the Church, but the Christian principle, which has again been brought forward and made the principle of Protestantism, is not forthwith turned to account in these spheres, nor made to find its development in them. In the *Lutheran* Church especially, the self-sufficingness of faith betrays for a long time a certain indifference towards the ethical construction of the different departments of human life. Attention is paid to these only as means for the cultivation of faith, as affording a field for its exercise. In faith man is already in possession of the chief good; and so his endeavour is rather to preserve it in spite of the activities of social life than to make the divine substance of faith become of any real service to them. The proper work of life is as good as ended when justifying faith has been won, so that afterwards there can really be nothing better for the individual believer than death. It is only in the *Reformed* Church that faith operates as a regenerating principle for the spheres of public life; in the Lutheran its efficiency is almost entirely confined to the religious life of the individual, and to the two moral communities, Marriage and the Family. Nay, in the Lutheran Church of the 17th and 18th centuries, the full assurance of individual faith itself declined, and although the tendency which began with Spener renewed it and laid stress upon sanctification, still little advance was made beyond the sanctification of the individual. In an ethical upbuilding of the world in a Christian sense only a partial interest was taken

—viz. only so far as the organization of the Church was concerned; for which purpose the Church carried into effect the evangelical doctrine of the universl priesthood of believers, and called in the laity to her aid.

Thus in the older form of Protestantism, the joy that is found in the experience of salvation was not sufficiently allowed to expand into the impulse and desire to conquer the regions of outward life. The natural consequence was, that what remained unsubdued, viz. the worldly principle, which was no longer held in restraint by the Church but was left entirely to itself, now completed its emancipation and took possession of the unoccupied ground, in the two forms of worldly Objectivism and Subjectivism. The *first* of these appeared in the absolutism which, beginning with Louis XIV., penetrated into Germany and England; and in absolutist *theories* of the State, which made not only individuals but also religion and the Church unconditionally subject to the State. These reached their harshest shape in the theory of Hobbes, who, in opposition to the extravagances of the English Revolution period, set up the State as a God upon earth, ruling with absolute authority all the outward actions of man. The *second* form appeared in the 18th century, when Rousseau in his *Contrat social* made Marriage, State, and Church all alike rest upon a mere subjective agreement between individuals, and thus abandoned their objective validity to caprice and selfishness. A reaction against this subjectivism took its rise with Hegel and Schelling. They, however, again made the State the universal of the moral world, although they did so in a more worthy form, and assigned to the State especially higher functions than had previously been given it. But the exercise of absolute power by the State is destructive of the rights of religion, of the Church, and of the individual as well; the necessary result of such a theory is the introduction—though in a nobler form—of pre-Christian forms of error, and the apotheosis of the State.

Here, too, it is Schleiermacher who marks a decisive turning-point in thought. On the one hand, he goes back to the Reformation principle of the importance of the individual, who, even now in this present world, becomes by faith a

partaker of the Holy Spirit and of eternal life; while, on the other hand, he holds that the new life of the believer must be applied like leaven to effect the moral transformation of the world. Thus, starting from Individual Ethics, which must certainly be taken as a foundation, he advances to so-called Social Ethics. He brings Christian faith into intimate connection with the objective moral world, and also with nature, and regards moral communities not merely as means for the subjects who compose them, but also as ends which have a moral worth of their own. Nor does he thereby deprive individuals of all reference to self; on the contrary, it is just according to the measure of their moral individuality as believers that they react upon the communities of which they are members. Thus there is opened up for the principle of faith a career of fruitful activity in the objective world; the opposition between the Universal or Identical, and the Personal or even the Individual, is in principle reconciled. It belongs to the truth of each single personality that the spirit of the community should rule within it; it belongs to the truth of each community that its work should be carried on by free personalities. He likewise guards the independence of separate communities as against each other. The life here is to become the representation of the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, which is already in existence in the Church.

But Schleiermacher, it must be admitted, has carried out this thought at the expense of what is reserved for the world to come. This is seen in the way in which he, and after him Rothe, attempt to overcome the opposition between the world of nature and the world of mind. According to Schleiermacher, the moral task assigned to humanity consists in this—that mind shall take possession of nature and make of it a body, as it were, for humanity, shall animate it by means of a process of moral assimilation, and thus transfigure it by its representing and organizing activity.[1] Mind is in this way to attain to organized and completely developed objective existence, to its identification, as it were, with nature, to the end that ethics and physics may be reduced to unity. But now, inasmuch as, according to Schleiermacher's Christian ethics, it is the State to which the moral task

[1] [See p. 99, footnote.—Tr.]

belongs of accomplishing the subjugation of nature, this has a dangerous sound for the Church, since to the latter also nature is necessary in order to afford it a form of manifestation. With Schleiermacher himself this danger is lessened by the independence which he reserves for the Church. Rothe, on the contrary, starting from similar ideas as to the moral task which mankind has to fulfil with regard to nature, makes the Church disappear in the Christian State.[1]

Rothe carries out with even greater rigour this idea of the spiritualization of nature as the moral work which man has to do. He regards it as the goal of the world. To him spirit does not exist until there has been this union and interpenetration of the ideal and the real. This takes place by means of the moral process. That process originates spirit out of matter. In fact, matter is so constituted that those elements in it which are capable of assimilation are destined to become spirit, while the human personality is destined to become spirit through its appropriation of matter. By means of the moral process a spiritual body is formed, and its formation is, for Rothe, the task to be accomplished, or the result of the moral process. But since the formation of this body goes on without our knowledge, it might be a result that arises of itself from the moral process, and in that case it ought not to be advanced as the proper ethical task of man, but only as something ordained and brought to pass by God. There is no doubt that the moral work which man has to perform includes nature in its scope; further, in consequence of actions passing over into habits, there ensues, as has already been shown, an incorporation of spirit with nature,—a result which is produced unconsciously. But the contents of the ethical goal of the world or of the Moral Ideal embrace not merely man's relations to nature, but also and principally his relations to God and to the human race; and it is by means of these latter relations that nature can everywhere be made subservient to moral ends. The complete spiritualization of nature, moreover, is something which we must not expect as the direct outcome of a moral process, but as the result of an act of God which will usher in a new era of the world.

[1] Cf. *Ethik*, 2nd ed. § 299 f. [*Theologische Encyclopädie*, pp. 83–94.—Ed.]

Note.—When we survey all these different conceptions of the goal of the world or highest good, we have the following results:—(1) That conception of it is defective which, at the expense of the individual personality, defines the chief good in a one-sided objective manner,—whether this objective good be the State or the Church,—or relegates it, so far as the individual is concerned, to the future world. (2) A one-sided subjective conception of the ethical ideal is also unsatisfactory; most strikingly so when it appears in the form of mere eudæmonism or worldliness; but also when it takes the form of maintaining that the mere subjective, free personality is the chief good, and that all objective communities arise out of individual caprice or contract. (3) The basis for the true definition of the chief good was laid down at the Reformation, and consists in justifying faith, the blessing of reconciliation, of which faith is already a partaker in the present world. This blessing is not of a merely subjective kind, either in the sense of being self-produced or of being something that renders the believer self-sufficient, but is union with God and the possession of eternal life through Him. But this divine life must also unfold itself; it must not shut itself up in self-contained isolation; but must rather seek and find its true relation to nature and to objective moral communities.

3. From this historical survey we now proceed to the correct definition of the goal of the world, and in doing so we will first of all consider the *Biblical Doctrine* on the subject. The all-comprehensive expression for the ethical goal of the world, which must be included in the divine decree, is the *θέλημα θεοῦ*.[1] This *θέλημα* takes two forms; on the one hand, it is a will that makes requirements, issues commands; on the other, it is a will that gives promises. In its first form it aims at producing moral activity on the part of man, whether of a negative or positive kind; in its second form it points to an act on the part of God towards which man must take up a receptive attitude. But both of these are joined in the very closest way. In the Old Testament, under the law, the Requirement predominates; although at the same time the Promise is not wanting, but both precedes and follows the law. In the New Testament it is the divine act, the fulfilment of the promise, that comes first and lays the foundation for everything else. But here, too, the act of God and the act of man are most intimately joined. In the *first* place,

[1] Cf. Schmid, *De notione legis.*

that which is simply and solely God's promise and act becomes nevertheless a demand made upon man, that is, upon his living receptivity. He must, before everything else, accept the fundamental gift of reconciliation in *ὑπακοὴ πίστεως*—there is a *νόμος πίστεως* (Rom. i. 5, xvi. 26; 1 Pet. i. 22). Faith is also a work, even the basis of all other work (John vi. 27–29); a work of God in which man also has something to do. But, in the *second* place, the conclusion of the whole matter has not been reached when the gift of God has been received. That work which God purposes to accomplish in humanity, the work of forming a new moral world, a second creation,—this must be taken up by believers, and made their task, their work; they must not idly rest in the blessedness of faith. On the first point see, *e.g.*, Matt. xviii. 14; John vi. 39; Eph. i. 5, 9, 11; Col. i. 9; Heb. x. 10. On the second, Matt. vi. 10, vii. 21, xii. 50; John iv. 34, v. 30, vi. 38, vii. 17, ix. 31. This, therefore, is the relation between the divine and the human *θέλημα* and work; receiving the gift of God to begin with, man must now proceed to make the divine *θέλημα* his own, in its full extent, and herewith the chief good begins to be realized in this present world.

We now proceed to consider the *contents* of the divine *θέλημα* in general. These receive all-comprehensive expression in the biblical phrase *βασιλεία θεοῦ* or *οὐρανῶν*. The final perfection of this kingdom belongs to the future, and even to the world to come (Matt. vii. 21, viii. 11, xxv. 34). Its commencement, however, takes place, according to the New Testament, in the present world, and, since the time of Christ, has begun to have a real existence among men (Matt. iv. 17, v. 3 (*ἐστιν*), xi. 11 f., xvi. 19, xviii. 3). It is destined to spread unceasingly (Mark iv. 26; Luke xvii. 21; Matt. xiii. 31–33); among all nations (Matt. xiii. 33), as well as over all the spheres of human life (Matt. xiii. 23), and also of external nature. Of this *βασιλεία*, which is a vigorous organism, the main divisions are as follows.

(*a*) First of all, communion with God, in which man becomes the possessor of salvation. Here it is willingness to receive that is of highest importance. God, on His side, lays the foundation for this communion by His prevenient love (John iii. 16; 1 John iv. 10); by the atonement, which

overcomes the obstacles of sin and guilt (2 Cor. v. 16–21). In the *αἷμα Χριστοῦ* (Rom. iii. 25) He seeks to be our Father, and intends us to be His children, and to desire so to be (Rom. vi. 1–6; 2 Cor. v. 19 f.). Nay, He will take up His abode within us, as His living temples (John xiv. 23, xvii. 21 f.; 1 Cor. iii. 16, vi. 19).

(*b*) Along with this, in the absolute sphere man is restored to his true immediate relation to God; the normal and fundamental moral relation in which he stands to God is that of a son. Moreover, when man is thus reconciled, and has become a child of God, the new man begins to live within him (Col. iii. 9 f.),—the true, immortal personality, which now lives and grows, purifying man's energies, and harmoniously developing them into pure and perfect efficiency (1 Cor. iii. 16; Eph. ii. 10, iv. 21 f.).

(*c*) Lastly, in all the moral relations which the believer holds, whether to other men or to communities, he is enabled, by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, to bring forth the fruits of the Spirit (Eph. v. 9). In these relations he does not merely assert himself as an individual, but also devotes himself to the duties they impose, in a spirit of self-sacrificing love, arising out of love to God. The social impulse of the Christian, or Christian love, finds its first sphere of exercise in the community formed for the purpose of rendering praise and thanksgiving to God for the gift of salvation, that is to say, in the cultivation of Christian brotherhood in the *Church*. This is a new, independent institution, belonging to the higher stage. For he who has come to know God as his Father and himself as God's child, loves, by virtue of the higher spiritual nature which is in him, every one who like himself has been begotten of God (1 John v. 1). Further, the gospel sanctions and confirms all the natural relations and arrangements of life, as well as the various circumstances and vocations which God has assigned to different individuals. Thus, with regard to civil authority (Matt. xxii. 21; Rom. xiii. 1 f.); the relations of husband and wife, of parents and children (1 Tim. iv. 3: *ἀφειδία σώματος*, Col. ii. 23); the relation of servants and masters (Philem.). On the other hand, *a new way of looking at everything is introduced.* Everything is regarded under the aspect of *worship* (Rom. xii. 1 f.); the

moral upbuilding of the whole person, whether in the way of enjoyment, of rest, or of activity (1 Tim. iv. 3); and in like manner, whatever is done for the common welfare. The same thing is expressed when it is said that everything is to be done in the name of Jesus (Col. iii. 17). To the idea of the kingdom of God as an all-embracing, objective end, there corresponds on the subjective side the idea of an all-embracing worship, in which man's whole heart and mind is engaged, and which enters even into the duties of his vocation and his moral enjoyments. Nature, too, is included in this βασιλεία, regarded in its consummation, for then she will be released from her present transitoriness (Rom. viii. 18 f.; Rev. xxi. 1; 2 Pet. iii. 13; Isa. lxv. 17, lxvi. 22).

4. After this biblical statement, a few words will suffice for the *thetic* [positive] *presentation* of our subject, especially as in what follows we shall have to treat it concretely and in detail. The world's ideal, or the kingdom of God, is contained in the purpose which God had in creating the world. Now, since it was from love that God willed the creation of the world, He could not have meant it to be merely an object for His love, and nothing more. He must have created it to give as well as to receive love, in order that it—and indeed every single personality in it—might become both an ultimate end, because an end for love, and also a mirror, or, as it were, the continuation of His love. Hence it follows that not only can dominion over nature not be the ethical ideal, and eudæmonism still less so, but also that neither the State by itself nor any one of the moral spheres can constitute it. Even the Church must not claim to be called the sole moral product. Everything will alike belong to the kingdom of God which can be a form of the life of love. It follows, too, that no community must make the individual a mere instrument for its own ends; and conversely, that the individual must not regard the community as only a means to be used for his own advantage. This is guarded against by the spirit of holy love (*justice* being an element in this love), which restores in the individual the image of God, and thus makes him an ultimate end. The community likewise participates in this spirit of love, and so becomes an ultimate end also.

Moral personality is certainly the basis for all moral

production. It is only in persons that love can dwell; the new personality is therefore the first prerequisite for the realization of the kingdom of God, and is in fact the beginning of its actual existence. It is the good tree (Matt. vii. 16 f.), its cultivation is therefore the first work of all. Hence *the word of Christ addresses itself in the first place to individuals*, to establish love in their hearts through repentance and faith; *it does not found institutions to begin with.* But as soon as the new, loving personality has come into being, it will now —inasmuch as it has its source in and is a copy of the perfections of God—become inspired with wisdom, and forthwith prove itself to be a principle that is able to bring the life of the individual, the life of communities, and man's relations to nature, into harmonious moral order.

The love of the new personality turns first of all, in devotion and thanksgiving, to God the Creator as its Father, and seeks to do His *θέλημα*, as He has revealed it in the word and example of the Son. Thus the fundamental moral activity of the Christian is a *religious* one, consisting in love to God (1 John iv. 10). But this love to God now leads him to conform his will, with regard both to himself and to all external things, to the mind and will of the all-wise and all-loving God, and to His *θέλημα* as already revealed in the creation and constitution of the world, and more fully in the conscience and history of man. True love to God therefore includes true love to oneself and one's neighbour (Matt. xxii. 37 f.; 1 John v. 1), and thus it gives the individual and communities their due position of co-ordination. One and the same spirit of love binds together the numerous energies of the individual in harmonious unity, and employs all the manifold varieties of individual character in the service of that organized life of love, that ethical cosmos or *kingdom*, in which all human capacities reach their full natural activity, and which also has everything prepared for it which is necessary to its growth. The world cannot fail to reach its goal; the infinite creative power and wisdom of God, as well as the ranks of the æons, are enlisted in its service. And so one day God will see reflected from His world, in the manifold diversity of its organized life, an image of His own perfections—created indeed, but still pure and majestic; and

humanity, together with the higher world of spirits, will form the perfected city of God, in which nothing will be lost that was ever won by moral effort upon earth.

5. But now, when we turn our attention to the transitoriness and death which are in the world, the question arises—How can we ascribe an inward moral, and therefore eternal worth to earthly products, relations, and societies in themselves, seeing that they are conditioned by nature, which is fleeting, and by matter? It is true that persons alone of all earthly existences have immortality, and even they only or principally so far as the mind is concerned. Nevertheless we must limit the assertion of the perishable value of all earthly works, relations, and societies, unless we are willing to rob them of that which is, as it were, the very pith of their life, and to reduce them to mere husks, empty instruments that are in themselves worthless and indifferent. Each single external work as such does indeed pass away sooner or later in the course of history; but in another respect it is imperishable. Every work which is the expression of mind—whether in art or science, in the State, the family, or the Church—is, by the act which throws it into objective shape, set free from that which is personal, the subjectivity of its author. Through this release it attains that form in which it becomes an object of perception, and so an operative factor in history, a leaven or seed deposited in the minds of men. When it has reached this stage, in which it is set loose from the person of its author,—nay, even from the individual, external form in which the work appeared, and which, it may be, quickly passes away,—it now proceeds to act independently like a kindling spark; it becomes incorporated as an element with the further progress of mankind, and helps to determine their succeeding productions, so that these can only be understood when its influence is taken into account. Thus the later and the earlier generations of men are linked together as partners in one great moral work; in the course of which, indeed, not only individual persons but also their works—as single, isolated productions—vanish from the scene; but in which, nevertheless, they possess a certain immortality as operative elements in the moral progress of mankind. Thus nothing great that has once happened is ever lost to humanity;

humanity takes it up into her life, either unconsciously or in conscious remembrance, and there it continues to work unseen.

Matter[1] and nature also render essential service in this process, since it is only through them that what is inward and subjective can be made objective in fruitful productions, whether as regards the family, the State, art, science, or the Church. It is true, no doubt, that the objective form thus obtained is no more than an intermediate element in the process, and is therefore transitory,—as indeed the work itself only expresses a single mood or side of the man who produced it, and is never his whole personality made objective. But as soon as what is subjective has been made objective, and has thus been taken up into the nature of things, then mutable though nature be, it still holds it fast for a length of time sufficient to allow it to be clearly perceived, and to be carried into the minds of other men. By this means a lasting influence is secured for human productions.

Moreover, with regard also to *individuals themselves,* who are the authors of moral productions, the words must hold true, "their works follow them" (Rev. xiv. 13). These endure even beyond death in the personalities whose works they are. They are the spiritual profit which these personalities have made; they give them a moral character, and thus form their stock of spiritual capital (§ 11. 7) and render possible still greater moral productions to come. "Thou hast been faithful over a few things; I will make thee ruler over many things" (Matt. xxv. 21). Here, too, matter and nature[2] prove to be essential conditions of acquiring such moral gains. For thought and will do not attain full strength and clearness until they reach complete objectivity in the world of sense. The perishable nature of such objectivity makes no difference to this truth. On the contrary, the very transitoriness of its *forms,* its plasticity, assists us in learning to treat it as that which it is intended to be—a means and not an end.

The same thing holds good also of all *moral communities.* Their present earthly form, in which they are involved with nature and matter, is a preparation for their final perfection in the kingdom of God. Moral employment in connection with them is thus of eternal moral value; and that not simply in

[1] Cf. § 9. 2. [2] Cf. § 9. 2.

the formal sense that they afford the individual a means of exercising his virtue, but also with reference to the actual work achieved. For in these communities the Christian sees even now the actual beginnings, the typical realization of the heavenly kingdom of God, and it is this which he loves and fosters in them. In the kingdom of God the true and eternal significance of marriage will be preserved and will endure—Christ the *νύμφιος*, mankind the *νύμφη* (Eph. v. 25–32; Matt. xxii.–xxv.; John iii. 29; Rev. xxi. 9, xxii. 17). So with the family; the true father is God (Eph. iii. 15). In the final consummation also, science will for the first time reach her perfect form when faith shall have passed into sight (1 Cor. xiii. 9–12). Then, too, will the idea of beauty celebrate its highest triumphs, for nature will be included in the universal transfiguration. Further, as the perfected kingdom of God is portrayed under the image of a house of God, so it is also called the State or City of God, because that which in the State is of eternal worth, viz. justice and good order, will be preserved and manifested in it. Finally, and as a matter of course, religious fellowship will also be perfected in the final consummation; and that not merely so far as individual communion with God is concerned, but also with reference to the service of thanks and praise which the religious community renders to God. Believers made perfect are represented as *πανήγυρις*, as an assembly holding sacred festival (Heb. xii. 22 f.; Rev. v. 9, xxi.). When thus the purpose of divine love has been realized, God will be all in all (1 Cor. xv. 28). This does not mean that the world will lose its existence in God, but that the divine will and the divine life will permeate all things,—all as a whole, and each individual thing according to its nature,—and will bind all things together.

Thus the attainment of the world's goal is a work which in every aspect of it is at once human and divine. *Θεῖα πάντα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα πάντα.* This is the sum of the whole matter—the divine *θέλημα*, in the whole of its extent, must become the *θέλημα* of man as a moral being.

The foregoing exposition may be sufficient to show that the moral law, considered in its contents, or, in other words, the world's ideal, is not an abstract barren formula, but an ideal

organism, which does justice to what is individual as well as to what is common to all, to nature as well as to mind, and thereby gains for itself an infinite richness of contents. Moreover, the divine ideal of the world embraces not only the goal, but also the road which leads to it.

§ 32. *The Way to the Realization of the World's Ideal.*

The inward inter-dependence of the factors which constitute the kingdom of God must be reflected in the moral process. Hence each stage in this process must be preceded by the stage which forms its necessary presupposition. And this holds good both of individuals and of the race as a whole. Accordingly the physical conditions described in § 10–17 along with the natural communities to which they gave rise, pave the way for the entrance of the consciousness of Right, and the consequent formation of States. With the consciousness of right the legal state is reached, and it again becomes the preparation for the stage of the free, moral spirit, the spirit of love, which finds immediate realization in the religious community of the Church.

1. At the present day, when humanity has a long career of moral progress stretching behind it, all the moral spheres exist simultaneously, and reciprocally condition each other. The family, for example, is conditioned by the State and the Church, and these again by the family, so that it is difficult to imagine that any one of them could correspond to its idea without the presence and co-operation of the others. In that ideal organism which is the goal of the world they do indeed appear side by side, though each of them has its own particular principle. Nevertheless, it has not always been so as a matter of actual fact from the time that humanity began to exist.

There was a time when, to say nothing of science and art, there was no Church, and farther back when there was no State. This earlier period we must designate as of necessity morally imperfect, but it does not follow that it was sinful.

On the contrary, if we examine the ideas underlying the various moral spheres, and thus see how the relations subsisting between them arise, it will become evident that the Ideal or World-goal, which embraces at one and the same time all the factors which constitute the moral organism, cannot come into existence by a stroke of magic, but must of necessity have a gradual growth, one factor being mediated through another. And our present investigation has a significance for all times; because none of the departments of moral life are in existence *once for all*, but must be maintained through a process of constant reproduction. Further, since each of them has the tendency to make itself, as far as it can, a complete whole or centre, it is instructive to see how its perfection is conditioned by the presence of the others. Now the gradual process of which we have spoken is not to be conceived as if it meant that all the various spheres existed together from the beginning, though in an imperfect shape. For example, it is only after the spread of family life that the State can come into existence at all; the State again is a preparation for the Church, for it is the school in which man is trained in the *idea of right*—an idea to which we were previously brought by the doctrine of the law, and which, as was shown in § 23, has its origin in God. It is true that the moral capacities for these spheres are present from the beginning and are not inoperative. But in order that they may attain to full realization, whatever is a necessary condition of any stage of progress must take precedence of it in time. It is quite consistent with this truth (inasmuch as the good is a unity), that whatever comes earlier and as a condition of a subsequent stage, is in another aspect itself conditioned by what follows, since it is only in connection with the latter that it attains its perfect form.

2. With regard, therefore, both to individuals and communities, the typical form of this succession of moral stages is as follows. The third stage, that of the conscious union of the free and the morally necessary, must be preceded by a stage of which the characteristic is law in the form of command. Again, the stage of law, since it cannot begin with the first breath of man, must be preceded by that state of existence in which man is an immediate but

unstable unity of human powers. Moreover, as it was not sin that brought this sequence of stages into existence, so sin cannot annul it: it belongs to the original form of the moral process in general. Accordingly there must be (1) a life *before* the law; (2) *under* the law; (3) *in* the law.

3. We have already treated of the life *before* the law in the third section of the First Division (§ 17, 18). There, those natural organizations were considered which arise of themselves, and apart from the moral law, out of the conditions of nature both physical and psychical. We have seen what progress can be made by individuals and communities under these conditions alone, and also wherein they are still imperfect. It therefore remains for us, in tracing through an ascending series the development of the contents of the θέλημα θεοῦ or divine World-ideal, to examine the other two stages embraced by this ideal organism—viz. the stage of right and that of the free moral spirit or of love.[1] We have thus to consider—

I. In what respects the entrance of the idea of right or of the law promotes the realization of the good. This has reference both to individuals and communities.

II. The imperfection of the legal standpoint.

(1) Apart altogether from sin.

(2) When sin has appeared (Ethical Ponerology).

This will lead us to inquire—

III. What it is that is still requisite for the perfect realization of the moral principle; or in other words, what it is that is still requisite in order to make it possible for individuals, communities, and the world as a whole to reach a condition in which moral imperfection will no longer be a necessity.

Or shortly; we have to consider—

I. The stage of right.

II. Its imperfection. This carries us forward to—

III. The stage of love or of the gospel; the gospel which was in the θέλημα θεοῦ *before* the foundation of the world, and was therefore present when its foundations were laid.

Note.—The lower stages continue to exist as substructure: the higher stages do not abolish, but supplement and complete them.

[1] Cf. besides, § 20. 2, with § 23, p. 224, note; § 25, § 30. 3.

FIRST SECTION.

THE STAGE OF LAW, OR OF RIGHT.

§ 33. *The Absolute Sphere of Right, or the Relations between God and Man.*

[Cf. supra, § 7. 4 and 5, § 20–23. *System of Christian Doctrine,* vol. i. § 23, 24.—Ed.]

The entrance of the consciousness of Absolute Law forms a great step in advance, especially as it is united in the closest possible way with the religious feeling of dependence upon God. This feeling now comes to fuller maturity; for our dependence upon God is recognised to be a moral dependence. Also, the idea of God itself is ethically determined, as the idea of the Holy and Just One. Hence the distinction between God and man is more completely carried out. Further, as a morally responsible being, man is now invested with freedom or the power of moral choice, and with the dignity of moral determination (§ 19).

1. The legal stage forms a great advance upon mere eudæmonism (§ 18). For now, man knows God as Lawgiver and Judge, and (what is the converse of this) he is conscious of his own obligation and responsibility. The idea of duty also establishes man in his rights as a moral being (§ 23); and in accordance with the idea of right, God and man stand related to each other as distinct beings, each with his own rights, although this relation is not one of co-ordination. The law proclaims that man is free. He is free with respect to nature; he is independent even with regard to God,—though it is through God that he is so—in so far as God cannot compel him to what is good, and cannot effect any ethical good in human life without the co-operation of man. It is no wonder that with the law a higher self-consciousness, a nobler sense of life is awakened, since man now becomes aware that a good of infinite value has been committed to his charge. Thus it is quite conceivable how the Rabbis, contrast-

ing the position of the heathen world with the position of those who had received the gift of the Old Testament, believed they were justified in calling the standpoint of the law a "בְּרִיאָה חֲדָשָׁה," a new creation.

It is no doubt true that the advance which has been made is at first only an advance in knowledge. On the stage of right, the law is set over against the impulses and the will, but it has not as yet gained an entrance into the will. On the contrary, transgression is now for the first time made possible, and will become actual if this mere external relation between God and man remains unsurpassed. Nevertheless, were it not for the legal stage and the relative independence of man that comes with it, a *moral* union of the necessary and the free would be impossible (§ 30). At the most there would only be a physical union. For did the divine will simply pour in upon the human as an irresistible power, without first confronting the human will in the form of obligation and demand, then loving self-communication on the part of God would sink to the level of a mere physical force.[1] For it would lack the mediation of the demands of the law, at least of the law as requiring faith or receptivity on the part of man. The legal stage, therefore, whether long or short, cannot be overleaped: it forms, even apart from sin (and consequently, even in the case of the first man), an indispensable factor. It is often indeed confounded with a state of sinfulness; but neither does the law give rise to sin, nor sin to the law. The mere fact that the demands of the law have "not yet been fulfilled" is not sin; for if it were, then the law could not by itself be an essential factor in human progress. It would, in fact, be a contradiction; for previous to the legal stage, it would be both absolute and yet of necessity unfulfilled. The two forms taken by the divine activity—the creative and the legislative, *voluntas* and *præceptum*—could never be separated, but would have to remain blended in absolute identity. Sin arises when the fulfilment of the law is delayed, although it can and ought to take place; and the cause of such delay can only lie in the abnormal resistance of a will opposed to the will of God in the law.

[1] [Of course this does not exclude the fact that the law, too, must find a point of contact in the nature of man. Cf. p. 140.—Ed.]

But *before* the law is fulfilled, its demands must be presented, and thus a knowledge of it given, a knowledge which addresses itself to the will.

§ 33a. *The Secondary Sphere of Right.*

The consciousness of the absolute sphere of Right, or of the law of God, gives rise to a *Secondary Sphere of Right.* Since the consciousness of divine right or of justice makes out of the mere human individual a person endowed with rights, it sets up in opposition to self-will a sacred standard of action, which raises communities constructed on a merely natural basis out of their eudæmonistic form, and gives them a moral shape. Thus, when the idea of absolute right or objective divine right is recognised by man as of binding authority, it gives rise to human relations of a higher kind; what we possess becomes our property; sexual association becomes marriage; proles or offspring becomes a family; and the mere mass of a nation becomes a State. And it is a moral duty to discover more and more fully this objective right which resides in the divinely appointed nature of things.

[Kant, *Rechtslehre.* Hegel, *Rechtsphilosophie.* Herbart, *Praktische Philosophie, Werke,* vol. viii. pp. 78 sq., 101 sq., 134 sq.; vol. ii. pp. 132 sq.; cf. also his analytical examination of *Naturrecht* and *Moral,* vol. viii. Stahl, *Die Philosophie des Rechts.* Savigny, *Ueber den Beruf unserer Zeit zur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft.* Rothe, *Ethik,* 2nd ed. vol. ii. p. 204 sq. Chalybäus, *System der speculativen Ethik,* vol. ii. I. H. Fichte, *Die philosophischen Lehren vom Recht, Staat, Sitte.* Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht.* Baumann, *Handbuch der Moral nebst einem Abriss der Rechtsphilosophie.* Schuppe, *Grundzüge der Ethik.* Dahn, *Rechtsphilosophische Studien.* Köstlin, *Staat, Recht und Kirche in der evangelischen Ethik. Studien und Kritiken,* 1877. Ihering, *Kampf ums Recht.* Hartmann, *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins,* p. 496 sq. For additional literature, *vid.* Part II., Division 3, Section 2, *The Doctrine of the State.*—Ed.]

1. The idea of absolute right gives rise to a secondary

sphere of right, a system of moral relations based upon right, subsisting between man and man. We have already discussed this subject in § 23. The idea of right and duty distinguishes and separates men from each other, but yet in such a manner that by means of it they are brought into a more enduring connection than the merely natural one. To the right of one man there corresponds the duty of another, and the objective law of justice establishes and confirms the rights and duties of all alike, since it lays its behests equally upon all. Objective right or law makes all men objects of respect for one another. For it makes all men its organs, in whom it is designed to assume a personal form in the world, and thus in a certain measure confers dignity upon all. Hence the standpoint of right effects two things at one and the same time; it places men in a position of independence over against each other, and it also brings them together into a relation in which there is an absolute bond of connection between them —a relation higher than the mere physical ones, which rest upon utility, prudence, and caprice, higher even than that produced by the sense of universal human affinity itself. It is now seen to be a duty to uphold universal right, embracing and regulating, as it clearly does, all human relationships.

2. *Communities.* By means of the law we become conscious that it is our duty to recognise and respect the honour of our fellow-men, both in its physical and moral aspects. And hence individual communities gain a higher import and value. All of these, indeed, have their origin in human nature and natural impulse, and existed in rudimentary forms (§ 17. 3) before ever the consciousness of law arose. But now law clothes them with higher than merely physical, with divine rights. Having their basis in the constitution of human nature, they are the expression of the divine will, and demand to be treated and conducted in accordance with their essential nature. And now on the stage of law, full recognition is given to their divine rights, to their sanctity and inviolability. This holds good

(*a*) With respect to *sexual association*, which now rests upon the consciousness of the essential equality of the rights of husband and wife, so that on neither side do we find rights dissociated from duties. Neither caprice, nor self-

seeking, nor desire must be made the ground of an alliance between the sexes, or the cause of its dissolution; for then each member of it would become merely a means with regard to the other, and would not be recognised as an end in himself. For this very reason, a union based on duty is more lasting than one that arises out of finite interests; for duty endures when finite interests give way. It is only an alliance of this kind, consciously based upon duty and the law of God, and existing under the protection of that law, that *deserves to be called marriage.* Nay more, wherever the essential equality of the rights of husband and wife is recognised, the necessary result is that marriage takes the form of monogamy, and is contracted for life.

(*b*) The consciousness of the protection which right throws over the personal life also elevates the offspring of sexual association — *proles* — into the *family.* Procreation now involves the duty of educating or developing the personality that is produced.

(*c*) *Social intercourse* also receives a higher form, since men now mutually respect each other's rights. By means of *justitia commutativa* their dealings with each other become much more widely extended, and much more safe. To fulfil agreements is now known to be a duty imposed by right.

(*d*) But the most important and peculiar creation of the consciousness of objective right or law is that community which comprehends all those that have been named, and which has for its function the protection of their rights as well as the rights of individuals. This community arises in the following manner. Families multiply and spread out into tribes and national masses, and then these are brought together and united into a *public institution for the maintenance of right.* This is the beginning of the State. A mere multitude of families and tribes cannot in itself form a State; it is only the material out of which a State is made, it needs the idea of right to give it life. Further, as the State is not produced by mere physical means, as it is not the product of physical force or of the mechanical power of numbers, so, too, it does not owe its existence to caprice or contract alone. Nor do we as yet have a State where merely certain prudent, useful rules and established rights (as matters

of custom it may be) have arisen in connection with property and the family. The State exists only where the interest in right has become so energetic that a new form of community appears, embracing all those earlier ones,—a community instituted to protect right, to carry it into execution with regard to all, and to defend all against injury, whether done wilfully or through ignorance. *Right as universal will*—the will, that is, that right be administered everywhere—is outwardly realized in a special organization, viz. *constituted authority*. Right is for all; it has to protect all against injury. As merely finite indeed, the individual person could have no absolute claim to such protection. But he stands in essential relation to morality; he exists for moral ends, and is the necessary organ of morality. Thus in protecting him right protects morality itself, and for this reason it secures for him the rights and the respect which are his due. The aim of the administration of justice, therefore, is to defend the freedom of the personality; the freedom, that is, which the individual must have in order to render his moral development possible. It is the duty of the State to ensure the possibility of the real freedom, *i.e.* of the harmonious moral development of the personality. Thus the order established for the maintenance of right is the bulwark which makes it possible for man to give free exercise to his spiritual powers in all the moral spheres of life. This order, exhibited in the State, is the sacred basis upon which the whole moral world rests; it is the negative condition of all morality, and is therefore indispensable if there is to be a moral world at all. It must, therefore, should occasion demand, be enforced and upheld by physical means or compulsion. It is the necessary outcome of the moral idea itself, the negative side of its manifestation. Since the ethical idea of right has recourse to physical compulsion, and therefore to nature, for the attainment of its ends, it assumes the form of physical necessity.

3. *The Right of Punishment.* Wherever, then, either the community as a whole, or its leaders, have become conscious of right as absolutely valid and necessary, it is the duty of all not only to subordinate themselves individually and separately to objective law, but also to feel themselves bound,

as one man, to become the organs of the idea of right. And since this idea represents a good of absolute value, all that exists must be at its service, for the purpose of upholding right upon the earth. This holds good even with regard to the transgressor. Him it confronts with punishment, and it arms the members of the commonwealth with the power to inflict it (Gen. ix. 6; Ex. xxi. 22; Rom. xiii. 1 ff.).

It is the right and duty of the State to carry right into effect, even by external force. Justice is a good of absolute worth, and it must be defended before the other moral excellences which belong to the personality can possibly exist at all. All men are bound to place themselves, in life and limb, at the service of this idea, as its organs or the means which it employs, and thus to uphold the validity of justice as the honour and soul of the State. All, too, are bound to conform themselves to the general will of the community that justice be carried out; and more particularly, they must undergo punishment when they have done violence to right, in order that the injury inflicted may be atoned for, and the majesty of right vindicated. It is true that if we do not start from an objective law, from a divine right which demands unconditionally that justice be done, if, on the contrary, we start from freedom instead of from duty, and derive the right to inflict punishment from convention only, or at least from tacit consent—then the question must arise, How do men come to have the power of punishing other men, even to the extent of putting them to death? Is it not a usurpation of divine rights, when men sit in judgment upon their fellow-men and bring them to account, without even getting their consent by means of a formal agreement? It is certainly the case that the exercise of the power of punishment has no right to take place, unless it can be shown to be a *duty*, a service which we owe to justice. But such in fact it is. It is undeniable that if there be an objective law, imposing objective, absolute obligations, then a violation of right deserves punishment and incurs it. Divine justice would be something else than it is, it would not be in earnest with itself, if it failed to take a punitive attitude with regard to a violation of the law, and were therefore wholly indifferent to it.

When once the idea of justice has been awakened among

men, and men have surrendered themselves to it to be the organs and means which it employs, when they have staked everything upon the preservation of justice as the primary condition of the moral existence of human society,—then, without fail, this zeal which is employed in the service of justice must carry into effect what justice demands, must therefore restore its authority when that has been shaken by a breach of right, and consequently must inflict punishment upon the evil-doer. For when a negation of right has been caused by a lawless will, dangerous to society, the latter has not simply to be rendered harmless, even though it be by physical compulsion. The criminal must not merely be treated as a being in a state of nature, and brought into order by natural force. He must have a sentence passed upon him, in which some positive evil is connected with the offence he has committed, as a just expression of resentment against his guilt. He would not be treated justly, in fact, if he were treated simply as a natural being, and merely rendered harmless, as if he were a wild animal. On the contrary, he is no mere creature of nature, but a man, and therefore the just stroke that falls upon him must be something more than a mere physical occurrence. It must be delivered for the sake of justice and out of zeal for it, since even in the transgressor justice sees one who was intended to be its organ, and who is therefore responsible for his misdeed. And an evil inflicted upon the author of a wrong, from motives of justice and for the ends of justice, is called *punishment.*

Now, wherever there is no *political* organization for the administration of justice by means of constituted authority, *self-defence* is the only means left of protecting one's individual rights, while the protection and security of society depend entirely upon the private administration of justice, such as is seen in *blood-revenge*, in *lynch law*, and in the secret *Vehme.* But it is manifest what a sorry equipment justice has, where the accuser, or perhaps even the injured person himself, is in addition both judge and executioner. For in such circumstances the passion for revenge is almost sure to lead to injustice. Thus, in order that justice may be preserved, it is necessary that the functions of prosecutor and judge be separated, and it is no less necessary that the judge be removed above every private, subjective

emotion and passion. The administration of justice is, according to its fundamental idea, a matter which is the common concern of all, a public affair, just as the injury which happened to one affects all together with him. It is not only that their interests and security are affected by it, but apart from this, it is the interest and duty of all to be answerable, in their own way, for the authority of justice upon earth. And just because it is a matter pertaining to all, no one must treat it as if it were a private affair, and arbitrarily make it his own particular concern. On the contrary, since it is of the essence of right to seek to become truly the will of the whole community, this must appear in the form which the administration of justice takes. The administration of justice must appear as a universal, public, and not as a mere private concern; the matters it deals with affect not only the rights of individuals but the rights of the community as a whole, and hence it must be carried out *in the name of the whole community.* It must be raised above and made independent of all parties, in order that it may serve the ends of justice alone.

From the same point of view it is also clear that wherever the consciousness of right exists, while at the same time there is as yet no political organization for the maintenance of right, it is a matter of duty and of moral necessity that all should assist in laying the foundations of a State; since this is the first thing that must be done if society is to assume a form which is worthy of human beings. No less is it a moral duty, one, too, which may be enforced, or a duty imposed by right, that all who are within the State should belong to it. The State now throws the protection of justice round the individual, his house and property, and round marriage and family life; it is now a public matter, in which the whole community is concerned, to see that the rights of all are protected.

We have seen (§ 17. 2) that the idea of right, which comes to realization in the State, turns what any one is possessed of into his *property.* In like manner, a people by becoming a State enters upon a possession that belongs to the whole nation, a possession which has an external form but has also a spiritual significance—in other words, a *fatherland.* This forms its earthly body as it were, which it may not allow to fall to pieces or be taken from it by force, but which it is

bound to maintain and defend on behalf of the great moral personality of the State, just as it is the duty of every individual to care for and protect his own body.

The State gives free scope to the individual in the exercise of his various activities; its law protects and promotes the free development of his personality, by securing it against any attempt to arrest it. Thus all the various kinds of individual traits and talents move and act freely within the State; it prevents their collision, or renders such collision harmless, by repairing any injury that is done to right; and so, in its own way, it contributes to the solution of the moral problem that is set before mankind.

Contempt for the State is frequently exhibited by false religious enthusiasm (the Anabaptists), or when the Church sets itself up as a rival political institution (Roman Catholicism).

Note.—Friendship, Science, and Art on the stage of Right.—Friendship is not directly affected by the idea of right, inasmuch as right is what is universally valid, what is the same everywhere, whereas the formation of friendships rests primarily upon special and individual grounds. Nevertheless, in so far as friendship unallied with *respect* is mere trifling, or is no more than comradeship, the idea of right ennobles this relation too. By means of the idea of right and the new spheres of life which it creates, Science gains fresh regions for her activity. Nevertheless, it is not an accidental circumstance that Science and Art did not flourish in the two nations which were the representatives of the idea of right in pre-Christian times. These were the Hebrews and the Romans, who represented it in opposite ways—the one in a theocratic, the other in a secular form. Right is the standpoint of keenly intelligent, practical discernment. It is prosaic, it must not depend upon fancy, feeling, or ideal apperceptions. Consequently it was not until these nations began to decline that either of them showed any appreciation or productive capacity with regard to Art and Science. Neither is there room for a *Church* at this stage, although the great political and theocratic lawgivers, in the sacerdotal and secular States, were fully aware of the connection that subsists between human law and religion or the eternal, unwritten laws. Previous to Christianity, the religious spirit, the spirit of mutual fellowship between God and man, was not so powerful in the world as to form a *special* religious community distinct from the State. Judaism as it exists at present, in which every vestige of a State has disappeared, is no proof

to the contrary. For it is the ruins of the Theocracy; in its nature it seeks to be and hopes to become a theocracy, and it is this hope alone which keeps it alive. It was only by force that this religion was separated from the State; in its essential nature, therefore, this separation has never taken place.

SECOND SECTION.

THE IMPERFECTION OF THE STAGE OF LAW OR OF RIGHT.

CHAPTER FIRST.

APART FROM SIN.

§ 34.

Even apart from corruptions which may arise, and which the law cannot prevent, the legal stage, considered by itself, is an essentially imperfect one, with reference both to the absolute and the secondary spheres. When the normal moral development of mankind has reached the legal stage, the desire must arise for a higher communication on the part of God than what is given in creation and in the law; and in like manner the divine love is not content with the mere revelation of law in the form of demand, even should it be love that is demanded; it is only satisfied when it reveals itself in the *bestowal* of love.

1. The imperfection of the legal standpoint with relation to God is obvious, even apart from sin, from several points of view. On the stage of right there is a necessary separation between knowing and being; man has a knowledge of the law, but what he *knows* and what he *is* remain, as yet, apart from each other. Now it might be supposed that this separation could only last for a moment; that the will would immediately, and as a normal consequence, fulfil the demand that is addressed to it, and thus return into perfect union with God. But the attainment of perfect knowledge is itself a moral problem that

can only be solved by degrees; with each advance in knowledge, therefore, new demands present themselves, and a new separation takes place between what ought to be and what is, between knowing and willing. As moral knowledge increases, it penetrates ever deeper and deeper into the connections in which the individual himself is placed, and into the wisdom and goodness of God. Therefore, although the will should immediately take up into itself the precept which the intelligence has discerned, still the stage of law is not yet surpassed. On the contrary, since knowledge increases gradually, the separation between knowing and willing is always renewed, even if it be but for a moment. In the normal development of the will, again, it is necessary that *obedience*, —which may have a moral import, even when it is nothing but simple piety, and is without any insight into the inward goodness of the command that is obeyed,—that *obedience* should grow into joyful pleasure in and love to the good, as the good becomes more and more clearly known.

2. In addition to this, the stage of law cannot *prevent* sin. On the contrary, it gives rise to temptation; for it recognises man's independence even with respect to God, and arouses in him the sense of freedom. If the legal stage were the highest and last, as Moralism will have it to be, then provision would only be made for the distinction between God and man, not for their fellowship; and this is the position of Deism and Pelagianism. But God wills a more intimate intercourse with man than that brought about by the stage of law or of right. On the stage of right God stands as Lawgiver and Judge; but in this there is no living fellowship between God and man, they are only related to each other by means of the impersonal law. Love is possible only toward a person, not toward the abstract formula of the law. And on the legal stage the personality of God is hidden, as it were, behind the law. As long as the personal God reveals only what is impersonal, namely, His commands or His will, He has not yet revealed Himself fully; nay, the divine law itself is not yet fully revealed, not even when it is love that it demands. For it does not as yet appear in the form of personal love, which alone is its true fulfilment, and in which it possesses attractive and inspiring power. Thus it is certain that

"the law cannot make alive." When it is said (Lev. xviii. 5; Gal. iii. 12; Heb. ii. 4), "Do this, and thou shalt live," it might seem as if, after He had given the law, no further act of God was necessary for the attainment of ζωή on the part of man, if only the latter would do his part. But the law, "Do this," etc., points in its deepest aspect to religious duties also, to humility and faith, to the longing desire for fellowship with God and for acts in which God gives proof of His love. For, according to Paul, the law also demands πίστις, that humility which permits no self-sufficiency or pride over against God, but which, impelled by gratitude and a sense of need, depends wholly upon Him and His Spirit and seeks communion with Him. And this shows that the law points for its fulfilment away beyond itself. But man cannot produce this fellowship of love with God; he has no power over God. In order that real pleasure in and love to God may be awakened in man, a higher act of God is required than the giving of the law, an act in which God meets man in love, communicates Himself to him, and establishes a living and loving relationship between them. Then, and only then, is the highest and permanent stage of morality possible.

Now, since man cannot be placed upon this stage at creation, and cannot reach it by the law or by any efforts of his own, since, on the contrary, it presupposes a revelation on the part of God, and one, too, that is not merely ideal or addressed to the intelligence, but real, forming a fellowship between God and man,—since this is the case, the following consequences ensue. Man can only reach the highest moral stage through the consummation of the revelation of God; and the highest and best that he can effect in a moral direction, before this revelation has been made, simply cultivates his spiritual receptivity and his longing after the self-revealing God.

§ 34*a*. (*Continuation.*)

The Imperfection of the Stage of Law in the Secondary Spheres of Right.

With regard to the secondary spheres also the stage of law exhibits many imperfections; and these are not got rid of, inasmuch as moral energy cannot reach its full strength on

this stage, nor can the law preserve these spheres from the ruinous effects of self-will. This can only be done by love, which restrains self-will in the right way (§ 31. 3, 4). The law no doubt brings marriage and the family under the point of view of duty (§ 33*a*. 2). But no arguments are required to show that mere duty, although it is higher than natural love, is not the perfect bond in these relations. Nature has already infused into them a warmth and intimacy which, while liable to change and not proceeding from inward moral motives, yet could not be replaced by the mere consciousness of duty. Besides, even should natural love continue to exist along with this sense of duty, it could not be compared with the closeness and firmness of the bond that is formed where husband, wife, and the members of the family all recognise that they are gifts of God to each other, and thus in Him become objects to each other of mutual respect, love, and joy. A similar truth holds good with regard to *social intercourse*. Social enjoyment and friendship, when they reach their purest and highest point, cannot but involuntarily point friends upward. The love of friends, in its deepest form, has a natural tendency to seek a foundation in love to God.

Even with respect to the *State* itself, which is the product of the legal stage, it must be said that it cannot here reach its perfect form. If there were no higher form of society than the State, then it would have to be accepted as the last and absolutely the highest of human communities, as the representative of human morality in the whole of its compass. Now, although it might not of necessity follow that finite interests would thereby be deified,—for in that case sin would be admitted,—although, on the contrary, men were to remain mindful of the connection between human rights and the divine law, still the only result would be a legal theocracy, in which the religious and the political would be side by side with relatively no distinction between them. But this state of things could only be acquiesced in from a religious point of view, if religion were still at the stage of law; and this, as we have just seen (§ 34), is an intermediate, not a final stage in its progress. When religion, that is, is still in its legal form, it is quite in keeping therewith that the chief stress should be laid upon visible, external actions, a

good intention perhaps being presupposed. But, on the contrary, the more that advancing moral knowledge penetrates within, and learns to attach an independent importance to the inward disposition out of which acts arise, the more does the human spirit outgrow the political form of religion, in which religion is bound up with a particular form of national life.

Further, the State itself would not be absolutely secure in its *right*, unless morality were to reach its highest development in the consummation of revelation and religion. The individual and the community are not of absolute value until they are actually moral. *Before* this time arrives, their absolute worth exists only in hope, or hypothetically. Now the State derives its divine right from the fact that it protects this their ideal moral perfection, or makes possible their free development towards it. Hence, should the legal stage never be surpassed, should therefore the principle of true morality never be realized, the State would for ever lack the very thing which makes it itself a good of absolute value. In fact, right derives its majesty in the last resort from love, of which it is the negative manifestation. Moreover, there must be progress on the part of the State; hence the State must exhibit productive energy, even with regard to legislation. And such energy cannot be derived from intelligence alone; like all faithful discharge of duty, it springs from love.

In the third place, the State cannot be the moral community that embraces men in general. It is too weak and narrow a bond for this purpose. If the principle of individuality is to receive justice, the State must of necessity exist as one among a plurality of States; it must have its own distinct national and terrestrial basis, its connection with a certain land and a certain people. Thus each is a particular State, and the existence of a universal State is utterly impossible. Each one in maintaining its rights may come into collision with other States, and this collision can be brought to a definite close by force alone. In its own domain it is the highest and sovereign source of right; it must refuse to acknowledge any earthly judge over it to settle the collisions that occur. Finally, the State requires the positive principle of love, and

not only of right, to form a bond of union between its citizens; for the crises which it must encounter it requires patriotism, that pure productive sense for all progress in law and government (cf. § 75).

Thus the State, that is, the community founded upon right, points on all sides to a higher community, which reaches out beyond the differences that separate nations, and releases them even from the refined egoism of patriotism—a community which has the power to control these differences, to knit the nations together as members of historical humanity, and to make them as it were brothers and sisters in one universal family, founded upon the positive principle of love. And this is the *Church*, the community to which religion when perfected gives rise, in which the unity of humanity is for the first time realized in a moral form—nay, in which it becomes an ethical product and an ethical good. Man lives not by right alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God, and above all, by that Word which is the consummation both of revelation and religion, the Word that was made flesh.

CHAPTER SECOND.

THE STAGE OF LAW WITH REFERENCE TO SIN (ETHICAL PONEROLOGY).

§ 35. Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, vol. ii. § 72–78, vol. iii. § 78–84, § 89.

The possibility of moral evil is given in the original constitution of man's moral nature. When it becomes actual, the insufficiency of the law, without a new and in the first place an atoning and redeeming manifestation on the part of God, becomes still more evident.

[LITERATURE.—Christ. Fr. Schmid, *De Peccato*, Partic. i.–iii. *Biblische Theologie n. T.*, 3rd ed. 1864. *Christl. Sittenlehre*, 1861. Ernesti, *Vom Ursprung der Sünde nach paulinischen Lehrgehalt*, 2 vols. 1855, 1862. Baur, *Theologie des neuen Testaments*, 1864. *Paulus*, 1845. Holsten, *Die Bedeutung des Wortes σάρξ im*

neuen Testament, 1853. *Das Evangelium des Paulus und Petrus*, 1868. Lüdemann, *Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus*, 1872. Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im biblischen Sprachgebrauch*, 1878. Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, 1873. Weiss, *Lehrbuch der biblischen Theologie*, 3rd ed. 1880, § 21, 46, 56, 66, 70, 100, 115, 148, 151, 157. Vilmar, *Was fasst der biblische Begriff der Sünde in sich und giebt es nach diesem eine Erbsünde?* 1840. Menegoz, *Le péché et la redemption d'après St. Paul*, 1882. Delitzsch, *System der biblischen Psychologie*. Beck, *Umriss der biblischen Seelenlehre*, 1871. Kern, *Ueber die Sünde. Tübinger Zeitschrift*, 1832, 1, 3. Stirm, *Anthropologische Untersuchungen. Tübinger Zeitschrift*, 1834, 3. Krabbe, *Die Lehre von der Sünde und vom Tode*, 1836. J. Müller, *The Christian Doctrine of Sin*, vol. ii. (criticized by Vatke, *Hallische Jahrbücher*, 1840, and by the author in Reuter's *Repertorium*, 1845). Von Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, 1857, i. 444, 505. *Theologische Ethik*, 1878, p. 32 sq. Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, i. p. 98 sq. (360 sq.), ii. p. 84 sq. Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, 1st ed. vol. i. § 28, 31, 44, 98, 121–123; vol. ii. pp. 170–251 (2nd ed. § 40, 55, 83). Sartorius, *The Doctrine of Divine Love*. Tholuck, *Von der Sünde und dem Versöhner*, 8th ed. 1862. Liebner, *Kieler allg. Monatscrift f. Wiss. und Lit.* 1851, p. 163 sq. Vilmar, *Moral*. Philippi, *Kirchl. Glaubenslehre*, vol. iii. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, vol. i. 2nd ed. 1856. *Dogmatik*, vol. i. Schweizer, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre nach protestantischen Grundsätzen*, 1863, i. 329. Weisse, *Philos. Dogmatik*, ii. p. 391 sq. Biedermann, *Christl. Dogmatik*, 1869, pp. 411 sq., 594 sq., 669 sq. Pfleiderer, *Grundriss der christl. Glaubens und Sittenlehre*, pp. 112 sq., 257 sq. Heinrici, *Die Sünde nach Wesen und Ursprung*, 1878. Kaehler, *Das Gewissen*, i. 1, 1878, pp. 216 sq., 294 sq. *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre*, Nr. 2, p. 289 sq. Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit*, 1878, i. p. 400. *System der christl. Sittlichkeit*, 1884, i. p. 104 sq. Ritschl, *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, 2nd ed. vol. iii. chap. v. Kreibig, *Versöhnungslehre*, 1878, pp. 21–46.

Philosophy: Spinoza, *Ethik*. Leibnitz, *Theodicee*. King, *De origine mali*. Kant, *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen blosser Vernunft. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. Fichte, *Sittenlehre*, 1798, 1812. Schelling, *Philosophie und Religion. Freiheitslehre. Philosophie der Offenbarung*, 2 vols. Bockshammer, *Die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens*, 1821. Daub, *Judas Ischarioth*. Herbart, *Gespräch über das Böse*, 1817. Schleiermacher, *Abhandlung über die Erwählungslehre. Glaubenslehre*, i. § 65–74, 79–81. *Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre*, ed. Schweizer, pp. 52 sq., 71, 421 sq. Ritter, *Ueber das Böse*, 1869. Steffens, *Christl. Religionsphilosophie*, ii. 1–100. Hegel,

Phänomenologie and *Rechtsphilosophie.* Vatke, *Die menschliche Freiheit im Verhältniss zur Sünde und göttlichen Gnade,* 1841. Marheinecke, *Dogmatik,* 1847, p. 196 sq. Wirth, *System der spekulativen Ethik,* vol. i. 1841, pp. 41–50, 117–155. I. H. Fichte, *Anthropologie,* 1857. *System der Ethik.* Benecke, *Grundlinien d. natürlichen Systems der praktischen Philosophie.* Kym, *Das Problem des Bösen,* 1878. Hartmann, *Phänomenologie des sittl. Bewusstseins.* Scholten, *Der freie Wille,* pp. 127–166.—Ed.]

1. Sin is not a mere defect, involved in finiteness, which is a natural necessity, nor does it consist in the mere fact that the good which ought to be does not yet exist; but it is a false position, love of the creature in opposition to God, and is therefore *ἀνομία* (1 John iii. 4). To stand on the wrong line is a different thing from standing at the commencement of the right one; the former means digression, the latter progression. False creature-love may incline to the form of love of the world, *i.e. concealed* selfishness, or to that of more direct selfishness, but it always involves opposition to God, our sense of God has become obscured and feeble. Moral evil does not become actual without a sufficient cause. That cause is freedom in the sense of self-will, which, though it does not act without a motive, still acts without one that is morally sufficient. In self-will, *one* factor in the whole notion of freedom isolates itself and seeks to become the whole of freedom. It breaks away from the law, which, as we have seen, is an original and essential element in freedom (not, however, in the shape of a mere compulsory power). Hence there exists a general similarity among all the manifold appearances taken by moral evil, a similarity arising from the fact that in every case evil is a contradiction both of the law of God and of the essential nature of man, and produces discord within him. And this it does all the more, because, according to the constitution of human nature, every Actus goes to produce a habit of action, a fact which throws light upon the connection of evil in the race. For the race is a unity of solidarity; moral evil, therefore, seizes, though by degrees, upon the whole organism of humanity, ruins the virtuous energy of man, his spiritual endowments, his moral aims, and in consequence even his moral knowledge as well.

2. Moreover, sin makes clear from a new side the in-

sufficiency or rather the powerlessness of the legal standpoint. The law indeed does not give way, it offers resistance; but this only excites the false freedom still more. Further, it threatens and punishes and puts a check upon outbreaks; but the only result is that one form of egoism is exchanged for another. It gives notice of punishment, it pronounces the sinner guilty and lays a ban upon him; but the ban does not make him moral in a living sense, it only robs him of vital energy and cows him. It might perhaps prompt him to retire within himself, to acknowledge that he deserves punishment, and to be ready to bear the displeasure of God which he has incurred; but actually to bear that displeasure would presuppose a love of justice, a power of truthfulness,—in a single word, a degree of morality which is just the very thing that the sinner lacks, as long as he remains thrown back upon himself. And he lacks it all the more for this reason, that actual sin passes over into habitual, and thus a nexus of evil is formed both in the individual and throughout the race, an evil tendency that continually increases in power. Man cannot atone for himself; and yet, since the grace of God like His displeasure is always *just*, atonement is the first thing which he needs, in order that he may again enter into that loving communion with God which is the source of all true morality.

3. Although punishment is necessary, and even a blessing, in the order of the world, yet the punitive justice of God does not require that it itself should be His final revelation. It is not necessary that God should leave moral evil to take its own course, which inevitably leads to *ἀπώλεια*. As is shown more explicitly in Dogmatics,[1] God remains free, even when sin has arisen, to make an atoning and redeeming revelation, as long as the evil-doer has not become absolutely hardened and unimpressible. And this he cannot be *before* the atoning revelation is made; for only in it has the clearest revelation of divine love been given. Hence it follows that he who has not yet rejected it has not yet set himself in absolute opposition to the Good in its fullest manifestation, has not yet united and identified himself with the principle of evil,—and therefore, that forgiveness is still possible for him (Rom. iii. 25, 26; Luke xxiii. 34; Rev. xvii. 30).

[1] Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. § 61, iii. § 89.

In accordance with our Syllabus (§ 32), we have now considered in the First Section of our Third Division the advance which is made in the ethical process by the stage of law or of right; in the Second Section (§ 34, 35), the imperfection of the legal stage, both apart from sin and with special reference to sin; in the Third Section we have still to take up the stage of love or of the gospel, as the contents of the ethical world-ideal, in which the ethical process reaches its consummation. *Vid.* § 32, p. 300.

[*Note.*—At this point the author had, at an earlier period, added two more paragraphs, treating of sin as it actually exists in the history of mankind, and of that historical counteraction of good against evil which formed the positive preparation for the principle of Christianity. I give these paragraphs in § 35*a*, 35*b*.—Ed.]

§ 35*a*. *The Actual Existence of Sin in Humanity.*

The three stages which have been derived from the essential nature of morality (§ 5. 3; 9*a*; 18; 19; 32. 2, 3) are also exemplified in history, which consequently affords proof that the divine World-Ideal is actually realized in the way which we find to be logically necessary when we consider the nature of that ideal itself. Moreover, both Scripture and experience give their testimony that sin—which is logically no more than *possible*—has become a universal fact, assuming the two forms of pagan and Jewish sin, of carnal selfishness and spiritual selfishness or pride, eudæmonistic Antinomianism and Nomism. Experience likewise confirms the truth that an abnormal process goes on in which acts that contradict duty pass into and become vice or evil habit, which, on its side again, reacts upon human freedom, enslaving and limiting it. The result of this action and reaction is that the moral nature of man becomes more and more corrupted, and he approaches that which is the opposite of the Supreme Good—viz. *Supreme Evil.* And although this corruption does not exclude the possibility of

redemption and final perfection, still the resistance made to evil in pre-Christian times—and which has never been wholly wanting—by conscience and the law, by political enactments, sages, and rulers, was unable to check it. In fact, the power of sin makes it all the more necessary, from a new side, that an act of God should take place, of an atoning kind, in which revelation is carried past the stage of law.

1. With reference to the universality of moral evil we shall only mention the following passages of Scripture: Rom. i.–iii., v. 12 f.; Gen. iii., cf. vi. 1 ff.; Eph. ii. 3; 1 Cor. xv. 22; John iii. 5 f.; Jas. iii. 2 (C. A. II.). Although all evil involves a turning away from God, yet it takes a double form, and has a double course.

(*a*) The godless tendency of the person may take the form of weakness as against the influence of the world of the manifold, with which we are brought into connection by the senses. In this case the natural will or the lower impulses are stimulated and become predominant, while the rational nature becomes feeble and passive. And this is *sensuality*. In it, however, there is also spontaneity on the part of the person. For after the temptation has seduced and mastered the will, it makes the will and consequently the whole man its organ for carrying out the sin which promises to give pleasure, and thus he becomes the servant of the sensual side of his nature. Here we have sin in its specifically *heathen* shape, that of Eudæmonism, in which the will submits to the sway of carnal desire or the sensual side of human nature, and resolves to strive after its gratification.

(*b*) The *other*, more spiritual form of the godless tendency shows perhaps more energy and independence as against the influence of the world, owing to the increased strength which self-consciousness receives from the law; but it may for all that take a form still more impious and alienated from God, as when the spirit shuts itself up in self-satisfaction and denies its creaturely dependence, or, should these characteristics be hypocritically concealed, when it exhibits spiritual or moral pride and legal righteousness. This form of sin has appeared

under the Jewish law (in Pharisaism), and is all the more dangerous because it is more or less veiled, and preserves the appearance of obedience toward God. It is sin in its specifically Jewish shape, the abnormal as it appears on the stage of law. There are general principles, ever returning types of evil, which have made their historical appearance in large and compact forms, in heathenism and Judaism. Let us look a little more closely at these two great divisions of the ancient world, and trace the development of evil in them.

2. With regard to *heathenism*, as it appears in history, no profounder derivation of it could be given than in the words of Paul (Rom. i.), "They did not give thanks to God, and thus they became vain in their reasonings." They did not gratefully refer their enjoyments and blessings to God, thus consecrating them and overcoming their ματαιότης; they never got beyond these gifts themselves, and thus their sense of the world became overpoweringly strong, while their sense of God and their self-consciousness as spiritual beings became weak. Heathenism acknowledges the supremacy of nature over the spirit by deifying the former and secularizing the latter; it has as many gods as it has goods. Along with the unity and absoluteness of the idea of God, which this worldly bias breaks up into a multiplicity of gods, the absoluteness of the moral law also disappears. The gods themselves commit sin. Caprice and Fate at least take precedence of the moral law. Moreover, just as selfishness, which is the opposite of love, lies hid in the carnal spirit, so the natural religions contain what is the very opposite of true religion. For their gods are not worshipped from love to anything in them that is worthy of love; on the contrary, they both exist and are worshipped for the purpose of being serviceable and favourable to human aims. Accordingly, they are essentially guardian gods of a country, a city, or a family. And since they are thus worshipped chiefly on account of finite interests,—a fact which is most apparent in the religion of Rome,—a false bent of the heart here makes itself apparent.

Connected with this thorough egoism also, there is the exclusive spirit manifested by ancient nations. This is seen in the opposition between Hellenes or even Romans and

barbarians, in the East between sacred lands and profane; as well as in the distinction of castes, the treatment of a part of mankind as slaves (a practice which Aristotle could defend, without contradiction from the public conscience), and finally, in the degradation of women—especially in the East and in Hellas—and the tyrannical rights exercised by parents over children, especially in Rome. The old heathen world had no idea of the infinite worth of the individual human being—a truth which is of such vast influence upon *marriage* and the *family*. Nay, *Art* even, however much it flourished in Greece, was too deficient in a sense of the infinite significance of life. Hence it was that its palmy days were so few, and its constructive power was so soon exhausted. With the downfall of religious faith—to which the Mysteries only gave artificial life for a little—art lost its strength and purity, through the supremacy of the natural over the spiritual; it grew more and more rank, but more and more empty and lifeless. At the same time *Science* degenerated into scepticism, and to this scepticism the followers of Aristotle and of Plato alike succumbed.

With respect, finally, to the *State*, the highest moral community which the heathen world knew, Plato's *Republic* is enough to show how the other moral spheres of life must suffer, when the State is made the absolute moral community, and everything else—*e.g.* the individual, marriage, family—is regarded merely as a means for its ends. As we have seen, the duty of the State is to afford, in the name of justice, its protecting power to every good that exists, and so to guarantee to it the possibility of development. But since antiquity knows no absolute World-goal, so for the most part right itself is not conceived of as having absolute ends to serve, and thus it lacks objective stability. The good things which are distinct from the State, but which the latter has to protect, are not recognised in their absolute value; thus the State remains as the absolute end, and this involves an apotheosis of power and finite interests, or of a particular nation. The greatest attempt made by the ancient world in the way of a State—Rome, namely—has no respect for foreign nationalities; in its gigantic egoism it seeks only to absorb them all in itself. No doubt a kind of universality seems to be attained in this

State; national limitations are broken down (*jus gentium, jus naturale*), nations are gathered into one kingdom, and the idea of the unity of humanity can now assert itself with greater freedom. Nevertheless, we have here only the shadow of true universality; it is preponderantly negative and empty. All that has happened is that the particular nationalism of Rome has attained universal power; it has come as a judgment upon the eudæmonistic world of sense, but it has brought nothing better in the place of the latter. And these very instruments of the judgment of God, the Romans, these murderers of the liberties of nations, are themselves overtaken by a righteous fate. This nation, whose highest good is power, fame, and dominion, and which has made these its aims, has to fall at last under the despotism of the Cæsars. After the Romans have crushed the liberty and prosperity of all nations, it becomes clear that all the while they have been digging a grave for their own prosperity and freedom. They now drag out an empty, material existence, filled with life's weariness; unless disgust with public and national affairs impels them to seek that inward comfort and consolation which just at this time Christianity comes forward to offer.

3. The Hebrews too, even with the help of the Old Testament, were not in reality more successful. We might point to the facts that polygamy was not forbidden, and that an almost unlimited wantonness prevailed in the practice of divorce (Matt. v.); that art and science were but sparingly developed; that the union of the political and the religious community in a theocracy was a hindrance both to the State and to religion, preventing each of them from shaping itself according to its own principle; and that when the two became separated in consequence of the intervention of heathen power, the separation was submitted to unwillingly, and gave rise to impotent attempts to set up a theocracy again. But apart from all this, what we would chiefly call attention to is the intense and sinful national pride which the Hebrews displayed toward other peoples,—as seen, *e.g.*, in the Book of Esther and the Feast of Purim,—a pride which drove them to that national hatred of the heathen which the latter on their part returned but too cordially, designating the Jews "odium generis

humani." In addition to this there was also their pride in the *knowledge* of the law (Rom. ii. 18 ff.). But as far as the fulfilment of the law is concerned, down to the exile the mass of the people was constantly inclined to fall away into heathenism, a tendency which continued at a later date in a more refined but not a better form, viz. in Sadduceism.

After the exile, moreover, when the law as an external principle was fully carried out, a spirit of mechanical legalism and adherence to the letter became prevalent, in which the chief place was given to outward works, while the inward side of the law, the circumcision of the heart, the spiritual sacrifice of repentance and thanksgiving, was thrust into the background (Deut. x. 16, xxx. 6 ; Lev. xix. 17, 18 ; Isa. i. 11–18; Ps. l. 16, li. 12 ; Hos. vi. 6 ; Prov. xv. 8, 26, xxi. 3 ; Amos v. 24). An exuberant, casuistical ingenuity was shown in setting fence after fence around the law ; men tried to advance in righteousness by increasing the number of legal precepts, instead of by giving heed to the relation of the heart to the law ; they never thought of asking whether the inward motive was a merely mercenary one, or the fear of punishment, or whether it was love to God. And at the same time this legal and not very difficult fulfilment of the law was combined with moral pride, a self-righteousness which disowned both humility toward God and love toward one's fellow-men. No doubt upright souls were not wanting, who preserved themselves alike from Pharisaism and Sadduceism ; but these were the very persons who looked for a true atonement in place of animal sacrifices, and awaited a new revelation, recognising that even the Hebrew people had outlived its day, if the regeneration did not come which the prophets had promised.

§ 35*b*. *The Historical Counteraction of Good against Evil, and the Positive Preparation for the Principle of Christian Morality.*

However great the power of evil became before the time of Christ, and however great it still continues to be, yet man's *need* of redemption has never gone so far as to make him *incapable* of redemption. The stages in the ethical process which we have seen to be logically

necessary are not obliterated by the power of evil. On the contrary, they continue to unfold themselves, and are promoted by the good influences which are at work in opposition to evil, due to the constitution of man's moral nature and to the progress of historical revelation. While sin was increasing, the capacity of man for redemption was being cultivated into positive receptiveness. This took place in two ways. (*a*) Through the unceasing reaction of the law, both ideal and real,—a reaction which is seen partly in the political and religious institutions of nations in general, and in ancient philosophy, partly and most clearly in the Jewish theocracy with its objective law. (*b*) Through prophecy, within the heathen but more especially the Jewish world, which points to a new revelation and communication of God, in which the principle of virtue will be truly realized.

1. It cannot be said that in the pre-Christian world sin alone was developed; the normal development of human powers and faculties also went on, as it would have done had sin never entered at all. By this means preparation is made for a perfect morality; and these powers, in their highest development, must be incorporated with the perfect ethical principle when it has been actually realized. The stages, too, which we saw to be logically necessary appear in history in the pre-Christian world, and are clearly recognisable. Reminiscences of a comparatively pure and innocent golden age at the commencement of the race run throughout the whole of mankind. That age was followed by one in which the heathen world saw more especially the predominance of evil, while the Jewish spirit saw in it the fact of sin, which it recognises as the source of all evils. Nevertheless, an advance has been made in the course of this age; the transition has now been effected to the stage of law. Lawgivers appear, at first as heroes; in the heathen and the Jewish world humanity is upon the legal stage. Among the most civilised nations too, a high degree of culture was reached to some extent, even before Christ; a contrast was set up to the moral chaos that

existed, a certain natural refinement was attained through the power of culture and of growing intelligence. Heathenism developed finely and fruitfully many parts of the moral nature, especially in science, art, and politics. And though there is still wanting the pure ethical spirit, to make all these achievements its earthly body as it were and give them life, and though they thus remain inherently perishable, they yet form a preparation for morality in its perfect shape. For the latter requires an external form in which to realize itself; and in this direction the ancient world did much good service in its own way.

2. Further, *sin* was opposed by the consciousness of *guilt* and of *punishment*. Ἄτη with her expiations plays a large part in Greek Tragedy, in Aeschylus and Sophocles, in the Prometheus myth, in the Antigone and Oedipus. The Delphic temple in particular had expiatory rites. Apollo was regarded as the purifying and atoning god, who does not shrink even from exposing himself to impurity in order to make atonement for the impure, and who submits even to menial service in order to wipe away the impurity he has contracted for the sake of men. The notion of guilt is vitiated, however, by its being referred not to the personal violation of duties, but merely to such outward acts as—unintentionally it may be (as in the case of Adrastus)—have an unfortunate result, or to an immoderate prosperity that excites the envy of the gods (as in the Polycrates myth). It is not a law-making God that occupies the supreme place; fate stands over all the gods. Moreover, since expiations brought no real peace, the tendency prevailed in heathen life either to seek forgetfulness of guilt in frivolity, and to relegate to Tartarus those austere and gloomy deities that remind men of sin and guilt, or to disregard altogether the inward spiritual discord, both practically and theoretically.

On the other hand, the consciousness of guilt and punishment was more vivid among the *Hebrews*, because here the law was set up in an objective shape; and thus the religious and moral history both of the nation as a whole and of the individual had a steadier course. Here we have the fundamental moral perception that guilt is the debt not of misfortune but of sin, that all guilt exposes man to punishment, and

that evil owes its existence to its connection with wickedness, and not to the hostility of irresistible powers nor to a *θεῖον φθονερόν*. Besides, the keener consciousness of sin and guilt among the Hebrews was met by a divinely-appointed provision for atonement. To heathen sacrifices there was no promise attached; but Hebrew sacrifices, in virtue of their divine institution, vouchsafed something not to hope merely but to faith; that is to say, when the offering was made, the penitent was warranted in feeling that he still remained a citizen of the theocracy, and had his share in the promise for the future.

3. In the heathen world, if we leave political regulations out of sight, it is philosophy that corresponds to the law; she seeks as it were to play the part of moral lawgiver. We see this in Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus, the Cynics and the Stoics. The wise man is the Hellenic analogue of the Messianic Ideal. This *doctrine of wisdom* had even something *prophetic* in it, especially when it bore a religious character. Thus it was with Plato, to whom the closest possible assimilation with God is the virtue that keeps the State together. If, now, we inquire how inward personal goodness is to be produced, then it is evident that knowledge is insufficient, though the will is conceived as entirely dependent upon it, for *φρόνησις* is not within the reach of all. Hence Plato goes back in true Hellenic fashion to nature and natural processes; noble children are to be begotten by bringing together noble parents, and he would make political regulations for this end. Again, and this is still more important, he says in the *Menon* that virtue can neither be learned nor acquired by practice, but must be given *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ*. In the *Republic*, moreover, he says that the appearance of those high, wise, and just persons, on whom, according to him, depends the hope of a regeneration of the disordered commonwealth, must be expected as a "gift of God." As the world now is—he says further and prophetically—were the *perfectly just man* to appear, he could restore faith in righteousness only through suffering (even scourging and crucifixion are mentioned), and would have to endure the extremity of wrong in evincing his perfect justice.

The *Stoics*, moreover, although they occupy the legal stand-

point of the stage of right, yet cannot deny the need there is of bringing the good out of its abstract, legal form into a more living one; so they too draw their ideal of the wise man who is free from sin. According to Chrysippus, he is a king, who judges all things and is himself judged by no one; according to Zeno, he is a priest, made so, however, through knowledge. In the wise man, who is both king and priest, they have produced the *Hellenic analogue of the image of the Messiah.* But where this wise man is to come from—on that point the Stoics leave us in perplexity. They are prevented by their false attitude towards religion, by their want of humility, from going farther still and postulating a revelation. They endow their wise man with the sense of absolute freedom, and take great delight in drawing a picture of him, as if no more were required than a beautiful ideal. Finally, Stoicism lacks an absolute teleology with regard to the world; it makes the history of the world run in a circle; when the world's æon is over, it is resolved again into Zeus, through the agency of fire. Thus, in the last resort, a fatalistic necessity rules the world. It rules even the wise man—a striking contrast to that sense of absolute freedom with which he is credited. The reason of this contrast is that his sense of freedom has only a pantheistic basis. The wise man calls the essence of his being the "god in him;" but this god, like those of polytheism in general, is subject to fate, and is no better in this respect than the deities it has absorbed. It is worthy of notice that the Hebrew analogue of Stoicism, namely Pharisaism, often arrived at fatalism also; for when God is thought of only as the World-law or its representative, then as the law does not arise out of His own essential nature, He cannot be absolute. Above Him an absolute power is conceived, which is not personal and free. The Rabbis make God a student of the law.

4. Through the religious fact of the giving of the law, the Hebrews were delivered once and for all from that vacillation with regard to moral ideas exhibited by the Greeks, who are always beginning over again to verify and state them. The religious development of the Hebrews goes on steadily within the limits of the law; while their sense of the relation

between God and man is firmly maintained. Pious people living under the law, and continuing to practise it, were of necessity led more and more from what is outward to what is inward. And this furthered their ideal appropriation of the law, that is to say, their religious knowledge. It came to be recognised that good intention is better than mere external works; that the true offering, of which the outward one is but the symbol, is that inward self-sacrifice on the part of man, which if it were present would make the outward superfluous and without meaning. The ceremonial law and other elements of the Jewish ritual had a similar effect. But therewith an inner conflict sprang up with the whole system of symbolical worship; the longing after a true worship, after reality, came to maturity. The increasing knowledge of the Jews brought them pain, a deeper consciousness of sin and of the gulf which separated them from God. Thus the law fulfilled its end; it quickened their consciousness of their need of redemption. Faith in the God of their fathers now led them to *hope for new acts of God* in the future.

The substance of this hope is as follows: (*a*) As God wills that His glory be shown forth, so He wills a kingdom of glory. This He will establish, and bring to pass the final consummation through the *Kingship of the Messiah.* This hope is expressed in the oldest psalms (ii., cx.) and prophets (Isaiah, Micah). (*b*) It was recognised, further, that Israel cannot at once be made glorious and perfect, that the kingdom of God cannot appear as a kingdom of glory without mediation. True and permanent kingship can only spring from inward majesty, that is, from righteousness; and righteousness manifests itself in lowliness and renunciation. The people must become the servant of Jehovah in the full true sense; then only will the sure mercies of David be given (Isa. lv. 3). Such is the purport of Isaiah's announcement in chap. xl. sq. There the people is at first described as the servant of Jehovah. But the empirical people of Israel is not the servant of God; on the contrary, it is burdened with guilt, and cannot become righteous without atonement. *It can neither wash away its sin nor bear it*, and yet the perfection of the kingdom depends upon the people becoming holy and reconciled to God. Accordingly, prophecy rises to the con-

ception of the "Branch" of Jehovah, of whom earlier prophets had already spoken. It presents Him as being through His personal righteousness the manifested archetype of the people, who represents them before God, and becomes the mediator of *forgiveness* and conscious reconciliation (Isa. liii.). This is the *Messianic priesthood.* Here the Messianic hope had to concentrate itself in the most definite way upon one single person, who, righteous himself, makes the rest of the nation righteous, and gathers them together into his kingdom, the true kingdom of God. This kingdom is now pictured in the most glowing colours, and in its all-embracing and redeeming majesty (Isa. lii.–lvi.). By means of this process, which began after the revelation of the law, Christianity is ideally foreshadowed, while on the subjective side man is made ready to receive Christianity, and is aroused to a longing desire for it.

5. *To sum up.* The condition of things in the pre-Christian world makes sufficiently evident: (1) The religious and moral helplessness of man, or his *need of redemption.* Sin and guilt require atonement before everything else. And this man cannot make for himself. Nevertheless (2) humanity is *not* by this means rendered *incapable* of redemption, either from the side of God or of man. On the human side, *counter agencies* have always been at work in opposition to the power of sin; and these serve to prove that in human nature, in spite of its ruin, a point was still left at which the Good could enter, when it appeared in the form of a divine act. Previous to Christianity also, and in spite of sin, *progress* was made in many departments of life that are of moral value—in politics, art, and science. Lawgivers and philosophers gave partial assistance to the subjective voice of conscience. Even among the heathen conscience was not lifeless, but oppressed the evil-doer with the feeling of guilt and wretchedness. But the most powerful of all agencies against sin were the institutions of the Old Testament,—the fixed, objective law, and the public ordinances that were established in accordance with it. But history also affords confirmation of what we have already perceived from the *very nature of the case,* viz. the imperfection of the legal stage and its powerlessness to give life. It was only the *prophecy* of new and higher acts of God that upheld

humanity in its moral efforts and hopes. Humanity has never been left altogether without prophecy; it appeared even in heathenism, it had its chosen seat in the Hebrew religion, and it formed the one sustaining element amid the imperfections of the legal stage. In fine, the chief thing which came to maturity before Christianity was merely the knowledge of sin (Rom. iii. 20), the sense of *need*, the heartfelt yearning for divine help and for the divine home from which man felt he was ejected and estranged. In this way man was prepared for a further manifestation on the part of God; that is to say, his need of redemption was intensified, while his capacity for it had now become complete.

THIRD SECTION.

THE STAGE OF LOVE OR OF THE GOSPEL, AS THE CONTENTS OF THE ETHICAL WORLD-IDEAL (§ 31, 32).

§ 36.

[Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. § 62, 70, iii. § 89.—Ed.]

The legal stage being imperfect both in itself (§ 34, 34*a*) and in relation to evil (§ 35), the goal of God's creative love can only be such a union of the human will with the divine as will make the life of man divine in wisdom and holiness. But human life can become divine only by an act of self-communication on the part of God, that is, by the divine life becoming human. The will of God is therefore wholly directed to this end, and must be met on man's part by a receptivity which responds to the act of divine love.

1. The fundamental fact in Christian experience is the union of the divine and human life. Accordingly, Christian ethics has to show how the ethical in general and ethical science are inwardly connected with this which is at once the fundamental idea of Christianity, the central point of Christian doctrine, and the central fact of Christian life. And this can

be done in two ways; either by considering human needs in themselves, especially as affected by sin, or by starting from the ethical conception of God.

2. The stage of perfect morality, which is of necessity kept in view from the very first, demands that the divine life become human in order that human life may become divine. Even the Old Testament requires that heart and life be at one with God (Gen. v. 24, vi. 9; Ps. li. 12; Joel iii. 1; Jer. xxxi. 34). The doctrine of the divine image in which man was created also involves the same truth with regard to human life: for it teaches that man is designed to recognise, of his own free will, that the Good which resides originally in God is also the true essence of his own nature, that he is intended to enter into full possession of it as a free yet morally determined being. For there is only one morality: the original of it is in God, the copy of it is in man. This is also the meaning of 1 Tim. vi. 11, according to which we are to become "men of God;" and of 2 Pet. i. 3, 4, where it is said that Christians become partakers of the "divine nature." (Cf. 2 Cor. i. 21, 22.) Whatever good there may be besides God who is the first source of good, it cannot exist in independence of God; it is only a good so far as God is in it as a quickening power. The law itself is not satisfied with separate, single acts merely, in which self-will is restrained, and obedience rendered to the external standard of the law. When taken in its full compass, it refers not only to what man does, but to what he is. Within it is the image of the ideal man, of man as he is designed to be, although it is powerless to realize that ideal. In fact, single acts done with a good purpose are truly good only when they are the expression of a will that loves and takes pleasure in the good as a whole.

Accordingly it comes to this: good must not merely be wrung by force as it were from the natural man; it must be the product of a character that is good through and through, of a leaning towards God that has become the true, higher nature of man. For it is not good fruits that make a good tree, but a good tree that brings forth good fruits (Matt. vii. 17). But man, and especially sinful man, cannot elicit from himself goodness in this its higher spiritual sense. And just as little can it be supplied to him by creation. It could not be given him to

begin with, for then there would have been no possibility of a really new and free life of love in the world, distinct from God, although not independent of Him (1 Cor. xv. 45 ff.). Man is created only with the *νοῦς*, receptiveness for the *πνεῦμα*. Instead of overcoming man by a kind of natural force, the divine love and its communicableness address him as a *free* being. They ask him, as it were, whether he will allow himself to be determined by God, to be taken possession of and swayed by the Divine Spirit, whether therefore he will admit the divine spirit of love (Rom. viii. 1 ff.) to dwell within him as an inspiring power, a higher spiritual nature.

3. Further, just as man, conscious of his need, yearns for something more on God's part than what He has given in creation and the law, so on the other hand the *divine love* is not satisfied with the revelation of the law. For the law does not perfectly reveal the goodness of God's holy love nor its communicableness. It is only a communication to the *intellect*, not to the inmost nature and will of man. It still stands outside of these. In the law God makes demands; He gives nothing. But God intends to be something more to the world than mere omnipotence and omnipresence; something more than an object of knowledge; something more than One who stands over against the world in the attitude of demand. He means to be in the world a power that both loves and implants love. It is His purpose that His cosmical relation to the world should become an ethical relation, in which He is all in all (1 Cor. xv. 28). The thorough exposition of this subject belongs to Dogmatics.

§ 37. *The Necessity of the God-man from Ethical Points of View.*

[Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. § 62.—Ed.]

The revelation of God, as is shown in Dogmatics, is consummated in the Incarnation, which gives to the world Him who is strictly the God-man. From ethical principles also it follows that the moral perfection both of the individual and of the world as a whole depends upon the realization of the idea of God-manhood. For the moral

principle can arrive at full power, or, in other words, love or a kingdom of love be realized in the world, only through the consummation of the revelation or self-communication of God. The God-man, moreover, must be One, and must be unique, both in Himself and in relation to God, as well as in the essential relation which He bears to humanity. In Him there must dwell a reconciling and perfecting power; the power of establishing, through the Spirit which proceeds from Him, the kingdom of God, or that absolute moral organism in which is realized the ideal both of the individual and of the whole world.

1. In § 31 and § 36 all that was shown was that the moral life, in order to reach perfection, must be at once divine and human. No conclusion, however, has as yet been arrived at as to the uniqueness of a life at once human and divine, and none as to the ethical significance of the incarnation of God in a single being, who is both God and man. In the act of God implied in incarnation, revelation reaches its climax; it is no longer a mere revelation, for love's sake, of God's power, wisdom, and justice; it is the revelation of love itself as being the very heart of God. The proof from ultimate principles of the necessity of this divine act belongs to the science of Dogmatics. But it is also well worth our while to recognise how important, from an ethical point of view, is that form of the self-communication of God to the world in which the perfect life of love appears at first in a single person, that of the God-man, and then, starting from Him as a centre, diffuses itself by a moral process throughout humanity.

2. It is true that the law is a revelation not merely of the divine will but also of the essential nature of God. But that which in Him is most essential, viz. His love, is not revealed in the law. When love makes a demand, it does not yet appear *as* love (not even when it is love that it demands). It does so only when it communicates something, nay more, only when it communicates itself. And the crown of the self-communication of God to the world is just the incarnation. By a personal revelation of Himself as love, God can

become the object of love, and raise mankind above the stage of law.

In itself the law cannot be an object of love. It may be revered, but it cannot be loved. Only that which is personal can be loved, only what is adapted to an interchange of love, whereas the law remains cold and dead to the human heart (Gal. iii. 21; Rom. vii. 6 f.). Only when the Good appears not merely as law, but in the form of a person, does it show that it seeks to communicate itself, and only then does it become communicable. Accordingly, the personal life of Him who is the God-man exhibits the law in its perfect form; by His fulfilment of it He brings to light that deep principle of love on which it is based. The God-man, as being in Himself the law unveiled and fulfilled, has an attractive power quite different from that of the mere γράμμα. The archetype is productive. In the God-man, the Good that has its seat in God not only becomes an object of perception, but offers to enter into a fellowship of love with all who appropriate it. And thus it is made possible for every one who does so to live and act as a totality, in the power of his whole nature as inspired by the spiritual principle of love. The legal standpoint always tends to split life up into a multiplicity of tasks, out of which no living whole can be formed; it cannot produce the higher spiritual nature, that entire bent and determination of character which the principle of love alone can evoke (Matt. vii. 17; 1 Cor. xiii.). On the legal stage, it is true, man is not without a presentiment of what is wanting. Still, the longing that is thereby awakened finds satisfaction nowhere but in Him in whom the love of God appeared in intelligible form, and who offers Himself to faith as the power of Good in its totality, as the living source of all true life, of a life that proceeds from Him, and may be received by all.

3. Further, it is of great *ethical* importance to observe that human freedom, which is the indispensable characteristic of moral progress, cannot be preserved in the transition to the third stage unless by revelation reaching its completion in the incarnation. If humanity were to be led up to the highest stage wholly by means of an inward spiritual operation (the "ideal Christ" or the "God-spirit"), it could not maintain perfect freedom in relation to the divine act. Man could not

resist a merely inward spiritual agency; for in order to act *upon* him, it must already have inwardly determined his Ego, —his feelings, disposition, and intelligence,—and thus his freedom would be more or less impaired. An external revelation, on the contrary, presents itself first of all to perception, and taking its stand here, on neutral ground as it were, maintains its objectivity over against the Ego in such a way that the will remains free with regard to it, and can therefore freely appropriate the revelation that is given. The historical revelation in the God-man is mediated first of all through the senses; it offers itself to objective perception, and the Ego maintains its *freedom* over against the object presented to it.[1]

4. Again, when we decide to accept the God-man it is not an act of caprice on our part, but an act which is morally warranted and even morally necessary. This arises from the *uniqueness of the God-man;* for in Him dwells the fulness of the Godhead, and *only through Him can the highest moral stage be reached.* Here, indeed, it might be objected that the manifestation of God in one man is in contradiction with the very thing that is to be revealed, since God is infinite and cannot reveal His fulness in a single being, subject to the limitations of sense. If we say, then, that revelation must be consummated in the person of the God-man, does this not necessarily introduce confusion into the true idea of God? To this it may be replied, that if the infinitude of God meant indeterminateness, then a revelation of Him in the world of sense would be a contradiction. But the infinitude of God is not

[1] The necessity for an objective revelation is also evident from the following considerations: God cannot be comprehended by finite creatures if He is only a supersensible and omnipresent Being, if He does not, in Luther's words, become "inclosed for us" in a definite revelation, which the spirit of man can apprehend objectively; "if He does not summon us to some definite place where we are sure to find and have Him." Therefore the eternal Word clothes Himself in an outward manifestation in space and time; and the gospel is the proclamation or preaching of the Word become flesh. The necessity of the God-man for the consummation of revelation is in harmony, therefore, with the universal principle expressed in Rom. x. 17. Faith does not arise of itself or altogether from within. It is an important maxim both for ethics and dogmatics, that the outward word is necessary. For man's appropriation of the divine influence can preserve a moral form in no other way than by the revelation of God entering into the finitude and individuality which space and time impose, and by its becoming a historical power alongside of others, so that man can maintain his freedom towards it—that is to say, can reject or acquiesce in and accept it.

indeterminateness, *ἄπειρον*. On the contrary, it is intensive, it belongs to His ethical nature, and being such, it is quite compatible with determinateness. And a specific ethical character can certainly be revealed. The world, moreover, and man especially, is fitted to express not only what is finite, but also what is of infinite value, viz. the wisdom and love of God. Human nature has been created with special reference to the perfect revelation of love, that is, to perfect self-communication on the part of God.

Further, if God by becoming incarnate in a single person appears to confine Himself within limits, and thus to contradict His own universality, yet, on the other hand, it must be remembered that this revelation includes all men in its reference. It is true that Christ is only a single individual, but He has a universal significance. Regarded objectively, He is the manifested love of God to mankind in general; while, at the same time, regarded subjectively, or as a human being, He is the love that embraces the whole of humanity. On the legal stage what was wanting was a character wholly determined and animated by love. Accordingly Christ is unique for this reason, that as He offers Himself to all alike, so all see in Him the centre of humanity, since He is the man in whom the divine love has appeared in historical shape. When the idea of the God-man is realized, something of eternal and universal worth for the whole of humanity is given, and hence the God-man, the *δεύτερος Ἀδάμ*, is wholly unique. A repetition of the act in which the idea of God-manhood has been realized would be superfluous, and would disturb the unity of the world.

But now, what is the relation which *different individuals* bear to this one God-man, this productive archetype? The life of love, indeed, appears in a multiplicity of individual forms, but love is essentially one and the same. Since the God-man reveals the divine love in the form of a person, it follows that all men stand in essentially the same relation to Him to begin with; all alike need Him, and are capable of receiving Him. In like manner, He stands in essentially the same relation to all. He has not a peculiar affinity to certain persons, as if He were in a special sense *their* archetype, and the source of a higher life in *them*; for this would imply that

He was not so closely and essentially related to others. But although He is a single human individual as other men are, yet He is also unique. For as He devotes Himself to all alike, so all find in Him the objective historical centre of their higher life. He is the central man among men, since in Him the divine love, that invisible centre of the world, has appeared in history in a personal form, and become the personal head of humanity. From this it follows again as a matter of course that only one man such as He can appear. He is the true, predestined Head of humanity.

Thus, too, it becomes evident how faith in Him can be demanded of every one; in other words, it becomes clear that the *νόμος πίστεως* in Him expresses a duty which is just as true and essential as any other. Faith in Him must be required as a matter of universal obligation or duty. It may be said, though with no real force, "Faith is an act of caprice; it cannot be exercised knowingly and consciously as a duty, since that only can be called a moral duty which has an essential connection with our moral nature and constitution. But the God-man has only an accidental position with regard to men, a position that is conditioned by the accidental fact of sin. Consequently, when we put faith in Him we do not act morally, but only from caprice, and our act therefore is mixed up with sin, or is mere blind submission to the authority of the Church, just as the mission of the God-man is itself due to the *beneplacitum* of God, and is therefore an act of caprice." This objection, which, indeed, would strictly exclude the God-man from the moral organism which has existed in the thought and will of God from all eternity, is refuted by the fact that the bond which connects us with the God-man is not anything accidental to human nature. On the contrary, God had in view the moral perfection of man at the creation,[1] and this His final purpose cannot possibly be accomplished by a mere revelation of law, but only by the highest revelation of all, namely, one of love (§ 34). And as we have already seen, such a revelation cannot at first be wholly and simply an internal one, but must take objective shape in the God-man. Human nature, moreover, was constituted at *creation* in such a way, that, in the event of sin arising, we can be

[1] Col. i. 13–20; Eph. iii. 9 f., i. 9 f.

redeemed by the God-man; in that case we are referred to Him for deliverance, and have the power to receive Him. For from the uniqueness of His person the following results may at once be derived. Since there is in Him universal ethical power, sufficient for all, and since His relation to all men is not a mere accidental, but an *essential* one, so when sin arises He *can represent them before God*, can *make atonement* for and *perfect* them. And not only has He the power thus to reconcile and redeem men, it is His essential vocation so to do, not a vocation which He enters upon arbitrarily.

5. Further, Christ is also He through whom the *kingdom of God* really becomes the world's goal. His loving self-surrender to mankind awakens the faith and self-surrender of mankind towards Him; men become willing to be determined by His spirit and will alone, and to be filled with His all-sufficient power; and thus there begins to exist, both in the absolute and secondary spheres, a community of love of which He is the organizing principle. Believers now recognise that in Him they are united both to God and *to each other;* they begin to have a far higher idea of what community is, and to realize it in a far higher shape than what appeared in the natural associations of the first stage, or the communities that arose on the stage of right. Believers being united to Jesus have Him as their centre—in a historical and not merely transcendental, but also in an ideal and not merely an external sense; they find in Him their true unity, and yield themselves to be moulded by Him; and thus they now form a community of love, recognising that they are all members of one organism, of that true humanity of which the head is Christ. Now no such organic unity could result from a mere *immanent operation of the Divine Spirit.* In that case the unity that existed would be wholly inward and beyond experience, residing either in human nature itself, if we take the Pelagian view, or in God; it would remain behind a veil, and never be disclosed to consciousness. But the God-man, who takes possession of individual believers and brings them into organic connection with each other, is the real, historic head of true humanity, the humanity which corresponds with the ultimate destiny of man; He remains indissolubly bound up with mankind even after He has triumphed over sin and

death, and men recognise their unity in Him as an objective factor in the world's history.

When once the absolute stage of religion and morality has been reached, it never gives place to any other. For the God-man does not occupy in it a merely accidental position, such as is held in other religions by their founders and prophets (Moses, for instance). In it, on the contrary, the divine principle of mediation, which has taken historical form in the person of the God-man, ever remains an integral element. Were Christ to cease to be of permanent significance, it would follow that even the absolute religion is awaiting another religion to which it will give place, and that even that stage which exhibits the principle of morality in absolute perfection will yet cease to exist.

6. According to the exposition that has been given, the God-man is the means by which the world attains its consummation. But at the same time He is more than a means. In order to be a means in this absolute sense He must be love itself made manifest in a personal form. Now love, although it may make itself a means, yet contains also its end in itself, and is even an *absolute end in itself*. Hence we must not stop short with regarding the God-man as a means merely, as a theophany given wholly for ends that lie outside itself (Scripture speaks of a glorification of the person and personal dignity of Jesus). While He is all this to humanity, He is also in Himself a good within the world which the world cannot want; He is its crown and its shrine. He is the full manifestation of morality, inasmuch as in Him we have the unity of law, virtue and the supreme good. On the legal stage these three still stand outside each other. But as the God-man is the law unveiled and fulfilled, so in Him, too, we see virtue and virtuous energy in a personal form. As love manifesting itself personally and in union with God, He is the absolutely virtuous man, the virtue of our race.

Moreover, besides being a good in Himself, He is also the beginning of the existence of the chief good in the world, both in its subjective and its objective form; He is the fertile principle of its realization in humanity. Thus in Him the highest moral stage is realized in a personal shape. The God-man is necessary both as an end in Himself and as a means

for the realization of the kingdom of God, of which He is the head; that is to say, He is necessary for the consummation of the divine order of the world. [For we see that only through Him can humanity attain to the highest stage, whether we take sin into account or look at the matter apart from sin altogether.—Ed.]

7. The fundamental idea of which an exposition has been given appears in primitive Christian thought (Col. i. 13–20; Eph. iii. 9 f., i. 9 f.). It has also been accepted by great theologians in every age, such as Irenæus, Tertullian, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa; while in addition to many in the Middle Ages, Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin, Brentz, and Osiander present clear traces of it.[1] Here we would make only two additional observations.

(1.) *The absoluteness of Christian Ethics cannot be maintained unless we recognise* that the person of Christ is and continues to be essential to the absoluteness of the Christian religion.

(2.) What makes many hesitate to assent to the foregoing proposition is the idea that it would make the incarnation, which is the highest act of God's free love, not an act of free will at all, but of physical necessity. But since free love is something quite different from caprice, and is yet in itself a moral though not a physical necessity, this scruple is easily removed by the following considerations. When God, out of love and for the ends of love, wills the existence of the world, there is here no physical necessity, since the world adds nothing to the divine φύσις, and the latter cannot act by itself. But, at the same time, neither is there anything of the nature of accident or caprice. Whatever is in harmony with the divine love is good, and so morally necessary. Now we only proceed farther, as we must do to be consistent, and say —if God had not willed the world, then in that case the incarnation would in no wise be necessary; but since the free will of God *does* will the world, it must do so teleologically; that is to say, it must keep in view the final consummation of the world as its goal. Hence it must also will the existence of the God-man, without whom that consummation is impossible.

[1] Cf. my *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, Div. II. vol. iii. p. 248 et seq. (transl.), where the objections are discussed that have been brought against certain forms in which this doctrine has been stated.

SECOND PART.

THE GOOD AS REALIZED IN CHRISTIANITY.

§ 38. *Syllabus.* [Cf. § 5. 3, 4.—Ed.]

Division I. Christ the Incarnate Good, or the Realization, in principle, of Morality in Mankind.

Division II. The Christian Personality.

Division III. The Organized World of Christian Morality, or the Moral Community of the Kingdom of God.

Note.—Communities and individuals have already been considered in important and fundamental aspects—viz. in the forms which they take on the first stage or stage of nature, as well as in those which they assume on the stage of right. At present they have to be examined from the point of view of the second or spiritual creation, in which whatever was true in the earlier stages is preserved and carried forward to completion.

FIRST DIVISION.

CHRIST THE GOD-MAN, AS THE REALIZATION, IN PRINCIPLE, OF MORALITY IN MANKIND.

§ 39.

In Christ we have the perfect unity of the three fundamental forms of morality, viz. the law, virtue, and the chief good; so that He and He alone is the principle that has power to bring these into unity and coalescence. Thus Christ is (1) the *personal law of faith and life*—or the personal *conscience* of humanity. (2) He is absolutely pure and all-embracing *virtue;* and as such He has become the *personal satisfaction* for our race

towards God, a satisfaction that is offered to the faith of reconciled humanity. (3) As King of Love He is the beginning of the Kingdom of God, endowed with infinite fulness of power.

1. Since Christ, as belonging to mankind, is the living law or conscience of humanity, the virtue of our race, and its fundamental moral good, *ethical* Christology forms the complement to the doctrine of the Offices of Christ. When these three elements remain separate, it is a mark of moral imperfection, if not of sin itself. Their union is necessary to moral perfection, and involves perfect knowledge, a perfect heart, and perfect energy of will. It is true that we would have no right to take this ethical view of the person of Christ if He were a theophany merely, and not One who becomes man in a true, personal and moral sense—if, therefore, His ethical worth were not something which, while depending ultimately on an act of God, He nevertheless gained through conflict and development. But such is the case according to the Biblical view (Heb. ii. 17 f., iv. 15, v. 7 f.). His moral perfection is borne witness to by all His disciples (1 Pet. ii. 22; 2 Cor. v. 21; Phil. ii. 8, 9; Rom. v. 19; Heb. ii. 10, iv. 15, vii. 26); by His own declarations—as when He asserts that He is the Redeemer, and therefore One who does not Himself stand in need of redemption (Matt. v. 17; John viii. 29, 46; Matt. xx. 28, xviii. 20), and that He is the judge of the world (John iii. 36; Matt. xxv.); and finally, by the impression which the image of Christ makes at all times, and the power which continually flows from Him. Let us now consider one by one the three points which have been mentioned.

FIRST SECTION.

CHRIST THE PERFECT REVELATION OF THE DIVINE LAW.

§ 40.

Christ is the end of the law, inasmuch as He perfects it. And He perfects the law through His being the will of God unveiled and fulfilled. Thus He is, in His own person,

the perfect law of *life* and *faith*, permanently incorporated with humanity; He is the conscience of mankind. [Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, vol. iii. § 111.—Ed.]

1. The authority which we here ascribe to Christ as the "lex viva præsensque," can only belong to Him if He is not merely a man like ourselves but a revelation of the Father; not only a man furnished with divine powers, but He within whose person the Godhead dwelt. He is quite different from other religious teachers. We must not regard Moses, *e.g.*, as if it were his person that laid on us the obligation to obey his precepts. But Christ is the revelation of the Father in such a way, that while He is a man related to us and approachable by us, He at the same time has the knowledge of truth as His own personal possession. Thus His knowledge is that of the free Son of God. It is the archetype of ours and communicable to us; and more, it is the exemplar of ours, since Christ by self-discipline increased in knowledge and wisdom, and abiding in firm and faithful union with God became the conscience of humanity.

2. Now the perfect law is a *law of life* and of *faith* (§ 31. 3). Christ has become both of these, since (to use Dr. Schmid's[1] apt expression) He has perfectly "unveiled and fulfilled" the θέλημα of God by His teaching and His life.

(*a*) He is the *law of life* for us; for He unveils the true will of God by His teaching and life.

(*a*) By His *teaching*. The multiplicity of precepts enjoined in the old covenant are gathered up by Christ into the unity of the single commandment of love, which embraces all the powers of man (Matt. xxii. 37 ff., v. 44; Luke x. 27 f.). He thus gives man a deeper sense of what morality really is, and opens up in him the fountain of free, personal, moral knowledge (John viii. 32), in order that his moral obedience may be rendered free by his direct apprehension of moral truth (John iv. 14, vii. 38 f., xv. 15). The unity of Christ's law gives a united direction to moral effort (John xiii. 34). Hence to Christ no work is good unless accompanied by a

[1] *Quæritur de notione legis in theologia Christianorum morali rite constituenda*, 1832.

good intention and disposition; He rejects a mere mechanical form of religion (cf. what He says concerning sacrifice and the Sabbath, Matt. ix. 13; Mark ii. 27). Nor is an intention good unless accompanied by a good work (Matt. xv. 1 ff., Corban). But to Him those works alone are good which spring from the totality of a good moral character (Matt. vii. 17).

(*β*) By His *life*. Christ unveils the law of life perfectly and effectively by the example and pattern which He affords, or in other words, He unveils it by *fulfilling* it. By this means the law remains no longer in an impersonal form, a cold, dead γράμμα; but as personal, holy love, it assumes an attractive and lovely shape (John i. 14). Christ encourages us to fulfil the law by showing that it can be fulfilled, and thus establishing our belief in its perfect validity. It might be supposed, indeed, that since *He* was the Son of God, while *we* are the children of the sinful race of men, we cannot take Him as a pattern for ourselves, nor can He be a guarantee to us that the law can be fulfilled. But to this we reply, that if He had been sinless, holy, and just, not from His connection with God but in His mere power as a man, He would not in that case be a pattern for us, but a judgment against us. Besides, He would be an incomprehensible phenomenon in the midst of sinful humanity. But He is no such phenomenon as this; for while man He is also Son of God, the revelation of the Father, in whom God has made a new communication of Himself to humanity. Moreover, the revelation given in Him is intended for all men, in spite of sin and as a gift of free grace. That is to say, Christ is not only the law of life, but also and before everything else the law of faith, and as such He can be a pattern for men.

(*b*) *The law of faith.* Christ unveils the whole counsel and will of God from its very foundation. He does not, therefore, reveal the divine will merely as holy and just and so making demands upon us, but also in its pardoning and sanctifying character, and so as bestowing something upon us. The divine law of life, made manifest in Him, becomes fruitful and efficacious only by His being at the same time the law of faith. And this He is, because by perfectly fulfilling the demands of the divine θέλημα He has won in His own person

a good for humanity, which man has to receive by faith, and in which the power of reconciliation and sanctification dwells. This good is not merely something which He holds up to view and instructs us about, but something which He has to win in His own person as mediator (cf. *Second Section*). If He were merely a teacher and moral lawgiver, His person would have only an accidental significance, like that of Moses or one of the prophets. But Christ *is* what He teaches.

3. Christ, moreover, though He is an individual man, can be the all-embracing law for all men. The form of personality is not a limitation for love; it is rather the means by which love manifests itself. It is in the nature of love to take up its abode in individuals; and the divine good comes to actual historical existence in the person of Him who on His human side possesses every requisite for its manifestation. Thus He is the Son of man; He is of universal significance, and has the same relation to all. It is a duty incumbent upon the universal human conscience to acknowledge Christ as the law of faith and life; for he is the objective conscience of humanity, its ethical truth and wisdom. Thus it is possible for us to put faith in Him, as an act of conscience and not of blind caprice. The law given in conscience, which also has its origin in the Logos (John i. 4, v. 39), is meant to act as a "παιδαγωγός" (Gal. iii. 24). In other words, by recognising itself in Christ, and even finding in Him its own essential truth, it thus forms a stepping-stone to faith, which confides itself entirely to Him (John vii. 17). The eternal Logos uses conscience as a means of drawing men to Him who became flesh; in the first revelation, that, viz., which was made in the natural conscience of man, the second and perfecting one was kept in view; while conversely, the latter links itself on to the former. It is one and the same law which has its foundation in conscience and is perfectly revealed in Christ, and through Him it comes to universal realization.

This fact must give an ethical character to the whole doctrine of the appropriation of salvation. It is in direct opposition to that kind of faith which is satisfied with mere intellectual motives, with acts that spring from the head or understanding alone—the faith of Rationalism and of pseudo-orthodoxy with its intellectual legalism. On the other

hand, the true doctrine of Christ as the law of faith and life is also opposed to the error of *Antinomianism*. Antinomianism takes faith as constituting in itself the solution of the entire moral problem, and for this reason,—that in it a new and all-powerful principle of life is given, a principle which is regarded as the sum and substance of the whole matter, including within itself everything that is necessary for its own development. It is held that faith is not conditioned by any external authority, since in it Christ lives in us, and thus from its own inherent energy and power of self-development it has the right to legislate for itself. The Evangelical Church, on the contrary, rightly insists upon the *tertius usus legis*. Faith does not enable us to dispense with Christ as an objective, external law. For at first it is weak, and has to grow up into strength, and it can only grow by means of the same power that gave it birth—that is, through Christ. Thus faith as being imperfect ever stands in need of counsel and instruction, and must direct itself according to the standard of the objective perfect law which is given in Christ. Of course, to take Christ as the law of faith is not a relapse under mere outward authority; it is the means by which man is brought to repentance, and grows in knowledge and in freedom.

SECOND SECTION.

CHRIST THE ALL-EMBRACING VIRTUE, AND THE MAN WHO RENDERS SATISFACTION TO GOD.

§ 41.

Christ is *the Love of God become Man;* and thus He is the Virtue or Excellence of our race in a personal form, and *the Man who renders satisfaction to God.*

[Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, § 122 (119).—Ed.]

1. As is shown in Dogmatics, the appearance of Christ in humanity, in accordance with God's eternal purpose of reconciliation, is sufficient to ensure the possibility of reconciliation; its actual accomplishment, however, is a work which must be

carried out by the God-man in an ethical way. If in Christ only an act of *God* were to be seen, then we should have to assume that God could at once, and apart from Christ altogether, have forgiven all men alike, and absolved them from guilt and punishment. In that case nothing would be gained and accomplished by the work of the God-man which did not already exist in God. At the most, Christ would only teach and prove something, perhaps that God in Himself is reconciled with sin from all eternity, although this would do away with the absolute reprehensibility of wickedness, and its absolute liability to punishment. But, on the contrary,—while it is, of course, true that everything depends ultimately on the act of God which sent Christ into the world,—the God-man acquired a merit that has moral value in the eyes of God, a merit which became the salvation of humanity, and which, were it not for Christ's work, would be non-existent even for God. His own personal *virtue*, of which love was the centre, being put to the proof and tried, became a satisfaction with regard to God, and thus He acquired a merit which benefits the whole of humanity.

(*a*) First of all, Christ is the *person* in whom humanity satisfies the universal law of God. Through His own personal virtue He has, as a man, rendered complete satisfaction to the demands of the divine law, including the law of love.

(*b*) But inasmuch as He is also the man who stands in an essential relation to all men, His love has a unique function to discharge. Since His sinless holiness is exhibited amid a race of sinners with whom He is in vital connection, His love has assigned to it a vocation, a peculiar position and duty,—the duty, namely, not merely of recognising or judging the sin and guilt of humanity, but of taking the place of men as their high priest, and of bearing, in sympathy with them, their burden of sin and guilt, in order to wipe it away. And to do this, Christ, in His substitutionary love and high-priestly sympathy, had to take upon Himself the sense of the divine displeasure that hung over a guilt-laden world: He affirmed its justice, He tasted it, and would not save mankind in any way that might lessen the gravity of guilt, or affect the justice of that divine displeasure in which the whole punishment of sin is summed up. Thus from His personal purity and the

strength of His love on the one hand, and from His unique position to humanity on the other, He had to evince His love in a way that was quite peculiar and official. And this He did by converting the suffering He endured from the world's sin into suffering *for* the world's sin; and also by not shrinking from what was the hardest thing of all, — to bear in sympathy the sin of the world, become the substitute of sinful men, and sacrifice Himself for their sake.

(*c*) His sacrifice, moreover, is a merit, a sacred possession of humanity. For what the God-man did and suffered, God in His love both can and will make to be a benefit for all men. Not, indeed, on account of their relation to Christ, for as yet they do not believe in Him and love Him, but on account of Christ's relation to them, or because from love to them He has become their substitute. The result of this relationship of Christ to men is, that henceforth God no longer looks upon humanity simply as reprehensible and failing in the duty it owes Him. One who belongs to it has, in substitutionary love, fully satisfied the divine law; and He who has done so is not a mere single atom of humanity, but One in whom the moral energy of the whole race resides, and who is destined to be its centre and head. In the person of one at least, humanity satisfies the love and justice of God; He has made atonement to the honour of divine justice, and rendered what it demands: incorporated with humanity, He is a historical power within it, and as Son of man has a lasting relation to all men. Such a display and proof of love in absolute union with justice, thus given in historical shape in the midst of humanity, is an ethical good of absolute worth, a sacred treasure laid up for all mankind, which, in the eyes of God, mankind can never lose. It is an ethical product which is itself productive, and continues to act with creative power throughout all generations. It is set up in the midst of the ages, in order that men by receiving it may have the moral principle implanted within them in the fulness of its power (Rom. iii. 25). For sanctification is the goal of atonement and justification.

The God-man, moreover, also occupies an important position in His state of exaltation. As *intercessor* He is the substitute for the *imperfection* of believers, so that they as

being united to Him, and thus virtually sanctified, can go forward courageously and in the peace of God. The *historical work* likewise, which is carried on amongst *unbelievers* for His sake, continues to advance through His power and His intercession on their behalf. Hence the God-man is the noblest, the most indispensable good in the ethical world. Through Him that world is an actual "mundus, κόσμος," partly because it already belongs to Him, so far as it is pure and well-ordered, partly because it is destined to become His.

THIRD SECTION.

CHRIST AS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD, AND THE HEAD OF HUMANITY.

§ 42.

The archetypal and substitutionary or high-priestly love of Christ is also invested with power or efficacy. Christ is the King of love, since He sends into our hearts the spirit of reconciliation and love, and becomes the Founder of a kingdom of God's children. These being conformed to His death and life constitute together with Him a Kingdom or Whole, the Highest Good upon earth. Thus in Christ and His threefold office the chief good begins its existence, in a personal form, and endowed with an infinite fulness of power. [Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, iii. § 110.—Ed.]

1. Christ was indeed born a king. He is the Word made flesh (John i. 14), the reflection of the majesty of the divine nature, and His Davidic descent symbolizes His natural claim to be King of the kingdom of God (John iii. 35, xviii. 37; Col. i. 13–20; Heb. i. 1–6). He ascribes to Himself ἐξουσία over all flesh (Matt. xi. 27, xxviii. 18 ff.; John xvii. 2). But the *ethical* character of His person and work is shown in the fact that He by no means enters into direct possession of this kingdom of supreme power, but rather, and just as if He were not in Himself a king, goes out to seek His subjects

and win them to Himself by His love. He and God who is in Him will have nothing to do with a kingdom in which mere might and majesty are the ruling powers. God has already such a kingdom in nature. No, Christ seeks to rule in the hearts of men by first winning their hearts to Himself. That kingdom which is His by right He first builds up for Himself by ministering love, in humiliation, and consequently by ethical means; even as it is also in an ethical way that He becomes that which in Himself He is (§ 40. 2). Nay, even in His exaltation He withholds any display of mere power,—in order to leave room for freedom of choice,—stakes everything upon believing faith, and waits until His love, which meanwhile suffers itself to be misjudged, shall lead men to decide for Him inwardly and freely.

On the other hand, however, with regard to the time during which His love is a suppliant, the time when His kingly dignity is veiled in the lowliness of His person and kingdom,—with regard to this period it is very far from being a matter of indifference whether in Himself He possesses royal rank and supreme power or not. For if in Him there were no inherent sovereignty which stooped to humiliation, but if, on the contrary, His dignity were entirely the reward of His virtue, then the impression made by His condescending love would lack an element of essential importance,—the contrast, namely, between His royal dignity and His lowly estate, which more than anything else gives to the latter its wonderfully captivating power (Phil. ii. 6; 2 Cor. viii. 9). The mind and spirit of a king, the consciousness of ἐξουσία, appears in all that He does and says; and it is just by reason of His greatness and majesty forming a *foil* to His love, that the voluntariness and grandeur of that love are so clearly displayed ("Who for the joy that was set before Him endured the cross," Heb. xii. 2).

Moreover, what makes Him absolutely trustworthy for faith is that He has shown Himself to be a king, and is thereby pledged to prove Himself the supreme power over everything that exists, the founder and king of the one everlasting kingdom, from which He will cast out all that is impure and vile (Eph. v. 27, ii. 6, 18–22, i. 20–23; Matt. xxv. 31 f.; 1 John iv. 16 f.; Heb. xii. 22–28). And

although, during the course of the world's history, His kingly majesty, considered as mere external power, is still kept concealed by Him even as against His foes, yet the time is coming when it will be outwardly revealed. And even now His royal power is *operative* in the world, in an *ethical* form namely, and therefore in a way which enables man to decide freely for Him, not from prudence or fear, but from a longing after divine good. His self-forgetful love is not without effect; on the contrary, it is ever efficacious. The precious seed of the life of the God-man falls into the earth indeed and dies, but only that it may bring forth much fruit. The high-priestly love of Christ proves itself the true king of human hearts; for by His devotion to and for the sake of men He leads them to surrender themselves to Him, and binds them to Himself so that His spirit becomes a ruling power over them.

(*a*) The *first* thing He does is to give to those who receive Him His own spirit of righteousness and truth, the spirit which led Him to suffer *for* the sin of humanity as well as *from* it; so that they now abhor what is evil, and recognise, as He did, the guilt and punishableness both of the individual and of the race (John xvi. 8). The power of His suffering love becomes in them the principle of repentance, and brings them into the fellowship of His death (Rom. vi. 1 f.), so that they die to themselves, and know that in Him they are at once judged and reconciled.

(*b*) But Christ brings the old nature to *death* through repentance, in order that man may be filled with the spirit of peace and sonship, and become a new man (Rom. viii. 15). From the first-born Son of God the rights of children are transmitted to us.

(*c*) Moreover, Christ's fulfilment of the law is also shadowed forth in believers (Rom. viii. 4–6, 9–14, vi. 15 f.), and therewith Christ, as our archetype, enters upon a new form of activity. He becomes our example. As archetype He becomes productive in us. By our being made partakers of the *πνεῦμα* (John iv. 14, vii. 38, xii. 24, xvi. 7, 13 f.; 2 Cor. v. 17), our souls become fashioned after the likeness of the image of Christ. *Τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου πληροῦται ἐν ἡμῖν.* Believers are now no longer *δοῦλοι* merely (Rom. viii.

15; John xv. 15), with conscience and inclination still apart, and with the principle that rules their wills outside of them instead of in them. For they themselves now have the πνεῦμα, having been apprehended they now themselves apprehend, nay, they have become the possessors of the divine life, and by them it is wrought out in the world. And therewith the highest good also begins its existence in the believer; the three fundamental forms of morality which are united in Christ are reflected also in him, and their union begins and is carried on through the exercise of Christ's kingly power.

(*d*) But now, while believers make progress as single individuals, and have their natural capacities purified and animated by the Spirit of God, they do not remain in isolation from each other, as a mere multiplicity of free citizens of the kingdom of God, and forming a unity only through their relation to Christ, their common centre. On the contrary, they are all bound to each other in a fellowship of love in that kingdom; and besides, they group themselves together and form particular communities within it, so that the kingdom of God organizes itself in a plurality of different spheres, which all belong one to the other as members of the whole.

In what has been said we have brought to view the contents of the two remaining Divisions, which treat of the World of the Good in its highest realization. (1) *The Individual Christian Personality.* (2) *The Organized World of Christian Morality, or the Christian Communities.* According to the evangelical type of doctrine, we must begin with the first of these,—and for this reason, because true Christian life cannot exist unless through a death which the individual dies; and until individuals live this Christian life they cannot be true members of a community, any more than the community itself can take a Christian shape. The Roman Catholic Church, on the contrary, begins with the Church as an institution for the salvation of men. It does not permit the individual to come into connection with Christ directly, but only through the Church, the representative of Christ. By this means the freedom and equality of believing members are sacrificed to dependence upon the ecclesiastical institution and the clergy. Moreover, since the religious community has a sort of divine position assigned it, in which it is held to

control the operations of the Holy Spirit, it is set in a false relation to other moral communities, and these are lowered out of their rightful place.

It is true that according to the Evangelical Church also preaching or word and sacrament must precede faith (Rom. x. 17); but these are not the Church, they are simply the continuation of the activity of Christ. Thus the Evangelical doctrine avoids two opposite errors—the *spiritualistic* and the *empirical*[1] (Roman Catholic)—by teaching, on the one hand, that there is no Church until there are *vere credentes*, that it is *societas fidei et Spiritus Sancti* (*Conf. Aug.* vii. viii.); and, on the other, that faith can only be attained by means of word and sacrament. These are vehicles by which we arrive at immediate fellowship with Christ. They are the bridge, way, or path to Him, by means of which, even now, Christ Himself in the Holy Spirit keeps up intercourse with men. But Christ has by no means appointed the Church to be the substitute for His personal activity and His mission of the Spirit; it is only the organ through which He carries out His purpose that salvation be preached and offered to men. [Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. § 128.—Ed.]

SECOND DIVISION.

CHRISTIAN VIRTUE AS EXHIBITED IN THE INDIVIDUAL.

§ 43. *Introduction.*

The principle of moral perfection which is in Christ is designed to be transmitted to us by our being receptive towards the love of the God-man, or towards the communication of His redeeming and perfecting power. This receiving of Christ is *faith*. Faith is the fundamental excellence or virtue (of a receptive nature) exhibited by the redeemed, because it is the willingness to receive the

[1] Empirical, because the Roman Catholic Church stops short with the empirical Church as the goal, instead of rising to Christ in faith.

love of Christ in its reconciling, sanctifying, and perfecting power. Moreover, since faith gives its assent to Christ and His saving purpose, and allows itself to be determined, yea, filled by His power as Redeemer, it becomes an image of that union of law, virtue, and the chief good which is exhibited in Christ. That is to say, in faith the perfect Good begins to be realized in a new, spontaneous, and productive life. Of its own free will faith makes what it has received its own, and thus a new, spontaneous, and productive life is created. This new life reveals itself both as knowledge and as will. When it takes the character of *knowledge* of the highest ideal aim, there arises the virtue of Christian *hope* (or wisdom); when it takes the character of *will*, we have the virtue of Christian *love*, which is the fulfilling of the law.

1. Christ at first stands *over against* us objectively, as the law of faith and life, and demands that we put faith in His act of atonement and in His purpose to perfect us, while He also demands that we imitate His life. But He also initiates the fulfilment of this law by taking us into fellowship with Himself. He conveys His image and His Spirit out of their bare objectivity into our inmost nature, and makes them our own possession. And when this has been done, man has now the law of his life and spirit within himself (Rom. viii. 1 ff.).

This, then, is the subject which our Second Division has to take up, viz. the *Christian in his individual personality*. That Division must contain the doctrine of the moral *excellence* or *virtue* which is produced when the moral law has obtained an entrance into man's heart, and has thus reached that personal mode of existence which it is meant to have. It must therefore treat of Ethical Dynamics, or the doctrine of Moral Energy. And this it must do in such a way as *at the same time to bring to light the operations or functions of this energy; that is, those acts of virtue (or of duty) by means of which moral excellences and moral communities are originated or maintained.* For as soon as the individual has become a Christian, there lies immanent

within him, as an end and impulse, the activity which has to be manifested in the kingdom of God. He cannot remain idle, or enjoy a dream-life of mere egoism. For he has been set down in the midst of a Whole, in the world, namely, which has to be moulded into moral shape, and made the kingdom of God; and of this kingdom, which is the highest good, the Christian himself is already a part, and that a productive one. The compassion of Christ for the sin and misery of the world is reflected in believers also, and arouses their readiness to work and suffer for His sake, for His kingdom, and His glory (Col. i. 24).

In the Christian personality itself there is a multiplicity of energies, but these are all combined in it so as to form a unity, in which the divine life and the human have entered into union with each other. At first, Christ is the whole virtuous energy of our race; but this is not yet *our* virtue. Nay, His virtue cannot, and is not to become ours so as to leave no distinction between them. He is the God-man, we are to become men of God. His virtue is that of the Head of humanity—prevenient, redeeming, communicating love; we who are to be redeemed stand to Him in the position of recipients, or as those who put *faith* in His creative, because God-incarnate love. Hence, while our virtue must indeed correspond with the Redeemer's, this does not mean that it is to be a repetition of His redeeming love, but that through a believing experience of His love we from being the recipients of it are to become loving ourselves.

Further, in order that we may resemble Christ in all His perfection, all our powers must enter as recipients into the act of faith, and Christ must also be received in His *entirety*. Intelligence, will, and feeling are alike appealed to by Christ, until through His image and the working of His Spirit all these functions are brought to converge into one focus, into the living receptivity of the whole nature, and there the spark of life can now fall, and the new God-created personality arise. This receiving of Christ is not mere helpless passivity; it involves self-determination, a willingness to be determined by the Redeemer; and for this reason faith is treated, both in Scripture and in Church confessions, as a virtue (1 Cor. xiii. 13).

Since faith thus marks the fundamental position which the Christian holds, or is the fundamental Christian virtue, it contains in embryo the Christian *character* in general. Hope and love, however, as we shall shortly see, are the essential forms in which it manifests its life; they come into existence along with faith, and with it constitute the new man. In faith man attains to a good state of being, of objective worth while subjective in form, and out of this goodness of the new man there now arise single virtues and virtuous acts. Faith in the Christian is the copy of what Christ was as the God-man; what He became through the act of incarnation we become, representatively, when we receive His redeeming power. Through faith we become children of God, as Christ is the Son of God. As firm, unbroken union with God in Christ, as trust and confidence in Him, and also as simple receptiveness, faith never ceases; as imperfect knowledge, however, it is destined to come to an end in perfect knowledge, that is, in sight. In 1 Cor. xiii. 13, love is said to be greater than faith, just as the ripe fruit is better than its green beginning; nevertheless the beginning lives on in the growth.

But now the question arises—if faith is thus the unity, in principle, of all Christian excellence, how are we to arrive at the manifold variety of Christian virtues? and more, how can we, in order to preserve the unity, evolve the diversity from it?

2. *Analysis and Classification of the Forms of Virtue.*—In the ancient world, ethics oscillates—to use the language of Schleiermacher—between two extremes. On the one hand, virtue is regarded as a unity which refuses to admit of analysis or separation into component parts (as in Stoicism); while, on the other, we are presented with a multiplicity of virtues, and still more of virtuous acts, which are taken up empirically merely, and are not brought together into unity. *Δικαιοσύνη* is almost regarded as the highest good, but is too formal to admit of all the virtues being derived from it. Rothe takes, as the basis of his analysis of the forms of virtue, a consideration of the objective work, the moral good for which they exist; and defines virtue as that peculiar property of the individual man, which makes him specifically fitted for

the realization of the highest good. But virtue does not exist merely for the sake of something else than itself; in itself it is also an ultimate end and a good. Objective works too, if they are to be produced by human beings, must presuppose that there is already in these beings something corresponding with themselves. So we confine ourselves, to begin with, to the person of the believer, in whom the virtuous power resides, and inquire here after a basis for our classification.

Now we have seen that in the human personality—(1) distinctions of a mental kind are to be found; especially that between knowing and willing. The latter faculties, when occupied with what is moral, appear as conscience and freedom (§ 11, 12). (2) Further, we have in man the distinction between mind and nature. We have now to relate faith—this unity, this fundamental receptive virtue—to both of these antitheses, in order to watch its development, and so obtain the classification which we seek.

(*a*) A basis for the classification of the forms of virtue is given us, first of all, from the mental side of the moral constitution, in the distinction between conscience and freedom; and this distinction refers us back to that between knowing and willing, the union of which is, as we have seen, the moral task which has to be accomplished. Now, if faith be really the fundamental virtue, we must be able to show that in it there is the unity of conscience and freedom, that in it the process has actually begun by which these are to be truly interwoven with each other. In faith, conscience is sharpened and on the alert, caprice or false freedom is negated through repentance, and the will is turned towards the good, the ethically free towards the ethically necessary. Accordingly, there is in faith, in fact, the double germ of two moral forces or virtues which are held by it in unity, the one referring to cognition and conscience, the other to the will. But these do not lose their distinction in faith. Moral progress is possible only through the fact that while the bond which unites them, viz. faith, remains unsundered, it is at one time the cognitive element, at another the volitional, which becomes predominant.

Now the new man, as free and exercising *will*, possesses

Christian *love;* as exercising *cognition,* he possesses Christian *wisdom.* If faith is the fundamental receptive virtue of the Christian, wisdom and love together form his fundamental productive virtue. Both of these determine each other reciprocally and act together, but each has its special function. Wisdom constructs the aims of ethical production —wisdom, of course, enriched by the spirit of love. Love, again, is the basis of the Christian disposition, it gives the will its virtuous character. Hence Scripture sees in love, as the *inward disposition* of the believer, the unity of all free moral excellence, the fulfilling and "ἀνακεφαλαίωσις" of the whole law (Rom. xiii. 8 f.; Matt. xxii. 40). But, on the other hand, in order that love may find *active exercise,* it is necessary that ideals be properly formed, and that the right means be found whereby they are to be realized. Hence love itself gives to cognition the impulse to become wisdom— wisdom based upon that knowledge, given in faith, which is its foundation and beginning, the knowledge of God in Christ. Thus Christian wisdom and love spring simultaneously from faith, as co-ordinate virtues which have their unity in true faith. Of course, the concrete *exercise* of love presupposes the exercise of wisdom, for what is willed from motives of love must have previously existed in thought and been recognised to be a good. Still, love, as the Christian disposition, must co-operate in the formation of ideals.

But now, how does what we have said agree with the fact that in 1 Cor. xiii. 13 it is *hope* that is mentioned in the place of Christian wisdom, and that our thesis treats hope as the intellectual virtue which springs from faith? Is not hope a much narrower concept than wisdom? Knowledge certainly embraces a wider field than hope. Hope directs its gaze to the *future,* while faith, as distinct from it, has regard to acts of God in the *past,* and love lives chiefly in the *present.* But if we leave out of sight the knowledge of past acts of God, since faith already possesses such a knowledge, then Christian wisdom is directed, before everything else, to the true τέλος, to the *good things* that are imperishable. And more than this, it is not a barren knowledge, like so much that does not deserve the name; it is a knowledge that wills the highest ends, and carries in itself the certainty of their accomplishment. But

practical wisdom such as this is nothing else than hope, which, inspired with faith, makes the future live in the present, apprehends the true goal to which the world is surely advancing, and holds it up before love, that love may take it as its own goal and work for its attainment. No knowledge can be ethically fruitful unless it be of a *telcological* kind; it must terminate in an end that has to be realized, and this end forms the contents of *hope*. Thus we may, in the strictest sense, take Christian hope and moral wisdom together. For the latter is wisdom animated with a practical purpose, wisdom directed to the solution of a moral problem, and all other knowledge is of moral value only as a preliminary condition of this practical wisdom, and as the means which it employs. It is the crown of knowledge; it is Christian hope consciously exercised, and apprehending that which is eternally true and which will yet be realized.

In another and formal aspect the idea of hope is wider than that of moral wisdom; for hope also includes courageous trust, assured confidence that the good work will be perfected. But it derives such confidence from the knowledge that this work has already been begun (Phil. i. 4, 6)—that is to say, from faith. Hence, in hope faith still lives and acts; or, to look at the same thing in another way, hope, in order to animate its courage, goes back to faith, which is its root, just as love also derives its joy from the same source. Thus when we survey the triad of faith, hope, and love, it is evident that as hope and love proceed from faith as their source, so they return into it again; and consequently this triad forms the complete whole of personal Christian morality,—a whole that is even separating into its component elements, and ever returning to unity again.

(*β*) Thus we have the primary division of Christian virtue into the triad "faith, love, and wisdom." A second principle of division is now given us in the further antithesis that exists in the moral constitution between *nature* and *spirit*—spirit, that is, as the *νοῦς* united with the *πνεῦμα*. Nature has a relatively independent existence. Hence it can limit the Christian spirit, and it does so through the flesh. Thus it is the task of the spirit to maintain itself against such restraints, and not only so, but also continually to extend its dominion.

And this it is possible for it to do, because everything it does reacts upon its state or character (§ 11, 7). Now by the *practice* of such self-assertion, Christian virtue becomes *habit* or a *second nature*. Thus we arrive at the distinction between virtue as an inward disposition and virtue as a habit or settled tendency to manifest and assert itself. If we now apply what has been said regarding virtue as a habit, or virtue persevered in (*ὑπομονή*), to the triad of faith, wisdom, and love, there results (1) perseverance in faith, which is *fidelity;* (2) perseverance in wisdom, or *sober-mindedness;* (3) virtuous *stedfastness*, or the *ὑπομονή* of love. The principle of Christian virtue manifests itself in the second triad no less than in the first. For it is a living power; if it is through the first triad that the Christian personality, as such, *comes into being*, it is through the second that it *continues to subsist.*

Christian virtue, moreover, can only *assert itself*, in spite of the checks and interruptions which it receives, by the faculties which worked abnormally and in the service of sin being more and more withdrawn from the sway of the sinful principle, and by their being appropriated by and assimilated to the renewed will. Christianity does not oppose evil desires with mere cold reason, in order to control and restrain them. For in that case they would always continue to exist inwardly. (And hence, if a man were merely to restrain himself from outward acts of sin, there would still be a contradiction between what is inward and what is outward; the apparent good would be unreal—what Luther was accustomed to call "pharisaic holiness.") No, Christianity drives out evil desires by the power of a *nobler* one, by a higher passion or *enthusiasm*,[1] so that the lower appetites gradually wear out and disappear of themselves. The more this takes place, the more completely does the principle of virtue *take possession* of the whole person and faculties of man, and the more thoroughly does the *new personality* and its moral excellence (*i.e.* its virtue as a whole) *develop* into a *new manifoldness of virtues* and virtuous acts. And further, the believer will, *on all occasions, devote his virtuous energies and efforts to that portion of the chief good, or kingdom of God, which ought to be realized*,—and this *both as regards his individual character and the outside world.*

[1] Cf. *Ecce Homo*, 4th ed. 1866.

Accordingly, we have the following division :—

§ 43a. *Syllabus.*

FIRST SECTION. The *Genesis* of the Christian Character, or of the New Personality regarded as an inward δύναμις.

SECOND SECTION. The *Subsistence* of the Christian Character by means of Virtuous *Self-preservation* (Ascetics).

THIRD SECTION. The Manifestation and *Self-development* of the Christian Character.

FIRST SECTION.

THE GENESIS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER.

CHAPTER FIRST. Of regenerating *faith*, the cardinal *receptive* virtue.

CHAPTER SECOND. Of *love*, the cardinal *productive* virtue of the *will*.

CHAPTER THIRD. Of *wisdom* (*hope*), which, active and inventive in its own nature, becomes, when united with love, the cardinal *productive* virtue of the *intellect*.

Note 1.—The blending together of willing and knowing, of outward self-manifestation and inward self-culture.

Note 2.—Relation of the four cardinal virtues of the ancient world, ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, φρόνησις, to the three Christian ones of faith, love, wisdom (hope). By Schleiermacher δικαιοσύνη is raised to the level of love, while faith is related to wisdom (σωφροσύνη and φρόνησις), so that hope is left to represent ἀνδρεία. But faith is not identical with knowledge ; it is the principle of love just as well. Faith is rather the principle of virtue as a whole, the primary form in which all virtue exists, the principle of love as well as of wisdom. Inasmuch as δικαιοσύνη was very commonly regarded by the ancients as embracing the whole of virtue, its place is most properly taken by faith, the true foundation of the Christian character ; while ἐγκράτεια and ἀνδρεία, as belonging to the will, correspond with love ; σωφροσύνη and φρόνησις (knowledge), on the other hand, being included in hope.

CHAPTER FIRST.

FAITH.

§ 44.

[Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, vol. i. pp. 31–184, especially § 11; vol. iv. § 128 and § 131, 132. Also, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* (*Der Kieler Vortrag über Rechtfertigung*, 1867. *Das Prinzip unserer Kirche*), pp. 48, 153.—Ed.]

When the gospel of Christ is received by the conscience, repentance is produced. The course of repentance, when it is pure and normal, is as follows. On the one hand, sin and guilt are seen in the light of the righteousness of Christ, and hence the *knowledge* of sin arises; on the other, there is an awakening of the *will* to resist evil and the power of evil; and these are so united in a sense of remorse and pain that a *feeling* of personal helplessness ensues, or—what is the same thing looked at from another side—a feeling that higher help is absolutely needed, and a longing that it may be bestowed. And now, starting with this longing, a *second process* commences, in which the activity of the will is predominant. The gospel, which initiated the process of true repentance, now becomes a law of faith, a command addressed to man to submit to be redeemed by Jesus. By this means the conscience is *enlightened* to perceive that faith in Christ is a moral duty, and the human *will*, by yielding itself to be apprehended by Christ, responds to His will which seeks to apprehend it. Thus we arrive at that act of faith which has at once a divine and a human side, that act in which man rises clear of the thought of his own righteousness and merit, as well as of his own guilt and sin, and not only sinks and forgets everything of his own in believing contemplation of Christ, but also gives his willing consent to the substitution which Christ in His love has made

for us. Thus, in *the third place*, Christ can now dwell in the heart and give it peace; He now unbosoms Himself to the soul that has put its trust in Him, and unites Himself to it in the bonds of love, that it may realize that the sin and guilt which belong to it have become His, and are swallowed up in Him, while all that belongs to Him is now its own possession. The blessed sense of all this is the light of life to the new man; at one and the same time he knows Christ as his Redeemer, and himself as redeemed and a child of God; it is a human knowledge, but filled with divine certainty.

[LITERATURE. — Köstlin, *Der Glaube.* Jonathan Edwards, *Remarks on the Trinity and the Economy of Salvation,* New York 1880, pp. 64–71. Gloag, *A Treatise on Justification by Faith,* 1856. Frank, *System der christlichen Gewissheit. System der christlichen Sittlichkeit,* i. § 4, 16, 17. Ritschl, *Rechtfertigung,* etc., iii. cap. 9. Martensen, *Christian Ethics,* ii. p. 142 sq. Rothe, *Theol. Ethik,* 1st ed. vol. ii. p. 434 sq.—ED.]

Note.—In order to understand how faith or regeneration arises, three points will have to be attended to. (*a*) At every stage there must be a co-operation of divine and human activity (*b*) This activity must be exerted in two leading directions—on the one hand, in repudiating the old life; on the other, in turning to the new life of salvation in Christ. (*c*) As the entire power of Christ was required for our redemption, and was manifested in the threefold office in which He personally revealed Himself, so the activity which is displayed from the side of man, and which is, as it were, capable of admitting the redeeming power of Christ, demands the exercise of the entire energy of his nature—chiefly in the way of receiving. And this whole energy of man is manifested both in rejecting what is opposed to God and in welcoming what is good, until at last it becomes indissolubly united with the moral power of Christ, and his will too, as recipient, becomes one with the will of Christ as communicative.

1. *The necessity both of the divine and the human side in the work of salvation* is apparent enough in general. The whole work of conversion is at one and the same time divine and human. This fundamental principle is opposed both to the Pelagian and the Magical theory. The Pelagian is irreligious,

the Magical is unethical. But true religion is ethical, and rests on an ethical conception of God, while true morality does not remain satisfied with mere human goodness by itself. Thus the Magical theory is only seemingly and superficially religious, the Pelagian only superficially ethical.

Now, if we ask more definitely wherein consists the divine element in the work of regeneration, and wherein the human, the first point (as belonging to Dogmatics) need not detain us. The divine factor, to which man must surrender himself, is—speaking generally—Christ, as we have shown in our First Division. There we saw that Christ is the Redeemer who unceasingly offers Himself to humanity,—primarily in Word and Sacrament, secondarily in the Christian community,—and who through His Spirit creates and establishes a new personal life in those who accept Him in the obedience of faith. The image of Christ must be present and efficacious in each stage of the saving process, it must accompany and direct them all. Christ must be present as the living law of faith and life, a law which addresses itself to our conscience, but still is more than our conscience (1 John iii. 19 f.), since He prepares us to receive Himself or to have faith in Him. It is therefore by no means necessary that repentance and contrition should first of all be wrought entirely by a law apart from Christ altogether, and then, when the penitent is in despair, that something should be communicated to him by Christ; on the contrary, Christ may, nay, means to work from the beginning upon the hearts of children baptized into the Christian Church. It would stamp the position of Christ as merely accidental, and undertaken on account of sin, if an extra-Christian legal economy had first of all to be brought into operation,—the remnant, so to speak, of an order of the world which did not include Christ in its original purpose at all. He who is the perfect law is able of Himself to act as law, to bring men, on the one side, to a knowledge of their sin and guilt, and, on the other, to penitence and heartfelt shame.

Outside of Christianity the knowledge of sin and guilt is not so easily brought into unity with penitence. There we find only an alternation of moods; at one time man in his contrition rejects what is evil as if sin had no power within him, at another he knows he is under the bondage of sin, but now the

undaunted resolution to reject sin in spite of everything is absent or extinguished. The objective word of Christ, on the contrary, has the power of uniting these two things—on the one hand, a recognition of the depth of sin and of the bondage into which it has brought us, and on the other an ever-hopeful struggle against the feeling of despair (a feeling which is very apt to become disguised Pelagianism, either resting satisfied with mere self-condemnation, or finding refuge in lowering the demands of the divine law and minimizing its gravity). For the gospel of Christ holds out help to every one, and prevents despondency, without, however, encouraging recklessness or carelessness. The image of Christ in His sufferings for us vanquishes pride, humbles us, and makes us sensible of our worthlessness and of the punitive justice of God, while it nevertheless restrains us from that slavish fear which would kill love at the outset. For Christ is with us and for us.

Note.—When the knowledge of Christ, of His holiness and grace, enters into the first conscious beginnings of life, the process of conversion runs its most normal course. The accusation and judgment of the law do not then operate without any sense of grace accompanying them, but the state of grace entered upon at baptism can continue to last and be carried forward to perfection. But notwithstanding, the process must take place. This remains certain—that the old man must be put to death through the will of the new man, through self-renunciation. *Christiani non nascuntur, sed fiunt renascendo.*

2. *Human activity* must have a place in the work of conversion; man has to play his due part in it, with all the energies of his nature. He must assist with his personal volition; the good cannot be forced upon him, because a good produced in a magical way would be worthless, and no real good at all. No one enters the kingdom by lethargy and feebleness, the *βιασταί* take it by force (Matt. xi. 12; Phil. iii. 12). Our salvation must be wrought out with *φόβος* and *τρόμος*. So little is it the case that passivity and weakness of will are the way to Christ, that, on the contrary, the strongest will-power which can be exercised towards Him is requisite in order to reach His kingdom. Only it must be remembered that this activity is not productive; its mani-

festation is of necessity principally of a negative kind, consisting in self-renunciation, the breaking down of self-will and pride, and the bearing of the "cross of Christ" (Matt. xix. 29, xvi. 24). The abnormal development that has hitherto gone on must be cancelled; we must be willing to go back to the commencement of that false by-path along which we have come; for a new and pure development is made possible only by our returning to the beginning and becoming children again (Matt. xviii. 1 ff.; John iii. 5). So great is the self-conquest which is required here, that the apostle often likens it to death (Rom. vi. 2 f.; Gal. ii. 19; Col. ii. 12).

The gospel has the following effects:—(1) It gives us the *knowledge* of guilt and sin, by setting over against us the holy prototype we have in Christ; the Holy Spirit ἐλέγχει (John xvi. 8). (2) It *awakens* the will, that is, it produces repentance, ἀναστρέφεσθαι. (3) It arouses a *longing desire* after the righteousness of Christ, after justification or reconciliation, and sanctification (Matt. v. 6). When a man's knowledge of his own wickedness and his repentance for it have come to maturity in the fixed determination to reject evil, when, further, he is aware of the power that evil has over him,—which shows that his resolution or ideal rejection of evil is not yet the victory over it,—and when, finally, his sense of guilt and punishment is so quickened that to remain as he is would be utter misery,—all this must serve to drive him out of himself, and draw him towards the source whence a better life-motive has come to him. And now, the more simply and firmly that Christ (in His entirety), as set forth in Scripture, takes hold of him, the more does he *know* that in Christ is to be found whatever he needs, and in this way the higher life-motive within him is encouraged by Christ to manifest itself more and more clearly, just as the sun draws a seed upward from the bosom of the earth (John iii. 19 f., v. 38–47). Recognising that unless new fountains of life are opened up to him, he is lost and must remain a moral chaos, he enters upon that stage of progress in which he sees it to be his *moral duty* to accept the quickening influence of those fountains to which access has been given. That is to say, he sees it to be his duty to *believe*, to renounce himself, and to sur-

render himself wholly to Christ. The conflict and discipline carried on by the believer against the old man has not taken its true form, until his determination to throw off the old man includes the conscious and definite resolve to submit himself to be determined by Christ. Where the will refuses its consent to this, egoism still remains unbroken, whether it show itself in the form of self-satisfaction and self-righteousness, or in the form of a self-accusation that is more severe than Christ Himself. The sacrifice which must be made of the old man does not only mean that we are to give up sensual desires and a sensual life; it also means that we must give up the idea of the insignificance of sin,—the idea, that is, of self-justification, or that any help can be derived from ourselves,—and, on the other hand, the idea that guilt cannot be pardoned at all.

Moreover, faith ought to rise above all these, as things it has left behind, into a quite legitimate idealism, in which it takes Christ in His full significance as Mediator, and, on the ground of that real union we have with Him in the sight of God, regards that which is as yet wanting in us as already existent, since it has a real existence in Christ. Our resolution to be determined wholly by Christ is, however, very different from a mere *quietistic* waiting for His help, or a mere striving against the old man and everything which would draw us away from faith; it is an act of the obedience of faith, resting upon the fundamental fact that we are drawn to Christ and laid hold of by Him, a resolution to put our trust in Him as our Redeemer as well as our Saviour.[1]

3. Accordingly, faith in the evangelical sense is not merely historical in its nature—*notitia*—nor a mere general assent, involving no personal relations,—*assensus*,—but along with both of these it is also *fiducia*. This third element, which formed the central point of the Reformation and gave to it its characteristic form, includes personal trust in the Redeemer, the closest union with Him, and willingness to cast oneself upon Him alone. It involves the following:—

(*a*) The person of Christ makes a powerful impression upon the *feelings*.

[1] What is the meaning of Luther's "*mere passive*"? It applies to justification; without our co-operation, before we believe, God's forgiveness is offered us for the sake of Christ.

(*b*) On the *cognitive* side, we are conscious that Christ is worthy of our confidence, Christ, that is, as presented in the word of God and preached by the Church; and we know that it is our duty to seek salvation in Him, although *before* faith has arisen it cannot be a matter of actual experience that in Him salvation is to be found.

(*c*) But *fiducia* is pre-eminently a matter of *volition*. It is the willingness to be determined by Christ, to entrust oneself to Him without reserve. In faith as *fiducia* there is, to use Schleiermacher's fine expression, a general movement of the whole heart and soul towards Christ, in order to receive from Him salvation and life. And whoever knocks, to him it shall be opened (Matt. vii. 7). In confiding faith we reach that point at which the Holy Spirit can bear witness to our spirits that we are the children of God, and arouse in us that first sign of life which the new man gives—prayer to God as a forgiving Father (Rom. viii. 15; Gal. iv. 6). The heart is relieved of its burden in the certainty that sin has been wiped away; our conscience becomes light and free, for we have the peace that passeth all understanding, the experience of justification; while we are filled with joy in the Holy Spirit, for we know that heaven is open, and that the way is clear to our Father's house. This is what Scripture refers to when it says we are *sealed* through the Holy Spirit (σφραγίς) (John iii. 33, vi. 27; 2 Cor. i. 22; Eph. i. 13, iv. 30; Rev. vii. 3–8). And now the new birth has taken place, and is consciously realized, and hence it is spoken of in the Apocalypse as the giving of a new name (ii. 17).

This sealing (*certitudo salutis*), upon which the Reformers universally lay so great stress, is therefore not to be identified with the act in which even an undoubting faith accepts Christ; it is rather a *divine answer* to the petition involved in faith when it embraces Christ, an effect produced within us by the object of our faith, and involving the knowledge both of the divine truth of the object of faith and of the saving and blessed relation in which we stand to Him. He who has it has no right to regard himself as superior to one who, although a believer, does not yet possess it. Nevertheless man naturally desires to participate in this *certitudo salutis*, and Christ purposes to give it to him. When therefore it is

wanting, hindrances must exist which will have to be taken out of the way, and the knowledge that it has been denied him is meant to stimulate the believer to have these hindrances removed. They will be found to disappear more and more, the more that he accustoms himself to lay aside disquietude, impatience, and restless haste, as well as spiritual indolence and timidity, and to adopt a simple childlike state of mind, in which, while fully aware of his sinfulness and honestly striving against it, he can yet wait cheerfully, patiently, and trustfully, without losing his longing desire for the full experience of salvation.

Along with the assurance of salvation wrought in him by the Holy Spirit, man also becomes a partaker of divine knowledge. At one and the same time there is given him a real knowledge of his own personal redemption, resting upon experience, and also a knowledge of Christ as the Redeemer with whom faith has brought him into fellowship; and therewith conscience receives a new position (1 Pet. iii. 16; 1 John iii. 19–21; 2 Cor. i. 12; 1 Tim. i. 5; 2 Tim. i. 3; Heb. xiii. 18). Thus the inward fruit of faith is a knowledge which is the basis of all further knowledge, the beginning of divine *wisdom*. It is a knowledge on the believer's part that he is known and loved by God in Christ; further, it is a knowledge of the faithfulness, holiness, and love of Christ Himself; and, finally, it is a knowledge of what we become through Christ and are designed to be in His kingdom.

Further, this knowledge becomes at the same time a living motive to the will. Accordingly it furnishes a point of commencement for *love*, and love, by uniting in itself both knowledge and will, gives us the *union in principle of freedom and conscience*. Faith believes in the love of God in Christ which is offered it, it evinces towards that love the trustful reverence which it claims, it is that response to the love of Christ which Christ seeks; nay, more, as the thankful acceptance of love, it is the felt need of love, the willing consent *to be loved*. Thus in it egoistic isolation is abandoned, and in its self-surrender there is a positive inclination towards God in Christ. Hence it is that in the Gospel of John our Lord, when speaking of faith under these aspects, calls it love. And, finally, there grows up in faith a free desire to *bestow*

love, resting upon the acceptance and experience of the love of God. For this experience kindles love in return. True faith is not egoistic, eudæmonistic, looking only to remission of punishment; it is a hunger and thirst after righteousness, and after that holiness with which it has been brought into close connection by its apprehension of Christ. Thus faith is love potentially; that is to say, it can grow into love by means of that which it has embraced and made its own.

CHAPTER SECOND.

LOVE.

§ 45.

Since faith, by involving repentance, overcomes sin in principle, and since at the same time it opens the door of the heart and admits the divine saving power to take possession of a man, so that he becomes in his own person the central seat of a new life, it follows that the new man, born of God, cannot but image forth the divine love. Receptivity becomes spontaneity and productivity. The new creation is something that has to be preserved and maintained, and the Spirit of God becomes the motive power in the believer's life. The love of the man who has been born into the new life turns naturally towards its origin first of all, and becomes free, reverent, filial love to the Three-one God who first loved him. Then springing from love to God there arises in the new man Christian love to his neighbour and love to himself, and both of these are united and harmoniously balanced in love to the kingdom of God.

[LITERATURE.—Rothe, 1st ed. i. p. 385, ii. pp. 350, 371, 2nd ed. i. pp. 500–557. Cf. Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, ii. 159 sq. Lemme, *Die christliche Nächstenliebe*.—ED.]

1. The Roman Catholic Church is afraid that unless justification be made the reward of sanctification, zeal for sanctification would be wanting. And in consequence of this fear

there are also Evangelical theologians, such as Hengstenberg, who agree with the rationalists in assuming different degrees of justification, each one corresponding with the degree of sanctification that merits it. The fear lest the Evangelical doctrine of justification might become an excuse for indolence would be well grounded, did we not hold fast the close connection between faith and repentance. For those who truly believe, it is so entirely a matter of course to repudiate evil, that a faith without repentance would be a self-contradiction. In addition to this, the Roman Catholic and rationalistic doctrine fails to give us the rationale of pure love. If the purpose of my love is to merit salvation for myself, then it is not pure love. Such a love cares only for itself; in it I make love a means for my own ends; I do not make my neighbour an end in himself. The Evangelical doctrine, on the contrary, knows that nothing can be thought of which lays us under a deeper obligation than God's free love; that for those who are not altogether past redemption there is nothing more shaming and humbling, nothing more likely to bring us to sincere remorse and repentance, than the prevenient love of God, which comes to the unworthy with the offer of thorough and complete forgiveness. Evangelicalism recognises that such a love has the power to awaken a kindred love (1 John iv. 10), which will never think of caring merely for its own interests, or of meriting salvation—for this it already possesses. As certainly as faith exists, so certainly will it give birth to real love. For it has surrendered itself to Christ to be determined by His whole will. And it is part of the will of Christ that love be wrought in the believer's heart, and that he receive the power to love from the Spirit of Christ.

2. We have formerly spoken (§ 7) of the essential nature of God's love. Now the new personality of the believer becomes more and more conformed to the image of God, and is therefore conformed to the divine love. Hence it has the *amor complacentiæ*. It is taken possession of by the beauty of the Good; above all else, by that beauty as it is seen in God and in Christ, who is the personal manifestation of the lovableness of God. In like manner the true personality, both our own and our neighbour's, is an object of love, even

if as yet it is not actually realized. With regard to the *amor concupiscentiæ* and *amor benevolentiæ*, these are the two opposite poles of true love, but always act in unison. In the *amor benevolentiæ* the tendency is towards communication, even self-communication, which tendency, however, must never be carried so far as to involve a real loss to our personality, but must always have self-assertion bound up with it. The *amor concupiscentiæ*, on the other hand, tends towards self-assertion in one's own interests. But this by itself would be egoism. Accordingly, two things must be blended together—we must appropriate another to ourselves, and at the same time make that other an end to ourselves, and communicate something to him. And this is attained when a *communion of love* is formed, when there is a *unio caritatis*. For such fellowship in love excludes everything of the nature either of egoism or self-loss, because otherwise there would be no real fellowship at all. This communion of love has its origin in God Himself.

3. *Love to God.* At first God establishes a relation of love between Himself and man by means of His prevenient love, which expends itself wholly in giving, and is received by faith. God is the universal Good, not, however, in an abstract, but in a personal form,—not as a mere dead law. God does not only bestow His grace and forgiveness upon us, or enter into fellowship with us from His own side merely; He also enriches our faith with the energy of a new life, of a life of love, in which we offer ourselves back to God, present to Him ourselves and our powers, and therefore return His love freely and spontaneously. Thus man from being a recipient becomes also a giver, and God, who was at first only a Giver, accepts our offering in order that a living, reciprocal communion of love may be formed. It might be supposed, indeed, that the divine love could not enter into such a relation of mutual exchange, of reciprocal giving and taking. But as Julius Müller rightly says, "This is the unfathomable mystery which is yet plain to every simple Christian heart, that love, which is absolutely the highest element in the life of the creature, is not subject to compulsion even from the omnipotent will of God Himself. Consequently, love is a good which God cannot give to Himself, but can only receive through the freedom of the

creature; He can only attract man by His own infinite love, can only fill and animate man's heart with the desire to give God his love by an act of his own free will." There is, indeed, a kind of mysticism which is unable to bring giving and receiving on the part of God into union with receiving and giving on the part of man. And yet it is the fact that the existence of a communion of love between God and man depends upon each of them being both object and subject, both an end for love or an object of love, and at the same time a loving, personal power.

(*a*) Mysticism speaks sometimes of an *unselfish* love to God, which does not desire to receive anything from God, but only to offer itself to God or to lose itself in Him; a love which would love Him even were He to cast one into hell (Fénélon). But it is evident that this would really be a very *selfish* sacrifice to make. For we should be dealing with God as if, while He wished to be loved by us, He Himself were not love, but merely a physical essence, absorbing whatever is external to Himself; we should, in proud forgetfulness of our own need, reserve for ourselves that which is best of all, namely, *active* love, and ascribe to God recipient love alone. But this would be sheer *wilfulness* and ingratitude on our part; for we truly love God only when we love Him as He is, and therefore because He is related to us as loving, nay, because He first loved us. And to this relation which subsists between God and us we must give our assent—as is demanded by our absolute dependence upon God, and our position towards Him as His creatures—in *faith*. To do so is the first thing that is necessary, and it is here that Catholic Mysticism and the Catholic Church make their mistake. It is just our consciousness of the prevenient love of God, the consciousness that we are loved by Him, which enkindles our grateful love to Him in return.

(*b*) The *other* false form of love to God is the *quietistic*,[1] which may also attach itself to a false form of the Evangelical doctrine of saving faith. Whoever, after he has found all he needs in communion with God in Christ, chooses now to remain in the enjoyment of his experience, without proceed-

[1] Quietism of Molinos. [Cf. Heppe, *Geschichte der quietistischen Mystik*.—Ed.

ing to the exercise of love toward God in return, treats God merely as a means for his own personal enjoyment. But this is spiritual eudæmonism, in which God is no longer regarded as an end or object of love. Thus here again we have selfishness, in the form, namely, of merely *recipient love*, just as before in so-called "unselfish love" we had the selfishness of pride, which will *only impart love*. Each of these extremes, therefore, is in itself nothing but egoism; it is only when self-assertion and loving self-surrender are blended together that true love and communion of love can arise. To say that a person loves, is to say that he can be both end and means, that he can will himself as both at the same time, that he can find himself in another, and also find that other in himself. Such love exists originally in God alone; by virtue of it God wills both Himself and the world, to the end that a reciprocal communion of life and love may be established between Himself and it. But God also implants this spirit of love in the world; hence, although the *first* thing which the world does is to receive, and the *first* thing which God does is to give, giving is not the *sole and last thing* for God, nor is receiving the *sole and last thing* for man.

4. *Self-love and social love in relation to love to God.* When love to God has been kindled in the believer, as his grateful and reverent response to God's own love, it becomes a motive within him, inciting him as a matter of duty to love both himself and his neighbour; nay more, it affords the prototype of what is here of special importance, the union, namely, of being in itself, or self-assertion, with being that goes out beyond itself and finds its end in another. True love to God cannot but seek to love what He loves, and to hate what He hates. Now we have experience in faith that God loves us as individuals; further, He loves not only us, but also the whole world; and, finally, He does not love what is merely finite in us and the world, not what is altogether worldly and sinful, He loves us and all men as designed and fitted to be rescued from the kingdom of darkness, and to be built up into His kingdom as living likenesses of God. Hence love to God cannot but involve true self-love and social love.

Let us now apply to both these forms of love what has

already been said concerning self-assertion and communication. Christian love is the reconciliation of the antithesis formed by *self-assertion* and *self-communication*, *receiving* and *giving*, the *personal* and the *universal*.

(*a*) In the manifestation of love on the part of the believer, the following process takes place. He receives the other, as it were, into his own personality, and makes him an end or object for himself; at the same time, he transfers himself to that other, and identifies himself, as it were, with the other; and he does both of these in order to serve the other and be a means for him. But all the while the love of the Christian also *asserts* itself as love. For if the self-sacrifice of love amounted to self-extinction, the love would cease altogether to be personal. Thus love has a double function to perform, in which nothing else can resemble it. For the Christian loves another just as he loves himself; he loves himself in the other, and the other in himself. These go together, for the Christian aim is to establish a communion of love, which, while it includes both the persons involved, is higher than either separately. The highest aim of all is the universal life of love, the kingdom of God, in which every individual is ennobled, and all are united to one another.

(*b*) Hence love also reconciles the opposition between the universal and the individual or personal. The *individual* person makes himself an organ of the *universal*, of that community of love which is the ultimate purpose of God, and thus the opposition is overcome. But although love contemplates the universal good, and, whether in the form of social or of self-love, is always in the last resort love to the universal good, it nevertheless has an essentially *personal character*, both in its objective and subjective aspects. The universal Good is the personal God, manifested in Christ; it is not the impersonal law, which can only be respected and cannot be loved. The law attains its lovable form, its beauty, only when it becomes personal; and this it does primarily in God and visibly in Christ, who is the fairest among the children of men (Augustine, Hamann). It also belongs to the nature of all spiritual excellences, that as they give to personality its true worth, so they themselves only truly exist when they assume a personal form. In like manner, the

personal character of love is also exhibited on the *subjective* side. That is not love in which only some real thing, something accidental to the person is bestowed, while the heart is withheld; and just as little is love shown when we are concerned merely about the gifts and benefits to be derived from any one, and do not rather seek the person himself as being himself the highest gift of love. But all the same these gifts are, as we have pointed out, the language by which love evinces its desire to communicate itself, to lay itself open to another, and freely give him what it possesses; while the acceptance of the gift, not only with the hand but with the heart, is likewise an act in which the heart opens itself to receive another—it is a response to the love which is presented in the gift.

5. *Love as the opposite of selfishness.* Love, as being the cardinal active virtue, is opposed to self-contained egoism or selfishness, both in its self-interested, worldly form, and in its more spiritual form of pride. The *lower kind of egoism* may manifest itself both in receiving and in giving; and this is true also of the egoism of *pride.*

(*a*) *The lower form of egoism* is greedy only of the gifts of love; about the love which was given in the gifts, and is the best one of all, it does not concern itself, or in other words, it is suspicious of the gift of *love.* In it accordingly there is no gratitude, in accepting anything it feels no answering love. And this kind of egoism may be shown by the giver also, as when he gives for the sake of thanks or of human praise or reward, or when by his gift he seeks to bring the recipient of it *under his power.* Such a giving puts on the appearance of love, and enters love's fellowship in an external kind of way, but behind it self-interest is concealed.

(*b*) The lovelessness of *pride,* which shuts itself off from others, may be exhibited in refusing to accept as well as in refusing to give. He who is rich, whether in a temporal or spiritual sense, is the very one who must be willing to accept love from those to whom he gives. He must look upon their love, which is only of value when it is a free gift, as a good that is unrequitable and infinitely higher than all his own outward goods; by so doing he proves that what he cares for is their love itself, not control over them in any shape, but

fellowship with them as free spirits. Conversely, when any one believes that he has nothing to give, and is therefore unwilling to accept, because he dreads being laid under the obligation of manifesting gratitude, he too shuts himself up in selfish pride. He rejects the fellowship of love that is offered him in the gift, and fails to recognise that by his refusal he is actually taking away something from the man who wishes to bestow the gift. For were he gratefully to accept it, he would confer upon the giver of it himself a free gift that is of more value to genuine love than all outward possessions.

But if it indeed be the case that love is itself the best gift of all, does it not come to this—that we must regard the distinction between communicative and receptive love as one that is not valid? For the following considerations may be urged. Communicating love is in itself recipient love as well, because the giver finds satisfaction in the very act of bestowing, and requires no external reward,—he is blessed in his deed (Jas. i. 25). Nay more, if it is more blessed to give than to receive (Acts xx. 35), it seems that since blessedness is the highest good, communicating love is more of the nature of recipient love than the latter itself. Finally, communicating love regards itself as having received a gift, when its own gift is rightly accepted, lovingly acknowledged, and the heart of the recipient opened. Conversely,—it might further be urged,—in true loving acceptance of a benefit there is also a real giving of the best gift, that is, of love. To sum up: he who gives in the spirit of true love always receives as well, even should no gratitude be shown from the other side; and he who receives in the spirit of true thankfulness has always something to give, namely, grateful love.

Now it is certainly of importance to direct our attention to this equalization—as it may be called—of communicating and recipient love, since true communion of love cannot last without it. For by means of it the guarantee is given that receiver and giver are each an end in himself, that essentially they are and remain equals, both in themselves and in the service they render each other. Love can be truly bestowed only when there is a real partnership; that is to say, when both are on an equal footing, when the relation is such that

pride is changed into humility, and even the poor man, though externally in a lower position, can do his part as an equal in mind and soul if not in fortune. The poor man can make the advantages of others his own joy, and thus possess and enjoy what he does not have himself; their sorrows, too, he can make his own. In a partnership of this kind he can evince prevenient and therefore communicating love, even though in his own person he is indigent, and outwardly does nothing but receive.

Nevertheless there *remains a difference* between the love which communicates, that is, which makes the first approaches or sues for love in return, and the love which receives, or exhibits gratitude. In the former, he who loves seeks to put the recipient on the same level with himself, while in the latter he seeks to set the giver above himself. Thus both persons are engaged in a noble, loving competition, and by this mutual interchange the living process of love moves onward. We are reminded, too, of the necessity of insisting upon the difference between recipient and communicating love, by the consideration that gratitude would cease altogether were the recipient to regard himself as bestowing something. For it does not become the receiver, but only the giver, to look upon moral acceptance of a benefit as being itself a gift. On the other hand, were the donor to regard himself simply as receiving something when he conferred a benefit, he would be an egoist, he would not make the recipient the end or aim of his act.[1] Further, the receiver must not remind the giver that he, the recipient, also gives when he accepts; for it is only when he feels that he is a recipient, and shows that he is grateful, not in appearance but in reality—it is only then that he really gives. And just as little must the donor bestow his gift merely because the act of giving brings him a reward and affords him satisfaction.

The two sides in this matter are connected in the following way. When we give, we must never do so in order to receive;[2] and when, on the other hand, we gratefully receive, we must

[1] The *personal* character of love must appear in the object to which love is directed and the gift that is bestowed, as well as in the disposition from which love springs.

[2] "He that giveth, let him do it with simplicity" (Rom. xii. 8).

never have the consciousness that by our acceptance we are giving something, for this would poison gratitude and make it a mere pretence. On the contrary, communicating love is genuine love only when it gives as if it were to receive nothing in return (Matt. v. 42–47), it has attained its end when it is solicitous for another's welfare (Phil. i. 4); and grateful love, again, actually gives while receiving only when it receives as if it were giving nothing, for it on its part has attained its end when it acknowledges another's love. Only in this way can the love that bestows be manifested on the one side and loved on the other, only in this way can the person of another and fellowship with him be made the aim both of giver and receiver. The self-forgetfulness of love forgets egoism and isolation, but it does not forget love and love's fellowship. In love we seek to enter into communion with a fellow-being and become a sharer both of his sorrows and his joys; and in doing so, we find that our self-surrender gives us what we did not seek—it enriches and completes our own personal life. And this takes place on both sides; we tender ourselves to another to advance as it were and develop his individual being and character, and we receive this development ourselves.

6. We have seen that in love the individual or personal is brought into union with the universal, while the difference between them is still maintained. We have also seen that love is the union of giving and receiving, of communicating to another what is our own, and participating in what belongs to him. And this union takes place as follows—we conceive of an evil that affects others as also affecting ourselves, while we regard a good that belongs to us as belonging also to others, as intended for our brethren as well as ourselves. (A striking illustration of what has just been said occurs in Acts iv.) But in addition to this, love is also the unity (*ἀνακεφαλαίωσις*) of all those commandments that address themselves to our spontaneity and productivity; it is the principle of all spontaneous and productive virtues, the virtues that are manifested amid the manifold relations and circumstances upon which Christian *wisdom* must be brought to bear (Rom. xiii. 9, 10; Matt. xxii. 36–40; John xiii. 34 ff.; 1 John ii. 5; 1 Cor. xiii.; Mark xii. 31). Where love is not

present, we often see *form* and *contents* separated from each other. On the one hand, the right act or work may be purposed while the right disposition is absent; and, on the other, the right moral disposition may be present, but devoid of contents—that is to say, the work is not done which the occasion demands. But love unites both form and contents. For when it is energetic, it does not rest satisfied with mere good wishes; it wills a good that is actually to be carried into effect, and hence it impels us to know truly and definitely what those *ends* are which ought to be realized. This leads us to our *third* chapter.

With regard, moreover, to the form of moral action, when we consider the *motive*—that is, the inducement to action when taken up into *consciousness*—and the *motive power*—that is, this inducement when it has passed over into the *will*—we see that in love to God in Christ both *motive and motive power are united.* For the *motive* is God's love to us which He has manifested in Christ; and this love, as revealed in Christ, does not remain for the Christian a mere external object, it becomes an end for his activity, and he devotes himself to its service with responsive love. And the love which he gives in return means that the love revealed in Christ has taken possession of his feelings and his heart, has seized upon and animated his will, and has thus become the *motive power* that inspires his life.

CHAPTER THIRD.

CHRISTIAN WISDOM.

§ 46.

As faith (§ 44) directs itself to Christ who is the perfect law, the law of faith and life, and by accepting Him becomes the cardinal receptive virtue; further, as Christian love (§ 45) is the cardinal virtue of the free, productive will: so Christian wisdom is the (spontaneous and productive) cardinal virtue of the intellect. United with love it becomes ideal, productive, virtuous

energy; its immediate aim is the chief Good; and this it conceives in two forms, both as already come and as ever in the process of coming. Thus true wisdom is the same as Christian hope, which is neither ignorance concerning the future nor uncertainty and mere empty desire, but is the principle of that true Christian view of the world which is quickened by love into fruitful activity.

1. Love, without wisdom to determine what aims are to be pursued and what means are to be employed in securing them, could not be morally productive, but would remain a mere inward loving disposition (§ 43. 2). It must of necessity, however, be accompanied by knowledge, for it arises out of faith, which contains knowledge in a germinal form (Eph. i. 17) (§ 44), and which brings us into fellowship with Christ, who communicates Himself to the intellect as well as to the feelings and will. It is only when love is filled with wisdom that it can *δοκιμάζειν τὰ διαφέροντα*,[1] those "excellent things" to which it must devote its energy. Thus it is when love is united with wisdom that it becomes the fruitful mother of all those moral virtues which address themselves each to its own specific work. From Christian wisdom, which is essentially and purely ethical in character and aim (Jas. iii. 13), we must distinguish—

(*a*) *Gnosis* (1 Cor. viii. 1, xiii. 8). Gnosis is not, like wisdom, a matter of universal Christian duty; it is a gift of grace bestowed upon certain individuals, and intended to be used by them for the edification of the whole community. If it were something merely intellectual as such, without an ethical and religious spirit (Col. ii. 18; 1 Tim. i. 6, 7, iv. 1 ff.; Jas. iii. 15), then knowledge or wisdom of this kind would be contradictory to faith (1 Tim. i. 19), which is the root of all true knowledge. It would be valueless, it would be *ἐπίγειος* even should it talk of heavenly things, it would remain psychical and even carnal, though it might appear to be super-spiritual (1 Cor. ii. 13; Jude 10; *δαιμονιώδης*, Jas. iii. 15).

[1] Rom. xii. 2, ii. 18; Phil. i. 10.

(*b*) Wisdom must also be distinguished from Christian *prudence* (Luke xvi. 1 f., Parable of the Steward), φρόνησις. The latter has to do with individual cases as they arise; it has to comprehend these intelligently, and deal with them in a manner suitable to the time and circumstances of their occurrence; its sphere is the world of means, while wisdom is concerned above everything else with the determination of ends.

Now Christian wisdom, from which σωφροσύνη derives its strength, is above all things knowledge of the ἀλήθεια, which is revealed in Christ. It springs, therefore, from faith, which is called the "eyes of the heart" (Eph. i. 17, 18). It is the knowledge of God's love as the absolutely true reality; it is consequently the knowledge of the absolute, permanent, and divine world-goal, the supreme *ideal*, the highest good; and in this knowledge also the means are pointed out by which the good is to be realized, for the end determines the way by which the end is reached. Cognition in its receptive form, or faith, is followed by cognition in its active form, or wisdom. Wisdom now takes the torch of that higher knowledge of God and His love which has come through faith, carries it into the inward sphere of self-consciousness and into the outward sphere of the world around us, and teaches us to understand more and more the divine thoughts which have been wrought into these spheres, to recognise their abundance, and to comprehend their connection with each other. But all the while, amid the diversity of the knowledge thus acquired, unity is preserved by the teleological direction that is given to it throughout, since it is all brought into relation to the highest good, the final consummation, which is the centre and aim of all our efforts.

Further, so far as faith has not only a general knowledge of the goodness and love of God and Christ, but is also assured of the unchangeableness and faithfulness of that love, we have a knowledge of the future given us in germ, and so Christian wisdom becomes *hope*. The invincible power and faithfulness of the divine love is our surety that the final consummation will be reached, the world-goal attained. Christian wisdom is practically fruitful just because at its highest point it is always Christian hope. And this involves that we not only

have the clear knowledge that the consummation is still at a distance, but that we also have the no less clear and certain knowledge that the good is real, and is not hoped and striven for in vain; it is the knowledge, in fact, that the energy resident in the kingdom of God is sufficient for its realization. Thus wisdom as hope effects the transition from virtue as an inward power to the *work* to which virtue is called, to actual labour for the coming of the kingdom of God. And this it does in reliance upon the fact that the kingdom has already come, a fact of which faith is assured, and to which it bears witness.

It is true that hope looks to the future,—as faith looks to the past, to the historical revelation made in Christ; but it does more, it overcomes the limits of time before us, just as faith overcomes those which are behind. As that would not be a living faith which regarded Christ merely as belonging to the past, as a mere figure in history,—for, on the contrary, it is the function of faith to make the past live in the present as an object of present experience,—so that would not be Christian hope which looked upon the End or the World-goal as something merely future, entirely absent, and therefore without present efficacy. For then there would be no certainty regarding that goal, and what it actually is; and without this there would not be Christian hope. But Christian hope has a knowledge of the future and what the future contains, since even now the chief good is present to it in Christ, and in knowing Him it knows one who in His spiritual supremacy holds the future in His hands. It is true that the object of hope lacks visibility, that is, it lacks the element of external reality or realization, and in this respect faith and hope are alike. Neither of them is sight; they are, on the contrary, wholly different from it. But, in rising above what is present and visible to their invisible object, they have emancipated themselves from the power of sense, and are conscious of the fact. Thus by means of faith and hope the past and the future are incorporated with the present, in the inward life of the new free Christian spirit, the life of love (1 Cor. xiii. 13). And hence the believer possesses an assured, joyful, and kingly spirit, and enters upon the enjoyment and activities of the life eternal, a life that is in time and yet above time (ζωὴ αἰώνιος).

2. Peter is the apostle of *hope*.[1] (1 Pet. i. 3–5, 9, 13, 21, iii. 5, 15.) With him, hope is not merely comfort and consolation in sufferings; it is not idle, on the contrary (i. 13), it is a living principle that stimulates us to gird up the loins of our mind. It is opposed alike to cowardice and to that fanciful enthusiasm which would fain flee to the goal without travelling the sober road of work. It is temperate and sedate (iii. 15, i. 13, iv. 7, v. 8), far removed from self-made fancies. It is not the mere natural outcome of a gay temper; it is submissive to God, willing to suffer, and yet amid all the sufferings of time is sure of the consummation that will be reached. Standing in view of the eternal, divine ideal, it gives the Christian, on the one hand, the sense of pilgrimage, of distance from his home, and forbids him to build everlasting habitations here; while, on the other, being assured of the future, it enters heartily into the present, is practically fruitful, and like a faithful steward puts its hand honestly to its work (1 Pet. ii. 11 f., iv. 10, 11, 16, iii. 17). For it knows that its work will be rewarded. Christian hope also imparts its tone to our love for our fellow-creatures, and makes our work among them of lasting value. For it enhances the worth of individuals by taking their future into account. It teaches us to treat them with confidence. When we distrust a man, we depress him, enfeeble him, and thrust him away from us; when we confide in him, we raise and encourage him. Christians love their brethren as those who are partakers of the same hope as themselves (1 Pet. i. 22, iv. 8). Hope embraces also the community, the spiritual household of God; it likewise embraces those who have yet to become brethren, and lays claim to our love and zeal on their behalf (ii. 9, 10, 12).

3. The *object* of Christian hope is, speaking generally, the chief good, and therefore everything that belongs to it. And this embraces—

(*a*) The perfection of the *individual character*, its emancipation from error and sin, and its harmonious development. It is no light task that is set before the Christian in his daily life, to hold it as a matter of divine certainty that he both can and is intended to become sinless and holy. The ever-

[1] Cf. Weiss, *Petrinischer Lehrbegriff*.

recurring experience which we have of sin, which continues to break out in spite of all our resolutions, leads us too readily to the tacit supposition that sin makes a holy life altogether impossible for us on earth. And although such a belief may at first humble and sadden us, yet it is very apt to result in a lowering of our ideal, and in a moral levity that makes us too lenient with our faults. Christian hope alone can obviate these errors, both the Manichæan and the Pelagian. For by setting our goal vividly before us, and thus showing us all that we yet need in order to have our imperfections remedied ("hope that is seen is not hope," Rom. viii. 24), it opposes our indolence, and calls upon us to exercise vigorously our will and our love.

Further, since in faith hope has already tasted the *ἀπαρχή* of the Spirit (Rom. viii. 23), and of perfection, as an earnest of that which is still lacking; or, in other words, since through faith hope sees in the kingdom of God, as it has already come, the surety for that which is yet to come, it inspires love with the confidence of victory, and fills it with good courage (1 Cor. xiii. 7; Eph. i. 11–14; Phil. i. 6, ii. 13) and Christian joy, *χαρά* (Phil. ii. 18, iv. 4). There is some truth in what Spinoza says when he calls *tristitia* the mother of much evil, especially of the powerlessness of good impulses. Only he omits to point out the way to true joy. This lies in Christian hope. In it that which humbles us, viz. our dissatisfaction with our actual state, becomes a negative factor in our progress, an incentive to prosecute our own self-improvement with vigour. Thus *tristitia*, when incorporated with the whole moral nature of the Christian, is deprived of all that would have an enfeebling effect, and what remains has only a salutary influence. It becomes godly sorrow, which is not irreconcilable with inward Christian blessedness, but is at one with it, and necessarily promotes its richer and richer development (2 Cor. vii. 10; Rom. viii. 15–17, 23–25, 28–30).

(*b*) But *Christian hope*, allied with love, also *extends beyond* the individual. It takes in the *Chief Good in the whole of its extent*, and hence it embraces nature and the spirit-world, and the final perfection of both in and along with each other (Rom. viii. 18–22; 1 Cor. xv. 23–28, 40–50), as well as the various

individual excellences that belong to the ethical spheres of life. Accordingly, Christian eschatology becomes an active element in Christian virtue. Hope presents us with an image of the individual and of moral communities in their perfection, and by this means the future is made an operative power in the present, and its realization is brought about. Under the old covenant, prophecy was sporadic and momentary; under the new, hope furnishes every true believer with the prophetic spirit. For Christian hope is not mere subjective wishing, nor does it mean nescience with regard to what the future contains,—such a nescience as we are entertained with oftener than is desirable in New Year sermons; it possesses certain knowledge of the essential contents, the ὑπόστασις (Heb. xi. 1), of the future, and above all, it is knowledge concerning that which is most remote—the final end of all things.

§ 47. *The Christian View of the World.*

Christian wisdom, united with love and based upon faith, leads us to a view of the world that is opposed both to Pessimism and Optimism. As against the former, the Christian knows through faith that the supreme good has already come and is present in the world; as against the latter, he recognises that the chief good has still to come, and has yet to be realized through love. Thus, through Christian wisdom in the form of hope, love is guided to the particular work which must be performed, in order that that part of the chief good may be realized whose time of realization has come. And so love effects the transition from virtue as an inward impulse to outward virtuous deeds or acts of duty, and in these manifests its productive activity. And this takes place in such a way that *every true act of virtue is a product of the whole virtuous energy* of the Christian, and in it faith, love, and hope are in essential union with each other.

Note.—Leibnitz, in his *Theodicy*, has tried to explain the evil —both moral and physical—that is in the world, without prejudice to the wisdom and goodness of God, by maintaining that

this is the best of all possible worlds. Here the goodness and wisdom of God are acknowledged, but at the same time it is asserted that a world without evil is an impossibility, even for the Divine Omnipotence. This view was called Optimism. But Optimism in this sense is different from what we here mean by the word, and from what it is usually taken to mean. It commonly denotes a way of thinking that takes a superficial view of physical and even of moral evil. [Optimism of this *latter kind* is advanced by Strauss in *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, Herbert Spencer in *First Principles*, especially § 176, and by other materialists.—Ed.]

So far as Leibnitz holds that finitude in itself necessarily introduces evil, and that the world therefore, as long as it remains finite, *i.e. as* a world, must be afflicted with evils,—to this extent his theory contains a pessimistic element, resting upon a species of dualism; and this remains true although he holds that good preponderates over evil. The *Evangelium der armen Seele* expresses the same pessimistic idea when it maintains that God cannot be thought of as omnipotent, if we hold fast, as we must do, to His goodness in presence of the evil that is in the world. Others, like Stuart Mill, come to the conclusion that we must doubt whether God exists at all; since, if He did exist, He would necessarily be all-powerful, and so would not endure the mass of evil that is in the world. Atheism is also the basis upon which Schopenhauer and Hartmann have raised their pessimistic theories; and among Oriental systems the same thing holds good of Buddhism, which is originally a system of philosophy. The torment and misery in the world, which would make its non-existence a blessing, are held to consist in this,—that the human will must necessarily always will something, and that everything which it does will must, in the nature of things, be individual, and so cannot bring satisfaction to the soul, but only satiety and discomfort. Existence always involves particularity and finitude, and these are of necessity accompanied with misery, suffering, and a painful sense of want, since the particular or individual is not the whole. Among leading exponents of this form of pessimism are Taubert and Volkelt. (The latter, in his *Das Unbewusste und der Pessimismus*, attempts to show his connection with Hegel.) [Frauenstädt. Bahnsen, *Zur Philosophie der Geschichte.* Mainländer, *Philosophie der Erlösung.* Plumacher, *Der Kampf um's Unbewusste* (pp. 117–150, Litteraturangaben).—Ed.]

Among the opponents of Pessimism are—Haym, *Preussische Jahrbücher*, 1873, Nos. 1–3. Weygoldt, *Kritik des philos. Pessimismus.*

[Rehmke, *Glossen zu Hartmann's Phänomenologie.* *Zeitschr.*

für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 1879, No. 2. *Der Pessimismus und die Sittenlehre*, 1883. Michelis, *Philosophie des Bewusstseins*. Ebrard, *Hartmann's Philosophie des Unbewussten*, 1876. Golther, *Der moderne Pessimismus*, edited by Vischer. E. Pfleiderer, *Der Pessimismus*. Lasson, *Philosophische Monatsheft*, 1879, Nos. 6 and 7. Gass, *Optimismus und Pessimismus*. A. Schweizer, *Philosophie d. Unbewussten. Ztschr. f. wiss. Theol.* 1873, p. 407 sq. Huber, *Die religiöse Frage*. Secrétan, *La nouveauté metaphysique. Phil. de l'inconscient. Revue chrétienne*, 1872. Sommer, *Der Pessimismus und die Sittenlehre*. Christ, *Der Pessimismus und die Sittenlehre*. My article, "Hartmann's pessimistische Philosophie," *Studien und Kritiken*, 1881, No. 1. Prantl, *Die Berechtigung des Optimismus*. Eucken, *Geschichte u. Kritik d. Grundbegriffe*, p. 236 sq. Hoekstra, *De Tegenstelling van Optimisme en Pessimisme*, 1880.—ED.]

Frank advances the idea that Pessimism is the truth of the life of unbelief. But it is Martensen especially who has given an ethical estimate of Pessimism as it appears within Christianity (*Christian Ethics*, vol. i. p. 164 sq., vol. ii. p. 199 sq.). The fundamental error in these systems is that finiteness is looked upon as necessarily involving imperfection. That is to say, all determination, without which there could, of course, be no world at all, is regarded as negation, instead of as a specific mode of being; and conversely, the unlimited or indeterminate is regarded as true and perfect being. But such being, like *Nirwana*, cannot be distinguished from mere nothingness. These forms of Pessimism, closely connected as they are with Dualism or Atheism, are for us made untenable by the Christian doctrine of God.

However, there is a certain truth in this pessimistic view of the world, if only it be taken apart from the grounds upon which it is made to rest. That is to say, if the world be considered as it is, apart from redemption, apart from the salt of Christianity which preserves it from corruption, then to sober observation penetrating to the truth behind the appearance of things, it is a state of misery, a huge grave; it is that vale of tears which the Preacher saw it to be when he declared that the true verdict upon the pre-Christian world was, "all is vanity." But revealed religion, even in Old Testament times, made a great advance beyond all the positions of absolute Pessimism, by referring the evil that is in the world neither to God nor to a power independent of God, but to human *sin*, and by deriving death from the same source. By this means, it is true, man is made to suffer a still deeper pain than the so-called world-pain, with its complainings; for physical evil reminds us of human guilt, and is thereby armed with a still sharper sting.

A greater than physical evil is brought to light in the world, viz. moral evil. Nevertheless, *faith in God* is now preserved, faith in His goodness and power, and this affords a resting-place for hope. Evil is now regarded, not as something necessary, due to existence itself, but as relatively accidental, since it is made to depend upon the sin and the freedom of man.

Finally, the evils that do exist would themselves be bearable, if only the greatest of them all, viz. guilt, were wiped away through divine forgiveness. For the sting of evil, which consists in its being punishment, would then be taken away, and evils themselves, while still continuing to exist, would be looked upon as a means of education and purification, and consequently as a good. And if, besides, the power of *sin* as well as of guilt were broken by God, then all other evils would be checked at their source, and hope might rejoice in the prospect of a condition of things in which evils will have wholly disappeared. This is the *Christian* view of the world. And it is opposed not only to the error of Pessimism but to that of Optimism as well. Although the Christian *principle* is in the world, and thus the salvation of the world is something real and present, we must not overlook the work that has still to be performed and the battle that has still to be fought before victory is won, nor must we lull ourselves into premature contentment with our own state and that of the world. Even in Christian times it is possible to find mild forms of Optimism and Pessimism at work, which alike exercise an enfeebling and enervating effect, and are therefore most pernicious. But Christian hope is able to withstand both of these errors; we have only to turn to it and then our moral vigour is restored, and true Christian motives aroused.

1. Along with hope there arises the *Christian view of the World.* Its character is clearly brought out by its opposition both to Optimism and Pessimism. Optimism is moral apathy, and takes two forms. On the one hand, it may *overestimate earthly well-being* and its influence upon morality; on the other, it may *undervalue* the *power of evil* in the world, refuse to look at evil, disregard its power, and lull itself to sleep with rose-coloured illusions concerning the power and practice of virtue in the world. In one word, it treats the world and the individual person ideally: it does not take them as they are, but anticipates their perfection in its subjective imaginings. When those who have arrived at such hasty satisfaction with everything proceed to act, they would fain overleap the stages which must first be traversed before

the end is reached, and so their action is applied at the wrong place. And just as their conceptions of the nearest aims to be pursued and the means to be employed are wrongly formed, so no result follows their efforts. Optimism is morally superficial; it lacks depth of earth, γῆ πολλή (Matt. xiii. 5, 20). Those who from love of ease would like to flee at once to the goal, make no progress, because they disdain to labour in the sweat of their face, and to mount upward step by step. In short, Optimism is too much satisfied with the present, and therefore it has no hope to urge it forward.

Opposed to Optimism is *Pessimism*, which has as its moving power the imperfection, the evil, and the sin which are in the world. *Pessimism assumes two forms.* It may appear in a more *passive form*, and then it leads to passive renunciation of moral effort, resignation, melancholy despair of the coming of the chief good. This is moral impotence, unbelief. If an interest is still taken in the kingdom of God, yet work is done with spiritless hands and progress is made with feeble knees (Heb. xii. 12), whereas faith demands us ζέειν πνεύματι (Rom. xii. 11). Here too, it may be, instead of honest and zealous work, there is the expectation of extraordinary events which will make everything turn out for the best (in the highest, Christian form of Pessimism, it is the second coming of Christ that is expected); but meanwhile all moral labour, except perhaps what is expended on directly religious objects, is regarded as vain, futile, or even sinful. Here there is exhibited a sour, censorious disdain, a barren and pernicious mistrust.

The *second main form of Pessimism* is the *active.* Here we find a restless haste which will not enter confidently into the present and the work of God that is in it, but is at variance with it, and thinks to reach a better state of things by some abrupt way, by the use of force, the violation of rights, or by fanatical means—in short, by a single spring as it were, and so by breaking off in revolutionary fashion from the past course of historical development.

Pessimism of *both* kinds proceeds as if the kingdom of God were altogether absent and had yet to come. According to the first species of Pessimism, its coming is to be brought about by a sudden act on the part of God, which must be

passively awaited,—this is the position of the *Darbyites* with their objective chiliasm. According to the second, it is to be brought about by human intervention, which has to lay the foundations, alike of society, the State, and the kingdom of God, entirely by human effort, or which at least has to prepare the way for the second coming of our Lord,—this is the form in which Pessimism has been held by many parties from the *Anabaptists* of the Reformation time onward.

In accordance with the principle on which it rests, Pessimism gives rise to all sorts of *ideals*, set up by fanaticism in the various spheres of life,—especially the political and educational,—such as the dreams of communism and socialism. In the ecclesiastical sphere, moreover, we find all kinds of *church-ideals:* that, for example, of *Donatistic* purity, either in morality or in piety and intelligence. Here we find separation and exclusion advocated, either from men wishing to form a Church composed of the regenerate alone, or from their demanding perfect purity in one department at least—that of public instruction, in the teachers of the Church. This means a pure creed, and brings us back to the demand that at least the *clerical order* shall consist of the regenerate alone, if the Church is to be a Church. For according to evangelical principles, we can demand a creed only as the product of evangelical faith, so that to require a pure creed is identical with requiring regenerating faith. Donatistic Pessimism refuses to be satisfied with a lowly condition of the Church, in which it includes unbelievers among the ministers of the word as well as among its members at large; it seeks by means of force or compulsion to rid itself of such as are not or not yet at one with the Church in its creed. Of course, it cannot hinder hypocrisy, but may very readily increase it.

Others, instead of allying themselves with the beginnings of the kingdom of God that are in history and in the present, would like to make a new beginning, to bring back again, perhaps, a past period of history, such as that of primitive Christianity or of the Reformation time—the *Irvingite* restoration of the apostolate is an instance in point. But if the kingdom of God has in nowise come as yet, it cannot come at all, for it is ethical, and can therefore be established only in an ethical and not in a magical way. And whatever is ethically

produced in any sphere must have a living point of connection with the present. In Pessimism, which seeks to break with the past and present, and to destroy them in order to introduce what is new, there is something dualistic, something Manichæan, just as in the premature satisfaction of Optimism there is an element of Pelagianism. It rends asunder the unity and continuity of the world as a whole, since it opposes to the actually existing world a world of the imagination; and so, wholly unsatisfied with what has been, it loves to talk of a future state, a future Church, a future religion. It may cherish hope, but it is a *hope without faith*,—that is, it is purely subjective, not a hope that is the outcome of the past and the present, of faith and love. Pessimism is restless haste and impatience; not, like Optimism, premature rest and contentment. But mere restless movement results only in stagnation, and Pessimism, however hostile it is to all conservatism, never makes any real advance. For, in accordance with its principle, it always acts abruptly; it is continually starting from the beginning over again, and thus all progress is rendered impossible, and a perpetual standstill is the result.

While Pessimism in its active form is that restless haste which never makes any advance, because it always begins anew and breaks with what has hitherto taken place, *Optimism*, on its side, is even *less capable of progress*. It is mere immobility; it lowers its ideal, and denies the imperfections of the present. The New Testament represents the kingdom of God on the one side as already come for faith, and on the other as still coming.[1] But this ethically necessary association of two apparent opposites is dissolved both by Optimism and Pessimism, and that in opposite ways. Optimism holds to the first alone, to the fact that the kingdom of God has come; it is faith without hope to impel it forward, since it has no conception of the richness of the Christian principle, or of the far-reaching moral problems which the latter brings to view; it is therefore faith of only a superficial kind. Pessimism, on the other hand, holds to the second alone, to the fact that the kingdom of God is yet to come. But it does not do this on the ground

[1] Luke xvii. 20; Matt. xi. 12, vi. 33; John iii. 3–5; Matt. xxv. 34; cf. Matt. vi. 10, Thy kingdom come. Chap. xiii., The mustard-seed. 1 Cor. xv. 50; Rom. xiv. 17.

that the kingdom has already come; and so, while it may have a higher idea of the problem to be wrought out in the conversion of the world, it has no faith in the power of grace that is already in the world; its hope is a hope without faith, not Christian hope, but one that is ever ready to fall back into legalism.

2. Whereas in Christian hope, joy (*χαρά*) is associated with true λύπη (2 Cor. vii. 10; Col. i. 24), we find in Pessimism and Optimism a *false sadness* and a *false joy*.

(*α*) The *pain of Pessimism* is superficial, as is seen when we consider its two forms. (*α*) It may take a merely *æsthetic* or eudæmonistic form, in which it is aroused only by the physical evils that exist, or by the lack of worldly blessings; it may be by evils that affect a whole community, such as the failure of one's country to secure power and glory, or the want of external splendour in the condition of the Church. The last of these plays an important part in the modern forms of *chiliasm, e.g.* in *Darbyism* and *Irvingism*, where pain is chiefly felt at the imperfect appearance of things. (*β*) Again, the pain of Pessimism may directly refer to the *sin* of the world, its might and dominion, or to the power of Satan over the world. But sin is here taken as absolutely unconquerable, so that the first Parousia of Christ is unable to meet it, and only the power of His second coming will be sufficient to overcome it. In the meantime, Pessimism opposes to sin no hearty labour of love, least of all a labour undertaken in common, but only action of a violent kind, for the most part negative, separatistic, and uninspiring; or its opposition consists in mere passive resignation, at most in bearing a Christian testimony in the world. Pessimism doubts the possibility of the gospel still being what it once was—a power that is able to overcome every form of individual and social sin. Accompanying this renunciation of loving, inspiring activity, we find, as a matter of course, that the Pessimist regards himself as opposed to the world, which he looks upon as lost, and the judgment of which he is awaiting. Nay, he even takes pleasure (Matt. vii. 1) in assuming the office of judge, and anticipating the verdict of God, by uncharitably supposing the worst of every one, and so keeping up within himself the feeling that he is a stranger and pilgrim in the world. It

naturally follows from this, that, since the heart is concealed from human view, a tendency is manifested to devise after a legal fashion certain tests, by which the Christianity of each one may be gauged.

Now Christianity deepens the pain of Pessimism. If the latter appears in an æsthetic form, then Christianity enlightens it as to the connection that exists in all departments of life between evil and sin, and also between Christianity and the highest blessings. Again, if the pain is felt with reference to sin (a legalistic spirit being predominant), then Christianity deepens it, by taking the man who has set himself apart as a judge, disclosing to him the sinfulness of the uncharitableness and pride which he exhibits, and thus surrendering him to inward self-condemnation. Christianity takes the edge off pessimistic pain. For it comes to him who so willingly finds pleasure in taking up the role of an accuser or judge, or who would fain play the part of a misunderstood benefactor of the world, tells him that his true position is one of humility, and exhorts him before everything else to accuse himself, and to recognise the connection between the common sin of humanity and his own personal share in it. And then it assures him that absolute reconciliation with God is to be found in divine grace, and, by reminding him of what a load of guilt has been lifted off his own soul, weans him from his spirit of exacting and censorious arrogance towards his fellow-servants. Further, since in absolute reconciliation with God we are already made partakers of the chief good, Christianity takes away all bitterness from the pain that is felt at the deficiencies everywhere visible, and teaches us to be thankful for the good that exists (Col. i. 12), and to cease from over-estimating what as yet is wanting. Especially does it teach us not to put too high a value upon the secondary spheres, as if in these by themselves the absolute good could be found. It therefore gives a deeper ethical character to the dissatisfaction of Pessimism, and by this means paves the way for that contentment with the leadings of Providence, that inner peace and joy, in which alone there resides the power to yield us true serenity of spirit amid the contradictions of the world.

(*b*) Christianity, too, imparts a deeper tone to the *joy of Optimism*. It brings to bear upon it the pain which is

experienced at sin both within and without ourselves, and so leads us to find joy in that good which alone is worthy of the name,—a good which now exists, but which no less ever points us to a future that demands our labour in the present time. Thus Christianity sets both Optimism and Pessimism right; in these the human spirit is at a false point of view, and Christianity brings it back to the true one. Christian faith gives it its true starting-point, and Christian hope its true goal. The joy of the Christian is a noble joy. Treading the path of sorrow, and mortification of everything that is impure, it becomes joy in the possession of a good that shall never pass away (1 Pet. i. 6, ii. 19 f.; Jas. i. 2 f.). It is true that this joy gives rise to a new kind of sorrow, viz. to compassion for the world with its mistaken ideas of happiness. But it is not a sorrow that manifests itself in cold separatism or in stubborn despondency; it is a sorrow that carries its consolation in itself, that enters into Christian love, inspires it with active courage, and gives it vigour. Thus we see that Christian hope, since it flows out of faith and finds an outlet in active love, is opposed to both the extremes which have been discussed. And so what has already been said is once more confirmed, that Christian hope contains the germs or buds, as it were, of the Christian spirit.

3. *Christian courage* (*ἀνδρεία*). The perversity of the world is often so overwhelming, that goodness appears to be overborne by wickedness. It is this which furnishes materials for tragedy, and these are to be found not only in poetry, but often enough in actual life. Now, in our conflict with sin, both within and without, we may be apt to regard the powers of evil as too strong or even as invincible. And this is the trial of our faith; for faith cannot remain sound if its hopes for the future are broken. The assurance which it possesses wears away when hope, into which it must blossom, gives place to despondency and cowardice. At such a time it is needful, above all things, that the foundation be renewed, that is, that faith again be made strong. We must make ourselves clearly conscious of the fact that in Christ the kingdom of God is already in existence, and that He is the truth and the power of the present. Against the world which stands in contradiction to Christianity, that world which spreads around

us, and yet in its inner nature is so unsubstantial, we must bring into force the idealism of faith, or faith on its mystical side. When this is done, then to faith the world, so far as it is opposed to God, ceases to exist: faith becomes again assured of the powerlessness of this world against the world so far as it is in harmony with God; for apart from God the world has only a semblance of life. In this way the human spirit again enters its stronghold, and there regains its freedom. To it the power of sin and error is already judged, and in the growth and spread of wrong it sees only the development of evil toward certain destruction. The bitterness and harshness of the pain that is felt when the kingdom of God in Christ seems itself to be threatened, disappear when we recognise the folly and vanity of all attacks that are made on the kingdom of God. Nay, when the Christian has recovered himself in faith, he sees that his former anxiety about the kingdom of God was itself but folly, no less than the blindness displayed in assailing it: and so even that which was most terrifying and tragic can now draw forth a song of triumph such as Paul's, "O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory? Thanks be to God which giveth us the victory, through our Lord Jesus Christ;" or the words of the Psalmist, "Why do the heathen rage," etc. (Ps. ii.).

Here we have what may be called *Christian humour*.[1] But it is humour of a high and Christian kind, only when the spiritual serenity that has been rescued out of the confusions of things temporal does not fall into Optimism and become, as in the case of Friedr. Schlegel, an *irony* that is wholly indifferent to the conflict which goes on in the world; an irony that refuses to take any part in that conflict, either in the way of sympathy or of action. Whoever, in order to maintain a mood of ostensible superiority, takes only a bird's-eye view, as it were, of earthly activity, and looks upon all that men busy themselves about with such tragic earnestness as folly and vanity and so as a kind of tragi-comedy,—such a man is given up to sensuous egoism, and only betrays folly in another shape, that, namely, of frivolity and life-weariness. On the other hand, it would hardly be possible to find a wise, observant, and courageous Christian, who has not again and

[1] [Cf. F. J. Meier's address, *Humor und Christenthum*. 1876.—Ed.]

again indulged in Christian humour, and found it give an impulse and zest to his life. It is wholly justifiable and even a duty, especially in times when in the Church, for instance, or in any other community, error and perversity have grown to a gigantic height. Then the conflict which we carry on would lack the circumspection and courage that are needful, did we not, by taking a true Christian view of things, attain that self-control which enables us to apply the proper standard to the appearance of power possessed by opposing forces, and which strengthens our joy in the present and future kingdom of God. But Christian humour is a salt in our life, not only when we are opposing hostile powers, but also when we turn to ourselves, for it serves to keep us from becoming dull, despondent, and slothful. It is the source of that speech seasoned with salt which is so pleasant to hear (Col. iv. 6). It demands, therefore (and this is a test of its purity), that we set ourselves not only against the perversities that we see around us, but also against that sinful reflex of them which is in ourselves, which consists in despondency and fear of the power of wickedness, and in an exaggerated estimate of that power, and which often expresses itself in bitter and passionate judgments upon others.

Further, Christian humour must be accompanied by the most living interest in the struggle that is waged. When this is the case, it becomes a moving power in that spiritual serenity which inspires the Christian with the bright and joyful hope that the kingdom of God will prosper even by means of its very adversaries, and sends him forth assured of victory and prepared anew to fight and to conquer. When the Christian has retired upon himself and regained his spiritual energy, the sympathy of Christian love now becomes the means of bringing him out once more into the sphere of external activity. Since Christian humour maintains the liveliest interest in the good and its realization, it cannot remain shut up in solitary and selfish enjoyment. It cannot make the follies and perversities of the world the material of its enjoyment, or a background to it,—this is diabolical pleasure, and requires the continued existence of evil. On the contrary, as soon as the Christian has won that inward

self-control and strength, which makes the opponents of the highest good seem no longer dangerous, there arises within him the feeling of compassion, when he sees how men are shut out from the highest good through their own perversity. Thus his newly-won sense of the reality of the chief good and of its worth rouses him to active love. Love, however, does not treat men merely as objects of compassion, as suffering and sick,—it treats them in accordance with their idea, as being all equals and free, and so it enters upon a chivalrous conflict with wickedness (Eph. vi. 10 f.). The compassion of the Christian is not a mere sentiment, but issues in action, when, in conformity with his calling, he takes up the contest with wickedness, and makes himself the organ of the good and of its honour—*militia Christi*. But whether the duty of the Christian soldier calls him to suffer or to act, the ζῆλος which inspires him, and which is Christian love, moves him all the while (just because its aim is the good) to love, in his ideal form, the man whom it combats as wicked.

Christ gives us an example of the courage that springs from a true Christian view of the world. At the lowest point of his humiliation He acknowledges freely that He is a king, a fact which at other times He concealed (John xviii. 36 f.; cf. vi. 15; John xvi. 33; 1 John v. 1 ff.). He is in heaven, while He is upon earth (John iii. 13), and in spirit He sees the fruits appearing (John iv. 35) which, nevertheless, can only be brought forth through the death of the corn of wheat (John xii. 24). He announces His final victory, and lets the world recognise in Him the majesty of the world's judge, even while He is being judged Himself and led to His death. But this conscious dignity in which He anticipates His triumph does not estrange Him from the world. In loving sadness He gazes upon Jerusalem, which is about to reject Him (Matt. xxiii. 37), and purifies the temple, while, nevertheless, He predicts its approaching downfall. His grief and compassion never lose their practical energy. "Weep not for me."

4. Hope, thus rooted in faith and united with love, now makes every effort of the Christian fruitful in realizing some portion of the highest good. Christian virtue is not solicitous

about results. But neither is it indifferent towards them. The opinion is often held, that results do not rest in the hands of man at all, and that the goodness of a volition must not be measured by the result. If this were absolutely true, it would mean that it does not matter what we purpose, so long as it arises out of a right disposition. But if no good comes of an act, then we have not willed the right thing, and therefore also not in the right way—that is to say, we have not been guided by the virtue of Christian wisdom. Whatever is willed rightly is done in God and willed by God; and when this is the case beneficial results are sure to follow, although it nevertheless remains true that the thoughts of man and of God in nowise coincide. Only we must keep *this fact* clearly in mind, that the kingdom of God may be celebrating its triumphs when to all appearance it is suffering defeat. Accordingly, the Christian, even when he is apparently unsuccessful, does not move in uncertainty; he is not beating the air (1 Cor. ix. 26). Christian virtue does not consist in an aimless *progressus in infinitum*, which would be no better than standing still or revolving in a circle; on the contrary, at each moment it attains something, produces either inwardly or outwardly some portion of the highest Good, some definite result, which in its turn yields fruit in the future.

SECOND DIVISION.

THE SUBSISTENCE OF THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER BY MEANS OF CONSTANT RENEWAL AND EXERCISE.

§ 48.

The *self-maintenance* of the Christian personality, which is the same thing as its growth, gives rise to a new series of virtues. It is realized by means of *purification*, and also by *exercise*, which becomes expertness in virtue. When faith, love, and hope become *aptitudes*, we have the trinity of *fidelity, stedfastness, sober-mindedness*. Through puri-

fication and exercise, however, Christian virtue, although in principle a perfect whole, enters upon a process of growth, or a life of successive stages, in which it is gradually unfolded. For virtuous aptitude is strengthened only when an ever more and more successful course of self-discipline is pursued, and when at the same time all the powers of our nature, spiritual and physical, those which are the same in all and those which are peculiar to the individual, are taken possession of or inspired by the principle of Christian virtue, which by this means gains so many organs and capacities for its own manifestation. When the principle of virtue has thus put its stamp upon the personality of the individual in all the manifold variety of his powers,—these powers all the while continuing to form a complete and harmonious unity (*ἁπλότης, εἰλικρίνεια*),—we have the Christian character in the stricter sense of the word.

1. *Biblical Doctrine.* The new personality continues as such only by constantly renewing itself (Col. iii. 9 f.; Eph. iv. 24), and thus accomplishing its work of self-sanctification. This renewal is carried out—(*a*) *negatively*, by a process of purification (*κάθαρσις*) (1 John i. 9; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Rom. vi. 1 ff.; Col. iii. 9; Phil. ii. 12; Tit. ii. 12), the putting off of the old man; and (*b*) *positively*, by *exercise* (*γυμνασία*) (1 John iii. 7; Heb. v. 14, xii. 11; 1 Cor. ix. 24–27). Both the negative and the positive element may be comprehended in *ἄσκησις* (Acts xxiv. 16). The New Testament makes the general demand that the Christian "*ἁγνίζειν ἑαυτόν*" (1 John iii. 3; Jas. iv. 8; 1 Pet. i. 22); this is "sanctification," which comprehends both the negative and positive element. It demands that the new man keep himself *τηρεῖν ἑαυτόν* (1 John v. 18), that he be renewed *ἀνακαίνωσις, ἀνανεοῦσθαι* (Col. iii. 10; Eph. iv. 23; Rom. xii. 2; 2 Cor. iv. 16; Tit. iii. 5), that he grow (Eph. iv. 12); and it represents these as the work of the Holy Spirit (1 Pet. i. 2; Phil. i. 4–7; 2 Thess. ii. 16, 17), but also as an end and task for the personal effort of the Christian (1 Thess. iv. 3, 7). And *finally*, it holds out to

the Christian increasing proficiency in virtue, ability ἱκανότης, as the fruit of his efforts, and demands that he acquire it (Col. i. 12; 2 Cor. iii. 6). The power of virtue, moreover, which in its entirety is comprehended in faith, hope, and love, now comes under a *new aspect*, when virtue becomes *proficiency* or *habit*. Then faith becomes fidelity, that to which the New Testament sometimes gives the name πίστις again, or δοκίμιον τῆς πίστεως (Jas. i. 3; 1 Pet. i. 7); love becomes the stedfastness of the good will, ὑπομονή (Rom. v. 4, ii. 7; Luke viii. 15; 1 Tim. vi. 11; 2 Tim. iii. 10; Tit. ii. 2; Jas. i. 3, 4; Rev. ii. 19, xiv. 12); and lastly, wisdom, when it becomes a habit, is σωφροσύνη, sober-mindedness (1 Tim. ii. 9-15; Acts xxvi. 25; σωφρονισμός, 2 Tim. i. 7; σωφρονεῖν, Rom. xii. 3; 1 Pet. iv. 7).

2. With the new nature of the believer a divine life is incorporated and becomes his own, and this new life he must now deal with as with the gifts of the first creation, which are talents, as it were, entrusted to him to be put out to interest; although it remains true that it is only through communion with the same Spirit of God from whom he received the new nature, and through His power, that it can be maintained. But the believer is no longer merely receptive, but spontaneous, free, and co-operative in its maintenance. To him who hath shall be given (Matt. xiii. 12). Synergism must indeed be rejected when it means that at any time, and of our own strength, we can do anything that is good apart from God altogether, or that any such doing of ours could even partly effect our justification. But it must be accepted in the sense that man is not destined to remain a mere passive channel for the divine will to flow through, as if there were here only isolated divine acts which created no new personality in man to be the focus of a higher life. Neither can the believer be kept and protected by any absolute decree; he must determine to be protected, and so protect himself. In the present life there is no finished state of grace (2 Pet. i. 10); each state constantly gives birth to another, and is therefore in constant movement. And in order that this process of reproduction may be firmly maintained, it is necessary that there be no want of vigour in waging war with present evils, but that disorders and failings be at once taken by the conscience of the Christian as signs which tell from what side the power

of the enemy is threatening, and that these signs be taken by his will as a real summons to a real conflict. Here there are two points to be noticed.

(*a*) The new man is at first still *νήπιος*, and has to *grow up* unto *ἡλικία Χριστοῦ* (Eph. iv. 13). He is feeble and unpractised, although there exists in the centre of the Ego a real blending of divine and human life.

(*b*) The new personality of the Christian is *in the old*, which is accustomed to devote itself and its powers to the service of another principle; and thus the enemy has still dominion over a portion of that which belongs to the unity of the personal life. Now, since the Christian is determined by whatever determines him on either side, the bad as well as the good, he can assert himself as a new man, in spite of this persistent complication with sin, only by showing that he suffers unwillingly the impure influences that affect him, and so is foreign to them in his inmost nature; by setting his will in conscious opposition to them, and casting them off by an inward process of disseverance from them, which always goes deeper and deeper and costs him painful self-denial. The new personality, in which sin has lost its power, can show resistance to the sin of the *old nature* that still cleaves to it, only by opposing and weakening temptations through self-discipline; and this discipline must be pursued in such a way that as the new personality grows stronger it ever continues to subjugate new portions of that region from which temptations arise, and to make them living organs of the Good. There is no vacuum in the personal life. Whatever part of it remains unsubdued by the new man finds a master for itself, or rather, it keeps the old one, who does not abdicate of his own accord. There is the closest connection between the subsistence of the new life and the death of the old, between the preservation of faith, love, and hope on the one hand, and Christian purification and self-discipline on the other, and it is by means of this connection that growth is maintained. The new man can only live at the cost of the old.

Accordingly, (*a*) with regard to the *maintenance* of the new man, it cannot take place unless we engage in a warfare with the evil that is in us. It is a dangerous illusion to regard the state of grace as a state of rest; for sin does not and cannot

remain at peace (Gal. v. 17). Peace without conflict therefore would be overthrow, a surrender to evil. The strife ceases only with the death of the one combatant or the other. (β) Likewise, the *growth* or strengthening of the new man can only take place at the cost of the old, that is, by the powers which were in the service of the latter being made organs of the new man (Rom. vi. 15–22). And finally, (γ) *growth* and *maintenance are combined in the closest way.* For it is self-evident that there can be no growth without maintenance. Inversely, self-maintenance in the form of *exercise* of our powers, as, for instance, in conflict with sin, tends to strengthen them. Continued purification and exercise result not only in daily renewal of our inmost spirit, but also in growth, which ensues as virtue becomes habitual. Growth consists in this, that the old nature, which not only has never hitherto been taken possession of by the new person, but has been under the sway of ungodly and unregulated propensities, is more and more made subject to the new person and becomes its willing organ. By this means virtue becomes habit and a second nature, and takes the forms of *fidelity, stedfastness, sober-mindedness* [cf. § 43, 2, p. 362.—Ed.]. Even involuntarily also the maintenance of the new personality becomes its growth. For the *spiritual vitality* it possesses, acting from within outwards, impels it to develop all its individual powers; while it is continually being enriched by its *assimilation* of something new, derived from the world, from God, from increasing self-knowledge, etc. But of this we shall treat farther on.

3. *Ascetics* is the *doctrine of the purification, preservation, and strengthening of the spiritual life.*[1] Since faith, love, and hope constitute Christian virtue in its totality, any system of purification adopted for the purpose of preserving and exercising the new life must be related to all the three; for none of them can be healthy apart from the others. Now any one of these virtues may, of course, be specially weak and imperilled;

[1] Literature: Reinhard, *l.c.* iv. § 416–v. § 478. Schmid, *l.c.* pp. 63 sq., 589–615. Schleiermacher, *Christl. Sitte*, p. 141 sq. *Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre*, 307 sq. Rothe, *l.c.*, 1st ed. vol. iii. § 869–873, 878–894. Martensen, *l.c.* ii. 1, p. 485 sq. Zöckler, *Kritische Geschichte der Askese*, 1863.

but it is specially important that the *life of faith* be strengthened, because the impulsive power of the whole life proceeds from it, and it alone makes possible a progress which is real growth, and not merely something acquired by external practice. It is important above everything else that fellowship with God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, which has been checked by the impurity of sin, be re-established by means of a course of conduct chiefly of a purifying kind. But now the question arises: when we engage in self-purification, in order to subdue the predominance of the life of sense, are we at liberty to impose upon ourselves privation, abstinence, seclusion, vigils, sparing enjoyment of food and drink, in short, *fasting* of every sort, whatever is comprised in so-called *negative Asceticism?* And then, with reference to *positive exercise*,—ought there to be actions in which exercise is the *sole* aim, or ought exercise only to take such forms as are of moral worth in themselves, and consequently be always allied with moral production?

Many distorted ideas have crept into the *Roman* and *Greek* Church with reference to asceticism, so that the very word has almost an evil ring in it. Here renunciations and self-tortures, voluntarily imposed or taken upon oneself, are accounted good, meritorious works and a proof of virtue, while no attention is paid to the motive and disposition which prompted them. As if mere abstinence from enjoyment, from the possession of property, from marriage, or the undergoing of pain were in itself something well-pleasing to God, although such abstinence or suffering does no good to any one! This would only be the case if these temporal blessings or relations were evil in themselves, or if God took pleasure in the pain of the creature for its own sake;—and this would be Manichæism. The "stylites" of the Greek Church and the ascetics of the Roman have performed wonders in the way of exercises of this kind, and after the fashion of athletes have gained admiring spectators. It is clear that anything of this sort is reprehensible, which is of no moral assistance to the man himself and is of no use to others. Such pretended saints, in all that they do, are not in the least occupied with the realization of any good aim, they do not have any good end in view which they mean to attain when they have trained their

bodies to be serviceable instruments; on the contrary, they injure the body, and set up the mere formal display of power, either of a negative or positive kind, as in itself a good work or an end in itself.

But while such asceticism is reprehensible, the question is not yet settled whether asceticism is morally permissible. Schleiermacher,[1] Martensen,[2] and Rothe[3] call attention to the following considerations against it.

(1.) An action is morally good when in it the good as a whole is willed, as well as some particular good; and consequently it must involve a reference to the common aim of all moral action, the realization of the objective supreme Good in the world. Hence — it is urged — action of an ascetic nature, since it is directed merely to the moral perfecting of oneself, is morally blameworthy. But it is quite conceivable that asceticism may be practised for the purpose of self-improvement, because the latter is held to be the necessary preparation for working in the best interests of the whole. These two things are quite reconcilable.

(2.) The *second* question is of more importance: Can the practice of asceticism actually promote one's moral improvement? Are we at liberty to recommend that by means of asceticism a supply of moral force should be stored up, to be afterwards used with vigour in the concrete relations of life, just as a soldier has to learn his drill, certain formal acts and movements, in order to prepare him for war? May we perform actions whose value is entirely formal, in order to learn to act with full moral power? Is not such power only to be gained by means of acts that have aims of a real and not a formal kind as their contents, just as we can only learn to swim by going into the water; and is it not therefore the case that we only come to act morally by practice in a moral element, namely, in the spheres of actual life? It is certainly true that action which effects absolutely nothing, or is purely formal, is not moral action. But one's own person is such an element as we have spoken of, and here it is requisite that labour be expended, though not without regard to the Good

[1] *Kritik der Sittenlehre*, p. 307 sq.
[2] *System der Moralphilosophie*, p. 74; *l.c.* ii. 1, p. 485.
[3] *l.c.* iii. p. 113.

in general. It is at least certain, that no one can accomplish anything for the good of others until he possesses virtuous energy in himself. Thus we see that, in accordance with the right moral order of duties, each one should first of all attend to the strength of virtue in himself. And here even abstinences and practices that are self-imposed have their moral right, for through them the superiority of the flesh is broken, and temperance and sober-mindedness are secured. Without these, faith is impossible, and if faith were gone there could be no origination on the part of man, flowing from the living fountain of his virtuous energy.[1] While we are minors we must undergo training of every kind.

But we have still to distinguish between the asceticism which is permissible in the life *before* faith, and that which peculiarly belongs to the *Christian life* as such. *Previous to faith,* ascetic practice cannot be the outcome of the power of Christian virtue; but it may be the outcome of a longing for it, and so its aim must be to remove everything that stands in the way of faith and of the birth of the new man. For this end, still self-communing, self-knowledge, and temperance are means to be employed. Hence abstinence societies are quite legitimate, in which those members who have greater moral strength impose restraints upon themselves for the sake of other weaker ones, in order that by such fellowship the latter may be led to self-discipline.

In the case of *Christians,* on the other hand, everything—fasting of every kind included—must proceed from faith, from the pleasure that is taken in the growth of the new man (for whose sake hindrances are taken out of the way), from the desire for spiritual increase (Matt. vi. 16 f.), and from the dissatisfaction that the Christian feels with the

[1] Accordingly, we agree with Rothe in the following particulars. On the one side, he rejects that asceticism which is nothing but ascetic, that is to say, which is exclusively taken up with the individual self; but, on the other side, he acknowledges that asceticism to be good and moral which diffuses itself throughout the whole of the moral life, as long as the latter has not arrived at its full power. It follows as a matter of course, that when those discords in the individual have been overcome, which asceticism was meant to bring to an end, there remains no further need for it. It likewise follows that the *moral necessity* for asceticism, which exists in this life, is matter for humility, so that asceticism can never become the subject of ostentation nor the ground of meritoriousness (cf. iii. pp. 114–117).

humiliating want of freedom which he still experiences. Fasting of this sort is no mere sadness of countenance; it is a manifestation of freedom and of the pleasure that is felt in the new life: it does not arise from pride or vanity, but always contains something that is humbling, the sense, namely, that it is still required. But at the same time it is productive, for it promotes the freedom of the Christian; and, because it is a strengthening of the moral spirit, it is an increase of moral good which will yet become of general benefit. Such asceticism—springing as it does from the virtuous energy of the Christian, which is ever desirous of growth—also has in itself a standard to oppose to subversive extravagances of every kind. For while it is the aim of the Christian to overcome those habits and tendencies in his natural energies which are opposed to his spiritual life, he seeks all the while to take these energies themselves and preserve them, by making them the organs of his Christian freedom.[1]

4. *Means of Virtue.* Since, in accordance with what has been said, even mature Christians may and ought to practise asceticism, we have now to inquire as to the measures or means[2] to be employed, in order to bring to a successful issue that process of self-training (in the way of purification and exercise) by which the Christian develops his virtuous energy to its full extent. This is the doctrine of the *means of virtue,* which has, indeed, been often stated in such a way as to split up the unity of virtue, or make of it a mere patchwork, and consequently to give countenance to the spirit of legalism. The *means of virtue* are the ethical correlate of the *means of grace,* with which they stand in close connection. Means of virtue are acts of man, means of grace are acts of God. The former are such acts as have for their aim the promotion of personal virtue. Strictly speaking, to the Christian all the relations of life, suffering included, and especially his vocation and private relations, must be means of grace. Nevertheless there are also special

[1] [It is self-evident that, in the author's opinion, the manner and measure of ascetic practice must be left to the judgment of the individual conscience.—Ed.]

[2] Cf. Rothe, 1st ed. iii. p. 120 sq. § 878–894. Reinhard, vol. iv. § 416 to vol. v. § 478.

arrangements, partly in existence already, partly to be found out by the Christian himself, which serve to strengthen virtue. Renewal, by means of which virtue is maintained and grows, is partly negative—purification, partly positive —exercise (§ 48, 2). It embraces primarily the maintenance and strengthening of *faith*, but it also includes the invigorating of the intellect and the will. Now a course of purification and exercise which has faith as its object demands the so-called *religious* means of virtue; while those means of virtue which are directed to the purification and strengthening of the intellect and the will, may be characterized as *moral* in the narrower sense of the word.

(*a*) *Religious means of virtue.* To these belong *prayer, contemplation*, use of the *word of God*, and *sacrament*, and also *association* with the Christian *community* in which these are the ruling standard. All these, while they have a religious effect in the way of purifying and training the Christian, not only benefit faith, but also do good to the intellect and the will.

(*b*) *Moral means of virtue.* To these belong: (*α*) so far as *purification* is concerned, *self-examination* on the side of the intellect (1 Cor. xi. 28), and *penitential discipline* on the side of the will. In self-examination, calm introspection, in the light of God's word and in solitude, holds the most important place; while penitential discipline consists chiefly in fighting against the predominant influence of the carnal nature, and in humbling ourselves before God, also before our neighbour should circumstances require.

(*β*) The *positive culture* and increase of knowledge or of Christian *wisdom* are gained principally through our contemplating the image of Christ as our ideal; but it is also of service to have intercourse with rich spiritual minds in literature or in life. Further, we acquire virtuous habits of will, or of *love*, partly by learning perfect *self-command* (so that our sensuous nature, in particular, is always becoming a more pliable organ for the spirit of love that is in us), and partly by accustoming [1] ourselves to forget and sacrifice ourselves, and to open up our heart and mind more and more in love towards others. Finally, it is requisite that we

[1] Giving, for example, must be learned by practising giving.

appoint for ourselves a regular *order of life* and division of time—and here our choice of associates takes an important place—in order to afford full satisfaction to all that is required for our purification and growth. Further particulars may be deferred to the next division, in which, as we have now spoken of the origin and subsistence of the new personality, we shall treat of its self-manifestation and self-development. For the *outward activity* also of the Christian must, as we have seen, *flow from the principle of virtue* implanted within him, and must therefore be a self-manifestation and self-development.

Note.—Are vows, too, means of virtue? From what has already been said, it follows that all vows are reprehensible which result in an arbitrary imposition of laws upon ourselves. All the powers that we possess belong to the Lord, and we may not arbitrarily dispose of them for the sake of a vow which has no moral necessity in it; for we are not our own. The law, which is the will of God, lays claim to the whole life; and this condemns monastic vows, pilgrimages, vows concerning almsgiving, mortification, and whatever is akin to these. But is it in all cases reprehensible to make a vow? such a vow, for instance, as to be obedient to something which is really God's will? It has been held that even here a vow is irreligious, because it makes it appear as if apart from the vow we were not bound to obey the divine will, and therefore, as if that which is God's will had no binding power until our promise was made. Or else—it is urged—a vow makes it appear as if it were entirely within the free power of man to fulfil the commandment, as if he were not dependent upon God's grace to enable him to do so. Now where the one or the other of these is the case, a vow is no doubt reprehensible, but such errors are by no means necessarily connected with vows. Vows only presuppose that man *can* refuse to acknowledge even that which is morally incumbent on him; that, while God is always ready to help a sincere will, man may, on the one hand, refuse to do a certain duty, or, on the other, may make up his mind to be obedient to God. Hence a vow simply means that he fixes this resolution, and enforces it upon himself, as the aim of his future unremitting efforts. Thus making a vow is closely connected with faith ["*Geloben*" and "*Glauben*"]. Unless it were morally permissible to make such a vow as this, which is identical with the resolve to lead a better life, we should be landed in ethical Quietism, and man's share in the work of his own moral culture denied. It follows, however, from what has just been said, that, strictly speaking, there is

only *one* vow, a vow referring to the whole life and corresponding to the one all-embracing covenant which faith makes with Christ in baptism. This one life-vow of fidelity to Christ (*confirmation*) comprehends everything. Vows which cannot find a place in it are not allowable, and especially a vow that involves something which is not a duty, but merely a project that can only be carried out at the cost of actually existing duties.

THIRD SECTION.

THE SELF-MANIFESTATION OR SELF-DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER.

§ 49.

The new personality is even in itself a part of the highest good, by reason of its inherent filial relationship to God, and it is so not merely on the ground of the enjoyment and blessedness which it involves, but because in its very essence and being it is thoroughly good and pure. And more than this; each separate personality, as Christian, is a good of an individual kind, for the natural individuality of each is sanctified and brought to pure and vigorous maturity. There are as many Christian characters as there are Christian persons. But the Christian personality is a good only because, by acting out its own inner life, and thus manifesting what it is, it is constantly engaged in the work of increasing the highest good.

CHAPTER FIRST. The Manifestation of the Godlike Personality in its Absolute Relation.

CHAPTER SECOND. In Relation to Itself.

CHAPTER THIRD. In Relation to Others.[1]

[1] [With reference to this division the following remarks may be made:— (1) According to the author's view, the doctrine of the Christian personality is by no means a mere doctrine of *virtue;* the personality is itself also a part of the supreme good, and shows itself in the acts and works which duty demands. Hence the latter are spoken of as the outward manifestation of the person-

CHAPTER FIRST.

THE GODLIKE PERSONALITY IN ITS ABSOLUTE RELATION; OR THE CHRISTIAN PERSONALITY AS EVINCING PIETY.

§ 50.

A.—*Christian Piety in itself.*

Christian *piety* is the immediate activity in which is embodied the filial relation towards the Triune God. Rooted in faith, it is full of joyful thankfulness for the salvation that has been experienced; in the presence of affliction and sin it is at once trustful, courageous, and humble. And having regard, not merely to God's gifts, but also directly to God Himself, it is the loving response of a child to the fatherly love of God. Nor does the child ever forget reverential fear, which, on the contrary, increases with every advance in the knowledge of the deep things of God, of His majesty and love.

[The Literature.—Rothe, 1st ed. iii. § 987–999.]

1. The object of the Christian's love is God in Christ, God Himself, and not merely His gifts, Matt. xxii. 40; 1 John iv. 19; Col. iii. 17; 1 John ii. 5, 15; Jas. iv. 4, 8; cf. Deut. vi. 5. From passages such as Matt. xxv. 40, according to which we ought to love Christ in our brethren, it does not follow, as some think, that we can or ought to love the Head in the members *only*, and to love God in men *only*. God is also a personal being in and by Himself, and we can enter into moral relationship with Him. Love to God and love to

ality. (2) In all its activities the Christian personality is a *unity;* and therefore faith, love, and wisdom (fidelity, stedfastness, and sober-mindedness) are operative throughout them all. (3) The self-manifestation of the personality, or the *active energy* it displays, *is divided* according to the *objects* to which it is directed, because here we are dealing not merely with a doctrine of virtue, but with the personality as engaged and manifested in the performance of acts of duty and the production of external works. Hence the author is occupied with a *complete* delineation of the personality, in which, *as Christian*, virtue, duty, and good are already naturally united.—Ed.]

man, while in themselves inseparable, are nevertheless distinct. 1 John iv. 20; cf. iv. 9, 10. Further, when it is treated as *idolatry* to pay *divine honours to Christ,*[1] something is imputed to Christianity from which it knows itself to be free, viz. polytheism. At the same time, it is certainly true that the Church regards Christ as Redeemer and Mediator because He is the revelation of the personal love of God, not only the way, but also the truth and the life; not a mediator who separates us from God, but rather one in whom is God Himself; so that we see and find the Father in the Son, who is the absolute image of the Father. We love God truly as a Father when we love Him in the Son, His perfect revelation. Since love to God in Christ surpasses all other love, even that belonging to marriage and family relationships, Matt. xvi. 24, x. 37, it is the principle that ought to regulate all love. All individual forms of good are subordinate to the good of being a child of God; if any other good takes the highest place in the heart, then idolatry arises. It is this which secures our freedom in all circumstances and fortunes. The good of fellowship with God, which the world cannot take away, is able to elicit spiritual joy even from suffering, and to sanctify our joy, Jas. v. 13. But love to God assumes the chief place in the heart in such wise as to be the germ and motive power of all other love which is of a truly moral kind, and keeps its due place. All sin has been defined by Augustine as "amor inordinatus." No individual thing can be truly loved as a good, unless in it we love the Good as a whole, which exists originally and personally in God.

2. The *subjective side* of Christian piety or love to God. This is, first of all, according to Christ's example, *grateful* love for spiritual and physical *gifts,* Matt. xi. 25; John vi. 11, xi. 41; Eph. v. 20; also for gracious acts of God, above all, redemption and forgiveness of sin, and for blessings conferred upon others, 1 Thess. v. 18; 2 Cor. i. 11, iv. 15. But especially is it thankful for love itself; and here gratitude rises to the very fountainhead of the Good, and becomes praise of God. Every virtue which is evinced may be derived from pious gratitude, as is done by the Heidelberg Catechism, but *contentment* and *patience* more especially are inseparable

[1] Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine,* iv. § 127, 7.

from it. A pretentious and discontented man is always unthankful. On the other hand, Christian gratitude is also the mother of *trust*. He who has bestowed upon us the best of all things in Christ, will not withhold any smaller gift, Heb. ii. 13, iii. 6, x. 35; Eph. iii. 12; 1 John iv. 17; Rom. viii. 15, 32; Gal. iv. 6; Phil. i. 6.

3. *Reverence and Love.* The Christian's love to God, being filial love, is a union of opposites—of reverence and childlike trust. Reverence seems to keep its object at a distance, while love encourages familiarity. In Christian love to God, however, there is none of the fear of the Old Testament, Rom. viii. 15; 1 John iv. 18; while, nevertheless, it is not irreverent, not a love, so to speak, such as one has to a companion. There is *αἰδώς* in it, Heb. xii. 28, that which is also called "*φόβος*" in the New Testament sense of the word. It dreads extending its fellowship with God to undue familiarity. It is not love on equal terms. It rests on gratitude; the Author of mental and spiritual life ever remains an absolute authority to His child; this is a part of the child's piety. But the Christian, too, like a child that looks up to his father, looks up to heaven, into which he has an entrance, Heb. x. 19 f., nay, of which he is a citizen, Eph. ii. 19. Thus the majesty of God does not alienate but attract him, and is the sure ground upon which his childlike confidence relies.

4. The *filial relationship* exists even before perfection, even along with much weakness, error, and sin; nay, without it perfection could never be attained; it is the highest personal good, because it is fellowship of the individual person with the Triune God, not merely so-called moral fellowship, but participation in God's life and spirit, 2 Pet. i. 4. The believer is a brother of Christ, the first-born, Rom. viii. 29; 1 Cor. xv. 20, 49; Col. i. 18; Heb. ii. 11, 17. He knows that he is thought, known, and loved by God, that he has been translated into the sphere of light, and given the hope of a crown that fadeth not away, Col. i. 12; 1 Pet. v. 4. The separate *moments* in this good of *sonship* are—(1) on the *negative* side, *emancipation* from a state of *disunion* with oneself and with God, Rom. v. 1, from the consciousness of *guilt* and *punishment*, Rom. viii. 1, and in addition, freedom from *legalism* and fear, Rom. viii. 15,

Gal. iv. 6, and from *bondage* to human authority, Gal. v. 1; 1 Cor. vii. 23. (2) Its *positive moments* are—the feeling of *peace* through experience of the love of God, Rom. v. 5, true *knowledge of God*, the unfathomable depths of God, and above all of His love, being opened up through the Son of His love, and the *new principle of love to God*. All this is (Rom. viii. 21) comprehended in the "*glorious liberty of the children of God*," which the ματαιότης of the world and its ills cannot affect, for ills themselves now become παιδεία, and consequently benefits, Heb. xii. 5. Nay, mention is even made of a συμβασιλεύειν of believers with Christ, Rom. v. 17; 2 Tim. ii. 12. But love to God has also an active side.

§ 51.

B.—*Christian Piety as Inward Activity, or Contemplation and Prayer.*

The (inward) activity of piety as such consists in — (1) a turning of the soul from without inwards, *i.e.* spiritual contemplation, or knowledge in the character of *edification;* (2) a movement from within outwards toward God, *i.e. prayer*, which consists partly of petition and intercession, partly of thanksgiving, adoration, and praise, and attains perfection both of form and contents by being offered in the name of Jesus. [Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. § 48; cf. p. 446; ii. 2, § 127, 6, 7, 146*b*.]

The Literature. — Stäudlin, *Geschichte der Lehre von den Vorstellungen vom Gebet*, 1824. Fénelon, *Discours sur la prière.* Löber, *Das Leben in Gott. Die Lehre vom Gebet*, 1860. Gess, *Vortrag über das Gebet.* Rieger, *Herzenspostille*, 1742, pp. 40 f., 412 f., 765 f. [Schleiermacher, *Der Christliche Glaube*, ii. p. 430 f. Monrad, *Aus der Welt des Gebets*, 2nd ed. 1878. Culmann, *Christl. Ethik*, i. p. 157 f. Ritschl, *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, iii. c. 9. Martensen, *l.c.* ii. 1, p. 207 f. Rothe, 2nd ed. ii. pp. 173–194. Hofmann, *Theol. Ethik*, pp. 129–155.]

1. The Christian has access to the fountain of a higher spiritual vitality than that which is open to other men, a vitality which is not of an external kind, either physical or

psychical, but is inward and spiritual, Rom. xii. 11; 2 Tim. i. 6, *ἀναζωπυρεῖν*; Col. i. 11. From this fountain there flow to him quickening influences, that affect the soul, nay, even the body. The *πνεῦμα* imparts living efficiency to the higher impulses, strengthens intelligence and will, and quickens feeling, and all these effects in union constitute "*inspiration.*" Inspiration in its highest and purest form is no ecstatic excitement, but a steady, pure flame, coupled with clearness of spiritual vision, while life preserves its steadiness and balance. Thus it is that spiritual warmth of life which is opposed alike to coldness and lukewarmness, Rev. iii. 15, 16 (*χλιαρός*, *ψυχρός*, *ζεστός*). The Christian has a ferment in his spirit, *ζέειν πνεύματι*, Rom. xii. 11, a good *ζῆλος*, that in his inward life shows itself specially in the desire to be occupied with God and divine things. This desire is carried into effect in the two forms of contemplation and prayer, which mutually quicken each other, and are characteristic of the pious life, both individual and social.

2. *Necessity of contemplation and prayer.* These are necessary, not only as a *manifestation* of piety, but also as a *means of strength*, as a *religious means of virtue* (§ 48, 4). The sin which cleaves to us is always making us languid and indolent, Heb. xii. 12. In this state of matters our work is apt to be carried on from a mere force of habit due to some former higher impulse that we have formerly received, whilst conflict and victory call for the constant renewal of such impulses. Hence we must collect ourselves again, and not let ourselves live upon our own strength, for, in other words, this would be to fall into Pelagianism. The fundamental relation of the Christian never changes; he seeks, by means of contemplation and prayer, to derive power for good from the one original Good, viz. the personal God in Christ; and for this end, whatever good he already possesses is brought into requisition. We will consider more closely—

I. Contemplation.

§ 52. *Continuation.*

I. Contemplation.

1. The necessity of contemplation is borne witness to in various ways by Scripture and its injunctions, see John v. 39;

1 Cor. x. 11; Acts xvii. 11; 2 Tim. iii. 14 f.; 2 Pet. i. 19, in which passages sacred Scripture is frequently pointed out as a means of edification, on the ground of its being the record of the chain of saving acts which God wrought on humanity, and of its presenting us with the classic form of piety. And here the Old Testament is included along with the New, but with this qualification, that it is Christianity which first gives to it its true interpretation, 2 Cor. iii.; 1 Cor. x. 1 f. In contemplation, the spirit, collecting itself from amid the distracting "many things" of life, and falling back upon the "one thing," Luke x. 42, breaks loose from that flood of daily thoughts, cares, and occupations in which its vision so soon becomes limited and dim, brings all things into the light of the divine, and views them in a religious aspect, *sub specie æternitatis*. This has a purifying effect, and aids self-examination and self-knowledge. Through contemplation we are consciously raised from time to time above external things, instead of becoming their slaves, and regard them in some measure as God does. But from the one thing we again return to the many, and see in the world the revelation of God and the sphere of His activity, and thus consecrate our daily work and the field where it is plied, be it small or great. Let us now dwell upon the nature, the object, and the mode of contemplation.

2. *The essential nature of contemplation* is cognition under the character of edification, *οἰκοδομή*, as is shown by the fact that when contemplation fulfils its aim, it naturally passes over into prayer. For although contemplation is religious *cognition*, it is not wholly or even chiefly taken up with the extension of knowledge, as if it could be completely satisfied with making new acquisitions. But Christian contemplation, having edification as its aim, seeks, above all things, to give life to the knowledge that is already possessed, and to maintain the living stedfastness of the spirit in the truth. At the same time, of course, new views of truth are continually opening up of themselves. Thus to make truth that is old, yet ever new, a living power in the hearts of men is the main art in *preaching*, and a difficult one. It is easy enough to say something new, especially in such an intellectual age as our own; it is still easier to launch out into constant repetition

of traditional dogmas and formulas. But it is a more difficult matter for the preacher actually so to place his hearers in the kingdom of truth, that they observe for themselves, that they breathe, feel, and think in it as in a really existing world, and feel that they are built up on a divine foundation. But wherever this is done a divine work has been accomplished, a part of the progressive history of redemption, of the history of the divine life in the world, has taken place, Eph. ii. 20 ff., iv. 12, 29 ; 1 Cor. xiv. 26, x. 23. Without such substantial *οἰκοδομή* every new thing soon becomes old, and loses its charm and its savour. Christian contemplation accomplishes the ends we have mentioned when it is not merely objective thinking or a statement of the *fides historica,* whether of a learned, scientific, dialectic, or speculative kind, but when it is aflame with living faith and love to God, and consequently the whole soul is engaged in it.

3. *The object of contemplation* is God and His deeds in creation and the government of the universe. Its most important field is history, especially the sacred history that is stored up in the Bible. Since the deeds recorded in sacred history reveal what is eternal, sacred history is both fruitful and applicable with regard to the present and the future. It is well known that simple people who read nothing but the Bible, nevertheless gain from it a treasure of Christian wisdom for the conduct of life. The Old Testament supplies us with a rich history of families and peoples, as well as of individual lives ; a connected account, typical for all time, of the divine education of humanity, a key that also enables us to understand the history of Christian nations. For the latter, too, may and ought to become more and more an object for Christian contemplation, since it would be unbelief to suppose that in the Christian age God's guidance and government are less real and have less purpose in them than in ancient times. Were this done more than it is, and had we such a clear, religious comprehension of the way in which each nation has been led, as the historical books of the Old Testament afford with regard to the history of Israel, we should have something substantial wherewith to counterbalance the theories of the moment, something to oppose to the distraction and confusion of judgment caused by the aber-

rations of the present time, and the discordant voices that are heard in literature, in journals, etc. It is much to be desired that we had also a literature clearly and truthfully exhibiting the deliverances God has wrought and the deeds He has done for humanity and for our own nation, and deeply impressing upon our people their conversion to Christianity. A beginning has been made on the side of the Church for diffusing among the people information of this kind concerning the heroes of the Church and the great deeds of God in the Church's history. This is the idea of the *Evangelical Christian Calendar*, an idea already entertained by Melanchthon. And from the calendar annals might arise.

But not only history, *nature* too is an object of religious contemplation for the Christian. It is true that nature is perishable, Rom. viii. 20; but still it is a sphere where God reveals Himself, Ps. xix., xxix., xxxiii., civ., cxlviii., Rom. i. 20, and intercourse with it refreshes both soul and senses, and is therefore of great importance for the work of virtue in which the Christian is engaged. Our Saviour, too, was far from exhibiting any super-spirituality or alienation towards nature. His eye dwelt with love upon the lilies of the field and the birds of heaven. His parables especially evince His holy love of nature, and show at the same time how He recognises the inner harmony that subsists between the first creation and the second. To Him nature furnishes types or similitudes of those laws of life which appear in their higher potency in His kingdom. He preaches that God provides for animated nature also, and from it He derives the fairest images in that realistic language of His which is so full of plastic force, John x. 1 ff., xv. 1 ff. To Him God is present and visible in nature also. But none the less, God is to Him, not merely the God of nature, but a Father. Our religious contemplation of nature and history must not, however, so lose sight of the real world, as merely to rise to universal views of the divine attributes; the important thing is to lay hold, as it were, of God in His living activity in nature and history. When this is done, contemplation is altogether detached from mere curiosity or the mere accumulation of knowledge—that is, from the deification of nature or of man. The *third* main object of contemplation is *oneself*, and all contemplation must,

in the last resort, have reference to *self-knowledge*, 1 Cor. xi. 28. Even the old heathen sages recognised the importance of self-knowledge. Here self-inspection, which is a means of purification and growth for the Christian, must be taken into consideration; and as this is an important subject, we will add a few remarks as to the right manner of conducting self-inspection, and so acquiring self-knowledge.

4. *The kind and manner of Christian contemplation in self-inspection.* On the subjective side, stillness and collectedness are requisite, in order that the objective means—the word and sacraments of God, and the contemplation of nature and history — may take effect. Christ by His example permits and recommends us not to be always in society, but to seek solitude from time to time, either in the stillness of nature or in the closet, Matt. vi. 6; John vi. 15; Luke vi. 12. It is no good sign for a man's conscience or for his spirituality, when he shuns solitude, whether it be that he is afraid of his own thoughts, or because he finds self-contemplation to be a weariness and a duty which he has not strength to discharge. Self-examination and self-inspection may be steadily maintained by the use of diaries, which are a means of resisting frivolity and distraction, and are fitted to accustom us to turn our attention upon ourselves, and to give account of our day's work or of the different portions of our time. Still there are also dangers to be avoided here. Slackness of conscience and self-love are ever ready to make self-inspection an occasion of self-display, of comparing ourselves with others, Luke xviii. 11 ff., of self-complacency, and of taking a poisonous pleasure in self. Such Narcissus-like thoughts unhinge us, and must be expelled by the stern earnestness of God's holy law. Again, when the conscience is more active, we must avoid the danger of brooding over our sins, a habit which, taking the form of self-accusation, may either cause us to feel pleased with ourselves (in secret, at least) on account of our very self-censure, or may quite dishearten us. Instead of this, the Christian looks at himself as a whole, and in the consciousness of his own impotence, fixes his gaze in childlike confidence on Christ, who alone has positive power to heal. For even though he knew all his sins one by one, the knowledge would not cure him. The

important matter is, that his knowledge of himself as a whole should impress him powerfully, not that he should lose himself amid the casual details of his life. Speaking generally, self-inspection must not degenerate into a magnifying of our own small importance. Nor does it afford any real help to the Christian merely to gaze unweariedly at his sins and infirmities, instead of comprehending all this multiplicity in one piercing, humbling glance, and going with it to the true Physician. Forward to the goal, upward to Christ—this must be the cry of him who is in earnest about his soul. Self-inspection which does not draw us to this centre, however severe and earnest it may seem to be, nevertheless misses the fundamental error of all, and is but a distraction.

With men of a more earnest stamp the habit of brooding has special reference to indications of regeneration, and these are only too apt to be laid down in an arbitrary way. But we must not forget that it is not signs that make us good, but that a good tree bringeth forth good fruits. If a man is troubled lest he be not among the elect or the converted, let him only see to it that he has faith, that he looks to Christ, that he keeps the doors of his soul wide open to receive the gifts of Christ, among which in due season will be numbered an established heart. For our future we need and can find no other guarantee than the faithful and gracious purpose of Christ, Phil. i. 6, who will perfect the work that has been begun. The chief means of fellowship with Christ, however, is communion with Him in prayer.

§ 53. *Continuation.*

II. Prayer.

For the Literature, cf. § 51.

1. The simplest definition of prayer is that it is the talk or conversation of the soul with God as a present Being; not a monologue, as was the prayer of the Pharisee in the temple, Luke xviii. 11.[1] In numberless passages the New Testament exhorts us to prayer, Matt. vi. 5, xxvi. 41; Luke xviii. 1, xxii. 43; John xvi. 23; 1 John iii. 19–22; Rom. viii. 26.

[1] προσηύχετο πρὸς ἑαυτόν.

Christ Himself prayed in the form of petition, thanksgiving, and praise, Matt. xi. 25, xiv. 23; Luke vi. 12; Matt. xxvi. 36, 39, 42, 44; John xvii., xi. 41. Prayer is the specific means of growth in the inner life. Other things may stimulate us to use the power we already have, but prayer increases our stock of spiritual life by drawing down upon us in richer measure the fulness of the Holy Spirit, and thus making our human life divine. Through prayer Christ Himself was made perfect; and so are all the children of God. Thus it is a means of virtue in quite a special sense, and not merely a manifestation of the life already possessed. But prayer is intended to lead the Christian life to a purer form of manifestation, to childlike converse with God; and this is in itself a valuable good. The wings of the soul are strengthened through prayer; fervour, zeal, and enthusiasm are kindled, and by this means our natural gifts are inspired and become charismata. But further, in learning to pray aright, watchfulness is a great assistance. "Watch and pray"—self-recollection; Matt. xxvi. 41, xxiv. 42; 1 Pet. v. 8; Rev. iii. 2; 1 Cor. xvi. 13. Watchfulness and sobriety of mind remind us at once of our own weakness and of the power and love of God. Seeking God presupposes self-distrust, and peace presupposes seeking God; and we must seek God before we can have peace. We can, moreover, only learn to pray by praying, however awkward our attempts may be. The principal rule for successful prayer is first of all to *will* to pray rightly, and therefore we must first of all ask for the spirit of prayer, to be enabled to pray aright. By this means we combat dissipation, dulness, dryness, and the spirit which shuts itself up within itself. The suppliant confesses that he is involved in all these failings, but against his will; and so he gets the blessing of collectedness, lively aspiration, clearness and openness to the Spirit of God. Thereupon he can proceed to drink refreshing draughts from the divine fountain; and then follows his response to the divine gifts—joy in God, love and thankfulness toward Him. Christian prayer has two chief forms, according as it is meant to express a *need* or *joy* at the satisfaction of a need. It is *petition* or *thanksgiving*.

2. *Petition* with *intercession*. With Christ, petition and

thanksgiving were never separated. In the very act of asking for anything, it was His custom to give thanks. He gives thanks because it comes; and it comes because *He* prays who makes all prayer acceptable. What He prayed for came to pass; He is the free Son of man, who, whilst praying, takes part in the government of the world. The Son stood consciously within the Father's will, nothing happened to Him that He had not ordained; so utterly removed was He from all passivity; so completely in His case was fate transfigured into freedom. Now we cannot pray directly in this fashion; but we are encouraged by Christ to pray *in His name.* In so doing, we put ourselves by faith into Christ, into His place; in such wise that we beseech Him to embrace us in His substitutionary love, or to pray for us, and thus be what Scripture calls our mediator or intercessor with the Father, Rom. viii. 26, 34. When this *rapport* has been established between the Head and the members, the promise attached to the prayers of Christ holds good also for those of His members. Their prayers, offered in His name, are a continuation of His life. Very numerous passages of Scripture describe the value of prayer in the name of Jesus, and its acceptation with God, Matt. xxi. 22; Luke xi. 13, xviii. 7; John xv. 7, 16, xvi. 23; Rom. xv. 30; 2 Cor. i. 11; Phil. i. 19; 1 Pet. iii. 12; Jas. i. 5, iv. 2, 3, v. 14. Prayer in Christ's name is therefore prayer proceeding from our fellowship with Christ and Christ's fellowship with us, so that we enter into His mind and spirit, and speak as commissioned, authorized, and enabled by Him. Wherever this takes place, wherever the mind of Christ is, there too that which is right will come into our mind; at all events, everything will be discarded at the outset, which, according to God's decree, ought not to be prayed for; everything, whether of a material or even of a spiritual kind, if it lie outside the dispositions of divine wisdom. Such prayer, being believing prayer, is then powerful and acceptable with God. Here we must assume — as is shown in *Dogmatics*[1] — that the efficacy of prayer, being interwoven with the divine world-plan, is entirely consistent with the divine government of the world. Christian prayer and its fulfilment harmonize,

[1] Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, i. § 32, 5, ii. § 48; cf. § 37.

because they have *one* and the same supreme source. Petitionary prayer in the name of Jesus is a presentiment wrought in us by the Holy Spirit, and its fulfilment is the corresponding activity of God, which He puts forth because the prayer of the believer proves that the world is ready to receive it.

From the exposition that has been given, we see that petitionary prayer, offered in the name of Jesus, excludes *two extremes*. There are *some* who indeed regard faith as necessary to prayer, but only in the general sense of trusting that *God will do all things well*. They therefore deny that prayer should refer to anything *definite* and *particular*. According to them, *submission* alone is Christian; to apply the divine promise to any particular thing is presumption. Such is the verdict of *Ammon* upon that prayer of Luther offered during the sickness of Melanchthon, although it was heard. But if Christians ought not to ask in confident faith for anything definite, they would still be in their minority, not knowing what their Lord doeth. They could never undertake any work in joyful faith, in the assured confidence that it would succeed. On the contrary, their participation in any matter would be only hypothetical, for we must never engage in anything to a greater extent than we can give expression to in prayer. And then the question as to whether prayer is heard would be settled by saying that the believer ought not to pray that anything definite should be granted. But this would make the life of the Christian poor and colourless, and deprive him of that wisdom which anticipates what the kingdom of God requires at the present moment. The New Testament speaks quite differently. It tells us we should be related to God as children to a father, Rom. viii. 15; Gal. iv. 6. No barriers prevent us from bringing all our concerns before God. One thing only is demanded—that our prayer be offered in the name of Christ, *i.e.* that our wishes be purified by our fellowship with Christ. And this does not mean that we are to desire nothing, to be simply resigned; on the contrary, it means that out of its submission to God's will, faith should rise again, well advised as to what the will of God really is, enlightened and ready to act with confidence. Simple submission is often necessary, since humility always remains the fundamental characteristic

of the Christian as a child of God. But submission is nevertheless short of perfection. Even the prayer of Jesus in Gethsemane was more than mere submission; it became assured conviction of what the will of God was, allied with the will and the power to fulfil it. The *other extreme* is *Theurgic Prayer*, which simply adheres to the fact that Christ has said, "Whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, ye shall receive." Here God is conceived of as compelled by prayer, or a kind of magical power is attributed to certain formulas. This would be to make God entirely passive in relation to man, just as in the other case man was made entirely passive in relation to God. But this is irreverent and unchildlike. The cure for this extreme lies once more in prayer in the name of Jesus. When we pray in His name, we lay every wish before Christ, and before giving it a fixed shape, seek to realize that fellowship with Christ which, wherever it exists, not only sweeps away all carnally egoistic and foolish wishes, but also makes the prayer that now ascends an agency of the Spirit of God, and consequently a prayer that is heard.

Although the question whether prayer, which is a free act, introduces any change into God's government of the world, belongs to Dogmatics, still it is clear on *ethical* principles also that we must hold an active reciprocal relation to subsist between God and His children. Accordingly, the so-called passive prayer of Molinos is also objectionable. According to him, God alone is said to pray in man. To this we reply: it is true that no prayer is successful in which we have not the co-operation of the Spirit of God in our hearts; but this does not mean that He becomes our substitute, to the exclusion of our own activity, but that His operation is positive, and a definite act. And the act of the Holy Spirit is the cause of prayer in this sense, that the prayer of the Christian is at once human and divine, and its imperfection is compensated for by fellowship with the Triune God.

Petitionary prayer, if only it be offered in the name of Jesus, may have reference also to *bodily wants*,—as we see from the Lord's Prayer,—although these must come in their proper place. Spiritualism insists that the "bread" here spoken of is spiritual bread. He, however, who is unwilling

to pray for what is necessary for the body, will not give thanks for it. A test of the purity of all our petitionary prayers is whether they contain *intercession*. This shows if the individual be concerned about the whole kingdom of God. Without intercession prayer becomes egoistic, the view and the heart narrow. When piety lacks expansion, it also lacks intensive force. And then our prayer is not prayer in the name of Jesus our Head.

3. *Thanksgiving and praise.* Thanksgiving also must be made in the name of Jesus, in order that we may give thanks for the right thing and in the right sense, and that we may not misunderstand God's kindness and His gifts, which may be shown even in the infliction of suffering and loss. Here, too, both the universal and the particular must be made the subject of thanksgiving. The test of the purity of this form of prayer is whether we give thanks for the good that happens to others as well as for that which happens to ourselves. This makes thanksgiving the Christian's victory over envy, jealousy, and pride. Thanksgiving, moreover, shows the measure of our gratitude, and gratitude of our humility. Where there is ingratitude there is much pride. All wilful, restless desires sink to rest when we give thanks for what we truly ought. Such thanksgiving, although it is some individual thing that gives rise to it, is praise of God Himself, and is pleasing to God. In thanksgiving, man renders back to God as a spiritual offering the divine benefit he has received, by bringing it clearly before his mind in the sacrifice of prayer as something presented to him by God; and then receives the gift again in a higher form, enriched with the consciousness that in it God's love is bestowed upon him. The more our thanksgiving melts into joy and delight in this love of God and Christ, the purer will it be. It then becomes *praise* of God. Further, just as no petitionary prayer is Christian which proceeds as if there were as yet nothing to give thanks for, so Christian thanksgiving must also include petition as a moment. This, too, is pleasing to God. The kingdom of God is here, but it is also coming. Premature contentment would be self-deception with regard to oneself or the world, if not indifference and lovelessness. The prayer of petition that springs from a

grateful heart, asks for new strength in God, in the knowledge of His majesty, holiness, and blessedness, and then passes over to the thought of the practical life, to the world in its alienation from God, and the valiant conflict we must wage therein. This is the course followed by the Lord's Prayer.

4. *The form of prayer.* Its inner form has already been determined in requiring that it be offered in the name of Jesus. But the question still remains as to the position of *oratio verbalis* and *mentalis.* Is it not sufficient that prayer should exist inwardly, as a longing, an inward emotion or affection? Can it serve any purpose to clothe our prayer in words and give it outward expression before God, aloud or in a whisper, when we remember that God looks into the heart, and knows all our desires as well as all our wants? Matt. vi. 8. The inward emotion must indeed be the first thing, though it be no more than the desire to be enabled to pray. But when this emotion does not clothe itself in definite thoughts and words, prayer is still imperfect, not in intensity, but in definiteness—although it is not always possible in the stress of circumstances to clothe our prayer in thoughts and words. Rom. viii. 26. At such times στεναγμοὶ ἀλάλητοι rise from the heart. The prayer of the publican in the temple was hardly anything but a sigh involuntarily expressed, yet it was more pleasing to God than many words. But still, outward audible words are of importance, and react upon the inward prayer. Mere internal emotion is very apt to fade into indefiniteness, and to lead to feebleness in prayer, unless it is laid hold of by the formative and practical power of Christian will and thought. When prayer remains entirely inward, it is prone to be crossed by a world of prayerless thoughts; but when expressed in words it draws our scattered thoughts more together, and presses our energies into its service. Real, audible prayer places us more directly in the act of prayer, and by the mastery we thus obtain even over the external world, our sacrifice of prayer is kept from distraction. In words prayer attains, as it were, its body, its earthly frame. It is also beneficial to set apart our accustomed place of prayer as a holy spot, to surround it as with a sacred circle, and thus to make it a templum in the old sense. Every study should be

such a templum, from which we look out to heaven and upon the world.

Again, which is preferable—*fixed forms of prayer*, or *free prayer from the heart?* The former have this disadvantage, that they allow the thoughts to wander too readily, whereas free prayer brings our powers much more into requisition. Forms of prayer are also apt to become a kind of mediator, keeping God and man apart; so that the *opus operatum* is looked upon as sufficient, and the inwardness of immediate fellowship with God falls into the background. Accordingly, *spontaneous prayer* ought at all events to be practised and learned, and this is very easily done even by children. It is not difficult, if only we do not try, in the words we use in prayer, to appear better than we really are, but bring before God in a childlike, natural, and inartificial way what we feel and what we long for. Only we must not aim at speechifying, Matt. vi. 7; on the contrary, prayer had better be short than too long. It helps us to learn to pray from the heart when we divide our prayer into thanksgiving, deprecation, petition, and intercession (Rieger). Nevertheless, *forms of prayer* have also their own peculiar advantages, and that not merely in times of dryness, in order to strengthen and cultivate within us the true sense and spirit of prayer. Here we must again distinguish between private and social *prayer*. The former belongs to the closet, and to those occasions when in the nature of things free heart-prayer must prevail. Matt. vi. 6. But since all association demands order and stability, forms of prayer have more power to keep the individual members together than subjective, spontaneous prayer. In family devotion, indeed, the father naturally represents the whole family, and consequently his position as priest will find expression in free heart-prayer also, which will take up all the common interests of the household, and have also a more stimulating and living power. The most suitable counterpoise to any imperfections that arise here may be found in conjoining free prayer with *contemplation*,—especially reading and explaining of Scripture, — and perhaps with sacred song. But in *public worship* the prayer-book is to be preferred. It is necessary to congregational prayer in the true sense, that the whole body of the people should actually *pray*,

and not merely learn God's word in a new form. And such prayer is hardly possible, if the members do not know beforehand what is to be prayed, but are dependent upon the clergyman, upon his subjective production of the moment, and have only to follow this. Without a prayer-book all prayer would be conducted in too subjective a fashion, the churchly tone would be lacking. It is in keeping, therefore, with the freedom of the congregation and the dignity of public worship, that the best prayers of every age, which have been bestowed upon the Church in the course of her Christian life, should be collected and used. At the same time, as particular and accidental cases arise, the gift of prayer possessed by the individual may retain its place even in the church. As for the quality of formularies of prayer, the Lord's Prayer is typical, with respect alike to its correct estimate of blessings, its sense of fellowship, its childlike mood, and—with all its brevity—its superlative excellence.

§ 54. *Times of Prayer and Contemplation, or the Order of Life determined by Christian Piety.*

The whole life of the Christian must be a life of prayer; and it becomes so by this means and in this way—the spirit of prayer arranges the life and divides it into smaller and larger portions, in order to obtain supremacy over the entire lifetime. Contemplation and prayer are works of absolute worth in themselves, to which the Christian expressly devotes special seasons. This organization of life is based, in the narrowest sphere in which it is carried out, upon the fact that our physical nature, in accordance with a beneficent law of life, requires an alternation of work and rest, of daily labour and recess, —a law which is reflected in the life of the spirit, so that times in which we are engaged with the duties of our calling alternate with times of vacation, in order that our corporeal, psychical, and spiritual powers may be renewed by relaxation and spiritual tranquillity. Accordingly, the Christian spirit of prayer, in the

exercise of wisdom and discretion, sanctions an order of life determined by Christian piety, in which our life is formed into an organism made up of smaller and larger portions, so that a *regular* rotation takes place which is indispensable to the rhythm and harmonious progress of the Christian life. These divisions are in part daily, in part weekly (*Sunday*), and in part are sacred seasons occurring at longer intervals.

THE LITERATURE.—Cf. the *Denkschrift des Evangel. Oberkirchenrathes über die Sonntagsfrage*, Berlin 1877 (by the author). Calvin, *Institutio*, ii. c. 8. *Catechismus Genev. ad mandatum*, iv. *Heidelberger Katechismus*, 4 *Gebot. Conf. Aug.* ii. art. 7. *Katechism. major Dekal.* 3. Cf. the works of Schaff, Liebetrut, *Sonntagsfeier*, Kraussbold in *Die Zeitschrift f. Protest. und Kirche*, 1850, p. 137 ff. Oschwald, *Die Sonntagsfeier*, 1850. The English work, *The Pearl of Days.* Hengstenberg, *Der Tag des Herrn*, 1852. Alex. Beck, *Der Tag des Herrn und seine Heiligung Vortrag v. Schmid auf dem Kirchentag*, 1850. Nitzsch, *Praktische Theologie*, i. § 56. [Wilhelmi, *Feiertagsheilsgung*, 1857. Haupt, *Der Sonntag und die Bibel.* Zahn, *Geschichte des Sonntags*, 1878. Uhlhorn, *Die Sonntagsfrage in ihrer socialen Bedeutung*, 1870. Rieger, *Staat und Sonntag*, 1877. Rohr, *Der Sonntag vom socialen und sittlichen Standpunkt*, 1879. Baur, *Der Sonntag und das Familienleben.*]

1. We are repeatedly enjoined to pray without ceasing, Luke xviii. 1; 1 Thess. v. 17. But inasmuch as the special act of prayer is not compatible with every task, though the latter may nevertheless be a moral duty, such an injunction must refer to the spirit of prayer, which may and ought to be heard like an undertone through all our work. But this spirit of prayer would soon disappear without special seasons for recruiting it. In the spirit of prayer we feed upon the grace we have already received. But we do not have grace at our command once for all; we need grace for grace; maintenance and growth, which here also are inseparably connected, demand cessation of work from time to time, that we may again apply to the fountain of strength. Only in such an alternation as this, where at one time we collect strength and at another exhibit it, can there be prosperity and progress either in physical or spiritual life, and accordingly we can

hardly say that this law is connected with our earthly existence alone. Even Christ set apart seasons of prayer for Himself. But in the rationale we have given it might appear as if work alone were our proper aim, and prayer only the means of supplying us with the power to perform it, as if prayer were therefore only a means of virtue, and the amount of time to be given up to it had to be determined by work, which is the real aim. This standpoint, however, is altogether false. Prayer and contemplation are in themselves ethical acts, ends in themselves, and of absolute worth. As the Triune God is an objective Good in Himself, and not merely by reason of His works, so, too, our action has an absolute moral value when we are directly occupied with God, and not merely when we are occupied with individual moral relations. Nay, such action is the centre of all action, as it refers to the moral centre of the world, to God in Christ. It is a divine work, and communion with God, which it enables us constantly to realize afresh, is an independent good in itself, which can only subsist by being continually renewed. Since prayer and contemplation are central, they are regulative; appointing their times to all our tasks by quickening the sense of God within us; and thereby most surely enabling us to set about our work in the right spirit. There must therefore be special *times of prayer* in the Christian life. Not as if these alone were divine, sacred, and religious, and times of work profane, but quite the reverse. Their object is that no moment may be left profane, without God, or irreligious, but rather that everything may conduce to quicken the Christian's sense of God, to keep the spirit of prayer in constant activity, and to teach us to discover in everything the side which connects it with God, in other words, to view and treat everything in the divine light.

2. Many, however, resist a *fixed order*. They hold that it should be left to the free spiritual impulse of the moment to determine when a time should be set apart for prayer and contemplation; that only in this way can prayer have inward truthfulness, and only thus can we be delivered from a new spirit of legalism. But, with regard to the *individual life*, this would mean, either that in the life of the believer times of slothfulness never occurred, or else that he can

do nothing against them, but only wait until the spiritual impulse returns. This would be mere passive resignation, the ethics of Mohammedanism. But, as we have already seen (§ 48), self-discipline has a part to play in the life of the Christian. And as far as the fear of legalism is concerned, it is only necessary that it should be the spirit itself which wills and arranges the order, that it should do so freely, recognising it to be something good, and adhere to it as a means of resisting the flesh, which ought to be disciplined and held in subjection by the spirit, until perhaps Christian wisdom perceives that the necessities of the case have altered. If this order be fixed by the Christian spirit in prospective wisdom, there is nothing arbitrary about it. There would rather be arbitrariness where there was no order, and it would be unethical to leave the maintenance of a right inward state of heart to the mercy of accident. Christian freedom is not disorder nor monotony, but a freedom duly organized, and the new man is sustained by establishing a definite order, and adhering to it. Hence the striking saying of Augustine: "Keep order, and it will keep thee." The only thing required, therefore, is that the believer should either, in the exercise of his own wisdom, form a fixed order for himself according to his needs, or should fall in with that which already exists, and there walk at liberty. It is impossible to see why in every other instance the regulation of the practical work of love should be regarded, not as hampering the exercise of freedom, but as promoting it, while in the work of contemplation and prayer alone—a work, too, of absolute ethical value—order and freedom should be looked upon as incompatible, and even contradictory. Further, in the practice of piety the life of the believer ought not to remain an *isolated* one, but to embody in itself the generic consciousness. Thus *individual piety* demands also *association in the worship of God*, and is raised and stimulated by it. This must be taken into account by Christian wisdom when instituting a pious order of life; otherwise, by falling into separation, it undervalues the blessing to be derived from the spirit of fellowship, and the essentially organic position which the individual holds. And now, should a *common order* of pious duties be established, *i.e.* an order of life for the Christian

community, the individual must also shape the order of his own religious life so as to *be in harmony with it*, so as to promote and not to hinder it. This last consideration is of more importance for the longer, regularly recurring portions of time set apart for prayer and contemplation, while for the shorter ones that occur each day it is sufficient to take into account the necessities of the individual life. But such a division of our time, both into longer and shorter portions, is only possible if men are not so constituted that each one must, in order to have a right order for himself, have one different from that of everybody else; that is to say, only if there is a *universal law of life* in human nature, the *same for every one*, upon which to base the regulation of our life,—a law that demands pauses in our work, points of rest, without which human life would fall into mere mechanism.

3. Now, as a matter of fact, the essential identity of humanity does not merely go the length of making all men stand in need of such a pious ordering of life. It goes farther than this; so that three circles of religious duties, each exceeding the other, and expressing the form which the regulation of Christian freedom takes, may be described.

The first of these especially, but also the second, depends upon the laws of terrestrial life; the third arises more immediately from the necessities or laws of spiritual life alone.

(*a*) The *first* is that of *daily life*. Daily life, from the general conditions of earthly existence, is divided into waking and sleeping. When we awake we naturally first of all look upward and give thanks, then we look forward into the day, survey the duties that lie before us, make our plans as to how we shall spend our time, what tasks we must engage in and in what order, and for the accomplishment of these seek strength and calmness in God. In the *evening* we look just us naturally backward, in order to regain the harmony we have lost, and to give ourselves to rest in renewed assurance of reconciliation with God; and in general, to bring the past to mind, and appropriate its blessing for the present. For that man is frivolous and undervalues the leadings of God in sorrow and joy, whose efforts are all directed to the future, and who never collects his thoughts to look back upon what

he has lived through in the past. The outcome of such efforts and such work is mere restless movement, it is not real gain nor progress.[1] Time is a capital entrusted to us by God, a capital that consists not merely of the present or the uncertain future, but also of the past, which is meant to live on in the present in the form of remembrance; and the more we *purposely* attach importance to the past, the more faithful will memory become. If, then, in the evening it is the past that is naturally uppermost in our mind, in the morning the future, while during our day's work it is the present—we may say that in the *morning* piety appears as *hope* arising from faith, that *love* has to inspire our daily work, and that in the *evening* piety comes back from work to the rest of *faith* in God.

During the day, too, certain natural pauses occur, in which the physical life recovers its strength, and in these it is a good and salutary thing to restore the balance between the sensuous and the spiritual side of our nature, by lifting our souls to the Giver of bodily strength. Besides, thankfulness requires this at our hands (*vid. sup.* p. 427). This is the first circle of pious duties, and a fundamental one for the *individual* life and for the Christian character of *family life*. And it is not difficult to observe these home religious duties.

(*b*) It is *not so easy to construct the second circle, that, viz., of weekly religious duties.* Here the *Sunday* question is involved. Within the last ten years this question has been discussed in many and various ways, as indeed it deserves to be, from its importance for individual and national life. A whole literature has been formed in connection with it. In addition to the articles already mentioned by Oschwald, Liebetrut, Kraussold, Schaff, etc., the Proceedings of the Stuttgart Church Diet, 1850, are worthy of notice. These contain a striking address by Dr. Schmid, in which he shows at length how at present the Sunday has almost become the most occupied day in the week, whether as regards work, or amusement, or even debauchery. Things have come to such a pass that, according to statistics, most crimes are committed on Sunday; that it strengthens the secular spirit, and instead

[1] Hence it is right even to set apart days to commemorate important events in our own life and in the lives of our friends.

of seasoning and consecrating the national life, has rather become a pest within it. Various causes are assigned for this by Schmid. One of these is a false Evangelicalism, tending to antinomianism; others are that men are gradually ceasing to feel the need of intercourse with God in prayer; that the study of the Bible is put low in the scale of importance, as, for example, in the spiritualistic delusion that he who has once become a Christian finds everything already given in his Christian consciousness, and does not require, for his growth, that word of God through which he became a Christian at first; and, finally, that the ties of domestic and church fellowship are being relaxed. If the members of a Christian family were as heartily united as they ought to be, they would eagerly welcome those still hours which Sunday affords, free from the stress of everyday business life, in order to give to education its true intellectual and spiritual centre in the family, and to bring down a Sabbath blessing upon family life. In like manner, too, if Christian life had *less* of an individualistic and *more* of a common spirit, the need of joining in congregational worship would be more generally felt, both for our own good and that of others. Nitzsch says (*Prakt. Theol.* i. § 56, p. 345 sq.), "If the distinction between work days and holy days were abolished, and work as well as worship were left to any day that each one might choose, the result would be the dissolution of the Church."

What has been said might be of itself sufficient to commend the Christian observance of Sunday, which, as is shown in the case of Great Britain, is favourable both to the intellectual and economical welfare of the people at large, and especially of the lower classes, and in which more than in anything else a people can manifest its Christian life.

In the ancient Church some Christians kept Sunday as the day of the resurrection; others, according to Ignatius, held fast to the Sabbath; while others, again, kept both days. The *Confessio Augustana* rests the Sabbath almost entirely upon the fact, that people must agree as to a day for the common worship of God, and the *Catechismus major* does not advance beyond this point of view in any essential respect. At the Reformation the Lutheran and Reformed Churches (Calvin,

Institutio, ii. c. 8. *Heidelberg Catechism.* Fourth Commandment), in opposition to spiritual legalism, laid special emphasis in this connection upon evangelical liberty, on the ground that a little leaven might leaven the whole lump. Still a fixed rule for the observance of Sunday, which the Christian spirit freely makes for itself, is quite consistent with Christian liberty, and we are indebted to the *Puritans* and the *Scotch* for having been the first to direct attention to this matter. However much the Puritan movement, which spread like a flood over the whole of Great Britain, afterwards retreated within more moderate limits, the introduction of a settled Sunday observance, dating from that time, has proved a blessing to the whole national life of England and Scotland, a blessing which later ages have not allowed to be taken from them, and which, transferred to North America, has become an essential condition of the spiritual health of the nation. For in these busy commercial countries, with their artisan and manufacturing populations, the Sunday is the power which maintains the balance between the inner life and its nurture and the restless outward life. It was a sound instinct which, soon after Elizabeth's time, demanded the Sunday as the regulator of the whole national life, and has hitherto maintained it as such: for without fixed rules for Sunday observance, these nations would have been liable to be swallowed up in the mechanism or materialism of work, and thus a large portion of the population would have been degraded to the position of Helots, while the remaining portion would have lost much of the ideal import of life. It may be said in general that the English Sunday is the foundation of English freedom; it is the subjection of time to the ordinance of God, and this acts as a pattern for bringing the national life in general into subjection to God's ordinances and laws. And it is only when rooted in the soil of law that freedom can flourish. The history of *Germany* has hitherto been a different one. The German people as a whole did not run so much risk from the tendency to mere mechanism; they have been for the most part an agricultural race. From their habit of mind, too, contemplation, even during the week, occupies a larger place in their life than it does in the case of the nations we have mentioned, and by this means elements of Sabbath-life are inter-

woven with the week days. Still this is not enough to render Sunday unnecessary. With reference to commerce and manufactures, a state of things is being developed amongst ourselves which is already analogous to what exists in these nations. For one thing, family worship has, to a large extent, to be set up over again in Germany as a customary practice. Still, the individuality of the German race will have to be taken into account when we contemplate the necessary improvement of our observance of Sunday, a work which will be of the greatest importance to the energy of our national life as well as to our self-respect as a Christian people. And in many ways our age is favourable to such an improvement. Our workmen and day-labourers are already making their voices heard with ever increasing strength, both in the towns and—to some extent—in the country, demanding that a Sunday should be given them; and this is no wonder. We here see the harmony that subsists between God's ordinance and man's natural requirements, for, even according to a wholly worldly standard, it is reasonable and advantageous that man should have a Sunday, it is a freedom to which he is entitled to have a free day; and when once he has secured it, it will be the duty of the Church to redouble its zeal, and see that it is worthily employed.

Foundation of the Christian Sunday. The observance of Sunday cannot be based upon the Mosaic law by itself. For in that case the Sabbath, the seventh day, would have to be made the day of rest instead of the first. And the legal penal sanctions which were given in connection with the Sabbath would also be still in force. Christ Himself took up a free position towards the Sabbath. My Father worketh even until now, and I work (John v. 17). To the same effect is Mark ii. 27, the Sabbath was made for man. Similarly, Paul (Rom. xiv. 5; Col. ii. 16 f.) enjoins Christians not to make it a matter of conscience to keep new moons, Sabbath days, etc.,—that is, not to regard the Jewish observance of holy days as indispensable. He wishes the whole life to be holy and consecrated to God. Nevertheless he nowhere says that it is morally wrong to set apart special times for collecting and recruiting our energies. On the contrary, he recommends self-examination (1 Cor. xi.). Further, he directs collections to be made among the Corinthian Christians at their regular

weekly gatherings (1 Cor. xvi. 2);[1] and Christ Himself not only assumes, without a word of blame, the continuance of the Sabbath by His disciples (Matt. xxiv. 20), but also says—the day of rest was made for man. Accordingly, that which is abolished is looking upon the Sabbath as *something rendered to God*, as an offering of time. But here too the saying applies, that from the beginning it was not so. On the contrary, it was instituted, according to Gen. ii. 1–3, as a day of blessing, a gift which God Himself has sanctified; and prophecy already to some extent again conceived of it in this way: it is the day which is to be kept holy as a blessing to man (Ezek. xx. 12, 20, xxii. 8, 26; Isa. lvi. 6). To this beginning the gospel returns, setting forth, as the fundamental idea of the Sabbath, rest in God,—that supreme good which was sought after under Old Testament forms and in Old Testament times, but was not found until Christianity appeared (Heb. iv.),—a rest, indeed, in which the whole life is to have its share. This end is attained by having fixed seasons for collecting our thoughts and raising them to God, and by both public and family edification. Sunday is not given for idleness. No part of life is to be devoted to sloth. The Old Testament Sabbath is a creation-festival, designed for bodily rest and relaxation, but also for spiritual strengthening; for it is to be kept holy. In the New Testament it is at the same time a memorial of Christ's resurrection as the sign of the new creation.[2] But the institution of the Sabbath (Gen. ii.) has a permanent significance. It expresses, namely, that this periodical recurrence of pauses is a law of life implanted by the Creator,[3] and must be kept sacred like other natural laws implanted by Him—as, *e.g.*, the regular alternation of sleep and waking hours. The order of nature is no less an expression of the divine will than the positive divine law; just as the State, for instance, is a divine ordinance, without its being established by a positive law of God.

[1] Κατὰ μίαν σαββάτων, *i.e.* on the first day of the week, which was therefore the day for assemblies.

[2] It is called κυριακή, the Lord's day, and was at first kept as a Christian holy day along with the Sabbath, but soon afterwards instead of it.

[3] At the French Revolution the tenth day was tried; but the attempt only served to prove that in the old custom there was a true perception of natural law, and accordingly it was soon reverted to.

With regard to the *employment of the day of rest*, the Old Testament gave but few definite directions. Abstention from everyday work leaves hours of life disposable at once for *bodily relaxation* and physical refreshment. No time must be devoted to actual idleness, but it may be devoted to the restoration of the physical powers, and to means suitable for this purpose. Even in Old Testament times the Sabbath was a day of joy. It is wrong to ignore this aspect of Sunday, and to hold that the enjoyment of nature and social intercourse ought to be avoided. At the same time, a relaxation that means fresh excitement, a rest that only brings unrest and fatigue, friction and not recreation, cannot be defended on ethical principles. But the most important thing is *mental recreation* and refreshment, and of these the most active source and centre is the rest in God that is found in family and public edification. The prophets show that the Sabbath is not kept holy by doing nothing, but, in particular, by the worship of God (Ezek. xx. 12, 20, xxii. 8, 26; Isa. lvi. 6). In the time of Christ, Sabbath-day divine service was already prevalent. Religious work must be the regulator of this day. The contemplation of the μεγαλεῖα θεοῦ, the raising of the soul above time to eternity—this is the most worthy employment of Sunday. Further, the Christian Sunday has been given us for visiting and comforting the poor, the sick, the prisoners, and for works of Christian love in general,—for all that is comprehended under the name of home mission work, and which lies outside the ordinary duties of our vocation. Schleiermacher[1] has shown how such works are necessary alongside of our special vocation, since they refresh our business life and preserve it from mechanism. The full ideal of Sunday does not lie in discontinuance of the Sabbath, but in the whole life being sustained by rest in God, as we see the life of Christ to have been (John v. 17). But we shall attain this end all the more surely, the more we grant that it is right to have a fixed order of Sunday observance, and the more we arrange one in such a way as Christian love and wisdom may require.

(*c*) Finally, a *third circle* is formed by *times in which we look backward or forward, and into our own hearts*, times of

[1] *Christliche Sitte*, p. 154 sq.

comprehensive periodical recollection and invigoration. In many respects we cannot be conscious of our backsliding or our progress after days or short intervals. But it is needful for the new man to survey, from time to time, his spiritual condition as a whole, and to pass judgment upon himself; and then all that is defective in him, and which in its separate items escaped his notice, is seen in its connection and significance. Such times of self-examination, moreover, will always make us sensible of our special need of comfort and strength, to enable us to carry out the life-resolves which we form anew. Hence they will lead the Christian to the feast which Christ has instituted for this very purpose, that He may slay death in us by His own death, that we may find life in Him.

Note.—The second and third circles have already directed our attention from private to social piety; contemplation and prayer must be engaged in along with others. By this means the Christian generic consciousness is brought into association with these religious exercises, and this is of great importance to its development.

§ 55. *Christian Religious Zeal.*

We have seen that prayer is at least an inward exercise of piety. Now, the outward expression that is given to the inward act is not the precise end that is contemplated; it is more in the nature of an accidental and involuntary accompaniment. Piety, however, seeks also an effectual and intended manifestation in the form of *religious zeal*, which shows itself on the one hand in *confession* of the truth (*ὁμολογία, μαρτυρία*, witness-bearing), and on the other in the *proclamation* of it (*κήρυγμα*). Thus the common object of both is Christian truth. The fundamental moral quality, however, that characterizes *confession* is truthfulness, which, by rejecting temptations to deny Christ in speech or act, or by undutiful silence, evinces and displays conscientious fidelity towards itself and towards Christ, and shows that it esteems the good of fellowship with Him to be higher than any other good. On the other hand,

love is the standard in the *proclamation* of the truth; love, which asserts the truth not only as something belonging to itself, but also as belonging to others, and therefore makes others its object.

Schleiermacher, *Christliche Sitte*, p. 580 ff. Cf. Rothe, *l.c.* 1st ed. iii. § 997.

Note.—It is true that confession and martyrdom include a reference to others. For part of their purpose is to make manifest, for the sake of others, the sincerity of the inward conviction. But this is only done in order that fidelity in faith may be shown to be a matter of duty—that is, a duty to God and to oneself. In the proclamation of truth, on the other hand, which accordingly belongs to the social sphere, we make our fellow-men our first aim.

1. The Christian makes no secret of his own faith, for he knows that Christianity is not merely a private matter or possession of his own, but a salt, a light for the world. Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh, Matt. xii. 34 ff. If we confess with the mouth the faith, namely, which is in us, Rom. x. 10, we shall be saved through such faith courageously asserting itself in confession. The Christian seeks to make his whole life a confession of gratitude, Rom. xii. 1. To deny Christ would be to Him shameless ingratitude, infidelity towards his most faithful friend, Mark xiv. 29 f.; Luke ix. 26, xxii. 34. The Christian, therefore, is not afraid of letting his whole being bear the Christian stamp, in intercourse with others, in tone and bearing, in dress and speech, etc. In all these confession is made. Here several duties are still in the background; although love to God in Christ is the soul of all we do, nevertheless our relations to our fellow-men do not supply our chief, our most immediate aim. And yet we do not act without a purpose. Our purpose is to assert our union with God in Christ, and to assert by truthfulness our Christian self-identity. In confession the Christian is actuated by the inner necessity alone, of not denying outwardly what he is inwardly. How different *confession* is from *proclamation* of the truth (the means of giving it currency) may be seen especially from the fact, that in the latter we have to proclaim something that is much better than ourselves, for then we are preaching to

ourselves as well as to others. But confession, which reaches its culmination in martyrdom, is a declaration as to our personal position in the matter. Here it is not only objective truth that is required, but personal truthfulness. We must not, however, allow any *self-importance* to be mixed up with this personal element. Christianity does not depend upon us; we must not take pleasure in a zeal for confession that has its roots in vanity and pride, and which would therefore be impure—nay, a lie before God. In such a personal matter as this we must act with modesty. J. J. Rambach says with truth, "Confession for its own sake is nothing but leaves, it is blossom and fruit that are of value." And yet even an unseasonable confession of Christian truth, Matt. vii. 4, when it threatens to involve us in injury and danger, is more honourable, because it costs self-denial, than one which promises to be to our advantage. Confession may become fashionable; but wherever it is the fashion, there indeed we need fear no martyrdom for confessors, but we may very well apprehend harm to their souls. This is the time for honest Christians to evince the self-denial that ought to be found in those who make confession of Christ, by testifying against mere fashionable virtue, by bearing witness that living faith must precede confession, that truthfulness is the life of confession, and that there can be no faith without humility and spiritual modesty. The Christian will not seek for opportunities of speaking about himself and his own faith; but he will certainly seek for opportunities of *making the truth known to others.* And this he can do by word or deed; for it is not the function of a special order only. The Christian waits until the duty of personal confession—*i.e.* confession of his own personal position with regard to Christian truth—is laid upon him as a duty by his Christian profession; until he is placed in the *status confessionis*—*i.e.* until silence would mean indifference to truth, or positive denial of it, or consent to its denial. Then, indeed, he boldly makes confession. It would be a false thing to be willing to appear worse, more unbelieving than we really are; it would be ingratitude to Christ, whose kingdom is increased by such acts of courageous confession as spring from our Christian standing and involve self-denial. But although

truthfulness is the soul of confession, yet this truthfulness is not severed from *love*. There is nothing heartless, nothing of the judge, nothing defiant about the Christian, not even in his confession, Jas. iv. 2; Matt. vii. 1 ff. Confession may, indeed, have the result of bringing about a definite verdict and a separation, but it must not seek to assume the character of a judgment. It is all the more irresistible, the more it is seen to be an imperative act of conscience prompted by our Christian profession, the more it is evident that for God as the highest Good of the soul we are willing to give up everything else, the more our words and demeanour make it manifest that our sincere wish is to make others participators with ourselves in Christian salvation, its peace and its joy, and not merely to impose faith upon them as a duty. This is the spirit also of true martyrdom, of which Christ is to us the pattern. That man will be the first to become like Christ who is afraid lest he may not stand the test. Obstinate self-confidence has already fallen, Luke xxii. 34. St. Paul is an illustration of how love is included in the martyr-spirit of the Christian, Acts xxvi. 29: "I would thou wert such as I am, except these bonds." In proclamation of the truth, on the contrary, which is an influence brought to bear upon others, we seek opportunities unweariedly and with the inventiveness of love. This subject belongs to the chapter on Social Love.

2. The *inward limit* of *religious zeal* as *manifested in confession* is love. Its relation to the various Christian confessions is determined by the principle—Christ the common faith of believers is above every particular system of faith. To reverse this order is sectarianism, bigotry. At the same time, Christian tolerance is no less distinct from *indifferentism*. Fanaticism is the passionate, and therefore egoistic endeavour to make the divine a power in the world—the divine, that is, according to one's own conception of it. In this sense fanaticism is common to all pre-Christian stages of religion, so far as they are not indifferent but zealous; for they seek to uphold the Divine, and maintain its glory by means of the State; as yet perfect faith in the power of the Divine is lacking, nor is the necessity of a free process as yet recognised. With the fanatic everything depends upon submission

to the religious tenets which he favours. He is all the while unconscious of the fact that such submission is not religion—nay, that real religion is not as yet in his own heart, however much he may think so.[1] Hence fanaticism is akin to hypocrisy. Mere objective religious zeal for the constitution or dogmas of the Christian Church is not yet religious zeal in the Christian sense.

3. The *oath* of the Christian is also a confession of faith in the Triune God as the omniscient judge, but its aim is a social one—that of making a statement worthy of credit. But inasmuch as an oath is permissible for this end alone, and not as a matter of individual choice, it belongs to the doctrine of Christian *truthfulness*.

CHAPTER SECOND.

THE NEW PERSONALITY, CREATED IN THE IMAGE OF GOD, IN RELATION TO ITSELF.

§ 56.

Christian Self-love; the necessary Grounds on which it rests.

True, *i.e.* Christian, self-love does not, like natural self-love, exist of itself, but arises from love to God, through renunciation of self, or hatred of self, as it is also called. The new personality, being formed after the Divine image, is an ethical good of absolute worth; nay, it is a microcosmic system of goods, which must be prized, protected, and promoted on all their sides, but in the order determined by love as manifested in the absolute sphere.[2]

Note.—The system of goods involved in the new personality is divided in accordance with the idea of God[3] (§ 6). This

[1] Christianity must be treated as favour, grace, election, and not as law and the performance of works.

[2] [Of course, when the author speaks of self-love, he conceives of it in all its manifestations only in its union with faith and wisdom, or hope, and therefore as an activity of the whole Christian personality.—Ed.]

[3] [Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, i. § 21–27.—Ed.]

results from the personality being made in the image of God; it is determined by the *categories* of *Life* and *Power*, of *Moral Beauty* and *Harmony*, of *Wisdom* and *Will*. Further, its activity is also determined by the fact that *its honour*, "δόξα," is also to be manifested.

1. Our race is highly esteemed by God (Gen. i. 26). The wisdom of God delighted in the children of men and rejoiced in them (Prov. viii.). It is an honour to be a man. Humanity confers nobility (Jas. iii. 9; Acts xvii. 28; Matt. vi. 26–30). But this does not arise from man's empirical nature without regard to its deficiency and corruption, but from the fact that he is destined to be perfect even as our Father in heaven is perfect (Matt. v. 48); and this remains his destination even in spite of sin, and attains realization through the gospel. We belong, indeed, like other natural beings, to a particular species. But whereas, in the case of the latter, the notion of a species is formed by taking together those characteristics which are common to all the individuals of the species, and excluding those which are not found in all, as being accidental with reference to the notion,—in the case of man, this logical method of forming a notion from mere empirical considerations is insufficient. In order to form a true concept of man, logic must become teleology, must therefore become ethical. For since there are also degenerate individuals belonging to our race, the Aristotelian application of logic would result in an idea of mankind which would leave out precisely what is best, what is most human in man, because it does not exist empirically in all. Nay, since there is sin in all men, were we to adopt this empirical method of forming the concept of man, we should have to make sinfulness an essential characteristic in it. What the elements are which belong to the idea of man in his true dignity, which alone are capable of making mankind a unity, and therefore also of forming a true and not merely a negative universal—this does not depend upon whether these elements are characteristic of the whole range of human individuals. And so Christianity, in opposition to that ancient logical method, has the boldness to form its concept of mankind and of true humanity from the standard presented by *one* individual, viz. Christ. In doing so it appeals against empiricism, to

which it bids defiance, to the sense of duty, to the moral imperative which is in all men; and forms its concept of man in accordance with this distinctive property of man, a property which belongs also to Christ. It constructs the notion of mankind, on the one hand, from the archetype of Divine-human moral power which has appeared in Christ, and, on the other, from man's susceptibility, his capacity to receive Christ's power. Thus Christ is humanity personified; for He is true humanity, endowed with divine power; He is the honour of our race (Rom. viii. 17). Moreover, as He Himself numbers Himself with mankind, to be a blessing and a sacred possession to them, and gives Himself for them in His love, so God, too, numbers Him with men, and believers with Him, so that His δόξα is transmitted to them, and the Son becomes the first-born *among many brethren* through the Holy Spirit (Rom. viii. 29; 2 Cor. v. 14–17; Col. iii. 9; Eph. iv. 24). Looking upon Him as a common possession of mankind, God, on account of His connection with humanity, bears patiently with those who do not as yet believe, but may become believers. Those who are united to Christ by personal faith are personally objects of His love (1 John iii. 1), and this fact is the foundation and justification of our love to ourselves, or of Christian self-love. The latter rests, therefore, as being Christian, upon prevenient Divine love, upon the fact that we are loved (1 John iv. 10). We, as simply empirical beings, must not be the objects of this self-love, except in so far as we are capable of being redeemed. Besides, where fellowship with God in Christ does not exist, the *subject* of Christian self-love is non-existent; whence it follows that it is only in Christians that true self-love is to be found. Apart from Christ, on the contrary, self-love has a false goal, and is a non-moral disposition; it is rather a degenerate self-love, a self-love run wild, inasmuch as it is not directed to the ideal of one's own personality as found in Christ. We love *ourselves*, we love our true self, by denying our empirical self, by conceiving and holding fast the true image of ourselves as it lives in God and is hid in Christ.

2. As it is a matter of experience that *self-love* is very often *selfishness* or egoism, many have held that it ought to be banished from ethics altogether. But wrongly so. God, at

all events, is an object of love to Himself, and men are to be likenesses of Him. It may, indeed, be said quite truly that all the subjects included in this Division may be treated as coming under the duty of love to God; and we have, in fact, referred to this source all our religious duties to ourselves. It is true that Christian self-love arises out of love to God. But whenever we give ourselves unconditionally to God, He makes us objects of His complacency, ultimate ends to Himself, wills that He should dwell as a gracious Father in souls made like unto Himself, and that we should regard ourselves as He regards us. And from this it follows that our love would not love what He loves, would not will what He wills, if we did not also become objects of our own love. In opposition, therefore, to a *false mysticism*, which would remain in mere passivity, in opposition to a false repose in justifying faith or in the assurance of election, it is a definite article of doctrine, a cardinal point, that the moral *necessity*—not *permissibility*—of Christian self-love should be acknowledged. When Christ commands us to love our neighbour as ourselves (Matt. xxii. 39), He thereby presupposes self-love, and in nowise blames it. Without self-love, the "τηρεῖν ἑαυτόν" of 1 John v. 18 would not be possible; nay, we could not even be thankful for the Divine gifts vouchsafed us. But, to be sure, one might think—no one needs encouraging to self-love; it exists of itself. By no means! Selfishness exists of itself, whereas Christian *self-love* does not exist of itself and apart from self-denial, any more than any other virtue. Its *prerequisite* and inward *regulator* is love to God. For we are to love ourselves *because* God loves us. And further, we are to love ourselves *as* God loves us and *as* He would have us be. Again, Christian self-love is the *prerequisite* and *standard of Christian love* of one's neighbour. For, on the one hand, there cannot be such a thing as love to one's neighbour unless there is a moral personality to exhibit it, and in that personality, as such, there must be self-love; while, on the other hand, the nature of self-love is determined, above all things, by the fact that we must first of all know how we have to love ourselves, since we are to love our neighbour *as ourselves*. Thus love to God descends to and assumes the form of that self-love which is godlike, the *amor amoris;* love to

the personality as loving, and not in any other way. But if true personal self-love means love to the loving personality, we see that in putting others upon the same footing as ourselves, it is necessary that we love them as manifesting love [to others]. And therewith love acquires its ethical character and contents; the necessity for *self-love* passing over into social love is so strong, that the individual loves himself truly, only when he loves himself as loving, as embracing his fellow-man in his love; and this in such wise that he is at first a mere recipient of love, and then also one who spontaneously loves. Thus Christian love takes shape as unselfish love to our neighbour, especially to *his* unselfish love; the deceitful bond of apparent, *i.e.* of selfish love is destroyed, and an indissoluble, sacred interchange or chain of love is formed, such as Zinzendorf especially has so often sung of in his hymns.

In what follows we have now to treat of the separate points indicated in our thesis. We consider, in the first place, *Christian self-love in general*, and then *Christian self-love in its special characteristics*.

§ 57.

A.—*Christian Self-love; its Nature in general.*

Self-love in the Christian is the principle of progressive self-culture, filling him, on the one hand, with humble and grateful joy in the work of God which is begun in him, and, on the other, turning him in Christian hope and with living earnestness to the goal that is set before him. In particular, however, it manifests itself as follows. (1) *In relation to itself*, it reveals itself (*a*) *negatively*, in constant self-purification, denial of the natural man, and protection of the whole system of goods which belong to the personality; in other words, in active self-respect in opposition to everything that would dishonour the personality. This is Christian self-love under the aspect of righteousness. Further, it reveals itself (*b*) *positively*, in *Christian culture* in the widest sense

of the word; or in other words, by infusing an ethical spirit into (making ethical) the physical and mental energies, enjoyment and work, even on their individual side. This is positive Christian self-love. (2) *With regard to others,* Christian self-love asserts itself in the form of *Christian dignity of character; negatively,* in Christian *independence* and *self-reliance; positively,* in Christian care for one's *good name,* and *legitimate personal influence.* The realization and combination of these different elements is effected by a truthful self-manifestation on the part of the Christian, and by his choice and exercise of a vocation.

1. From the *fundamental Christian virtue,* in which *faith, love,* and *hope are united* (§ 43, 2), Christian self-love issues spontaneously. For the new personality is self-conscious, not unconscious; it cannot therefore exist without the Christian being joyfully aware of the work of God which is begun in him (Phil. i.), and this knowledge fills him with thankfulness and humility, and also with courage. Looked at more closely, therefore, Christian self-love means that we value highly and keep pure and holy the *divine work* in us, a work which is the *forming of a new person,* the realization to us of a part of the highest good. And for this very reason, Christian self-love is infinitely far removed from that spiritually impure, Narcissus-like, self-admiration, in which the Ego falls in love with its own image. Such conduct is only possible where there is a lack of humble acknowledgment of God's grace and of the effects of sin in defacing our image; and further, where God's work in us is regarded as something *complete,* a dead product as it were, whereas it is an ethical product, that has to be constantly reproduced. In this work, the new personality which has to be reproduced is itself actively engaged, its energies are directed to itself, and it points to a *future* in which all its powers will become normal and appropriated by the Christian principle, so that all discords among them will cease. It is therefore impossible for the new Ego to remain at a standstill in *self-satisfaction.* And it is *this* Ego, not the empirical one, which is the object of Christian self-love. This

Ego is, indeed, not a Platonic Idea but a reality; it exists, however, only in communion with Christ, and is at first a reality in principle merely, or, as it were, *in embryo*. But there is in it the *impulse* to *develop* into the pure and perfect form of personality, of which the archetype has been given us in Christ (Col. iii. 9). This growing manifestation and unfolding of the principle of Christian virtue, not merely in momentary acts but as a habitually animating force, is the process in which the personality branches out, as it were, into the Christian virtues. But the personality can only succeed in bringing its whole inward domain into subjection to the principle of Christian virtue, by carrying on a purifying course of discipline with regard to itself, *i.e.* with regard to the empirical personality, or through the old man within us dying more and more. In this way, the claims of justice are satisfied with reference both to the old and the new man. This is, therefore, the *negative aspect* of Christian virtue towards itself, the aspect of righteousness, the *self-respect* of the new man, in which he protects his purity and honour, and at the same time executes justice upon the old man. The latter point does not mean that the natural energies are to be weakened, for this would rob the new man of some of the organs of his activity, but that we are to contend against the evil which exists together with the new, God-given nature.

2. In *relation to others*, Christian self-assertion may legitimately take the form of separating ourselves from our *neighbour* so far as his *sin*, but not so far as his *person* is concerned. This negative aspect of Christian self-love, manifested in self-assertion with reference to our empirical Ego and to other men, must then be supplemented by a *positive* activity, the object of which is the improvement or *culture* of that personality given us by God, the promotion of its life and growth, in order that we may be able to be of some service to the whole community, more especially in our particular vocation.

B.—*Christian Self-love; its Special Characteristics both in Itself and with regard to Others.*

I. CARE FOR PERSONAL HONOUR IN ITSELF.

§ 58.

Care for the honour of the personality in itself comprehends the acquiring and perfecting of the goods which belong to the personality, both of a temporal and spiritual kind. It therefore includes—

1. With reference to the *temporal* life of the senses:
   (*a*) Care for our *Physical Existence*, Health and Strength, and for the maintenance of the right relation between Work and Recreation; in other words, care for *virtuous Well-being;*
   (*b*) for virtuous *Beauty* and *Purity;*
   (*c*) for virtuous Ownership (Property).

2. With reference to the *mental* life:

On the *intellectual* side, care for virtuous *Refinement;* on the side of the *will*, care for virtuous *Self-control* and *Stability of Character.*

§ 59.

1*a*. *Care for our Physical Existence.*

1. *Care of the body and bodily health.* Although life is not the highest of goods, yet it is sinful to neglect to shorten, or to destroy it. There are many passages in Scripture referring to self-destruction. Job xiii. 13 f., ii. 9; Judg. xvi. (Samson); 1 Sam. xxxi. 4 (Saul); 2 Sam. xvii. 23 (Ahithophel); Matt. xxvii. 5 (Judas Iscariot); Acts xvi. 27. No express prohibition is given against it (except in so far as it is forbidden in the Fifth (6th) commandment); but its

sinfulness follows from the universal proposition, that as Christians we and all our powers belong no longer to ourselves and our own wills, but have been bought by Christ, and are dependent upon the Divine Spirit. Rom. xiv. 7 ff.; 2 Cor. v. 15; 1 Cor. vi. 19; Phil. i. 21 f. The act of suicide does not consist in our purposely bringing death upon ourselves. *E.g.* in war on behalf of our native land, or to save another's life, we may, in order to fulfil our duty, have to venture upon an undertaking which must end in death. In like manner, the Christian martyrs, who pressed forward to death in order to evince their love to Christ, must not be called suicides. But in suicide, in addition to the outward act of destroying life or of its arbitrary renunciation, there is also this, that the subject has himself and his own advantage in view, and wishes to escape from certain evils, that there is no self-sacrifice for an ideal or for a social good. Its guilt therefore consists in the fact that life is thrown away wilfully, whether from fear of physical or moral evils, or in hope of a higher gain, as is the case in the suicide of fanaticism. The awful thing about this crime is, that in the wicked self-will which it displays, there is a renunciation of obedience, a denial of dependence upon the Creator, a rebellious interference with His will as Creator and Preserver, allied with unbelief in the avenging God, except where the act proceeds from fanaticism or superstition. The suicide does not merely sin against one side of his nature, but so far as he can, he destroys the very possibility of all moral activity. The impiety of suicide appears most clearly when it arises from worldly motives. If one has lost his wealth or his reputation among men, it looks as if it might be from a feeling of honour that he commits suicide. But it is rather from cowardice, which makes him wish to escape from pain and evil instead of bearing them manfully, preserving his inward honour, and winning for himself by moral effort a new stage of his activity, and of outward respect as well. Fear of moral temptation also is no justification for the evil deed. Finally, the incurring of disgrace, violation in the case of virgins, or the fear of it, are just as far from making suicide permissible. For that which is endured helplessly is dishonouring neither in the eyes of intelligent men nor in the sight of God. Moral temptation,

moreover, when we have not wantonly rushed into it, is not to be avoided by death, but to be overcome.

It is self-evident that self-mutilation also, which the law indeed forbids, as well as every approach to suicide through brutal debauchery, is included in what has been said, since they too employ the great gift of life as a means for the ends of egoism. *E.g.*, cutting of the flesh on occasions of mourning. Lev. xix. 28, xxi. 5; Deut. xiv. 1; Jer. xvi. 6, xli. 5, xlvii. 5, xlviii. 37; cf. 1 Cor. vi. 19; Phil. iii. 21.

§ 59*a*. *Duelling.*

Single combat is the settlement of a private matter of honour by engaging in personal, mortal conflict with the offender. It is undertaken in order to compel the offender to risk his life in return for the damage done to our honour; and especially to show on the part of the injured person that he values his honour more than he does his life, and thus to re-establish it. But however differently duelling has to be judged at different times, it must be repudiated as immoral, when regular legal proceedings can be taken.

The Literature.—Reinhard, *Moral*, i. 481 f. Unger, *Der gerichtliche Zweikamp bei den germanischen Völkern.* In the *Göttinger Studien*, 1847. [Schleiermacher, *Christliche Sitte*, pp. 625 f. *Zur Philosophie*, vol. i. pp. 614 f. Rothe, iii. pp. 326 f. De Wette, *Christliche Sittenlehre*, iii. 288 f. Martensen, ii. i. p. 425.]

1. It is evident that we must pass a different verdict from the above upon judicial combats, ordeals, appeals to the judgment of God, etc., among ancient nations, where single combat was also a public affair in which whole nations were represented (Horatii and Curiatii). But in a settled state of society duelling is a relapse into the state of nature, for here other means are available and ought to be tried.

2. Duelling is to be condemned—

(*a*) Because in it the *guilty* and the *innocent* are unjustly placed upon an *equal footing*. It is true that in

a judicial trial they are also placed on an equal footing before a decision is arrived at, but in the latter case it is right that decides, while in a duel it is bodily strength and dexterity. He who has been wronged has in the first place to risk his life, while it may be that the offender risks nothing. If I am the guilty party, I have no right, in addition to this, to threaten a good possessed by the innocent, viz. his life. If I am innocent, I ought not to have to seek satisfaction by risking my life, which is a good of mine. That would be prodigal magnanimity. Consequently, two persons cannot engage in a duel without sin. And if it is a matter of dispute which is guilty, no decision can be arrived at by means of a duel.

(*b*) Further, should a duel take place, it is *morally futile*, inasmuch as its end is not really attained, for to risk one's life cannot possibly be a proof that one is an honourable man, since there is a contempt of life that is immoral.[1] Natural courage may exist together with the meanest disposition. Besides, he whose cause is not superior in point of justice may be superior in point of skill. In a duel, therefore, we have recourse to the right of the stronger, and this is no right at all. When public opinion assumes that a man's honour is re-established because he has fought a duel, it deceives itself, it is too lax. Other proofs are required.

(*c*) Duelling being thus immoral, we can only defend our outward honour by means of it, at the *expense of inward honour*. Since the duel is inadequate to accomplish its end, a true inward sense of honour must show itself, wherever false notions of honour have crept into a community, by bravely checking these, and thus awaking a common spirit of rectitude, which, when it is vigorous, will find out suitable means for the protection of outward reputation. And here *organized means of protecting* outward honour must certainly be taken into consideration. Courts of honour, when properly instituted, will be a more effective safeguard of our rights

[1] No one can engage in a duel without taking into account the danger to which he exposes his own life and the life of others, and thus implicitly giving his consent to the worst results that may ensue, and being responsible for them. American duels are consequently not so very different in principle from others as is supposed.

than duelling. And all suspicion of cowardice is obviated in the case of one who refuses to engage in a duel, when he shows in his whole life that he is honourable, manly, and Christian.

Note.—Among military men, where bravery and manly spirit are professional virtues, the stain of cowardice is an absolute disqualification. Here the mere conventional rule that, in certain cases, injuries must be expiated by means of a duel can of course have no authority. But when in their case the state itself appoints courts of honour, with the power to determine that a duel should take place, and thus in a certain measure lends it its sanction, still more when it makes one who avoids such a duel suffer for so doing, then a duel becomes a *judicial combat*. But although an individual may thus engage in a duel without sin, the guilt of it, while taken off his shoulders, falls upon the legal ordinance. In other instances, on the contrary, duelling inflicts an injury upon the state, especially where it is defended as a custom that is moral in the case of the nobility. The state, it is then said, cannot attach that value to honour which class notions demand. But it is a usurpation of the power that belongs to constituted authority, for any one thus to take the law into his own hands. In well-ordered states, no one has the right—apart from self-defence—to seek self-redress, and employ force in protecting a good which the state as such does not recognise. In early times all freemen, and not merely the nobility, had the right to prosecute private feuds. There is thus all the less reason why the nobility should claim a position of moral exemption in this matter. When, in consequence of false prejudices on the part of the nobility with regard to their class honour, the practice of duelling is made persistent and contagious, it becomes the other classes of society to maintain their independence, not by imitating the example that is given them, but by offering a gallant resistance to it from the standpoint of Christian culture.

§ 60. *Continuation.*

Care of the Body.

1. On its *positive* side, careful attention to life, health, and strength is incumbent upon us as a duty, since the body—not merely the gross matter of it, but also that spiritual quality in it, that plastic power, namely, which remains the same amid

the change of bodily elements and nutritive substances, but which may be impaired as well as strengthened—since the body is not merely accidental to man, but is that side of himself which gives him actual existence in the world. In order to recommend the old "mens sana in corpore sano," we do not need to show in detail how important for the mind of man are the health and strength of that organ by means of which alone he can directly influence the world, and how intimately even mental powers, especially imagination and memory, are connected with the constitution of the body. Care of the body is therefore a moral duty (Col. ii. 23, *μὴ ἐν ἀφειδίᾳ σώματος*), and in performing this duty we must not only see that the powers of the body are not wasted, that the necessaries of life are not denied it, that our vital energy itself is not weakened by austerities in the way of exertion and needless abstinence, but we must also endeavour to make the body capable of exertion. It is essential to the freedom of man that he should seek to render himself independent of terrestrial influences, of wind and weather, and so train his bodily organ all round as to make it ready to accept the impulses of the spirit and carry them energetically into execution. Rom. vi. 13, 19 (*μέλη* for the *πνεῦμα*). 1 Cor. vi. 13 (*ὁ κύριος τῷ σώματι*). Rom. viii. 13 (*πράξεις σώματος θανατοῦν*). Training of the body, in the case of the male sex more particularly, has to be carried out by means of gymnastics, drill and the like. Female culture, on the contrary, must not be carried on by gymnastics, but to early participation in household duties; let there be no emancipation of women. With regard to attention to *health* in particular, each one must adhere to a certain diet. It is a necessary part indeed of full self-consciousness to distinguish between what is beneficial to the body and what is injurious; but, unless sickness or the doctor prescribes otherwise, we must also beware of scrupulosity, or at all events be able to dispense with it, since it may degenerate into a slavish and legal spirit, which becomes a burden both to ourselves and others. Finally, as regards *strength*, what we should attend to is not so much to make ourselves capable of great momentary achievements, explosions as it were of power, but rather to cultivate endurance within the limits of our individual strength; endurance imparts more of an ethical character to

our strength, and we derive more real advantage from it than from exercising ourselves with a view to great, athletic, momentary achievements. Bodily endurance is the earthly support of *ὑπομονή*.

2. Attention to the body and to bodily health is, however, something pitiful and unworthy, when—as happens in various ways, and especially in the bathing season—it becomes a worship of health, in which the moral act is almost entirely swallowed up in the pursuit of one object—viz. to vegetate. It is a disgrace for a sensible man, not to speak of a Christian, to make this the end and centre of his life-functions, the point upon which he concentrates all his active energies. Plato refuses to provide a physician for such people in his Republic. This seems harsh, but it may be just as humane, as when bath-keepers and doctors contend for such men as their prey—nay, it might help to set them all the sooner on their feet. The body is not an end in itself, but a means. We ought not to regard even death as the greatest of evils. Love of life must have its limits, as well as fear of death (Matt. x. 28, xvi. 25; John xii. 25; 1 John iii. 16). It is irreligious for a mature mind to succumb to death only with reluctance. For then the last moment of life becomes a confession of bondage, of a separation of our will from the will of God. To the Christian, on the contrary, death does not come as a surprise, because he has learned to carry "memento mori" into the midst of life, and can thus turn even death into something that he *does*, not merely that he suffers, and make it a work of willing and joyful surrender. He *goes* from this earthly scene, he is not dragged from it like a prisoner.

§ 61. *Continuation.*

Christian Care for Virtuous Happiness.

Christian self-love consists further (§ 58*a*) in care for virtuous happiness, to which belongs especially the moral relation between work and enjoyment, including recreation.

1. It is a matter of dispute whether enjoyment and

recreation may be made objects of moral volition, or whether they are to be regarded not as objects especially aimed at, but simply as concomitants of a moral act directed to something else. There are moralists who look upon everything which is not directly an act of will as indolence, and something immoral, or at least refuse to recognise any moral element in enjoyment and recreation. Fichte holds that no other recreation than a change of work is necessary, and it is indeed true that many do not require anything more the whole day long. Some also appeal to the fact, that every moral action has an inward pleasure accompanying it. But if active work is to be carried on without intermission, then even though there be a change from one kind of work to another, men become mere working machines; they lose the clearness of self-consciousness, as well as freedom, and the result is that work itself loses its intrinsic moral value. *Sleep*, at all events, remains as something that must receive ethical construction, and is a proof that the ethical must not be confined to positive and active work in opposition to enjoyment and recreation. Death likewise, which cannot be regarded as an act in the productive sense, nevertheless falls within the circle of moral duty. On the other side, that life becomes dull and empty which is wholly given up to enjoyment. It is pleasure-seekers and idlers who, for the most part, are overtaken with a disgust of life. Now that we have indicated the two extremes, the way is clear for a solution of the question in hand.

2. It cannot be denied that all morality depends upon every moment being determined by the will, so that an act of will may continue to operate throughout a series of moments. Now, we found at an earlier stage, that with *relation to God*, two forms of self-determination must be distinguished, viz. a *receptive* form (faith) and a *spontaneously active* form (love). Consequently it is morally right, and even a duty, to *afford opportunities for both of these in our earthly life.* But this must be done in such a way that everything may bear the stamp of personality, while the πνεῦμα gives to everything its pervading tone. Whatever is natural in the way of enjoyment and recreation must be brought about by an act of personal volition. It is the duty of every one, not to renounce the

corporeal side of his nature, but by an act of will to submit to be determined by it in accordance with the laws of physical life, and therefore to accept freely whatever tends to promote life. But since to the Christian physical life is required merely as an *organ*,—not as an end in itself—for he remains a Christian even in enjoyment,—we have here the necessary limitation of what has just been said. It is immoral and base, especially for the Christian, to surrender himself absolutely to enjoyment for even a single moment: *i.e.* to suffer his personality to be swallowed up in the mere natural life, and the mere spirit of nature. This holds good of all sorts of enjoyment, of eating and drinking, sexual love in marriage, the excitement of social pleasure, amusement, and the like. And since the moral element in all enjoyment and recreation depends on their being brought about by an act of personal volition, moral freedom is preserved. And this holds good even with regard to sleep. The rule should be, the day for work, the night for rest. Any subversion of this rule is opposed to the laws of physical life, and also anti-social. Among healthy men, sleep ought to be determined by an act of will, both as regards its time and its duration. Our moral strength ought also to be sufficient to determine the hour at which we shall awake, no less than to enable us at times to dispense with our nightly rest altogether; it ought, finally, to give us sleep at the proper time, and bring our spirit into a state of peaceful harmony before we lay ourselves down, so that we may not be robbed of sleep by care or sense or by carrying on our work in our dreams. If we have mental self-control, our mind will not continue to work like a machine against our will, but will succeed in willing to partake of such recreation as may fill up in a moral manner the time devoted to the strengthening of the bodily organ. It ought to be a rule with every one, never to lay himself down to rest before he has brought his soul into the peace of God. If this rule were followed, much of that morbid stuff would be done away with, which accumulates and is the cause of confusion and perversity in our sleep (cf. Prov. vi. 6–11, xx. 13, xxiv. 33; Matt. xxvi. 40 f.; Luke v. 5; 2 Cor. xi. 27; 2 Thess. iii. 8). Now, when the spirit, by an act of moral determination, has given itself to enjoyment and opened itself to the influ-

ences of nature for the purpose of recreation, it has voluntarily retired for the time being from active productivity. Consequently, it is opposed to ethical principles to turn recreation again into work, since it is a necessary means for restoring strength to the bodily organs, which are also required by the spirit for its purely spiritual work. But all the while, the personality of the Christian is not absorbed in nature; it remains awake in its position of authority, even in sleep. It is a personality made in the image of God. Consequently, it wards off whatever is wrong and impure; in the midst of recreation and enjoyment *conscience* never ceases to act,—it does not lie in wait outside our enjoyment, meditating and fretting about it, and so destroying it, but is immanent as an ever-observant eye and pure impulse, which suffers no injury to be done to it, and it summons us to work again at the proper time, viz. when the sense of physical life is once more aroused within us, and we are conscious that our strength is restored. And this holds good both when we are awake and when we are asleep.

3. In *enjoyment* and *recreation*, moreover, the true freedom of the Christian is preserved by that unceasing and vital communion which he maintains with God in Christ, and which, though differing at different times both in measure and degree, is yet essential to his nature as a new man. For then, even when he is determined by nature (in a free, moral way), he can regard himself as determined by God, and can be thus determined through his own volition. Our enjoyment is consecrated, is at once enhanced and idealised, when we regard the means through which it comes as a gift of God, and render Him thanks for His gift. Thus it becomes clear how even in enjoyment and recreation the Christian maintains his filial relationship to God. It is a false spirituality, due to pride and ingratitude, that would exclude this region of life from the sphere of Ethics. The pleasure, too, which we derive from the senses need not be changed into or lost in the thought of God; but while the sense of God ought to be present in our enjoyment, we shonld experience a real pleasure in the gift itself. *E.g.*, if in walking in a garden we come to a beautiful flower and stop to admire it, it is not necessary, in order to make such a moment a Christian and

moral one, that the flower should give rise to contemplations concerning the attributes of God, or that our enjoyment should be transformed into formal prayer. The pure enjoyment which we feel is in itself quite consistent with the spirit of prayer, Col. ii. 23; 1 Tim. vi. 3, iv. 3 ff.; Rom. xiv. 2–6, and is, in its own way, an honouring of God and well-pleasing to Him.

4. The sympathy which is always a property of personality is connected with the fact, that we prefer to enjoy *physical pleasures*, such as eating and drinking, in the society of others rather than by ourselves. For *personal fellowship* includes the individual self-consciousness and stimulates it, so that the mere enjoyment we derive from the senses is raised to the rank of a social pleasure—always, however, on the supposition that those who meet together do so harmlessly, and can thus really "enjoy" each other's society. To this end it is requisite that those in company should yield themselves to each other, with no other purpose than to reveal themselves as it were, to let themselves be seen, and without calculation or constraint to bring to view what is in them—of course in a harmless sense. On the one side it is necessary that, instead of displaying vanity or sensitive reserve, one should possess some sense of humour or irony with regard to himself, and accordingly that he should learn to surrender himself to good-natured humour on the part of others, and thus to look at himself from an objective point of view. On the other side, it is necessary that we unsuspiciously appropriate whatever is said and done by others: over-wise criticism is folly; it destroys pleasure both in ourselves and others, and leads to cynicism. The pleasure of the fault-finder is folly; it is a parasitical plant that preys on the trunk of humanity. Thersites, the critical, censorious character, would be less common, if only men made it clear to themselves that unloving, heartless egoism was at the bottom of it.

It follows, further, from the same principle of personality, that it is a sign of moral imperfection when people know no better way of spending the time of social recreation than by engaging in amusements where every one puts himself at the *disposal of chance*—as in games of hazard—instead of finding recreation in the free play of minds, whether in serious or sportive conversation. Card-playing is objectionable in so far

as chance is made the one power to which all the players must passively submit. And since there is little charm in such amusement of itself, a further means of attraction is very apt to be added, in the shape of a money-stake. Now, it is true that this might simply show that we are inwardly independent of what we possess; but we have quite other opportunities of showing this; in a mere empty amusement it is really the hope of gain that is the attraction. Amusement, too, runs the risk here of forfeiting its proper character; for it ceases to be what it ought when it becomes a work, a desire for profit, or even when it excites the passions instead of restoring the balance of our physical and mental powers. The highest form of recreation is to be found in free conversation, which should therefore be regarded as an art. It is only successful when it is not a *work* in any sense,—for it must continue to be a recreation,—and is at the same time neither arbitrary nor desultory, but when speech and reply fit in easily with each other. Further, the conversation must not be usurped by one individual; for whatever is said should be fruitful, and stimulate some response in those who listen. The Apostle requires our speech to be with grace, and to have salt and seasoning. Col. iv. 6; Mark ix. 50.

5. The *means* to be employed for the purpose of recreation and enjoyment, as well as the *method* of using them, are, on the negative side, dependent upon the limitations arising from the other moral spheres. These must not be injured but promoted by enjoyment; for enjoyment, while in itself a proper object of volition, is such, not in the sense of being a final aim, but only as a means. On the positive side, the means of enjoyment must be made to depend upon the principle which is peculiar to this sphere, viz. the *æsthetic* principle. Here the question is, What will promote a sense of harmonious personal life? Too much eating and drinking, as well as epicurism, must therefore be characterised as morally reprehensible, Phil. iii. 18, 19: the gastronomist is simply a man who is all tongue or palate.[1] But by a beautiful arrangement, it is the tongue itself that we use in speaking, and in that table-talk which alone gives to a meal

[1] With regard to intemperance, *vid.* Gen. ix. 21 f.; Luke xxi. 34; 1 Pet. iv. 3; 1 Cor. vi. 10; Rom. xiii. 13.

its true moral seasoning and consecration. Since work is the real aim in enjoyment and recreation, and since the latter are therefore objects of moral volition only for this reason, and not for their own sakes as though they were final aims,—it might seem as if the best course were to take such things for means of enjoyment as are a work in themselves. The more refined æsthetic pleasures, for instance, combine the two in various ways. It is indeed true, that virtuous happiness must be sought not merely in enjoyment as such, but also in work itself. But if work itself be made a means of enjoyment, then the latter is the real aim, and the former cannot be content with such a subordinate moral position: what is morally requisite in work is not satisfied. *Dilettantism* in art or science can only be morally justified as a higher kind of play on the part of our powers; it must not seek to replace the true moral work which belongs to these spheres—nor, indeed, can it do so. And just as little ought the spheres of the beautiful and of science to be put forward as absolute ends in themselves, at the expense of the other moral spheres [as if they alone brought true happiness]. Sound science points of its own accord to practice, and true art does not idolize its objects nor suffer itself to be idolized, but seeks to lend grace to morality.

§ 62.

1*b*. *Virtuous Purity and Beauty.*

1. *Their connection.* Purity and beauty are closely connected. The former is the negative condition of the latter; hence simplicity and modesty are requisite above everything else in the sphere of art, or the world of the morally beautiful. The beautiful must not indeed, any more than science, be measured by a standard external to itself; but it is in secret, inward alliance with morality, it is a manifestation of the latter, although it obeys its own law. And since this law demands, above all things, that the world of phenomena or of forms be inspired with life, that matter, or at least its forms, be brought under the sway of the ideal, it follows that the beautiful is corrupted by every intrusion of an element of sense that has not been thus subdued. Wherever, says Rothe,

sensuous brilliancy of colouring is meant to dazzle, or sensual wantonness to allure, the beautiful is destroyed. The same thing happens also when the material element is so predominant as to cause loss of buoyancy, dulness, and insipidity.

2. With regard now to each of these by itself, what has been advanced (§ 61) concerning enjoyment applies also to *purity;* but at the same time the latter must also be brought into relation to our active powers in the narrower sense of the word. Christian purity therefore demands not only that we preserve self-control, self-command, temperance in enjoyment of every kind, but also that an inward measure or restraint be exhibited in all that we do.

The *passions* especially must here be brought under consideration. Many are of opinion that these are altogether reprehensible, because they imply the being affected by a sensual stimulus. And they adduce in support of this position, James i. 19, 20: "The wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God." This is no doubt only too common; but this is only a reason for being slow to wrath and maintaining self-control (v. 19). In Eph. iv. 31, Col. iii. 8, it is true that *that* anger is forbidden which is accompanied with bitterness and contempt; but on the other side, the New Testament often speaks of ὀργή on the part of God, and therefore of an anger that is akin to ζῆλος, and such ζῆλος accompanied, too, by mental emotion is related also of Jesus. It is certainly true that Christian purity demands freedom from passion, for the Christian ought never to act from mere passion; but it does not follow from this that our *passions* are reprehensible. As certainly as all passions are unethical in which the spirit submits to the domination of the senses, so surely do such impulses contribute to the goodness of human nature, since the latter has been constituted, not only with a view to common, but also to extraordinary occasions. When our passions are enlisted in the service of the good, they increase our strength to do what is right; they double a man, as it were, and are given him not only as a means of protection for his physical and moral life, but also to promote the energy of his self-manifestations. Consequently they are not to be eradicated. He who cannot grow indignant at what is evil has lost all strength of will, the elasticity of his moral

life is relaxed. The one thing of importance here, as in the case of enjoyment, is, that no loss should accrue to the Christian personality itself. It must therefore never suffer itself to be carried away by those sensual impulses which it cannot approve—such as revengefulness, heartlessness, envy, selfishness, over-self-estimation. And even when the personality is the source of the impulse, and the Christian allows his will to go along with the emotion that takes powerful possession of his spiritual and physical life, the personality must by no means lose itself either wholly or in part; it must not be "carried out of itself," by suffering the mere physical emotion to escape from under its own central control. It must, on the contrary, remain at the helm, like the steersman, who, while he permits himself to be swept forward on his course by wind and wave, still keeps full and clear possession of his senses, and retains his power to guide. By this it is not meant that the ruling will should merely stand calmly on the watch, and, as it were, outside the effect which is being produced. In such a case, the strength of the passion would be broken at the outset by a duality. For the whole personality would not be given to it, and yet the strength of a passion depends upon such a personal unity and totality. But at the same time, the personality must continue to be immanent in the passion; if it loses itself for even a single moment, the purity of the effect produced is forfeited. It is evident from what has been said, that for a passion to be moral, presupposes the acquisition of some moral capital, which operates of itself without any special design and consideration. He who has none cannot yield to passion without sin, nor indeed can he act at all without sin. Passions, therefore, bring to the test the moral acquisitions we have made. They do not lie, they are honest. The New Testament speaks not merely of *χαρά*, but also of *ἀγαλλιᾶσθαι*, *ζέειν πνεύματι*, *ἐμβριμᾶσθαι*, with *ὀργή*, *ζῆλος* (Rom. xii. 11; 1 Thess. v. 19; Matt. v. 8, 22; Eph. iv. 26, 31; Mark iii. 5; James i. 19; 2 Cor. vii. 1; 1 John iii. 3). But where there is a natural tendency to passionate anger, it is of special importance that a discipline of "katharsis" should be adopted, for such a tendency deranges the harmony both of individual and social life, and is a hindrance to the life of prayer.

3. In particular, is *chastity* an essential part of purity? Here, too, the fundamental law is—the life of sense is not meant to rule over the spirit, and this is always what happens, unless it is itself governed by the spirit. Every extra-matrimonial gratification of the sexual impulse is sin, a desecration of the temple of the Holy Spirit—a degradation. *Vid.* 1 Cor. vi. 13-20; Gal. v. 19; Col. iii. 5; Rom. i. 24 sq., where various other forms of unchastity are named. The general expression is *πορνεία*. But married intercourse is not sin, and it is immoral to regard it as not belonging to the beneficent order of nature (Matt. xix. 4 f.; 1 Tim. iv. 3). But in marriage, also, chastity must be practised — *i.e.*, decency, modesty. Everything is summed up in saying that the body is, and is ever to continue, a temple of the Holy Spirit; that thus the spirit may have dominion over the body, not the animal nature over the soul. Hence inward chastity is above all things necessary. And this requires the suppression of impure images that arise in the mind, and easily lead to impure desires, or to "*αἰσχρολογία*" (Eph. v. 3, iv. 22 f.; Col. iii. 8; Matt. xv. 11); and the avoidance of wanton pictures and books. Christian chastity also demands modesty in dress (1 Cor. xi. 5; Matt. v. 8, xv. 18; 1 Tim. iv. 12, v. 2; Acts xxiv. 25; 1 Cor. vi. 13-20).

4. *Virtuous beauty.*—The sphere of the beautiful and of art reaches much further than art pure and simple. Every one should have his share in the beautiful, and every Christian does have it. Nay, the idea of art—the informing of the natural by the ideal—is much more perfectly realized where the material that is so informed is a person, than where it is marble or canvass (*χάρις*, grace, Eph. iv. 29; Col. iv. 6). Now it looks, indeed, as if it were an exaggeration to demand beauty as a virtue, and many are fond, in this connection, of referring to Socrates. But yet it is certain that the body, especially the countenance and the eye, is and should be a mirror that reflects the character, just as the sway of evil, on the other hand, gives the body an ill-favoured appearance. It may, indeed, happen that a man's endowment in this respect is meagre to begin with, but even the most unpromising physiognomy becomes ennobled by nobility of mind. This implies that when we speak of virtuous beauty we cannot

mean that tempting beauty to which the French, with some degree of frivolity and yet not without pungency, have given the name of "beauté de diable," thus indicating those attractions which, like the flowers, have their time to bloom, but also like them, and all the things of earth, have their time to fade. No, we mean that beauty which lasts and can increase with age, which can be displayed not merely in face and figure, but also in glance and mien, in bearing and behaviour, as well as in grace and charm of speech. In woman, the essential character of this beauty, that does not wither but increases with age, is *grace*,—and this can be exhibited even when the body is not beautiful by nature; in man it is *dignity*. And in both cases, each sex, starting with its own characteristic beauty, should appropriate to itself the excellence peculiar to the other. Thus the beauty of woman becomes in old age that of the dignified matron, while on the other side we have the beauty of the kindly old man. Virtuous beauty, moreover, should not be exhibited in personal appearance only, but also in *dress* and in the *home* (1 Pet. iii. 1 ff.). Here, too, the æsthetic principle should receive its due place. In consequence of the progress of humanity, inventions of many kinds, such as photography, have made art a good much more within reach of all, and introduced it into family life. We should preserve a style of living suitable to our position; personal honour demands that in this connection, too, the outward appearance should be dignified and pleasing. But too much importance ought not to be attached to it, as if the coat made the man. Slavish dependence upon fashion is a weakness, indicating emptiness of head and hollowness of heart. Among our own people, along with the breaking up of corporations, etc., a levelling process even in respect of dress (the so-called French costume) has come in with the dress-coat. But Ethics must insist upon this—that countless evils and miseries now existing amongst us will not give way until more truth is introduced into dress, until it is more in keeping with personal position. And this can only happen by the masses once more organizing themselves, and of their own free-will forming a standard of honour and of custom for the various ranks of life. A general custom thus established would afford the individual direction and a fixed line of

conduct to be pursued with regard to his expenditure in general, and his dress in particular. This leads us to the subject of *luxury*. It is true, in a general sense, that it is not only what is indispensable and necessary that is morally permissible, and this altogether apart from custom, which demands of the higher classes a certain degree of luxury in their household arrangements. The æsthetic principle may also be carried out in one's own house; everything is not to depend on mere economy. And here, it is not only comfort, in the strict sense of the word, or convenience, that has to be attended to, but also the exhibition of taste, and this demands a certain measure of profusion. God Himself has so constituted the world that not only herbage, but also flowers grow upon the meadows (John xii. 1–8, ii. 1–12). But in this matter, too, the Christian spirit must be expressed. And we manifest it, when we do not allow our hearts to cleave to luxury, when it does not tend to effeminate us or encourage impure fancy, and when, if need be, we are willing to sacrifice luxury for the sake of the community or of our suffering brethren.[1]

§ 63. *Conclusion.*

Virtuous Ownership, or Christian Management of Property.

1. The possession of property is also necessary to the dignity of the Christian personality, because it enables the Christian to take his share in the subjugation of the world, which is one of the tasks assigned to our race. It is the duty of a man to have property, and he who renounces it renounces important ethical functions. For it is altogether inconceivable that one who had absolutely no property should achieve anything in the various moral spheres; he would be extremely ill-provided, both as to material and means of displaying his activity, if he possessed nothing belonging to the kingdom of nature but his own body. On the other hand, the property he acquires for the purposes of bodily life or of his calling, is the first thing to give an extension to his mere corporeal existence, just as the earth is, in a wider sense, the body of the race. Fidelity is demanded even in the things of earth (Luke xvi. 1 f.; Matt xxv. 14–30). Acquisition of

[1 See in addition the following paragraph.]

property is a duty (2 Thess. iii. 12; Eph. iv. 28); but only as a mediate, not as an absolute aim. The efforts put forth by the Christian to become a possessor of property must be *noble* in their purpose or ultimate end, and conscientious in the choice of the means to be employed. Now, the goodness of our aims depends upon the use to which we put what we acquire, and this should be (*a*) to support those who belong to us, and (*b*) to relieve poverty and aid the general interests of the kingdom of God. The moral quality which has to do with the preservation of property is *frugality* as opposed to *extravagance*, that which is taken up with its augmentation is *industry* as opposed to *negligence*. *Niggardliness* is not an excess of the virtue of frugality, and *covetousness* is not an excess of the virtue of industry. On the contrary, although in appearance they differ only in degree, yet internally, as far as regards motive and disposition, frugality and industry on the one hand, and niggardliness and covetousness on the other, are as different from each other as virtue and vice. The latter make the mere earthly possession their sole aim, while the former seek to obtain it as a means to be employed by the spirit, and for the service of the moral kingdom. Those who display niggardliness and avarice think they will acquire more personal worth, more power and freedom. But here we see how sadly sin deceives its friends; for they are made all the more dependent upon the world, upon what is earthly. Since they give their whole souls to worldly gain, they make it the satisfaction of their spiritual needs, their highest good as it were, even their God (1 Tim. vi. 6–10; Matt. vi. 19–22; 1 Cor. vii. 30, 31). But the Christian preserves his freedom, since he does not cleave absolutely and therefore immovably to what he possesses, as if it were the supreme good; he has as though he had not, he has his treasure within himself, and having it he is independent of all externals (Col. iii. 5; Eph. v. 3, 5).

2. *The Collisions which the standpoint of Right* (per se *Private Right*) *introduces into the Sphere of Property* (cf. § 33*a*). At an earlier stage (§ 17, cf. § 18), we considered the beginnings of Property. Man, as the being in the likeness of God, has it as his right and his vocation to take possession of the earth (Gen. i. 28), and to impress upon it the stamp of his dominion.

But this is first of all the right and duty of mankind as a whole. How then does the individual come to hold property exclusively? or how does it happen that what belongs to one, just for that reason does it not belong to another? This is only possible by means of the idea of right, which makes what we possess to be our property (§ 33*a*). It is the idea of *Right* that determines how that work of occupying and ruling the whole [illegible] which is incumbent upon mankind, is to be carried out. [illegible]ily arises in the following way. The possession of some one thing, some part of occupies, makes serviceable to his will, and pends his labour. What a man has thus occupied, and on this ground has made the xertion, cannot be seized upon by another of right; the latter must recognise the prior mer. Thus Paul was resolved, even with spiritual avocation (Rom. xv. 20), "not to ner man's labours." It is a sin "to encroach n's office" (1 Pet. iv. 15). Hence the right erty is a well-established one, and includes dispose of it, *e.g.* by sale, exchange, presentaes and wills. And here it is to be specially property of a person who is dead passes of mily, without a will (succession by law), ession of property by an individual member lves the right of the family to an eventual It is, however, only too true that the ty is accompanied with much injustice and nay be polluted by being wrongfully obtained, or through injustice of a coarse or more refined kind, and nevertheless pass lawfully from hand to hand, *e.g.* may be *inherited*. The distribution of wealth may in the course of history arrive at a condition in which, while one person is excessively rich, another is shamefully poor, and has not even so much as the means of self-culture or of moral activity. It was in anticipation of such evils that the Old Testament instituted the Sabbatical year, the year of Jubilee, and other laws, with the purpose of restoring a healthy condition of things by means of a fixed and regular adjustment of property. These evils increase like an avalanche as if by a law of

gravitation; the greater mass of wealth, as it now exists, has a greater attractive power, and *Right*, which gives to what we possess its higher meaning and consecration, has so little power to avert these evils, that it rather serves to perpetuate the wrong and sinful way in which wealth is divided between the rich and the poor. For right merely gives security to property and the differences that exist in its division—as it *finds* them. It is not productive, it cannot create a right distribution of wealth by its own power. It is only divine justice that can do this, that *justitia distributiva*, which is essential wisdom directed by love. Thus things may arrive at such a state, that right becomes the servant of Egoism, and the rich are established by Divine right in the possession of property to the exclusion of the poor, whereas God gave the earth to man, not to the rich. We are here presented with a serious antinomy, viz., that an unrighteous state of matters, such as this unjust distribution of wealth, is confirmed by a Divine idea, the idea of right. This antinomy cannot be resolved from the simple standpoint of right. For right even in its law-making capacity, although it may introduce to some degree an adjustment with regard to the future, must not go the length of plundering the property of an individual, nor reduce the individual personality to a state of pupilage. The function of the state is simply to protect personal freedom and the possibility of personal development. It must not take the first result of free activity, the acquirement of property, out of the hands of individuals; it must not constitute itself a universal guardian and manager of wealth; this would be contrary to its right and duty. It must not make a division of wealth,—by giving the same to each, for instance; this would be to offer a premium to idleness, and to impose a punishment upon industry and skill. A similar result would ensue were families not allowed to keep an inheritance, a property that had been gained: this would discourage individual spirit and industry. A succession-duty is alone permissible. Otherwise, the united work of mankind would be interrupted in revolutionary fashion. Humanity would become a mass of drones, and a universal moral corruption and chaos would soon intervene. Even progressive taxation, which might render some help to an adjustment, would, if it were to encroach too

far, pamper laziness and discourage the spirit of enterprise—and this is a leading argument against the modern theories of *Communism* and *Socialism*. The enforcement of poor-rates is also unable to remove the evil thoroughly; nor is any system of Political Economy adequate to the problem. Here, therefore, we again see clearly enough the powerlessness of Right to occupy the highest place. Unless it relies upon other spiritual powers besides itself, it cannot even make it possible for every man freely to develop his personal life. It is love and wisdom alone which, without injury to right, can go back to fulfil the original will of God, according to which it is *mankind*, and not a part of it or only some individuals, that is to possess the earth —that Divine will which cannot be realized by Right alone, whether in its private or public form, since, in order to avoid a chaos, it must rather serve as the protector of Mammon. Christianity found proprietorship grown stiff and exclusive; it made it again free and mobile, broke down its inflexibility, and softened the rigidity of right by first of all relaxing it in the heart of the owner himself.

3. *Modification of the idea of Property by Christianity.* There is a difference here between the Old Testament and the New. It was a temporal future that was set before Israel. The Holy Land had for the Israelites a religious significance. Their possessions, distributed according to tribes and families, were, like the people itself, God's property. It was not merely a right but a duty, for each family to hold a piece of property in subjection to Jehovah. And this was not to be for ever alienated from a family. The Christian religion has no connection with any particular land. The promise of earthly blessing to the pious falls into the background behind the promise of salvation, and even as compared with the granting of spiritual blessings in the present. But Christianity does not help to solve the problem by destroying the idea of property, and inviting men to a distribution of goods under some such banner as that of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. Nor does it merely demand the establishment of a state of things in which all shall possess the same amount. It is wrong to adduce the Church of Jerusalem as a proof that Christianity introduces the abolition of property (Acts iv. 32, v. 4). It was love that then put property at common dis-

posal to meet the needs of others. Community of goods was not a law, it was not universal. Christianity did not directly abolish even the worst species of property, that of slaves, nor did it prohibit it by positive laws. But, without directly altering anything in the absolute right of property with respect to others, without demanding of the legislature a direct change in favour of the lower classes, Christianity simply established a moral and religious way of regarding property. Property has been given by God; He gives it every moment, and that for good ends, and we must give account of how we use it. That is to say, that which in relation to men is the right of property, is, when looked at from a religious point of view, or in relation to God, only the right of *administration of a good, not our own, but entrusted to our care* (1 Pet. iv. 10). Man only holds it in fee from God, therefore for good and Divine ends. Consequently, when he dissociates it from these ends, and uses it selfishly, he thereby robs God of what is His; from being a steward he becomes an embezzler, although no one of his fellow-men has a right to take his goods from him because he does not use them faithfully. For the right of stewardship is with respect to others nevertheless a right; to them he remains a proprietor, as long as the lord of the house does not take his office from him (Luke xvi.; Matt. xxi. 33 f.). To this lord he is only faithful in his stewardship, if he uses his good as the giver intended. But God, when He imparts to an individual anything of which he is to have the management, does not have regard solely to him, although it is meant to be a blessing to him also (Ps. cxii. 3, xxxiv. 10; Prov. iii. 16, viii. 18, x. 22; Deut. xxviii. 2–8). God's purpose is never confined to an isolated individual, but includes the whole community. But at the same time, this general purpose is to be wrought out through the free-will of the individual. Thus the right of property is preserved uninjured, while scope is given for softening the rigid harshness of laws relating to private right, and making compensation for inequalities that are becoming notorious. But it is the spirit of free-love that does the work. Here accordingly we have the grounds of the ethical right of the church to the care of the poor, of the diaconate, which as early as Acts vi. appears as one of the earliest of Church

institutions, and of the *Inner Mission*, the many ramifications of which embrace, both in a *fixed official* manner and also *freely*, the whole sphere of Christian and national life.

The unequal distribution of property rests, undoubtedly, upon a Divine order [talents being unequal to begin with, the acquisitions made by their use must be different; cf. p. 509] (Prov. xxii. 2; Eccles. ix. 11 f.; 1 Sam. ii. 7; John xii. 8). But in order to incite us to communicative love, Christianity also warns us of the dangers of riches. The essential equality of all men, which Christianity proclaims, nay, realizes (1 John v. 1), takes away the chief support of the separation between rich and poor; but also makes Christianity a stumbling-block to Egoism, and occasions a crisis, in which the rich are exposed to greater danger than the poor (Luke vi. 24; Matt. xix. 21 f.). Since the blessings which Christianity confers involve the essential equality of all men (Gal. iii. 28), and mitigate from within outwards the sharpness of the difference between rich and poor; since, too, the charitable duty of giving to the poor is incumbent upon the rich, it naturally follows that it is harder for the rich to become Christians, and that it demands more self-denial on their part (cf. Matt. xix. 21 f., the rich young man). In addition to this, wealth soon makes us satisfied and proud, increases worldliness and worldly desires, and conceals from us our spiritual poverty. Accordingly we find such passages as Luke vi. 24, "Woe to you that are rich," which is not a curse, but a lamentation (cf. Luke xvi. 19 f., xii. 16 f.; Jas. v. 1 f.). So, too, the desire to become rich (1 Tim. vi. 6–10; Prov. xxiii. 4, xxviii. 22), instead of contentment (xxx. 8), is described as a snare; and in Matt. xix. 23 f., Mark x. 23, Luke xviii. 25, it is said of the rich, that it is harder for them to enter into the kingdom of heaven than for a camel to go through the eye of a needle. But in exchange for what is given up, Christianity gives new riches, which are none the smaller because all men, even the poor, may possess them. In the case of the Church of Jerusalem, it was a natural expression given by Christians of their sense of the new riches they had found, when to a certain degree they had all things in common. Not that the renunciation of property would be in itself a virtue; we might thereby renounce also our vocation, our stewardship.

But the Christian in his freedom can be at once rich and poor (Phil. iv. 11, 12). This inward freedom from the fetters of wealth, and from its temptations, found expression in that sense of common interests, which made the early Christians put all their property at the disposal of the whole community for the ends of the kingdom of God (Acts iv. 32 ff., v. 4).

4. It was the Church first, and afterwards the civil community and the State, which took charge of the poor; in the latter case, however, poverty increases. In the Catholic Church, care of the poor, through the influence of the erroneous doctrine of justification by works, gave rise to begging, a practice that was repressed by the Old Testament, that personal dignity might not be injured (Deut. xv. 4): "There shall be no beggar among you." Such was to be the result of care of the poor. And it is possible to secure it by distinguishing the various kinds of poverty. These are (1) *Wilful* poverty arising from laziness. (2) *Unmerited* poverty from physical causes. (3) *Social* poverty.

Wilful poverty, where a man will not work, must be repressed by the State, by its police and by punishment; here the apostolic saying holds good—"He who will not work, neither shall he eat" (Eph. iv. 28; cf. 1 Thess. iv. 11; 2 Thess. iii. 10, 12; Ex. xx. 9). There is no obligation on the part of State or Church to feed the lazy. It is only in the way of furnishing work that both of them have to provide for poverty. And this preserves the dignity of a man, which will make him willing to eat his own bread. The sick, orphans and widows, etc., should be provided for without having to beg, by means appointed by the *Church* for the care of the poor.

Those who are *socially* poor, who desire work but cannot find it, must be provided for by the state and community, in connection with voluntary associations for that purpose. The state must also act by legislation.

Note 1.—*Socialism and Communism.*

The Literature.—Stein, *Der Socialismus und Communismus des heutigen Frankreich*, 2nd ed. 1848, pp. 574–590. Literature on this subject. Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klassen in England.* 1845. Quintessence of Socialism. Alexander Meyer, *Der Emancipationskampf des vierten Standes.* Wichern,

Vortrag auf der Oktoberconferenz, 1872. v. Treitzschke, *Der Socialismus und seine Gönner. Preussische Jahrbücher*, vol. xxxiv. part I. Schmoller, *Ueber einige Grundfragen des Rechts und der Volkswirthschaft.* 1875. Martensen's Ethics (Clark's translation), vol. ii. p. 142 ff. Lasselle, *System der erworbenen Rechte.* Marx, *Das Capital.* Schæffle, *Capitalismus und Socialismus*, 2nd ed. 1878. [Reischl, *Arbeiterfrage und Socialismus.* 1874. L. Brentano, *Das Arbeitsverhältniss gemäss dem heutigen Rechte.* 1877. R. Owen: A list of his writings is given in Reyband's *Etudes sur les réformateurs contemporains.* Lange, *Die Arbeiterfrage.* 1875. Cf. also Uhlhorn, *Die christliche Liebesthätigkeit in der alten Kirche, im Mittelalter.* Wach, *Die christlich sociale Arbeiterpartei.* Dove, *Die Verwerthung der Kirchengemeinde und Synodalinstitutionen zur Lösung der socialen Aufgaben.* (Report at the German Evangelical Church Conference.) A. Dorner, *Kirche und Reich Gottes*, pp. 363 f. Hartmann, *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins*, pp. 589–652. Cf. Roscher, *Geschichte der National-ökonomie in Deutschland*, especially pp. 1004 f.]

The development of national industries that has taken place in more recent times has been the cause of a great inequality in wealth, while the enormous extension of manufactures especially, has given capital the control of labour—a state of things that has given rise to pauperism and proletarianism. Parallel with this state of things, there has been a hitherto unheard-of increase of the self-consciousness of the lower classes, in consequence especially of the French Revolution, with its proclamation of the equality and liberty of the individual. An equal share in wealth and the enjoyments of life is demanded as a universal right of man, at one time by theories which are indigenous to France especially, at another, by action in the way of revolutions and strikes, and also by more rational means. The most important socialists in France are St. Simon and Fourier and their school; Pierre Leroux, de la Mennais, Proudhon and Louis Blanc; in England, Jeremy Bentham, R. Owen, and Stuart Mill, who is of kindred spirit (cf. his Life, 1874). Communism made its appearance during the first French Revolution in the person of Babeuf, spread more widely after the revolution of July (Cabet, *Voyage en Icarie*), until in 1870 and 1871 it for a time obtained full sway in Paris. Socialism and Communism have also been propagated in Germany, especially by Marx and

Lasselle. It was in England that workmen first sought to extort higher wages by forming unions and strikes in opposition to employers, but in this way they have only injured themselves and the national prosperity. In the so-called Chartism[1] they proceeded to enforce their wishes in a legal way, through Parliament and Parliamentary elections. In like manner, among ourselves, Lasselle looks to state aid to carry out his ideas, and in this way he is opposed to Schultze-Delitzsch, whose watchword is self-help on the part of working-men by means of associations. Communism seeks, in the supposed interests of freedom and equality, to abolish personal property for ever and in every form.[2] There is also to be no such thing as subordination, not even such as arises in a republic from the common will of the people. Every one is to have a claim to everything, and this idea is also extended to community of wives, etc. From the emphasis it lays upon liberty and equality, it seems to be inclined to republicanism; nevertheless it is essentially anarchical, because even a republic demands subordination of the individual will to the general will of the state. Communism destroyes the state; it will not even let civil society stand, as *Socialism* does. The latter only aims at a better constitution of society with regard to the division of labour and property, at an organization of labour, but still undoubtedly on the principle of equality, and therefore also in a chimerical manner, because inequalities would necessarily ensue from the inequality of individuals, in talents, in industry, and in honesty. Both Communism and Socialism involve the assumption that the Divine right of every man is the same; both are manifestations of Individualism — fragments or caricatures of the Reformation principle, which civilized France, while remaining Catholic, has managed to pick up. Both talk of *rights*, not of *duties;* and rights are conceived in a *purely eudæmonistic* form [labour is essentially regarded only as a means to enjoyment]. For the most part they hate all religion, deny God and immortality, and hold that the chief good is to be found in the present world, in the grati-

[1] [On the Chartist movement, cf. the article by L. Brentano, *Preussische Jahrbücher*, May, June, 1874; and Gammage, *History of the Chartist Movement.*]

[2] Stein, *l.c.* p. 446.

fication of desire. At the same time, however, they are fond of talking as if they only wanted to realize the aspirations of the Church of Jerusalem, and accordingly, to their watchwords, freedom and equality, they have added another—fraternity. Of the socialists especially is this the case. But the difference lies here: the primitive Church, animated by love, desired to give to each a share of the general wealth, those who had property supplying those who had none according to their need; whereas socialists desire to take each his share. In the latter case we have egoism, coming into conflict with right; in the former love, raising us above the stage of law, law being admittedly inadequate to meet the collisions that have arisen.

The great evil from which society is suffering may forebode a *bellum intestinum*, such as was the Servile War in ancient Rome. It cannot be remedied by any panacea — *e.g.* by societies or political rights, or by any one ethical sphere apart from others, whether State or Church or Inner Mission; but all must work together in a free and legitimate way (the way in which the Inner Mission has taken up this work[1]), State, Church, the Community, voluntary associations and individuals as well. But one thing especially will be necessary. The breaking up of the organization of the artisan and labouring classes due to the abolition of corporations, the introduction of free emigration rights and a universal election franchise, has begun, on the one hand, to reduce society to one level, and on the other, altogether to effect its disintegration. It is therefore necessary that labour should be reorganized, and his appointed place thus allotted to each, in order that men may not foolishly act as if each of them were the whole community in himself, and had a right to everything; also that no attempts should be made to bring all men to the same social level (which is just as disorganizing), but that each one should have his place in the organism, as a member of it,—differently constituted indeed from other members, but still co-operating towards the general welfare, and in this way enabled to prosper as a part of the whole. Accordingly, apprentices must be trained, progressive training schools instituted, and the difference between masters, journeymen, and apprentices established.

[1] [Cf. the author's address at the Inner Mission Conference in Magdeburg.]

Note 2. *Interest.*—Cf. Joh. Dav. Michaelis, *Mosaisches Recht,* iii. § 147 f.; Luke vi. 34 f.; Matt. v. 42. Aristotle was opposed to interest; Cato, too (who, however, is said to have been a usurer himself). In the Christian Church it was at first regarded as unbecoming in clerics to engage in worldly matters of commerce, and accordingly they were forbidden to accept interest. But this prohibition was soon extended to the laity; numerous councils and popes condemned the taking of interest as contrary to the command of God in the Old Testament, and to the precept of Christ—to lend or give to him who asks, demanding nothing in return (Luke vi. 34; Matt. v. 42). However, it was only the name that was changed. For it was not reckoned sinful to purchase annuities (rents, yearly revenues), to let houses, or to lease estates. Escobar even directs that in money matters we should reserve a fixed sum for ourselves under the title of a share in the profit, and only avoid the term interest. Hence he is satirized by Pascal, Salmasius, and Molenæus. Cf. Reinhard, iii. 25 ff. Boehmer, *Jus. Eccl.*, v. pp. 330 ff. The *Old Testament* laws are not binding on us, so far as they were of a national theocratic kind. Israel was to be founded not upon *trade* and intercourse with the world, but upon agriculture. The *merchant-spirit,* which was asleep in Israel, was not to be awakened. The Canaanite merchant was the empirical, worldly Ego of Israel, which had to be curbed by the law. The words of Christ, moreover, refer to Christian charity towards the poor. Christ is not speaking at all of the case where one uses another's money, not simply to relieve his own indigence, but to make profit out of it. On the other hand, it certainly follows from His words, that it does not become a Christian to be severe towards the poor, much less to bring them to ruin by the demands he makes with regard to either interest or capital; in such cases the Christian ought rather to be willing to lose. That Christ does not condemn the taking of interest is evident from Matt. xxv. 27.

§ 64.

Self-Love with respect to the Mental Life.

2. With respect to the *Intellect* (§ 58. 2), Christian self-love is, on the side of *Feeling* and *Cognition,* care for a virtuous *liberal education,* while on the side of the *Will* it is care for virtuous *stability of character.* (Cf. Rothe, *Ethik,* 1st ed. iii. pp. 250, 337.)

1. True culture embraces, of course, whatever is ethical,

but by prevailing usage it applies more to the culture of the understanding and the mind, of sensibility and taste. At the same time, however, it gives a polish to our natural instincts, although it in no way enhances their intrinsic value. Education indicates a way of thinking rather than a way or system of living, although there is no doubt that true culture cannot exist unless the will too is pervaded with the ethical spirit.

(*α*) True culture consists in an enlargement of our mental horizon beyond the narrow individual interests of person, position, family, city, or country; it is openness of mind to the idea of humanity and its highest interests. In this meaning of the word, *humanism*—a sense for what is purely human—forms one side of the Gospel portraits of Christ, a side specially brought out by St. Luke. But here more accurate definition is necessary.

(*β*) True culture forms as great a contrast to that vague cosmopolitanism, which has no home, but lives in a world of wholly chaotic and elementary ideals, as it does to a narrow Philistinism. Abstract universalism is just as much a perversion as self-contained individualism. It would simply reduce all individuals to one and the same dead level, it would smooth away all personal differences in a characterless uniformity, and would fatally injure the idea of an ethical organism, by breaking it up as it were into atoms. And the individual personality would also be injured by both extremes alike; on both sides there is about an equal want of culture. No doubt it is on its culture that this abstract cosmopolitanism or humanism particularly prides itself, as we see from its exponents, who are to be found more especially among literateurs belonging to that unfortunate and homeless race, the Jews, and among the discoverers and preachers of the rights of man. It points out how the barriers that separate different classes are everywhere falling away, and how the universal solvent of culture is causing everything that is fixed and rigid to disappear, and thus bringing men closer to each other. But while it is certain that progress involves as a moment the breaking up and decomposition of outlived institutions, it is just as certain that such an equalization, as is here spoken of, is in itself so unfruitful and poor in ideas that it requires its opposite in order to exist. And if this

opposite were abolished, there would exist but a chaos, a barbarism, only distinguished from *that* barbarism which this innovating tendency reproaches with paleology by the fact that it requires a universal equality of individuals, *i.e.* an equal barbarism of all. Culture must not resemble a faded picture, but be like a diamond, which increases by polishing in the sharpness of its angles and in light and brilliancy. Hence we are equally in opposition to true culture when, adopting this merely *negative ideal*, whose true content is the primitive nothingness which it regards as Paradisaic, we surrender ourselves to the desire for novelty which likes to be called Liberalism; and when we have no ideal at all, but are satisfied with things as they are (cf. § 47 on Optimism). Christian culture, on the contrary, both recognises and insists on personality, to which the individual and general factors are equally important. Christian culture is not such merely general humanity, but the instilling of the general interests of mankind in individuals,—a process which makes them bring forth fruit, and attain to a condition whereby the entire community is profited. Or, if regarded in a personal aspect, it is a development of our inmost nature, the bringing into a normal state our natural onesidedness of temperament, etc. As the world, however, is constituted, the abstract universal and the abstract particular cannot give up their contest with each other; they cannot let each other alone, nor—even leaving sin out of the question—be really reconciled, apart from that higher Christian principle which unites them by placing them in a normal state. In Christ was manifested true universality, true humanity, and yet in a personal form. The highest Christian aim equally excludes a vague generality, which is but empty and colourless, and a particularity which shows itself cold and reserved. On the contrary, it gives intrinsic worth to both these qualities, which they then seek and find in each other. Empty and negative universality seeks both to be filled and to have a more concrete definition, and hence delights in and desires multiplicity; cold particularity, when its view and interest are expanded, comes to its truth, and *desires its position as a single member of an organized body.* And this involves the perception of its own limitation; in other words, *modesty*, which is an essential attribute of culture. No one can be a master in

everything, and it is by his true self-limitation that a master is known. It is, moreover, a mark of an uncultured mind, to have no appreciation of, or feeling for, the mastership of others, and, by rashly giving an opinion on every subject, to credit ourselves with productive ability in a sphere in which we do not possess even receptive capacity. The true culture of a man for his position as a member of an organism requires two things, first, personal education, and then also the cultivation of receptivity, of a feeling for and appreciation of others. Hence it is a capacity for transferring oneself to the standpoint of others, for entering into their special cases ("I am made all things to all men," 1 Cor. ix. 22; Acts xv. 4), a quality which is the prerequisite of all influence upon others, all mutual giving and receiving. The memory and imagination must also have their especial share in this education (cf. Nitzsch's sermon, *Die Heiligung der Phantasie*), nor must the culture of sentiment be omitted. This in its ethic form is *feeling*, its opposite is *insipidity* and *affectation*. The over-culture of the imagination induces to luxuriating in mere diversion, to a preponderance of æstheticism, to that intellectualism which is now a tolerably cheap quality, and very different from intelligence (*Geist*). It is a quality readily combined with vanity, affectation, and mannerism, and, moreover, with extravagance and over-sensitiveness. On the other hand, the non-cultivation of the imagination makes a man both prosaic and pedantic. Its culture is of great importance to piety, which needs the power of a lively conception of God and of Christ, that it may surrender itself thereto. And such co-operation of the imagination is, so far as it is necessary, not untrue, but is in pre-established harmony with the truth, with God and Christ.

2. Virtuous *stability*. It might be thought that this was a gift, and not to be required of all. But when any one gives us the impression of having a light and shallow character, when our intercourse with him gives us the feeling that there is a lack of mental stamina in him, we do not regard this as entirely the fault of nature. On the contrary, highly gifted and ingenious men may also leave this impression and the dislike connected with it, which destroys confidence, and consequently cordiality. What, then, do we mean by

stability? It is that quality in a man which creates the impression that he is constantly, and not only momentarily, influenced by his moral will, *i.e.* by his conscience, or, to speak more strictly, by the thought of God, and therefore possesses self-control. To such a man we involuntarily accord our confidence, however small his gifts, or however limited his sphere of operation. If we are but certain that any one submits to the decision of conscience, or indeed of Christian piety, we know also that he is not shallow, that there is in him depth and trustworthiness, that under every variety of endowment and function such an one will ever be at unity with himself, and therefore neither untruthful, vacillating, nor capricious, but simple ἁπλοῦς, a sharer in the Divine unchangeableness. Thus the inward multiplicity is collected into the focus of simplicity, is concentrated in singleness of moral aim and effort, is devoted to communion with God and the kingdom of God. Not till this concentration takes place is it possible that all his powers and gifts should undergo the process of penetration, and every single virtue come into the service of all his gifts—an ethic περιχώρησις. Not till then is he a complete whole, ὁλόκληρος, an ἀνὴρ τέλειος (Matt. v. 48, vi. 22; Jas. i. 4, 6).

Having now considered Christian self-love with respect to one's own bodily and mental state, we proceed to contemplate it with reference to others.

II. CHRISTIAN SELF-LOVE AS SELF-ASSERTION AND SELF-MANIFESTATION WITH REFERENCE TO OTHERS.

§ 65.

The *negative* agency by which personal dignity is *outwardly* preserved and promoted, is *Christian endeavour after independence and respect.* Its inward limits are *humility* and *love,* which exclude unrestrained love of freedom,—ἀνομία, —and ambition no less than servility. The *positive* agency by which personal dignity and due personal influence are promoted, is *self-manifestation.* Its animating principle or impulse is communicative love, in alliance with the negative condition of *truthful-*

ness, which requires that we should manifest what we really are, and not a mere semblance of ourselves. In self-manifestation, truthfulness and love must never be separated, and thus while all lies, even so-called "white lies," are excluded, it must always have the good as its object. Christian wisdom so directs self-manifestation on the impulse of love, that it is always united with truthfulness. In particular is self-manifestation exhibited in the choice of a *vocation*, which occupies the same place in the intellectual and social spheres, that property does in the physical. This conducts us into the social sphere.

1. *Christian endeavour after independence* has respect to (*a*) the mind, and is thus opposed to servility (Jas. ii. 3); it is an assertion of personal dignity, and is also opposed to the fear of man and to men-pleasing—in fact, to every species of idolatry that is paid to persons or things in matters intellectual or spiritual. It includes whatever places us in false dependence upon others—*e.g.* entering into secret associations or factions, a thing which is especially ruinous in Church life. For through party interests of a factious kind we are brought into a position where, for the sake of obtaining success, we support impure measures or men, or become their advocates, and carry about with us two standards of judgment, one to be used when we are among our party-associates, the other among other men (1 Cor. i.–iv.). (*b*) Christian endeavour after independence has respect also to the *body*, for as long as a man is not master of his own body, he cannot manifest his personality freely—*e.g.* he cannot choose his vocation. Accordingly the New Testament, though it does not directly forbid or abolish slavery, yet purposes its abolition in a moral way that respects the rights of property. "If thou canst become free, use it rather" (1 Cor. vii. 21 f.; Philem. 12 f.). Christianity does not indeed allow a slave, who is lawful property, to *take* his freedom. In slave States, the working power of a slave has become of money value, and comes under private right. Help must be derived not from upsetting the rights of property, but from a recognition of them, though after a Christian manner (§ 63). Thus, for

example, the redemption of the slaves in the English colonies by the State was a magnificent Christian sacrifice on the part of the State, an imitation of ancient Christianity when it ransomed Christian slaves. In North America, too, slavery has of late been legally abolished. But at present the important thing is to afford a possibility of independence to those who are slaves, and this the Emperor of Russia, for example, has attempted to do for the serfs. For this purpose, however, it is necessary that the moral sense of the community should be raised, and that public opinion should advance to a higher conception of the worth of the Christian personality; and here again it is Christianity that can render the best service. Thus Wilberforce, Buxton, and their friends, together with the Quakers and Baptists, prepared public opinion in England for the emancipation of the slaves. When once the Christian idea of personality has attained universal validity, the conviction will not be wanting that it is a sin to treat a man as a mere thing, that, on the contrary, his dignity as Christ's free man must be recognised, and efforts will be made to supply the slave with education, and in particular to bestow upon him the blessing of Christianity. It is a process of this kind which, working from within outwards, has led to the abolition of slavery and serfdom in European Christendom. On the other side, when the Christian idea of personality has been aroused among heathen slaves by means of missions, it does not follow that they have received the signal to burst their chains. But the power of Christianity shows itself conspicuously in this—that even in such unfavourable circumstances it knows how to rescue the personal dignity of the slave, and to make him independent of his lot. The slave, who has become a Christian, is no longer inwardly a mere thing, although outwardly he is so still. Inwardly he is the Lord's free man, and has to show his thankfulness for being so by consoling himself with this inward freedom which is the chief good, when he cannot alter his lot without sin and rebellion (Eph. vi. 5–8; Col. iii. 11, 22 f.; 1 Pet. ii. 16, 18; Philem. 16). And in so doing he has, in truth, a greater share of freedom than his master, who, ignorant of higher things, is a slave of sin. With regard to *political freedom* also, a verdict similar to the above must be passed,

or even a still stricter one. Christianity, and especially Protestantism, is not directly, but only indirectly, a political principle. Our filial relationship to God makes us all essentially equal with respect to the highest, the eternal sphere; and by virtue of this supreme good we can patiently dispense with anything that is still wanting to our comfort. It would be sinful for the Christian to regard political rights not as a secondary, but as an absolute good, or to try to secure them by a breach of right, and thus to strive after a merely relative good at the cost of doing injury to one that is absolute.[1]

2. *Care for our Good Name.* Importance is attached to a good name (Ps. xli. 6; Prov. xxii. 1; Rom. xiii. 7; 1 Pet. ii. 17). It is a good of great value, a condition of influence in society. But our Christian care for our good name must find its standard in humility as opposed to ambition, as well as in Christian independence of the world and of what the world means by a good name (against the passion for rank and titles, see Matt. xxiii. 7; John v. 41, 44, xii. 43). The way of duty leads not merely through good, but also through evil report, especially as the judgment of the multitude is so changeable and capricious (2 Cor. vi. 8; Luke vi. 26). This care for our good name, moreover, does not consist in a merely negative warding off of whatever is hurtful, it is not mere freedom from vice and crime; it demands in addition to this that the Christian should be something positively good, and make it manifest that he is so. In this way he becomes an *authority* in his own sphere; and since no one can avoid acknowledging spiritual worth and pre-eminence, he thus acquires a position of influence. But such acknowledgment cannot be compelled, it must be merited.

§ 66. *Continuation.*

Truthfulness.

THE LITERATURE.—Krause, *Ueber die Wahrhaftigkeit*, 1844. Reinhard, iii. pp. 163 f., 195 f., 199 f. Nitzsch, *System der*

[1] [Here the author evidently opposes secondary political goods, such as political liberty, to what the State is in its essential nature. The idea of right, which it protects, makes the State an object of worth *in itself*, and the latter therefore must not be subverted for the sake of merely secondary political goods. In addition, cf. what is said farther on, concerning political liberty, in the chapter on the State.—ED.]

Christlichen Lehre, 4th ed. p. 312 f., § 172. Harless, *Christian Ethik*, p. 295 sqq. De Wette, *Sittenlehre*, iii. 126 f. Rothe, 1st ed. iii. § 1073–1075. Martensen, *Christian Ethics* (Clark's Translation, i. 205–236).

1. Truthfulness is repeatedly and urgently recommended in the New Testament (Matt. v. 37 ; Jas. v. 12 ; John viii. 44 ; Eph. iv. 21–25 ; Col. iii. 9 ; 1 Tim. i. 10). We are members one of another. No rational being makes one member of his body deceive another. The manifestation of the Christian personality with regard to others has *truthfulness* (which is, besides, a duty to oneself) as its *negative*, and love as its positive characteristic ; while both in contents and in form it is determined by wisdom. Truthfulness is of a negative character, and hence it does not form a complete act by itself, it is only a moment in an act. Truth does not demand that all that is in a man should be brought out ; else it would be a moral duty for him to let also the evil that is in him come forth, whereas it is his duty to keep it down. Truthfulness, therefore, can never be the impulsive power in self-manifestation, it is love alone that can be this, unless we except cases where to abstain from self-manifestation would amount to positive denial, as in the *status confessionis* (although here, too, love to Christ is ever the motive). After what has now been said, it is not difficult to come to a decision respecting untruths, falsehoods, and white lies. An untruth considered in itself is something of a wholly objective kind, and does not necessarily imply untruthfulness. It takes place whenever something else than the objective truth—perhaps its very opposite—is set forth, and error thus produced in the minds of others. But at the same time the speaker may be himself in error, and consequently subjective truthfulness maintained. On the other hand, untruthfulness—that is, subjective untruth or falsehood — takes place when the speaker speaks against his own conviction, *even should what he says be true*. If along with this he intends to deceive, then his lie acquires also a social aspect that is hostile to love. And here actions are included as well as words. The use of rouge, *e.g.*, involves the intention of making others believe that there is more beauty or youth beneath it, than is actually the case. On the other hand, where the artificial means employed have created

a false appearance, but at the same time this is not the intention of the act, then there is no falsehood. The purpose, *e.g.*, may be to cover a bodily blemish, or to conceal some repulsive natural defect, or for health's sake to seek an artificial compensation for something that has been lost. Here there is no falsehood, for it is not a duty to expose what is offensive, or to endure it, when the power we have over nature enables us to supply the deficiency. Nevertheless, if the means that may be used to cover a defect are changed into a means for making a dazzling display of beauty, then falsehood arises. The case is somewhat different with regard to our conventional phrases of politeness.[1] These certainly contain many false exaggerations, that have arisen from the effort to talk in a complimentary fashion, or from people trying to attain some end by means of flattery. The Quakers are wholly averse to such forms of speech, and have broken with them, and we can accept their attitude in the matter as a Christian protest against the continuance of these habits and forms. Still we must not characterize such customary modes of expression as lies, since they resemble worn-out coins, which in the course of exchange have acquired a different value from what their inscriptions denote. If an individual were to attempt to alter these forms, he would occasion another false impression—namely, the appearance of intentional impoliteness or insult. The Quakers run no risk of doing so, because every one knows that, in refusing to use these forms of speech, they have no intention whatever of giving offence. But Quakers also go too far with their universal use of "Thou;" for it is important to human society that politeness, too, should have a sphere of its own where courtesy and deference alone are manifested, a sphere half-way between non-acquaintance and intimacy. This is the outer court of the temple of social intercourse, and we may not enter in by any other way. Men must still continue to respect each other, though they are not on a footing of intimacy.

2. But now are there cases where *lying* is *allowable?* Can we make out the so-called white lie to be morally permissible? The insane, the sick, children are involved, in manifold ways, in false ideas, in a world of appearances. Is it right for us to

[1] Cf. Schleiermacher, *Christliche Sitte*, p. 654 f.

accommodate ourselves to them out of love? To let them remain amid appearances when to dissipate these would be precipitate, to withhold the truth from them when it would not benefit them, and they would form a false conception of it, —this is permissible beyond doubt; for all moral communications have love, not truthfulness, as their impulse (John xvi. 12; Matt. vii. 6) (κύνες). But is it also allowable to carry accommodation so far as to give assent to errors, even should it be with the purpose of afterwards overcoming them, when we have thus won confidence? Or, what comes to the same thing, is it allowable to *create* a false appearance (*fucum*)? In general, and in accordance with what has already been said, it must hold good, that whoever regards something that is really a lie—a so-called white lie—as permissible, must also look upon it as a duty. But how shall ethics ever be brought to lay down a duty of lying, to recommend evil that good may come? (Rom. iii. 8). The test for us is, whether we could ever imagine Christ acting in this way, either for the sake of others, or—which would be quite as justifiable, since self-love is a moral duty—for His *own* sake. To accommodate ourselves to others—*e.g.* to children or those who are sick—is no doubt a duty, but it must have its limits; and these are given in saying that we must not contradict ourselves—that is to say, there must be no contradiction between our inward mind or opinion and our outward words or acts. In particular, to withhold the truth from one who is dying, to give him false hopes when all hope is gone, is questionable for this reason—that we thereby take something from him, the incentive, namely, to prepare himself for death both outwardly and inwardly, that he may take the last step, the step from life to death, consciously and willingly. We overestimate the value of human life, and besides we in a measure usurp the place of Providence, when we believe we may save it by committing sin. There are certainly cases, however, where the *appearance produced* is quite *honest*, where the untruth is confessedly an untruth, and is by this means preserved from being immoral. Thus playful fictions may be propounded by friends amongst each other, after the manner of riddles, in which, by way of free mental diversion, they have to guess what they are to think of them. In war, too, something like a

game of this kind is carried on, when by way of stratagem some deceptive appearance is produced, and a riddle is thus given to the enemy. In such cases there is no falsehood; for, from the conditions of the situation,—whether friendly or hostile,—the appearance that is given is confessedly nothing more than an appearance, and is therefore honest. On the other hand, I should be unwilling to extend what has just been said to the social phrase in which a person denies himself to visitors. Unless, perhaps, it has become conventional to understand the formula "not at home" as meaning "I am prevented from receiving; but wish you to regard my refusal not as if I had repulsed you, but as if you had missed me" (as against Rothe).

3. With regard, however, to the *degree of guilt* attaching to lies, of necessity a distinction must certainly be made. If the lie is selfish, as so-called white lies generally are, it is simply dishonourable, and a fraud; and whoever as a matter of principle allows himself to tell such lies for his own advantage, shows that his sense of truthfulness is fundamentally impaired. But the amount of guilt must be otherwise estimated, if the lie was told in the interests of love, and in defence of a good legitimate in itself. In such a case, however, there must be no indifference to the preservation of truthfulness, for then the love that is displayed would probably be altogether superficial. But an act may amount to a lie even when it was originally intended to be pure, and to preserve not only love but also truthfulness uninjured. We may intend, *e.g.*, not to tell a lie, but only to maintain a conscientious silence, and yet in carrying out our intention fail to fulfil the duty of keeping truth and love united. Here the will was good, but from want of moral skill or wisdom our act has so fallen out that silence has become deception. This is again a case that puts to the proof our moral advancement, and its solution therefore depends upon the degree of discretion and prudence we have attained (Matt. x. 16). The impulse to act must always come from love; truthfulness is only the negative side of action, except in the *status confessionis* (§ 55). Consequently, whenever revealing the truth is opposed to love, it would show want of love to communicate it. Now, should a case arise where an act is not intended to deceive, but truthfulness

is meant to be preserved, and should the result be that, in guarding the interests of love, we do injury to truthfulness, then it must be said that, relatively speaking, it was better that the chief moral requisite of the situation—viz. love—should not suffer loss. Still the act itself, though perhaps, with the degree of moral strength existing, unavoidable, must be to the Christian an object of regret and repentance,—and that not merely on its own account, but because of the state of character to which the fault was due.

§ 67. *Continuation.*

Oaths.

In an oath we solemnly, and in spoken words, connect a statement with the thought of God as the Omniscient Witness and Righteous Judge of untruth. Where it is found to be necessary, it points to a sinful condition of society, and is accordingly destined to cease along with the evils which occasion it. But in itself an oath is not a sin; on the contrary, when the truth cannot in important matters be otherwise established, it is our duty both to put a person on his oath and to give our own.

LITERATURE. — Stäudlin, *Geschichte der Vorstellungen und Lehren vom Eid*, 1824. Bayer, *Betrachtungen über den Eid*, 1829. Bauer, *Ueber den Eid, moralisch-theologischer Versuch.* Nitzsch, *Predigt über die Heiligkeit des Eides.* Göschl, *Der Eid nach seinem Prinzipe, Begriffe und Gebrauche*, 1837. Strippelmann, *Der Gerichtseid*, 1855. Rothe, 1st ed. iii. § 1076.

1. Its Idea. The various kinds of oaths make no essential difference to the idea of an oath. A distinction is made between (*a*) *civil oaths* (word of honour) and (*b*) *religious oaths.* Both of these classes, again, are divided into *judicial* and *private* oaths. According to their occasion or their contents, oaths are partly those of *conviction* (*juramenta credulitatis*), where a subjective conviction concerning some matter is stated on oath (as in the case of a jury, for instance), and partly *corroborative.* The latter are either negative—*oaths of purgation* (*juramenta purgationis*), for the purpose of rebutting

an assertion—or positive—*assertory* oaths (*juramenta assertoria*). Among the latter are oaths connected with the giving of evidence and with promises, the oath of citizenship, of office, and of allegiance, as well as cases where a confession of faith is accompanied with an oath and a vow or promise, as, for example, in the so-called religious oath. An oath has been regarded under the aspect both (*a*) of a *covenant*, and (*b*) of a *confession;* the former chiefly in the last century.

(*a*) The oath as a *covenant;* (*α*) *with God.* In an oath, it is said, the highest goods are put in pledge. To include God Himself among these goods would give no sense, and therefore it must be eternal blessedness that is meant. But such a relationship with regard to God as a contract implies, would be immoral in itself; it would be opposed to humility. And then, how can it be right for a man to pledge salvation for any earthly thing whatever? Further, however certain a statement may be to which we give our oath, it ought not to be as certain to us as God and the blessedness we have in fellowship with Him. How, therefore, can a true Christian, to whom God is more certain than the empirical world, nay, who has derived true assurance from God alone—how can he ever say with truth, that any earthly thing whatever is as certain to him as God and fellowship with God? With those, however, to whom not God and salvation, but something that is earthly, is the highest good or the clearest certainty, an oath in this conception of it would afford no guarantee of truth. And thus it follows that pious Christians could not take an oath in this sense of the word, and that those who do take it would not be pious.

(*β*) Michaelis represents an oath as a contract between the person who gives it and the person to whom it is given (*adjurans*). Here God is the *guarantee of the contract.* But this would look as if a special contract were necessary in order to make truthfulness obligatory, and as if God were not the judge of all untruth. This conception, therefore, tends to moral laxity with reference to declarations not made upon oath.

(*γ*) Instead of this juridical conception of an oath, we have the *moral* conception, as in the civil oath, where one's word of honour is passed, or moral honour is pledged. Even an

atheist could take an oath of this kind. But while moral honour is no doubt rightly comprehended in an oath, it includes religious honour, and the latter must be made prominent in an oath, because it alone affords security that the person who takes the oath occupies a fundamentally moral position.

(*b*) Consequently, Göschel's conception is more to be commended, according to which an oath is a *religious confession*, an act of worship. Still, it is again incorrect to regard this as exhausting the meaning of an oath, for in that case it would be a wholly desirable act, and no disapproval could attach to it (in opposition to Matt. v.). This would mean that an individual is here performing a religious act, an act of worship, in the presence of his fellow-men, in order to assure them that he is a religious man. But, while one of the results of an oath may very well be to convince us that we are dealing with a religiously conscientious man, still this must not be the purpose of him who takes it; for then the act of worship would be performed, not for its own sake, but in a manner to suggest display. On the contrary, since the statement that is to be attested refers to a single finite fact, which may be altogether separated from the thought of God, while at the same time it is necessary to arrive at certainty concerning this fact, the essential nature of an oath consists in this—that he who makes it brings *his statement into connection* with the *thought of God*, and makes confession that he is speaking *before God in all good conscience.*

2. *New Testament passages* with regard to an oath are Matt. v. 33 ff., xxiii. 16–22; Jas. v. 12. Here swearing is forbidden ὅλως. Some hold that it is only an oath attached to a promise which is forbidden, because we are not *nostri juris* (Grotius). But the command is—Swear not at all (ὅλως). Others maintain that it is only extrajudicial oaths which are forbidden. But no grounds can be shown for excluding these, if judicial oaths are allowed, because we may be brought into the *status confessionis* in private, as well as in public circumstances. It has further been held that we are only forbidden to swear by finite things, such as the temple, heaven, or earth, etc., but are not forbidden to swear by God; the reason being that in the former case we are apt to be betrayed into thoughtlessness in the matter of taking an oath.

But what Christ says is, that in swearing by finite things we are in reality swearing by God, and that we ought not to swear at all. Hence it need not surprise us that scrupulously conscientious parties, such as Quakers and Mennonites, reject oath-taking altogether. And there is much to countenance this position. An oath arises from sin, it is sin alone which calls for it; for it can only be necessary when society is much infected with the vice of lying, when a simple yea, yea, nay, nay, is no longer sufficient, and statements unsupported by an oath are exposed to suspicion. Further, where oath-taking is practised, the *duty of telling the truth when not upon our oath* seems to be *put lower than the duty of telling it when upon oath*. But by this means the sense of duty is weakened in the sphere of ordinary life, the *truthfulness of a people is undermined*, oaths become more and more common, and by reason of their very frequency become useless and even pernicious, since their evidential value is constantly decreasing. This injury, which may be inflicted on the general truthfulness of a people, cannot be measured, but the mischief is as great as if oaths were to be discontinued, and many single facts were to remain unproved, especially as the security which an oath affords is so often merely formal. In addition to all this, the *honour of the Christian* is affected. He speaks the truth plainly and simply; to demand an oath from him implies mistrust of his simple assertion, and therefore, if he is really a Christian, his honour is injured. Ought he to submit to this? Further, among those parties that refuse to take an oath, there by no means seems to be more untruthfulness than where statements are made upon oath. On the contrary, their release from the obligation to take an oath is for them a mark of distinction, and an incentive to truthfulness, while at the same time it justifies the State in making the punishment of any abuse of confidence all the more severe, and hence it may be doubtful whether a community would not be better off were oaths abolished altogether, and the precepts of the New Testament literally followed.

On the other hand, we must also admit that Christ Himself on various occasions confirmed His words with an "Amen, amen;" and that when the High Priest adjured Him to speak the truth upon an oath which he proposed, Jesus replied,

"Thou hast said," and thus consented to the oath, Matt. xxvi. 63. Similarly we find Paul also frequently making asseverations, Rom. i. 9, ix. 1; 2 Cor. xi. 31, xii. 2; 1 Thess. ii. 5, 10; 2 Cor. i. 23; 1 Tim. v. 21. In Heb. vi. 16, an oath is called the end of all strife. Further, in the Old Testament, oaths are spoken of as acts that are moral, or are even legally enjoined, and God is described as swearing by Himself, Ex. xxii. 11; Lev. vi. 3; Gen. xxii. 16, xxvi. 3; Num. xiv. 21; Ps. lxxxix. 4, cx. 4; Ezek. xxxiii. 11; Isa. xlv. 23. In fact, *it cannot be shown why there should be anything wrong in an oath*, if the truth cannot be otherwise made credible; for if it is sincerely taken, it merely bears witness to the fact that God is remembered in connection with the statement that is made. But, all the same, the thought of God should be continually present to the Christian, so that an oath contains nothing new or foreign, but only something that is good. We cannot compel men to believe our simple word; in a court of justice all must be treated alike; and since lying exists in our social life, every one who would be a member of society must assist in bearing like a Christian the burden to which falsehood gives rise. Moreover, where oaths are administered, *it does not necessarily follow that statements not made upon oath have their value lowered*, or that the spirit of truthfulness in general is weakened. Means can be devised to obviate these dangers without forbidding oaths entirely. But at the same time we must always endeavour to render oaths less and less frequent, and more and more dispensable. If only the objective duty of truthfulness is enforced with sufficient earnestness, a community will be none the worse for oaths being permitted; they will serve as a reminder of the duty of truthfulness in general. Consequently, the *sayings of Christ directed against oaths* must be understood as follows. Oaths ought to be strictly excluded as between Christians, because, although they are sincerely taken, they are nevertheless superfluous. Further, the principle remains, that our object should be to make oaths dispensable, and bring about their entire discontinuance. Hence they are rightly employed only, when at the same time the duty of truthfulness in general is enforced in such a way as to make *the taking of oaths*, itself *a step towards rendering them no longer necessary*. Christ

therefore does not set up a mere empty ideal or aim, but presents truthfulness throughout the whole life of a people as the real aim of the Christian. Within these limits an oath can receive its due ethical place, as something that is transitory, as the expression of a momentarily imperfect condition of society, but the expression, too, of a real and ceaseless striving after the true goal. It belongs to the freedom of the Christian to take upon himself, in the spirit of love, something that is not necessary for himself, but is occasioned by the average ethical state of society. From what has been said, however, it follows that an *increase in the frequency of oaths* is a *disgrace* to a Christian commonwealth, a sign, if not of levity, yet of indolence on the part of judges, and of the decay of truthfulness in the community at large.

3. An oath does nothing to raise the objective duty of truthfulness to a higher level, for objectively there are no differences of degree between duties. But subjectively, and in a religious way, it does enhance our obligation to tell the truth; he who takes it must either say what is true, or else grieve the Spirit of God, who is warning him to be truthful, and thus become a worse man than he was before. The guilt of untruthfulness is thus incalculably increased by perjury. Accordingly, (α) an oath must not be taken without well-tested conviction. (β) No one must be compelled, or allow himself to be compelled, to take an oath; for if swearing be altogether contrary to a man's moral sense, then if he did swear, he would sin against himself. (γ) Still less must he who administers an oath allow one to be taken for statements, when the contrary of these has already been affirmed upon oath. (δ) Further, since an oath does not create a new duty, but only makes an objective duty more binding subjectively, it also follows that just as nothing impossible must be promised on oath, so, too, nothing immoral can become a duty by having an oath attached to it. But we must certainly maintain, that if the oath was on the whole permissible, it ought to be kept. If, on the other hand, it was immoral, then, while we refuse to adhere to it, we ought to be filled with earnest contrition for our sin in entering into it, and with penitent sorrow for the offence and confusion of moral ideas to which our conduct so readily gives rise. Finally, we

ought also to be willing to accept all the injurious consequences of our sin, in order to make atonement for the offence we have caused. Hurtful consequences of an external kind, injuries that follow in the secondary spheres, and the like, do not release us from an oath; it is only plain immorality that can make a promise null and void in itself. He who would make any damage he might sustain in consequence of keeping his word to be something immoral, shows that he is materialistic in his ideas, and unbelieving with regard to God's blessing on fidelity.

§ 68. *Continuation.*

Our Vocation.

There is also and essentially an individual side to the activity of the man created in God's image (§ 13 ff.). Moreover, since, though he is endowed with individual gifts, his feeling for the general good is constantly evidencing itself in a moral manner, his self-manifestation and self-activity are carried out in a particular vocation.

1. In what has hitherto been said in treating of Christian character, we have not given any special prominence to the individual or social factors. We have regarded both the physical and spiritual duties which Christians owe to themselves more under this aspect, without absolutely defining the individual point of view. Even such matters as truthfulness and oaths have not been brought *primo loco* under the social or individual point of view, but under that of Christian honour and its self-assertion. In this paragraph we turn away from the personal to the individual side. In so doing we seem to be farther removed than ever from what is social, while nevertheless personal honour is inseparably connected with the moral position which one bears to others, to the social sphere at large. But, in truth, it is just the individual side of the Christian personality, which forms the transition to objective communities, and conducts us from the subjective to the objective form in which the highest good is realized. For *moral* individuality on the side of its power of manifestation is

talent (or when Christian, *χάρισμα*), which is indispensable to the formation and self-preservation of an organized, moral world, just as this world again assigns to talent its place or *vocation* (1 Cor. xii. 4 ff., 28 ff., xiv.; Matt. xxv. 15 ff.; Luke xix. 13–25). Every individual is indeed a microcosm, reflecting the whole of existence, both God and the world; each one, however, does not reflect everything in the same way, but in a different way from every one else. That is to say, the predominant characteristic is different in each individual, and modifies all his energies. When a person is pre-eminently endowed on one side of his nature, he is of necessity limited on other sides, so far at least as productive power is concerned; and it is only within its proper limits that his special skill can be exhibited. They are for us the negative condition of concentration. At the same time, such limitation forms a strong social *bond*, rendering it necessary for the accomplishment of work that all should reciprocally *supplement* each other. With regard to our inward disposition, however, no such process of supplementing can be admitted, because inwardly each one ought to be devoted to the whole, with open heart and in faithful love. If there were only identity, individuals would, on the other hand, remain like so many atoms alongside of each other in their action. And an infinite repetition of one and the same would never make an organism. It is true that the idea of God is reflected in its totality in every single person. But different sides of this idea are reflected individually in separate individuals; these become so many different talents, and constitute a diversity that aims at and establishes the different spheres of vocation or different communities, in which is realized the *σῶμα Χριστοῦ*, the kingdom of God,—that greatest and holiest of all works of art, that splendid temple of God, *that is built not of stones, but of persons.* And although persons die, yet these communities endure, and have a relative immortality, since new *individuals* are constantly arising to *carry on* those essential functions, through which every community is *produced* and organized. Attaching himself, with his individual capacities, to these communities,[1] each individual is now raised, and has his

[1] In treating of the *genesis* of vocations, we can either begin with individuals and proceed to communities, or begin with the communities themselves in which

moral life raised, to a higher level; for it is now essential to his personal honour, as belonging to a particular vocation, that he should not so much act of himself, as that the moral spirit of his sphere of life should act through him. Individuals, indeed, remain the vehicles of virtues, for Vinet is right in maintaining that the moral communities are not possessors of virtuousness. Individuals, however, are the vehicles of the virtues of their vocation by this means alone—that they do not merely think and act *as* individuals, but that the Ethos, the spirit of the whole community (which, in the case of Christians, is the Holy Spirit), is the principle which impels and animates them, whether in the Church, the State, in Science or in Art. The physical person becomes the organ of a higher, of the moral person or community. An individual has not truly found himself, until he has found his moral vocation, which makes him a useful organ, animated by the consciousness and will of the whole community.

2. *Vocation; its Universality.* Since the gift possessed by each Christian is held by him for the common good (1 Cor. xiv. 12, 26), it naturally follows that Christian society ought not to have any drones who merely consume, and do nothing to nourish it. Every man must have a *vocation*, a special one, not merely the fundamental or family vocation, arising from his position in the family, which is the basis of all other moral communities. It is woman alone who has the latter as her proper vocation,[1] and hence she is also the vehicle of the universal human. But every man must have a special vocation besides the family one. "The man must not be a stay-at-home" (Rothe). Marheinecke[2] and Rothe[3] rightly declaim against private gentlemen and squires, who make such a figure in the "Visitors' List" at watering-places, and are not producers, but only consumers; and with striking force compare them to beggars, the parasites of society. If any will not work, neither let him eat (2 Thess. iii. 10–12). When men have no longer the strength to carry on their own calling, civic duties and church work are still open to

individuals are assembled. [Here the first method is, of course, the one adopted; for the second, see below, § 72, note.—Ed.]

[1] [Cf. *supra*, pp. 141, 142, 419.] [2] *Theologische Moral*, p. 394 f.

[3] 1st ed. iii. § 947 f.

them. In these they may find, to their own benefit, a new vocation adapted to their powers, and be supported by the experience of age and the respect accorded to it. Therefore let every man have a calling (1 Cor. vii. 20; Matt. xxv. 15).

3. It is a more difficult matter, however, to say anything definite regarding the *choice* of a vocation. If a wrong choice is made, it is a serious misfortune both for the individual himself and for the community. When the life of a man is a failure so far as his vocation is concerned, his own inward moral development is rendered more difficult, while the community is deprived of a member in the place where he ought to be, and at the same time is furnished with a member in the wrong place. He thus acts as a hindrance and check to the free movement of the whole. Accordingly, the utmost conscientiousness and strictest self-examination are necessary here. From a moral point of view, the most dangerous thing of all is to enter upon the *clerical* or *theological* vocation without an inward call. For since this vocation rests upon religious enthusiasm and love, hypocrisy can hardly be avoided where the inner call is wanting. On the other hand, when the requisite gifts are forthcoming, it is the easiest and, so to speak, the most natural vocation. For that which is the universal Christian duty is here made, only because of the possession of the necessary talents, the special duty. This vocation has a peculiar dignity. It stands among others like Sunday among the days of the week. None of the other professions, indeed, is deprived of fellowship with God; each one catches and reflects some ray of Divine light. But in the clerical vocation a man is professionally occupied with the sun itself. Should the student, moreover, fall into doubt with regard to the faith, this must not lead him astray. It is just when he is anxious about his truthfulness, that he is specially fitted for this line of study. No more is required of him than would still be requisite were he to abandon his profession, if he desires to continue a Christian. Doubt with regard to Christianity must become doubt with regard to salvation. But such doubt can, nay, ought to be changed by every one into full assurance of faith; and this change takes place in a practical way, not by means of demonstration. If by faith he has only the elements of Christian truth, he has that knowledge and

certainty which is the foundation of every other, and starting from this all other doubts will gradually be cleared away.[1]

The moral choice of a vocation in general is made through an act of an individual kind, in which a decision is arrived at on purely individual grounds, subject to the direction of conscience. Thus there is a side to the choice of a vocation, which is altogether removed from the judgment of others; nevertheless, from an ethical point of view, one additional remark of a general nature may be made. The good, which forms the sphere of each separate vocation, has ever been already realized in the course of history, though the division of labour must still go on. The manifold varieties of vocation and of work already realized make it possible for every person, by careful survey and comparison, to arrive at a self-knowledge which, if it is only sufficiently aroused, will of itself become a knowledge of what his vocation ought to be. Still it is a dangerous thing for any one (*a*) to follow solely his inward inclination, without receiving the consent of that objective sphere of life to which he is inclined, by means of those who are authorities in that sphere. To do so is to follow what Schleiermacher calls the *maxim of Libertinism.* On the other hand, it is just as false, and even immoral (*b*), to be guided by mere external calls and grounds of decision, when there is an inward reluctance (cf. chapter on Marriage). Accordingly, to carry on a profession for the mere sake of making a livelihood is ethically reprehensible. This is what Schleiermacher calls the *maxim of Cynicism.* It is immoral, because here that very thing is wanting which must be the animating principle of all productive work—viz. pleasure in and love for our profession. Class divisions, *e.g.*, which *compel men to adopt particular vocations,* have a mechanizing tendency and are immoral. In the choice of a vocation, if one of the two factors (the objective and subjective) should, however, have less influence than the other, love for our vocation must at all events never be wanting. It is the first requisite, even in point of time; for in the case of many professions, the necessary preparation would be quite impossible, unless it could be made upon the foundation of subjective inclination. Objective approval from the side of that sphere of life in which

[1] Cf. *Glaubenslehre,* i. § 10.

our vocation lies comes afterwards. Besides, there are always new vocations to be discovered.[1] It may also happen that experienced and friendly persons do not express their opinion, but that we are nevertheless able to anticipate the rational will of the community from our knowledge of its needs. Only thus much, therefore, can be laid down; our decision must never be a merely subjective one, nor, on the other hand, must love and inclination ever be wanting; in some way or other, inward impulse and an outward call must always go together.

Note.—No vocation that is taken up for mere display admits of an ethical construction. Such professions as those of the acrobat, the juggler, the dancer, or those for the exhibition of physical dexterity, grace, or beauty, do not exist so far as ethics are concerned, for they only consume and do not produce. These are the breadless (*brotlos*) arts, so called because it is only occasionally that they yield daily bread, and because many are ruined in them; but in addition to this they have no ethical basis. The case is somewhat different with regard to the *drama*. The life of the actor may degenerate into the mere playing of a part, in which he loses his own individuality, and may thus become mere display and nothing more. A man may act the part of a hero, and be so pleased with it, and so lose himself in it, that he becomes a hero in his own thoughts. But this is inartistic as well as unethical. Art demands that one should assume an objective attitude to the part he plays, and never sink his self-consciousness in his part. To do the opposite is as unseemly as it is unethical, for the sphere of art is the sphere of beautiful appearances. But when the actor takes up the stage as his life's vocation, he runs a great risk. It is no wonder that the Christian Church has never been willing to regard acting as a legitimate vocation, however friendly it may be to the art itself. Classic antiquity during its prime in Athens had the dramas — tragedies — but no professional actors.[2]

[1] *E.g.* Wichern originated a vocation that had no existence before his time.

[2] [As supplementary to what is here said, cf. the chapter on Art.]

CHAPTER THIRD.

THE CHRISTIAN IN RELATION TO OTHERS, OR THE LOVE OF ONE'S NEIGHBOUR IN GENERAL.

§ 69.

Christian love to one's neighbour is derived, like self-love, from love to God; but it is through self-love that this derivation takes place. On its negative side, again, it takes the form of respect or justice, on its positive side it is love in the form of kindness. It is variously modified, however, in the different social spheres.

THE LITERATURE. — Rothe, *Theologische Ethik*, 2nd ed. i. p. 500 f., 1st ed. p. 380 f., iii. pp. 252 f., 452 f. Martensen, *ut supra*, ii. 1, p. 237 f. Lemme, *Die Nächstenliebe.*

1. He who is born of God, loves also whatever is born of Him (1 John v. 1), by a kind of higher natural necessity, arising from the kinship of the new creature with Christ. The personality formed in the image of God must resemble God, must love what He loves. Self-love and love of one's neighbour are so related to love to God, that the latter demands both alike, and as co-ordinate the one with the other. For that which sanctions self-love in the Christian—namely, the value of the new person in the eyes of God—also makes the love of his brother binding upon him. In point of time, however, self-love must precede love of others, for the new self-determining person must itself exist before it can love others. Express exhortations to love of one's neighbour are given in Matt. xxii. 39 f.; Luke x. 27, 31; John xiii. 34; 1 Cor. xiii.; Eph. v. 2; Col. iii. 14; Gal. v. 14, vi. 2; 1 Tim. i. 5; Jas. ii. 8, 10; 1 John iii. 11, iv. 7–9, ii. 10 f.; 1 Pet. i. 22, iii. 8, 9; 2 Pet. i. 7; Heb. xiii. 1. The name given it is not ἔρως, in which the sensual side predominates, but ἀγάπη (2 Pet. i. 7); among relatives, φιλόστοργος (Rom. xii. 10); while φιλαδελφία is Christian brotherly love (2 Pet. i. 7). With regard to a non-Christian, it is the future Christian, the *Candidatus vitæ*, that is loved in him, on the ground

that Christ loved the world (Rom. v. 15), and died for it. Since Christian love for others flows from love to God, it can never place men or human societies higher than God. And just as little can the love we show to others be opposed to Christian self-love, or sanction anything that involves a loss of our own soul. For then it would itself cease to exist. But there is a gradation in the measure of ardent affection shown in Christian love for others (Gal. vi. 10); the οἰκεῖοι τῆς πίστεως have the first claim upon us (1 Tim. v. 8). As compared with men in general, moreover, those who are naturally connected with us are adjudged to have stronger claims upon our love (Matt. xv. 4; Rom. xii. 10; 1 Tim. iii. 4, v. 8). But when the second creation has taken place, all the rights of natural love are suspended in favour of Christian love for the brethren (Matt. x. 37, xii. 47–50; Mark iii. 32 f., x. 29; Luke viii. 19 f.). It receives this high place because it is born anew out of love to God, which is the measure and rule of all love. The negation involved in faith presupposes an ideal severance from all merely natural love; but when once this has taken place, the natural love that subsists between relatives is again, and in a higher degree, established in its rights.

2. Christian social love, like self-love, has both a *negative* and a *positive* side. On the one hand it appears as respect or justice, on the other as positive love, *i.e.* kindness, χρηστότης, and these must never be *inwardly* separated. Outwardly, however, love must often be veiled in justice; but though thus kept in restraint so far as manifestation is concerned, it must be present inwardly—nay, it is love itself that must impose this restraint. Further, since it is directed to mankind as a whole, it also brings into requisition in due order the whole nature of the Christian. On the side of feeling, Christian love for others appears as good-will; on the side of knowledge, as cultured public spirit (§ 64); on the side of will, as effort for the common welfare (§ 68) (1 Cor. xii. 7). It is the Christian vitality of the generic consciousness. Inspired by it, the Christian seeks to have fellowship with his fellow-men as far as possible; at first inwardly, by cultivating good-will, and then outwardly, in the way directed by justice and wisdom, which are immanent in love. Love gives

the impulse to social intercourse, and in doing so it aims at real reciprocity, for otherwise the fellowship would only be apparent, there would only be a desire either to give or to receive. Accordingly, in social love we must be sincerely willing *both to give and receive*, no matter which of these two elements may predominate. Here we must—though gradually and not too hastily—give ourselves to our neighbour, *just as we are*. In like manner, we must seek to unite ourselves to him *just as he is*. That is to say, we unite ourselves (*a*) positively to what is true in his individuality, so far as it has already been developed; and, on the other hand, (*b*) negatively to that which mars his individuality, so that our love helps to set free the true ego of our neighbour. Christian *humility* here becomes *modesty;* we do not regard ourselves as rich and having need of nothing, nor overestimate ourselves as so highly endowed as to be meant to give only and not to receive. For there is nothing that does more to check or split up human fellowship than self-conceit. It is contrary to justice both with respect to God and our fellow-creatures. In no less a degree would it be opposed to justice and to the sincerity of love, if our sole object in associating with another were to obtain in him a serviceable instrument for our own ends, or to make him a mere copy of ourselves. On the contrary, love will make us treat our fellow-man as a real end in himself. We shall always entertain a sacred reverence for his God-designed peculiarity, even when our love to him is communicative rather than receptive. True love points away from itself to Christ, and desires only that He may increase (John iii. 30). Hence Christian love for others helps to strengthen and perfect the new creation in which all these individual differences are implanted. Justice, which grants *suum cuique*, by its recognition of these, that is, of what is pure in them, helps to confirm them; it promotes the development of the various individual characteristics.

Love and justice might here seem to be in contradiction, since the former seeks by means of mutual giving and taking to reconcile existing differences, while the latter aims at confirming them. But love will never seek to efface any distinction that justice wishes to see maintained. Nothing that is pure in individuality can be an obstruction to love; on

the contrary, it enriches social life, § 68. 1, 2. Love does not seek to make all alike; what it tries to do is to make the interest of one the interest of all, to make us regard the joy and sorrow of another as our own (1 Cor. iii. 22), and to enable each member of a community, although he does not directly possess all that is within it, to enter *in some degree* into the enjoyment of everything, and so to feel that he has a share in everything. On the other side, he possesses what is his for others also.

3. It is not necessary to go into detail as to the separate ways in which social love is actively carried into effect. We manifest it by helping our fellow-men to promote and care for those goods that are included in the circle of individual life. These have been examined with some minuteness in § 57–68, and consist of such goods as the body, life, health, property, good name, legitimate influence, outward and especially inward honour and our vocation. There are just two points on which we will dwell for a little. Many, who in other respects are ready to make sacrifices for love's sake, frequently omit to show a loving care for the *soul made in the image of God*, and thus neglect to *promote the spiritual welfare of their fellow-men*. Such conduct, if it does not arise out of worldliness, yet involves the secret presupposition, that Christianity is not equally necessary for all, and therefore that salvation is not such an absolute requisite for all as food and clothing. It therefore implies a secret doubt whether Christianity is as necessary to others as it is to us, and whether their case must not just be left to the ordinary course of events. But persistently continued silence concerning salvation in familiar personal intercourse with others may become a denial of Christ, may bring to a standstill that productive process of love which, as the Christian well knows, draws its energy and its nourishment from Christ. The decisive means of counteracting this error is the *practice of Christian intercession*. When the Christian remembers his neighbour before the throne of God, he cannot forget his spiritual needs. And whatever we earnestly pray for, we shall work for too. The *second point* refers to love for others when directed, not to individuals, but *communities*, and concerns the relation that subsists in

them all between the *universal* and the *particular*. Here Christian love for others transcends both abstract cosmopolitanism and narrow party spirit. For it holds the proper balance between the universal-human on the one hand—which in its essential truth is the universal-Christian—and particular communities on the other. And for this very reason it exerts itself to maintain a living fellowship between individual communities (cf. § 64). The cosmopolitan, on the contrary, sets little store by his own particular community and depreciates it; he stands far removed from the actual world, indulging in an impotent love for universal humanity, which naturally dwells more in a realm of ideas than of actions; he has therefore no spiritual home, and evinces neither justice nor love towards that which is most closely related to him. The opposite extreme is that of *party spirit*, which seeks to elevate its own particular community at the expense of others, and is therefore lacking in justice and love towards other communities. Party spirit may pervade like a disease the various spheres of moral life, it may be found in *science* and *art*, in the different schools and tendencies of thought; but it has always taken up its chosen seat in the regions of the State and the Church, and is seen in the relations of individual States and Churches to each other, as well as within the same State or the same section of the Church. It is not the true spirit of association, nor true love to our own community, which we show when we idolize that community, deny the gifts that have been bestowed upon others, and wind up a part into the place of the whole; such proceeding is a caricature of churchmanship; it is in principle sectarian, even though exhibited by a great Church community. For the principle of sectarianism is, that the part tries to swell itself out to the dimensions of the whole, and forgets catholicity for its own particular confession or national Church. Such party spirit is exposed to great moral dangers from the injustice and lovelessness it manifests towards others, and its contempt for the gifts which have been conferred upon them, —gifts which were by no means meant for their possessors alone, but which, on the contrary, are needed by the whole body of the Church. Further, since our own party has become a mere extension of our individual Ego, the deification

of it is, from a Christian point of view, only an intensified form of self-idolatry, though we may be quite unconscious of the fact. Outwardly, party spirit becomes Egoism, which may even take the negative attitude of hatred. Finally, party spirit in the Church, and elsewhere too, while thus encroaching upon *truth* and *justice*, is also opposed to *freedom*, since it makes us more or less dependent upon men (1 Cor. vii. 23). What makes the Apostle Paul so large-hearted is, that he puts all Christians alike in subjection to Christ, and requires them to consider themselves *μέλη Χριστοῦ*. He allows Christ to be preached in different ways, provided only He be really preached, and preached as *ἐσταυρωμένος* (Phil. i. 15–18 ; 1 Cor. ii. 2, iii. 11–15). And the history of the Church and of doctrine shows that there is never perfect agreement in belief or in the apprehension of Christ, but that, on the contrary, the differences which exist in this respect are necessary to progress. In Eph. iv. 13, perfect unity, even in the apprehension of Christian faith, is put forward as a goal to be attained, not as something to be required at present. And notwithstanding their differences, the apostle tells his readers that they belong to the *σῶμα Χριστοῦ*. Such differences as do not injure the *θεμέλιος* are borne by Christian hope in the unity of the spirit of love, with a patience which is not, however, indolent.

4. *The Dissimilarities which Christian Brotherly Love strives to adjust.* Some of these dissimilarities rest upon the *constitution* of the world, *apart from sin* altogether (*e.g.* the difference between those who in the main are ill-provided with regard to things spiritual and physical, and those who are, on the other hand, capable of communicating), while others are due to *sin ;* to the latter class belong the relations involved in *strife.*

(*a*) The first difference arises from the fact that the older and the younger generation, § 17. 3, parents and children, teachers, masters and scholars, exist contemporaneously. Educational influence must aim at something more than mere equalization ; it should seek to make the coming generation better than the one that preceded it. Further, difference of talent is the chief ground of the difference between *wealth* and *poverty.* And Christian love for others,

in endeavouring to eliminate whatever is hurtful and disturbing in the condition of things, introduces the relation between *benefactor* and *beneficiary*. We must dwell a little longer on this point—that is, on love for others, in its two forms of communicative goodness and recipient love, or gratitude (cf. § 45. 5, § 63. 3).

The difference between rich and poor is not evil in itself. It is a bond of fellowship, an opportunity for love to interpose and adjust inequalities both of a material and spiritual kind. The loving bestowal of material gifts upon those who are in want is called beneficence (2 Cor. ix. 11–14). Every act of charity is a God-appointed way of using external circumstances to bring men inwardly into closer connection. The gift is meant to be the means of forming a moral bond between giver and receiver. But this end is not gained by *merely giving away to beggars*. Begging was forbidden in the Old Testament (Deut. xv. 4), and it has still less right to exist in Christendom. It should be unnecessary. There is enough work and material for all, if only love and industry be not wanting. There is something sacred in poverty. The poor are the altar of the Church. But there is *nothing sacred about begging*. It injures personal dignity, leads to lying, deceit, and sloth, and to an irregular and thoughtless way of living. Indiscriminate almsgiving increases all these vices, as is shown on a large scale in the Romish Church. It is the part of the Evangelical Church, since it lays such stress on the honour and dignity of the Christian personality, to make regulations for the relief of the poor, and thus to *eradicate* the practice of begging, which is a symptom of disease in a community. Voluntary efforts must also be made for this purpose. It has a pernicious effect when the case of the poor is assigned to the sphere of law alone (§ 34*a*, 63. 2). Socialistic and communistic theories would fain (§ 63, *Note*) secure, by means of law and compulsory power, that which only love can accomplish, viz. the adjustment of crying inequalities. *But the absolute removal* of these inequalities must not be thought of. Every attempt in this direction, by means of a *division of goods*, would not only be a wrong to the rights of property (§ 63), but would also be a failure; for differences would at once break out again, since

they have their ground in difference of talent, of industry, and of character. Moreover, there would be *no room* left for either *love* or *gratitude*. *Gifts* would be *demanded* as a right, and the spirit of egoism would be pampered. Universal impoverishment and mendicity would be the result. There was no compulsion exercised in the Church of Jerusalem (Acts v. 1 ff.); there was only perfect willingness to put property at the disposal of the apostles for the common benefit. No division of goods took place, nor was such division generally carried out; but gifts were put into a common treasury, out of which cases of necessity were relieved (Acts ii. 45).

But a word or two in addition must be said on right giving and right receiving.

(*a*) When we give rightly, we do not seek to make our fellow-men dependent upon us, but leave them free. To *demand* thanks is an odious thing. Christian charity, too, does not wish to be seen, Matt. vi. 1 f.; it gives simply—that is to say, it has nothing in view but the actual need before it. It does not ask the needy whether they are worthy (Matt. v. 45) or deserving; but neither does it give in a way that would prove injurious. Just as little does it give for the purpose of getting rid of the poor. For in that case the gift would lack that which is its salt; a real interest in, or respect for, the recipient as a personal being. It is enough that the giver has through his position a certain advantage; he must not make the recipient *feel* his dependence as well. When a Christian gives, he puts himself by sympathy in the place of the sufferer, regards him as a member of the whole; and thus his help is divested of everything that might offend the self-respect of the recipient. All that is here required is summed up in the injunction, *μεταδιδόναι ἐν ἁπλότητι* (Rom. xii. 8). When an act of beneficence on the part of Christ is recorded, it is often added—He was moved with compassion.

(*β*) The other side of Christian love for others is *thankfulness*. In a certain sense, indeed, it may be said that it is to God alone that we owe thanks. We may justly have some scruples about giving thanks to men. God's gifts honour and ennoble us; but human gifts may reduce us to a condition of dependence, and have an enslaving effect. It is

better not to accept such benefits as damage our personal independence. In expressing our thanks to our benefactor, moreover, we may very possibly do so in a way that acknowledges such a dependence upon him as we ought to feel towards God alone, or we may treat him as if he had bestowed his kindness of his own favour and goodwill. When those who give have done so in a pious spirit, their act carries our thoughts away from themselves to God as the giver; but when they have not given from love to God, but from egoism, however refined it may be, then in so doing they would seem to have forfeited all reward in the shape of gratitude. Nevertheless *thankfulness towards men rests on good grounds* when we regard them as persons, who in spontaneous love and for our benefit seek to make themselves the instruments of Divine love. In gratitude towards men, therefore, gratitude towards God must certainly be present and occupy the chief place. When this is the case, the loving will of God is also honoured, since by means of the gift it has brought the giver into closer connection with us. When God brings two persons into the relation of giver and receiver, He has formed between them a moral bond of love of a special kind. And to break this bond, instead of making it a mutual one by responding with love on our side, or to accept the gift while we impugn or suspect the love that is in it, is a base thing. Mistrust is loveless and a sin. Thankfulness consists in *keeping in mind* the love we have experienced; to *thank* is the frequentative of to *think*. The giver, indeed, has an advantage over the recipient to begin with, in so far as it is more blessed to give than to receive; but the latter will be quite satisfied that it should be so, if only he believes that love is at the bottom of the gift; and this it is his duty to do, unless it is openly manifest that the opposite is the case. For to know that any one has loved us before any advances on our part is not degrading, but ennobling, since we see that his love has been freely bestowed. And for this very reason grateful love does not seek to pay or recompense the love that has been evinced, but to *respond* to it. Love as the fruit of freedom is an infinite good, it is absolutely invaluable. In the eyes of love, only love in return is of equal value with itself.

(*b*) With regard to the *settlement of the disturbances which sin occasions* in the relation of one man to another, that is to say, with regard to *strife* between private individuals, the New Testament enjoins the love of peace (Mark ix. 50; Jas. iii. 17). The Christian *prevents* strife by doing justice and showing respect to his fellow-men, by being amicable and peaceable (Matt. v. 5 f.). He will rather suffer wrong than do it. When brought into strife against his will, he exhibits meekness and gentleness, *πραότης, ἐπιείκεια* (Gal. v. 23; 2 Cor. x. 1; cf. Col. iii. 12; 1 Tim. vi. 11). When the strife is over, he exhibits love by his readiness to forgive and be reconciled (Luke vii. 41 f.; Matt. vi. 12, xviii. 32 f.; Eph. iv. 32; Col. iii. 13). For even love to enemies is commanded; the Christian is no man's enemy, he is only passively involved in *ἔχθρα*. It deserves serious consideration, how our Lord makes the forgiveness of our sins depend upon whether we ourselves forgive. Placability is the negative condition of our sacrifices being well-pleasing to God (Matt. v. 24, vi. 12). And why? Because he who will not forgive his brother shows that he is insensible to the much greater debt he owes to God, and therefore impenitent (Matt. xviii. 23 f.). Further, Christ enforces the duty of placability upon His disciples, because nothing does more to destroy the efficacy of Christianity in the world, and to extenuate the antagonism of the world to the gospel, than want of love in the conduct of believers toward each other. For it is the power of love proceeding from believers, that is intended to be the specific means of attracting the world to Christ as the source of salvation and love, and to convince the world that Christ was sent by God (John xvii. 23). At the same time, it is not required that Christians should call black white, or light darkness. No fact must be surrendered. To do so would betray indifferentism (§§ 55, 66) or partiality, and would lead to a dishonourable peace. But all strife between Christians about a fact ought certainly to exhibit meekness, moderation, and justice; and ingenuity is much better employed by love in trying to put the best construction on everything, and discovering means for coming to an understanding, than in hunting up excuses for keeping apart (1 Cor. i.–iii.), or in finding food for mistrust.

§ 70. *Social Intercourse.*

The fellowship into which Christian love brings us with our fellow-men (§ 69), when it does not take an organized shape, but nevertheless is something more than mere momentary and accidental contact, is the sphere of social intercourse, and forms the transition from social duties in general to settled Christian communities.

1. Social intercourse is the indispensable antecedent of all ethical communities, the preliminary of their genesis or reproduction. Standing midway between individuals wholly unconnected with each other and organized forms of social life, it is a means of supply for matrimony, art, and science. In this region, too, all great advances in the State and the Church have their true birthplace, more especially in *friendships* of the higher kind—heroic, as distinguished from merely "romantic" friendships. For the former have their bond of union in an objective ethical aim, to be realized by action; their object is not simply ideal enjoyment. At the same time, we must not forget that social intercourse has also another side (§§ 61, 62). It is meant to afford enjoyment and recreation, and thus belongs to the sphere of self-love and self-duty; but in such wise that love for others has its place also, since we may not make use of our neighbour simply as a means. Here, too, it is inclination, love, that must keep men together; otherwise there is no real exchange of good offices, but only giving on one side and receiving on the other; or, at all events, something quite different from recreation and enjoyment is manifested.

2. Social intercourse, moreover, has also its position within organized communities themselves. These, if they are to continue in a healthy state, must call it into being from themselves. For it is, as it were, the womb out of which their future prosperity is born; or the vehicle and source of a public opinion, which must send its purifying and refreshing streams through the barriers that divide the special department of each separate community. In family life this is realized by means of *family friendships*, and the relations of guest and host: in science and art, as well as in State and Church, by

means of voluntary societies. It is narrow-minded on the part of an organized community, and destructive of the germs of its own future, to regard associations of this kind existing within its pale as objects merely of anxiety and jealousy, or to strive to absorb them into itself, and to restrict their due activity. But, on the other side, such associations become immoral when they seek to take in hand the tasks which devolve upon an organized community as a whole, and would thus place themselves as secondary suns in the position of the latter—as a State within the State, or a Church within the Church. In the Church this applies to all the voluntary societies that at present exist, and in particular, to pastoral conferences. On the contrary, organized bodies are always higher than independent associations; each of them is the strictly responsible vehicle of its own idea, and hence the latter must always be in harmony with them, must respect them, and not attempt to govern them; otherwise voluntary association results in the formation of pernicious coalitions, in which men seek to play the part of a State within the State, or a city within the city; and their association with each other, which is in itself harmless and of general benefit, is perverted to purposes of intrigue, conspiracy, etc. In a community, therefore, each voluntary association must devote itself to only one particular object, and must not seek to occupy the whole of the sphere to which it stands related. Only under this limitation do they exert a wholesome influence: it keeps them flexible as well as living and powerful, and though their life may be short it leaves behind it fruitful furrows. Freemasonry is an association that cannot be ethically approved of; for, in the first place, it is not flexible, and then it is a secret society, disengaged from public national life, and inclined to abstract cosmopolitanism, which is often closely allied to indifferentism. It is impossible to see how we can become members of such an association in a moral way. For its aims are shrouded in mystery, and hence the extent of the promise demanded on entering cannot be known before we bind ourselves by it.

THIRD DIVISION.

THE ORGANIZED WORLD OF CHRISTIAN MORALITY, OR THE MORAL COMMUNITIES IN THE KINGDOM OF GOD.

§ 71. *Summary. The Kingdom of God.*

The highest Good, which exists originally in the Triune God revealed in Christ (§§ 6, 7, 39–42), and derivatively in the individual personality (§§ 43–70), reaches full development as a power in the world, in the various moral communities, which are organically connected with each other in the same way as the divine attributes,[1] of which they are copies. The unity or total organism formed by these communities is the *Kingdom of God* (*civitas Dei*) (§ 31). Accordingly, the organic construction of the latter corresponds with the leading categories in the idea of God (§§ 6, 7), and in conformity with its foundation in the individual personality formed in God's image (§ 56, p. 445). Thus we have the following three main portions:—

DIVISION I. The fundamental moral community, or the household (§§ 17. 3, 18, 33*a*, 34*a*). Here we shall consider — 1. Marriage; 2. The Family; and 3. The Extension of Family Life by Friendship and Hospitality, and by the relations between Masters and Servants.

DIVISION II. The special communities that have been created by reflection or human skill (§§ 17, 18, 33*a*, 34*a*). 1. The State, §§ 17, 18, 33*a*, 34*a* (§ 23). 2. Art, §§ 17, 38*a* (61, 62). 3. Science, §§ 17, 33*a*.

DIVISION III. The Absolute or Religious Community (§§ 31, 33*a*, 34*a*).

The self-reproduction and self-preservation of the *life* of the human race are promoted by the *family* or the *household*, which is

[1] Cf. *Glaubenslehre*, i. §§ 22–27, 32.

the fundamental moral community. Divine *justice*, *beauty*, and *wisdom*, are reflected in the particular moral spheres of the *State*, *Art*, and *Science* respectively; while the reflection of the Divine love is presented in the absolute or religious community, the *Church*. Each of these spheres embraces, in its own way, all the others, and takes an interest in them, according to its own particular principle; each one, therefore, is also embraced by all the rest. Thus they penetrate, without intermingling with each other, advancing in an orbit of the spirit of love in its diversified manifestations, in an ethic περιχώρησις. Notwithstanding the unity of all these spheres—a unity maintained by each one promoting the well-being of the rest—each continues to be an *end to itself;* and notwithstanding their independence of each other,—an independence maintained by each having its own distinct principle,—they yet remain *means* for one another.

THE LITERATURE.—Martensen, *ut supra*, i. 32 f., 147 f.; iii. pp. 1 f., 306 f., 348 f. Ritschl, *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, iii. ch. 4. Krauss, *Das Dogma von der unsichtbaren Kirche*, p. 142 f. A. Dorner, *Kirche und Reich Gottes.*]

Note.—It is true that the individual person is made in the image of God, and is thus a copy of the divine nature in its totality; but this he is imperfectly, and under the limitations inseparable from the individual. A higher representation of the Divine is reached in the following way. By reason of the individual differences that exist among men, especially when these are concentrated upon definite objects and thus become talents (§ 68), the one moral organism becomes a unity made up of many members, each of which is an organism with its own peculiar principle and its independence, while, nevertheless, they cannot deny their essential connection with each other. All these principles, indeed, as well as their products, already exist in germ in every individual personality—nay, more, are rooted in personality and draw from it their nourishment; but these principles do not receive their fully developed, that is, their world-wide manifestation, until the whole of humanity has formed itself into an organism built up of communities distinct from each other, yet distinct in such a way that the principle of each of them includes the whole of humanity within its scope. These principles, it may again be said (cf. p. 500, note), become so many centres of attraction gathering men around them, each according to that side of his

nature which is in sympathy with each of these communities; and thus every individual may belong, by different sides of his nature, to several, or even to all of them, though in varying degree, according to his endowments. [In some he will be merely receptive, in others he will be productive and find a vocation.] If, therefore, each personality is *per se* a copy of the Divine attributes, much more does the whole of humanity, as an organism made up of many different moral communities, present us with a living picture of the Godhead, as it mirrors itself in the creature. In the first part of this work we have already spoken of the natural genesis of these communities, through the combined operation of universal and individual capacities, and we have likewise seen the modifications they undergo on the stage of right. On the Christian stage, the religious community is added to the others, and all of them together, when comprehended in one whole, form the kingdom of God. Moreover, the individual members of these communities or moral persons are, through their connection with them, elevated to a higher stage of personal morality (§ 68. 1). For, being inspired by the spirit of the whole, they are thus raised to a higher degree of moral power, since in them the universal and the individual have now reached that penetration of each other intended by God.

1. In the New Testament, the phrase "Kingdom of God" is used, not in an ideal sense to denote something merely subjective or internal. It is true that the subject, the individual person, is the first element of its earthly existence; but it is itself the whole system of ethical organisms destined to come to objective appearance. Of these no particular one must be singled out above the rest, and made the one that alone embraces all the others. Roman Catholicism, indeed, puts the Church in the place of the kingdom of God, (§ 31)—a doctrine which the Reformation opposes. Within Protestantism a tendency has appeared—especially where the State takes the form of bureaucratic absolutism and territorialism—to give this position of superiority to the State. The Hegelian philosophy, in particular, has advanced the theory that the State is the All of morality. Among distinguished theologians, Rothe approaches nearest to this view—at first in his book *Die Anfänge der christlichen Kirche*, and then in a more finished and careful form in his *Ethik*[1] [also in his *Encyklopädie*[2]].

[1] 1st ed. i. §§ 273–285; iii. § 1156 f., p. 900 f.

[2] [*Encyklopädie*, edited by Ruppelius, pp. 83-94.]

He would have the State regarded as the realization of the perfect moral community. The State must set nothing less than this before itself as its aim. Its mission is (i. p. 424) simply to become the universal and absolute community, that is, the religious and moral community which embraces all men and all departments of life. Until the close, however, of its moral development (§ 279), the moral community, of which the State is as yet only the imperfect realization, requires to be supplemented by the religious community as such, the religious community pure and simple, that is, the Church. The reason of this is, that during the process of development (*not*, indeed, morality and religion, but) the moral community and the religious, differ from each other as regards the *extent* of the spheres which they embrace. The latter, or the Church, has been from her very commencement the absolutely universal community, whereas it is only gradually that the moral community, or the State, becomes the all-embracing community, and that instead of isolated national States, there arises an organised system of States, forming one perfect whole. It is *self-evident* that Rothe does not hold that religion will disappear in the State, but regards it as existing in its highest form, when it pervades and moulds the various moral spheres which, while maintaining relative independence, are all embraced by the State. Accordingly, he calls his perfect State the city of God, a theocracy in the highest sense of the word, i. p. 424. He holds that the State embraces all other spheres, but does not admit the converse of this. Thus they are no longer co-ordinate with the State. With this fact is connected another, viz. that Rothe does not make *right or justice alone the principle of the State*, but *love* as well. Nay, he even says that *the State in the course of its development is again becoming a great all-embracing family*. This is a virtual confession that the final *consummation* may *just as well* be described as a *family* as (by Rothe) a State, and that no sufficient grounds can be adduced, why the State should be singled out as absolutely destined to be the sole moral community. We might quite as well say, that the State will cease to exist as a State, that is, simply as an institution working by compulsory means for the maintenance of right (§§ 33*a*, 34*a*). But the

question, whether the *Church will ever cease* in presence of the State, depends upon another—whether public worship can be conceived as belonging to the functions of the State, or whether as a State it can perform acts of a religious nature. Since it cannot do this, and since, nevertheless, common action is necessary for this purpose, there must always be a religious community, and it will in its own way include the State no less than the State includes it. The religious community must not be dissolved, and religion exist merely in the piety of all individuals belonging to the State, or in the pious character of the other spheres of life. There is not only the State, science, and art desiring on their own parts to be Christian and pious, nor is there merely a piety desiring to exist so far as it can be manifested in and by the other spheres of life, as, so to speak one of their properties, but also a piety of a social kind desiring to exist as such, and there is therefore also a community desiring to exist as a religious community. For God does not exist merely in the multiplicity of the world; He is not to be loved merely in our fellow-men, but also in Himself and for Himself alone (§ 50). The right of religion to form a community of its own could only be contested if everything external, everything in the way of organization, were under the control of the State. But the State has no such supreme power. It recognises private rights, private property, and the free disposal of it, although it can interfere in cases of necessity. It surrounds everything with its protection, but does not meddle with every petty matter. Most things are left to the free management of the individual. Nor can we suppose that even in the final consummation only the *spirit* of prayer will prevail in our work, and that no special times will be devoted to worship. And if only *public worship* be recognised as the essential function of the religious community, it cannot be said that the Church is destined to be absorbed in the State; and further, the Church will have, during the whole of its earthly career, a spiritual organization regulated by the principle of worship. Thus there will always be teachers and hearers, order of worship and means of worship, doctrines and a system of doctrine, institutions for the education of teachers, congregational and pastoral organizations, an administration department and a constitution, and

these give rise to rights on the part of the Church, which do not come under the rights that belong to the State.

2. In their earthly *form*, all these communities have a transitory, a pædagogic side. Their present form is based upon the succession of new generations, and the pædagogic relation which the one portion of mankind holds to the other. Thus marriage and the family will cease to exist on their natural side. "They neither marry nor are given in marriage" (Matt. xxii. 30). The State, too, will be no longer recognisable in its earthly shape at the time of the consummation. Litigation and lawsuits, right of succession and penal administration, separated nationalities, military, finance, and police will all be unknown. Law and justice will no longer appear severed from each other. In the Church, too, catechetical and missionary activity will cease; there will be no need of professional teachers, theological faculties, or consistories. On the other side, however (§ 31), it must also be said, that in all these communities there is an eternal germ, a type of that which the consummation will usher in; nay, that it is by means of these communities that the consummation will be brought about. Accordingly our Lord has taken illustrations of His kingdom from them all—from marriage, the family, the city, the community, and the State (Matt. xvi. 18; Rev. xxi.; John iii. 29; Matt. ix. 15, xxv. 1 f.). In the notion of the Church, that temporal side which belongs to the conception of the perfected community is certainly not so happily expressed as in the word State. But in the latter expression, again, the ideal side, which is the most important one, is less prominent. Accordingly, the primitive Christian phrase Kingdom of God is to be preferred (so Schwarz and Hirscher). But the kingdom is not a thing of the world to come alone; neither is it the invisible Church merely, nor does it consist simply in Christian rules of life; it is something that has actually begun to exist. In the empirical Christian communities its realization has commenced.

FIRST SECTION.

THE FUNDAMENTAL MORAL COMMUNITY, OR THE HOUSEHOLD.

CHAPTER FIRST.

MARRIAGE.

THE LITERATURE.—Liebetrut, J. Mueller, *Ueber Ehescheidung*, etc., 1854. *Kirchentagsvortrag.* Richter, *Geschichte der Ehescheidung in d. Evang. Kirche. Deutsche Zeitschrift*, 1858. Hofmann, *Theologische Ethik*, p. 213 f. Hofmann, *Zeitschrift für Protestantismus und Kirche*, vol. xxxvii. [J. G. Fichte, *System der Sittenlehre, Werke*, vol. iv. Hegel, *Rechtsphilosophie.* Schleiermacher, *Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre. Predigten über den christlichen Hausstand. Christliche Sitte.* Rothe, 2nd ed. ii. pp. 265–304. Baumann, *Sechs Vortrage*, p. 23 f. Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, § 122 f. Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, ii. p. 7 ff. v. Scheurl, *Das gemeine deutsche Eherecht und seine Umbildung*, 1882. Koehler, *Ueber Trauung und Trauformen. Zeitschrift f. praktische Theol.*, 1879. Harless, *Die Ehescheidungefrage*, 1861. Cf. also his *System of Christian Ethics.* Sohm, *Das Recht der Eheschliessung.* Roedenbeck, *Von der Ehe. Studien und Kritiken*, 1881, also published separately. v. Oettingen, *Obligatorische und fakultative Civilehe nach dem Ergebnisse der Moralstatistik*, 1881. Thoenes, *Die christliche Anschauung von der Ehe.*]

§ 72.

Marriage is the union of two persons of opposite sexes in the most intimate fellowship of body and soul, a fellowship in which each personality has its deficiencies supplied, and both together form a higher unity. It is the sacred home, both physical and mental, where the race reproduces itself by means of the married pair, while it is for the latter themselves a fuller evolution of their physical life. Marriage is essentially monogamic and indissoluble, and only as such can it be morally contracted. The *negative* condition of a moral union is, that no marriage

be contracted with a person with whom, whether on physical, psychical, or mental grounds, intimate fellowship of the kind described would be impossible. The *positive* condition is, that there should be free choice and inward inclination, that is, that the two persons be ready to give themselves unreservedly to each other, and also that they should be willing to join the great moral communities, and this they do when marriage is regarded as a civil and religious contract.

1. *Scriptural conception of Marriage.* Gen. ii. 24, although written in an age of polygamy, advances so high and pure a conception of marriage, that Christ goes back to, and adopts it (Matt. xix. 4 f.). Let the husband, in the East the lord, follow the impulse of love to his wife, which is stronger than filial love, that he may become one flesh, one being with her. When the two become one, a union of closest intimacy is formed, involving also a co-ordination. But this first state was followed by the fall, and with it the will of the woman was made subject to the man; his authority and her obedience were, on the ground of natural difference in point of strength, made harshly prominent, with the view, however, of insuring unity, a final decision in matters of dispute, and the welfare of the family. Gentleness and prudence may ameliorate the condition of the woman. The relations between husband and wife were not essentially altered before the time of Christ; on the contrary, polygamy intervened, and was not forbidden by the law; and if in the time of Christ intercourse with nations that practised monogamy had made polygamy less common, yet, on the other hand, divorce was made all the more easy, and hence what may be called successive polygamy increased. Christ first of all re-establishes the manner in which marriage was observed at the beginning. Matt. xix. 3–9; Mark x. 2–12; Luke xvi. 18, declares against divorce as involving sin on the side of the guilty party, and again enforces the objective sanctity and perpetual obligation of marriage. Every separation presupposes sin. Whom God hath joined together, no man may put asunder. No human form of divorce is higher than the primitive rights of marriage.

These, on the contrary, stand permanently opposed to the subjective caprice that would sever the marriage union, oblige those who have already broken it to restore it, and make it a sin to contract a new marriage, when the first has been sinfully dissolved (Matt. v. 31 f.). Neither Luke nor Mark mentions *πορνεία* as a ground of separation. But the omission explains itself, inasmuch as marriage is at once broken by *πορνεία*, as the word itself implies. In the New Testament the matter is viewed, not from the standpoint of one of the married parties, but from that of the unity of the objective relation; morally speaking, that relation admits of absolutely no dissolution; only sin and crime can sever it (1 Cor. vii. 10). So high is the position assigned to the universal moral rights of marriage, that even when a Christian is united to an unbeliever, the marriage tie must still subsist, if the non-Christian partner wishes it; if not, then the Christian is free. The Pastoral Epistles (Tit. i. 6; 1 Tim. iii. 2) disapprove of choosing Church officials from among those who are practising *successive polygamy*,—probably for the sake of good report. For according to 1 Cor. vii. 39, those who have been widowed are permitted to marry again. The *subordination* of the wife is often insisted on by the apostle: not as if the state of things brought about by the fall were always to remain the same, even among Christians (Eph. v. 23 f.), but because that difference between governing and obeying, which has its foundation in a benevolent natural ordinance, has no other claim than to result in a love which recognises this divinely-ordained difference. And this point of view, when adopted by the woman, is the surest means of gaining ascendancy over the man, and inducing his love to raise her to co-ordination with himself. It is in entire harmony, too, with the natural position of the husband, that the co-ordination should proceed from him. He *must* not resign his place as the *head;* it is not only his right, but above all his duty to maintain it, and it would be prejudicial to married and family life for him to become the one who is ruled. But that with this subordination of the wife to the husband there may nevertheless be a free relation of love between them, based on the difference of the sexes, is seen from the fact, that marriage has been honoured by being called an

emblem of the relation of Christ to the Church (Eph. v. 23–33; cf. Col. iii. 18; Heb. xiii. 4). To prohibit marriage is characterized as demoniacal, as enmity towards God, the Creator.

2. *History of Ideas regarding Marriage in Christian Times.* At first the Old Testament spirit prevailed in Christendom, and the personality of the wife, as well as of the children, was thrust into the background. Still there was not wanting the consciousness of essential equality, to which all are raised by baptism. The sanctity of marriage was very highly esteemed among Christians; they adhered to monogamy and the indissolubility of the marriage tie, and many of them did so, not only with regard to the present world, but also with regard to the next, by looking upon a second marriage after the death of a first husband as conjugal infidelity, the disruption of a bond still in existence. According to Athenagoras, second marriage is *εὐπρεπὴς πορνεία*. The Montanists, especially Tertullian,[1] held the same view still more decidedly, maintaining that a second marriage was fornication. Marriage was conceived from a religious point of view, and accordingly the Church soon began to take part in the contraction of it. The first traces of this are to be found in the Ignatian Epistles, according to which marriage ought not to take place without the knowledge of the bishop—the purpose being to restrain Christians from mixed marriages. Both in unmarried and married life the strictest chastity was demanded, and was universally practised in the earliest Christian ages, so that the coarse reproach of *μίξεις* could be met by Athenagoras[2] by saying, that Christians, on the contrary, believed that virginity and complete continence bring us nearer to God (*μᾶλλον παρίστησι θεῷ*). Here, indeed, is the point at which the lack of a developed Christian anthropology, and especially of a Christian doctrine of the relation between body and spirit, becomes apparent. The consequence of this want was, that a still surviving remnant of dualism broke out, and found adherents on one hand in the Gnostics, on the other in the

[1] *De monogamia*—written before he became a Montanist—and *de exhortatione castigatis*. Cf. Hauber, *Tertullian's Kampf gegen die zweite Ehe. Studien und Kritiken*, 1845, H. 3.

[2] C. 33.

Manichæans. And its spread was also favoured by the fact, that the position which the first Christians were compelled to assume toward heathenism was very apt to become negative and one-sided. The apostolic Fathers and the apologists do indeed recognise marriage as an ordinance of God. But part of them hold that it is a still *higher virtue*[1] to remain unmarried altogether, or at least to practise continence in the conjugal relation. Here (as in their attitude to the State) there already lay the germs of that which was afterwards reduced to a system in monasticism. As far as the *family* is concerned, the most important thing to be noticed is, that the high conception, which Christianity introduced, of the worth of personality could not but improve the condition of children, with regard both to their education and the moral value attached to them. In all probability, however, infant baptism, in which this higher conception receives the seal of the Church, did not become a dogma and prevailing custom until after the apostolic age, and was in Tertullian's time still a matter of dispute. He blames the practice of bringing innocent children to be baptized. Among the Germanic nations, woman was held in high respect even before the introduction of Christianity; nevertheless in the rude ages that preceded it, the custom of having concubines existed, and was not infrequently practised by their chiefs. It was Christianity that first actually established monogamy among them. The *chivalrous* love of the Middle Ages saw in the woman the ideal of the genuinely human—which was personified in the Virgin Mary. In the Middle Ages, the chastity of the man, where it is not—as in monasticism—of a negative kind, consists mainly in chivalrousness, which makes him protect the honour of woman, not only against others, but also against himself. Spain did not get beyond this point. Yet this romanticism applied more to woman *in abstracto*, to the womanly; marriage itself was not essentially altered by it, more especially as celibacy, with its spiritualistic ethics, designated marriage as an imperfect state, nay, as

[1] Tert. *adv. Marc.* Marriage is indeed a work of God, but there is nevertheless a stain of desire adhering to it. As a chiliast he further believed that all marriages would soon be superfluous. With Origen, too, marriage occupies a lower place than celibacy. The Holy Spirit cannot be present in *generatio*.

belonging merely to the sphere of things allowable; and in consequence of this men partially lost sight of the moral duty of bringing married life under the permeating power of the Christian spirit. Thus the ethics of marriage were developed more on the external side, by restrictions against divorce, and against marriage within forbidden degrees of relationship. The permanent obligation of marriage was based upon its sacramental form, and the forbidden degrees were defined by positive statutes.

At the *Reformation* two results ensued. On the one side, the unnaturalness of this view of marriage was exposed, particularly by Luther and the other Reformers; nature received her rights, and marriage was recognised as a divine institution, in connection with the principle, that the whole of human life is capable of being, and is meant to be, pervaded by the moral influence of the Holy *Πνεῦμα*. Other limitations were abolished, such as the unwarrantable extension of prohibitions against marriage on account of ties of relationship. Marriage was also deprived of its sacramental significance, but at the same time its ethical dignity as a divine institution was vindicated. Hence it followed, that, like all ethical blessings, it could be ruined and destroyed by sin, that divorce therefore might be rendered necessary by human guilt, and that it was no part of the duty of Church or State to uphold a semblance of marriage, when marriage itself no longer existed. On the other side, however, the time of the Reformation exhibits a resemblance to the romanticism of the Middle Ages; for in the woman it sees the species, so that for this age, too, one woman is very much the same as another. Friends procured wives for each other, as in the case of Melanchthon and Calvin. The act of personal choice, preference for the individual as such, were but little regarded; and this held good not only for the woman, but also for the man. Even his own individual sympathies were regarded by the latter as not of very much importance. Here, indeed, there was something great; viz. that men looked to the objective authority and sanctity of the marriage relation, to its objective right and morality. Still, individuality was too little recognised, although it received in other respects such a powerful stimulus from the Reformation. The claims of religious personality

were acknowledged, but only as essentially the same in all; men were not as yet fully conscious that in marriage ethical individuality had a rightful part to play. So matters stood until the close of the 17th century. From the time of the 18th century, again, the personal and individual side has been the more strongly emphasized, nay, so brought into the foreground, as if all that is divine in the marriage relation were to be found here alone, and not in that relation itself as an objective ethical ordinance. Fiction, too, has contributed its share towards completely ruining the representation of marriage as a divine institution of objective validity, and making it nothing more than a subjective product, a matter of mere sympathy, of desire and inclination. Even Kant, earnest as he was, conceived it simply as a matter of subjective contract. But with such views as these, the indissolubility of marriage cannot be maintained. For, if everything were to be decided by individuality, then should the elective affinities and sympathies of two married couples cross each other, the objective institution would at the most receive only outward respect, and that for the sake of propriety. Further, passionate, natural love would obtain a false ascendancy, an apotheosis to which it has absolutely no right [as in fiction]. By such an evidently enhanced requirement of love for marriage, if it is to be marriage, indeed, its tie would be absolutely loosened, since it would thus be made to depend upon empirical and individual considerations. Worthless novels have in many ways had a pernicious effect upon our ideas concerning marriage by making it an affair of mere sympathy. But the worst effect is produced by *that* false and delusive notion of marriage, according to which a person should expect to obtain from marriage—if it is to be a valid one—such full satisfaction on the individual side of his nature, that he and his partner, finding in each other whatever they need in this respect, will have no want unsupplied. Here each of the two expects everything from the other, "to be made happy" in a eudæmonistic fashion. But virtuous happiness must be more deeply rooted than this. And so, when husband and wife do not find all they looked for, their married life becomes unhappy, they think there is no longer any reason to continue it, and that separation is allowable.

With us, the Legislature has shown a reprehensible compliance with this subjectivism, by granting divorce on account of "*invincible dislike.*" But wherever divorce is easily obtained, the reaction is felt upon married life, upon education, and upon the welfare of the whole people. For many a marriage that has begun badly has turned out well, when husband and wife have been impelled by the consciousness that separation is impossible, to struggle against hardness of heart, to take pains with themselves and attain to self-control, and thus to amend a state of matters that at first was perhaps no more than endurable.

According to *Socialistic* and *Communistic* theories, so far as they deal with marriage and the family, marriage is to cease to exist as a separate association formed by two persons, and meant to be lasting and exclusive. If ever these theories could be carried into effect, they would result in the degradation of the woman most of all, but also of the man as well. Men would, as in imperial times, no longer care to form indissoluble ties, but prefer their own wandering fancy—the *Venus vaga.*

A departure from this subjectivism was initiated by the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel, in so far as it fixed its attention not upon the will, not upon happiness, but upon external objective being as the expression of pure will, and so brought men back to the recognition of objective authorities; cf. in particular Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie.* But it is Schleiermacher especially, who, while at the same time giving full consideration to the claims of individuality, has indicated the objective character of marriage, and made prominent its fundamental importance for all moral communities.

When we look at the development of ideas regarding marriage, especially in our own day, and at the numerous divorces connected with them, especially in those regions where Prussian statute-law is in force, we see plainly, that what our age stands most in need of, is that the *objective character* of marriage should be rescued from that subjective caprice which, under the form of individual likes or dislikes, is exerting such widespread influence. Of course we must at the same time never neglect consideration of the individual side of the matter. The people at large must again be

brought to recognise in marriage an objective, sacred power and institution, which demands, indeed, free consent on the part of those whom it unites, but can never be legitimately dissolved on account of individual likes and dislikes. Only on this objective basis is a true marriage possible; and such a marriage will also be in a condition to bring about, in an ethical way, an ever-increasing harmony and understanding between husband and wife, and to yield the blessing that God has placed in it to those who seek it. Mere empirical individuality of character, so far as it is not in conformity with God's will, has no right to be the cause of breaking the marriage bond; and, on the other hand, individuality in conformity with the will of God, so far as it has become empiric, in other words, has been realized, can never be morally repulsive; with it the formation of an intimate moral alliance must always be possible. Hence in the case of husband and wife whose individualities in their natural state are not at first very favourable to their union, the only thing required is, that they should cleanse the pure metal from the dross. And thus marriage will be for each, as it ought to be, a strengthening and purifying of their personal characters. Neither of them is without faults; but if they are Christians, the faults of the one will bring forth and exercise just the opposite virtues in the other, and by this means they will become more and more able to assist each other in overcoming these faults, and to make their union and happiness more complete.

3. When marriage is defined as indissoluble, a union—which State and Church must recognise—of two persons of opposite sexes in the most intimate fellowship of body and soul, a fellowship in which each personality has its deficiencies supplied by the other, this definition contains both the objective side of marriage, or marriage as an institution, and its subjective side of affection. Moreover, it is clear from this definition that, on the one side, there were real marriages before the time of Christ (cf. *supra*, p. 305), and therefore that it is not the sacrament of the Church which makes marriage what it is; while, on the other, it is no less clear that marriage in its perfect form cannot be thought of apart from Christianity, since marriage exists between persons, and it is from Chris-

tianity that persons derive the principle of perfection. As we have already seen (§ 17), the mere *physical side* of the union would not of itself constitute marriage, but only sexual fellowship. But just as distinctly—and in a certain sense even more distinctly—must the fact be emphasized, that neither can psychical affinity, or the spiritual side, be of itself taken as its basis. The spiritual side would of itself do no more than create quite another relation, that of friendship; and it would be immoral to confuse different spheres, and build up marriage upon friendship alone. If marriage is to be distinct from every other moral community, its essential character must be conditioned by the natural side, but constituted by the union of the physical and the spiritual. For that is the form which human sex life must assume, and marriage has its basis in the category of life—(cohabitation)—but a life that is *human*, in which it is personality and not ἐπιθυμία that must govern. It is the duty of man as a personal being to keep the natural in subjection, since it exists for the spiritual, not the spiritual for it. Marriage, considered in itself, exhibits a completion of human nature in the aspect in which it has differentiated itself in the two sexes; in it, in accordance with God's will, the differences both physical and spiritual, that exist between the sexes, are gathered up into unity in the way of moral action. Mere τεκνοποιία does not denote the aim of marriage. This depends upon the blessing of God. Neither does marriage exist *merely as a precaution against incontinentia. Just as little* is its object simply *the attainment of married happiness*, however certain it may be that marriage is able to afford the highest earthly felicity. But it is a state appointed by God, a κλῆσις (1 Cor. vii.), because here an *ethical design planned by nature* is raised out of possibility into actuality. In marriage two duties are performed and stand in the most intimate union with each other, duty to oneself and duty to one's neighbour—the latter being in the present instance the husband or wife.

The *physical* side of marriage, the bodily cohabitation of husband and wife, is the external *basis* of the relation, the *conditio sine qua non* of the realization of this moral association. But, at the same time, it must be the basis for some-

thing else, and not be mere *πορνεία*. For those who are joined together in body are *human beings;* and therefore their physical connection must exist for the purpose of rendering possible an inward spiritual union — nay, it must be the beginning of such a union. The external basis is not the aim of marriage, but what makes a true marriage possible. It is also a necessary condition of the realization of marriage, that the spiritual side of the relation should not be wanting, but should be present as a beginning, though an imperfect one; more and more perfect spiritual union being the ultimate goal itself. It is for this reason that Christianity is so important for marriage. It did not indeed first exist through Christianity; but the latter alone brings marriage into full conformity with its idea; for the redemptive power that is in it restrains and eradicates whatever would cause discord, increases the love of the married pair, and enhances their value in each other's eyes, as partakers of the same hope. It should be required of Christian marriage that it should not be at its best at the beginning, in the honeymoon, in the days of early passion, but should be a fellowship that becomes closer the longer it lasts.

There is no *school of virtue* like marriage, none so well fitted both to purify and strengthen the character by means of the joy it affords, as well as the never-failing suffering it brings. Upon a physical foundation, which spiritualism despises or finds repulsive, God has built up an association of the tenderest kind, embracing the highest spiritual relations, and has made it a real union of souls. The effect of the physical side of marriage is that this relation does not, like friendship, consist in a mere series of intermittent acts; on the contrary, although its subsistence depends upon ethical activity, it is nevertheless a continuous state, and carries in itself a sort of natural security, which affords a basis for the feeling of home in man. For here everything is common, property, energy, enjoyment, body, life, joy and sorrow; and yet this relation bears a personal form. For not only is each spouse a distinct personality, and must continue to be so; in addition to this, their individual wills unite to form one common will, which makes nature subservient to the welfare of each, and promotes their moral growth. In this loving

devotion of husband and wife to each other, however unreserved it may be, no *loss of personality* is involved, but, on the contrary, a recovery thereof in a higher sense. A new and higher form of existence is attained by means of marriage. The creation was not perfected when Adam was made; he knew that he was as yet imperfect, that he needed completion —until the woman was given to him, and then for the first time he knew that he was a complete unity. At the same time, *marriage is by no means a mere expansion of the individual ego:* for if it were so, the result might be mere selfishness, the desire to absorb another in oneself. On the contrary, the personality of each spouse is expanded and completed in the following way. Each surrenders himself freely to the other in love, to be the means of amplifying and completing the personality of the other, while he also surrenders himself no less freely to receive the same service that he renders. And since this takes place on both sides, the higher life that results is shared by both in common. Each, to whom the person of the other is freely surrendered in love to be the means of subserving his well-being, has the assurance that he is the chosen end of that other. The former also does the same. And thus each remains by means of the other an end to himself, while each at the same time feels and exercises a loving self-forgetfulness—a forgetfulness in which love is not forgotten. It produces a peculiar elevation of consciousness to know that we are loved by a person faithfully, truly, and for ever. In marriage, too, we learn, with regard to earthly relations, the same truth that the Christian is taught by religion, viz. that in the long run there is no true blessing but love, both that which is received and that which is conferred. Thus marriage is the school, the laboratory of true love, and thus, too, of the highest earthly bliss, which must ever be rooted in virtue. Outwardly a Christian husband and wife are one. No sound of serious discord becomes audible. And since they thus form as it were one higher person, their sense of responsibility is increased, while they also feel that they are living a richer life. The care of each for himself is always elevated into care for the other as well; they have all things in common. Inwardly, it is true, husband and wife remain two independent persons; but they are not simply

two distinct persons, and nothing more, for each of them has made the other a part of his own being; there are two foci, but one ellipse. It shows the wonderful objective power of this relation, that here, on the one hand, it is never long before egoism betrays itself to be nothing but folly, and the blows of unfaithfulness fall upon its own head. On the other hand, it is a connection of such tenderness and intimacy, that it can never prosper nor unfold its loveliness and charms, where the care of one spouse for the other arises from egoism and prudence alone, and that only when the one really makes the other the objective aim of his love, does self-renunciation meet its reward. In true marriage, husband and wife make it their aim to allow nothing to come between them; they seek by *open confidence* to be perfectly transparent to each other, and in this mutual *confidence* they both feel that they possess the surest safeguard of their married happiness. Still, here, too (§§ 56, 69), it is the ideal ego that they must love in each other, the empirical ego must be loved only so far as it does not conflict with the ideal. Their union is spiritual and Christian, only so long as they promote each other's religious and moral life.

The failings of one spouse must be borne in sympathy by the other, and felt as his own, as something for which he too is responsible, and which he must help to combat. People take things easy in marriage, and let their faults appear as readily as their virtues. But a higher conception of marriage teaches the duty of self-control, and that only what is best and noblest in character should be displayed. Here, as well as elsewhere, respect is the basis of love and its duration. Husband and wife, moreover, have a peculiar power over each other, arising from the constancy of their mutual influence. From the intimacy of the matrimonial relation, both of them become aware of each other's faults; but marriage is a school of patience and gentleness, and affords the most abundant means for self-discipline and self-knowledge. And if husband and wife only conduct their married life in the name of Christ, neither their union nor their happiness will be injured by sin, for then sin is contrary to their will, and they will strive against it in common, and above all by their common prayer. Their *common subordination to God* also purifies their love

from sensual passion. Ἔχειν γυναῖκα ὡς μὴ ἔχων (1 Cor. vii. 29). Thus their love becomes pure and strong, and this it could never be but for their common devotion to the Redeemer.

As everything is held in common in Christian marriage, and the marriage bond is strengthened thereby, so do children in particular, who are the fruit of mutual love, and the blessing which God has attached to it, contribute to such strengthening. For in their children each parent sees a continuation as it were of the personality of the other, and loves the other in them, the child being a transcript, not of the one parent only, but of both.

And, finally, husband and wife must also devote themselves to some moral aim lying beyond the immediate circle of married life. For when they are entirely wrapped up in each other, their marriage cannot remain a healthy one. The more exclusive and the more intense their wedded love is, the more necessary is it that they should look beyond the domestic sphere. It is only when they thus take a common interest in moral aims, that their married life reaches full development and strength.

4. *Contraction of Marriage.* (*a*) On *the duty in general* of contracting marriage. Marriage is, apart from certain special exceptions, a universal calling, natural to every human being; a calling in which the whole community, with its universal aims, is as much interested as the individual with his single and particular ones. Evangelical ethics, following the New Testament, starts with the principle that to enter into wedlock must be regarded as a universal calling and duty, that it is not a matter of mere choice whether one will do so or not, and that special grounds must exist to justify an exception to the rule, and to prove that it is the duty of this person or that to remain unmarried. Such an exception may arise from external causes, *e.g.* from the want of those outward means which are necessary to the moral establishment of a household. Accordingly, the State may impose restrictions upon marriage. Then, too, the woman *must wait* to see whether she will be asked in marriage by a man whom she can conscientiously obey, and for whom she has an affection. *Physical* causes, likewise, such as bodily infirmity, may form a moral

ground for not marrying. The man also may be unable to find a woman to whom he is drawn by affection; or it may be that while there is liking on his side, there is no response on the other. These are instances of moral celibacy—*involuntary*, however.

But celibacy may also be voluntary, and yet a matter of duty (Matt. xix. 11, 12, xxii. 30; Luke xx. 34-36; 1 Cor. vii.; Rev. xiv. 4). For example, a man may find himself required by his special vocation to forego family life; for man has a *vocation*, whereas the sphere of a woman's vocation is the family itself. So it was with the Apostles Paul and Barnabas, while it is evident from Matt. xix. that Christ did not disapprove of such celibacy. Paul, too (1 Cor. vii.), though he is far from making a merit of it, is conscious that he is acting morally in remaining unmarried, as by this means he secures free play for his missionary activity. Similarly, we can imagine a daughter, who has sick parents to wait upon, denying herself for their sake a home of her own. It is even conceivable that a person may by nature have no *sexual inclinations* at all, and may even have a repugnance to anything of the sort. As long as this continues, marriage is of course forbidden, from the want of the requisite inclination. In fine, it cannot be said that marriage is *absolutely indispensable* to every one as a means of moral education; but only that family and domestic life must be the basis of such an education. And this is possible to even an unmarried person by sharing in some circle of family life. Paul gives unmarried life the preference; not universally, however, that is, not in every respect, but partly on account of the circumstances of the time and the dangers connected with them, which were greater for families than individuals; partly because those who lead a single life could be more constant in prayer. He who remains unmarried from motives of duty is also more independent of the flesh, his sensual life is more undisturbed; but his position is not on that account in every respect a better one, for from another point of view we may say, that a married man is able to do more in the way of moral achievement. Even Paul does not see any merit in celibacy, does not regard it as a special and higher condition of life. At all events, *it is certain* that it is every one's duty, unless he is prevented

on moral grounds from marrying, to seek to reap the benefits of this high and social blessing, this school of virtue.

(*b*) *Moral Contraction of Marriage.* Positively, marriage should be entered upon only after "judicious deliberation, and on the ground of virtuous and proved mutual affection" (Rothe, iii. 640 ff.). Since the way in which a marriage is contracted has usually a decisive influence upon its whole character, the most careful consideration is necessary in forming an engagement. Hence precipitate engagements should be avoided; an age should first be reached at which a sufficient degree of discretion and experience has been gained. And in taking such a matter into consideration, the following points should especially be attended to: first, none of the physical conditions should be wanting that are necessary to the establishment of a household; then there should be no incongruity in respect of age, position, or religion; further, there should be an earnest affection capable of lasting, and its necessary conditions, an affection not *in abstracto*, but one to the person in question; and finally, the two parties should harmonize in their tendencies and fundamental tone of character. This last point does not by any means imply that they should be exactly similar; for dissimilarities go very well together when they supplement each other. For any one to form an engagement without a pure and tried affection is a lie against the objective relation itself and against another. All passionate and extravagant courses also will be found reprehensible, when tested by virtuous reflection. For passion fades (§ 18). But the most important thing of all is to bring our resolve to God and try it before Him. He who marries and does not form the alliance as in the presence of God, nay, who even refuses to regard it as a religious covenant at all, exposes himself to all the dangers of self-deception and failure. The part which piety should play in the contraction of marriage must be to lead to such a choice as presupposes, if not that the other is already a Christian, that he or she has at least the will and inclination to become more and more such.[1] There is no sure basis for mutual confidence, unless the Christian fear of God be present. This alone is the foundation of wedded happiness. To marry any one in order to convert him is immoral,

[1] Harless, p. 436.

for this is a matter that is not in man's hand. Also, since family worship is one of the principal parts of domestic life, an alliance should be sought after in which such worship will be possible, and mixed marriages of such a sort as to render it impossible ought to be avoided.

Further, since the testing process mentioned above is a serious matter, and since youth does not possess the experience of riper years, but is swayed by passionate inclinations, it must be laid down as a general rule for the moral contraction of marriage, that the choice made by children needs to be supplemented by the judgment of parents or guardians. Although children must not be forced into a marriage, and are not bound, nay, are not even justified in yielding obedience against their inclinations, it is no less certain that it is the duty of parents to refuse their consent to a union, which they feel convinced is pernicious. It ill becomes children also, even when it is legally within their power, to institute judicial proceedings and make good their choice in opposition to their parents. By so doing they disturb that moral relation which is the older of the two, and form a new moral relation at the expense of one already in existence. Only in the rarest and most exceptional cases can it be permissible to enter into marriage without the consent and blessing of parents. Even an *engagement* ought not to be formed without at least the knowledge of parents. To do so would be unchildlike, and would indicate a mistrust that is sure to do mischief, while it would show but little confidence in the inward rightness of the step that is taken.

In addition to receiving the consent of parents, those who enter into marriage must be willing, that the new alliance should be united to the great moral communities which surround us, and should obtain their recognition. The subjective side, the free choice, requires (as we saw when treating of Vocation, § 68) to be recognised by the other moral communities, with which the new marriage is to be organically connected on its social side. And this takes place, not only through the participation of parents, but also through the civil recognition of the State and the consecration of the Church. It is true that neither Church nor State initiates the marriage. This is done by the wills of the two persons who engage

themselves to each other; but the marriage is not made manifest as something that is morally right, nor does it obtain the social character which is essential to it, until it has received that place in the social organism which is given it by the recognition of the State and the Church. Accordingly it is morally reprehensible to anticipate married life in a libertine manner before this ratification has taken place [cf. p. 546].

Note 1.—*Those who are too closely related by blood* should not marry. A family becomes enfeebled, if new life is not infused into it from others. It is beneficial to marriage, giving it strength and character, when the contrast of individuality between husband and wife is well marked. But in the same family this contrast, which is so conducive to the vigour and richness of married life, is less strong. This at least is the case at present; in the beginning of the human race it may have been different, for then marriage took place even between brother and sister.

Note 2.—A marriage should not be formed with an *unbeliever*, especially when he belongs to a non-Christian religion. For a marriage which excludes at the outset all fellowship in the innermost sanctuary of the soul, cannot be a right one. Speaking generally, too, marriages between Protestants and Roman Catholics are unadvisable. But Christian ethics cannot absolutely forbid them. They may turn out well, if they are accompanied with a special degree of true Christian piety. And then, too, they may serve the purpose of bringing Catholic and Evangelical Christianity to view and respect, and, as far as such association reaches, to recognise each other. The union of Christian Churches must always be an object of hope, and mixed marriages between Christians, when they are prosperous, may be a type of this union,—nay, they may be an important means of realizing it, for before the Churches are united they must first know and respect each other.

5. *Monogamy and the Indissolubleness of Marriage.* Monogamy follows directly from the very nature of marriage. For marriage demands the complete and exclusive surrender of person to person. The opposite principle would be, that no moral ends are involved in marriage—a principle that would degrade love to a lower level. On the corporeal side marriage has something exclusive about it, an exclusiveness, however, that serves as a condition and background, as it were, for bringing out love with all the more intensity. In polygamy, on the

other hand (and in polyandry *mutatis mutandis*), the husband has a position of false predominance, and cannot give himself up completely to one of his wives. Polygamy confirms him in sensual egoism; he soon becomes a lord instead of a spouse, while marriage becomes a species of slavery, degenerating into a relation of master and menials, which is degrading on both sides. Still polygamy in the Old Testament, or wherever it is sanctioned by law and custom, is not morally identical with fornication and adultery. There is γάμος even in polygamy, and adultery is possible here as well as in monogamy. Hence in the African mission field, for instance, it is not to be demanded of a prince who is living in polygamy, that he should repudiate all his wives except one.

From the essential character of marriage it likewise follows that it is *indissoluble*. It would be immoral to contract it under the reservation of possible separation. Morally, it must be entered upon as for ever. Such a reservation would mean a withholding of love and loyalty. If marriage, indeed, were only a relation of contract, it might be annulled by mutual agreement. But then its right, its sacredness as an objective institution, would be surrendered to subjective caprice; and this would be sinful, because marriage, and even civil marriage, is in itself indissoluble.

Divorce is the contradiction of the indissolubility of marriage. Christ forbids the divorce which was permitted, though by no means approved of, in the Old Testament (Deut. xxiv. 1 f.; Matt. v. 31, 32; xix. 3–9; Mark x. 4 f.). He opposes the frivolity of practising divorce at pleasure; to come more closely to the point, He forbids *a separation* on the part of either the man or the woman (Mark x. 12), except it be for πορνεία; this exception referring not to sins committed before marriage, nor merely to adultery in the narrower sense of the word, but to any kind of unchastity in married life, as for instance where the woman allows herself to be treated unchastely. Whosoever, He says, shall put away his wife (ἀπολύσῃ); and this evidently means an arbitrary putting away, a repudiation. The sacredness of the objective relation ought to keep both parties together, and this relation continues to have claims upon a man, even when he has arbitrarily withdrawn from it. Christ expresses this

by saying, that he causes her who is put away to commit adultery. That is to say, he brings himself into a position that renders it impossible to restore the marriage that has been broken, while the ease with which the separation is effected makes it easy for the woman to enter into an adulterous connection with another. Further, it is said that he that marrieth her that is put away (that is, arbitrarily and invalidly put away) committeth adultery, for he makes the restoration of the marriage and the duty of reconciliation impossible. And, in the third place, Christ adds as a matter of course, that when a man, who has put away, *i.e.* has sinfully repudiated, his wife, marries another woman, he thereby violates a still existing marriage. In this connection Christ always speaks of *marrying again*, because in the case of an unjust divorce it is a second marriage that gives finality to the separation—that is, where monogamy prevails. In the second marriage the sin of the separation has reached its climax, for any renewal of the former relationship has now become impossible, unless polygamy were permissible. Thus we see, that any *arbitrary exercise of authority*, in the way of breaking an existing marriage relationship, is censured by Christ in the strongest terms, and represented by Him as equivalent to the sin of causing adultery. Still, it is evident that the duties of that party who is *only passively implicated in the separation*, are not discussed. The words, "he that marrieth her when she is put away committeth adultery," might seem to signify that a woman even when divorced without any fault of her own must not marry again. But Christ is here speaking of arbitrary divorce by means of a bill of divorcement. In this case the marriage still remains valid objectively, and is broken by a second marriage. The above saying of our Lord, therefore, is a warning against divorce on frivolous pretexts, reminding His hearers that an arbitrary separation leads to adultery, to the violation of a marriage that ought to be maintained notwithstanding the bill of divorcement. Christ does not take any special notice of the second marriage of the innocent party, which is certainly a very likely result, because He is solely engaged in combating the arbitrariness that prevailed with regard to divorce. St. Paul, however, speaks of this case in 1 Cor. vii. 12–16.

The believing wife must not separate from the unbelieving husband, and conversely. For it was not Christianity that made them man and wife, and God can make the continuance of their marriage the means of winning the husband to the Christian faith. Difference of religion therefore affords no ground for dissolving a marriage that has already taken place, though it may be a reason to prevent a Christian from forming one. *But should the unbelieving husband separate himself from his wife, then she has only a passive share in the separation.* Here the apostle does not bid her to do penance for the guilt of her unbelieving husband, who has separated from her, nor to remain exposed to trials of her faith or to manifold sufferings on account of her Christian profession, but says, that if her unbelieving husband will not stay with her, she is no longer bound to him (οὐ δεδούλωται), ver. 15—a phrase which means, according to Rom. vii. 2 f., that her husband no longer exists for her, he is as good as dead, and she can proceed to form a new marriage. According to the apostle, therefore, the *vinculum* may be broken by something else than death; marriage has no character *indelebilis*. It may be asked, why does the apostle tell the woman that she is free from her husband, when it may be that the latter, although not as yet a believer, will become one by and by; why does he not expressly require her to remain unmarried in expectation of this happy result? To this we must reply that the *hora conversionis* depends upon God's sovereign power, and therefore that while nothing must be done to hinder its coming, we must not, in shaping our individual life, reckon upon factors that God keeps in reserve and has not yet permitted to appear. Accordingly, cases may arise where a woman, who has been abandoned by her husband, may, from the nature of the circumstances, enter upon a second marriage without committing sin. Of course the circumstances of the case, and the individual relations between her husband and herself, may be such as to leave room for hope on his behalf, and then it will be both a right and a Christian thing for her to wait in involuntary *separatio a thoro et mensa*. From causes, however, connected with the man or the woman, the circumstances may point in an opposite direction, and for this reason

the apostle is content with the indefinite *οὐ δεδούλωται*, and neither advises nor forbids a second marriage. Further, there are many hard cases of marriage that occur, when a *separatio a thoro et mensa* seems at the first glance to afford a welcome solution of the difficulty. And the reason that the apostle did not enjoin it as a remedy, may have been that experience teaches that a *separatio* which is not final places one in danger of adultery, while if it is final it differs in no respect from divorce, since marriage is only valid during the present life. Hence in the Reformation age 1 Cor. vii. was appealed to as showing that desertion is equivalent to compulsory divorce, as far as the innocent party is concerned, and that a second marriage of the latter is therefore justifiable. Against this view it has been urged, that Paul in the above passage specifies the particular case of malicious desertion (*desertio malitiosa*) on the ground of difference of religion, and therefore that his words afford no justification of a second marriage in the case of malicious desertion arising from other causes. But if the apostle had based the right to marry again, and consequently the right to break the marriage bond, upon the religious difference and not upon the fact of desertion, he would have been compelled to allow the believing spouse to effect a separation and marry again, even though the unbelieving one were willing that the marriage should continue. But this he absolutely forbids. Consequently it is the separation, the dissolution of marriage through desertion, upon which the apostle rests his declaration that the deserted spouse is free, and we must agree with the Reformers in placing *desertio malitiosa* alongside of *πορνεία* as a valid ground of divorce.[1] But, of course, *desertio malitiosa* as such must be clearly proved, and proved to be obdurate. For otherwise, and if there were any want of foresight and strictness in this respect, any wish on the part of a married couple to be separated from each other could be carried out without trouble. For this desire for separation could by a preconcerted arrangement take the garb of *desertio malitiosa*; the deserted spouse would no longer have merely a passive

[1] We are less able to agree with them, however, when they treat the refusal of conjugal rights as *desertio malitiosa*; for even in such a case the greater part of the fellowship of married life may still subsist.

share in the transaction, and the most frivolous of all kinds of divorce, viz. divorce on the ground of mutual dislike, might clothe itself in this form.

In addition to adultery and malicious desertion, are there still other grounds of divorce recognised in the New Testament? It has been held that such grounds might be inferred from Matt. v. by taking *παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας* to mean—except in cases which fall within the category of *πορνεία*. Accordingly, by adopting this meaning the so-called *par ratio* has been set up, and it has been said, that wherever there is a ground of divorce the same as, or similar to adultery, divorce may take place. But the passage Matt. xix. 9 has merely *μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ*, and this does not admit of other cases being included. Mark and Luke also do not mention *πορνεία*. A more important question is, what is the meaning of *παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας*? Every divorce, Christ says, is sin; but there are cases where it is not sin to effect a divorce—the innocent party being, of course, here referred to. It is certain that adultery is also meant. But *πορνεία* is a wider idea. There are sins against marriage which are not adultery in the narrower sense of the word, and yet destroy marriage irretrievably, while the degree of guilt attaching to adultery may vary very considerably. Now marriage may be destroyed in two main ways, corresponding to the idea of marriage, which is compounded of both the physical and the spiritual (par. 3). (*a*) The physical side, which is essential to the idea, may be withheld, either through *desertio malitiosa*, of which the apostle speaks, or through adultery with a third person, which comes under the head of *πορνεία* (Matt. v.). (*b*) The spiritual side may be *entirely* withdrawn; love, for instance, may be lost, husband and wife lay snares for each other's life, there may be attempts at murder, the one may endeavour to ruin the other in body, in soul, or in reputation; the husband may try to force his wife to prostitution, or may persist in living a dissolute life, utterly regardless of the duty of supporting wife and children, and may thus in the language of the apostle be worse than a heathen. Here love, the *first* requisite in marriage, no longer exists, but is changed into hatred and malignity. In such a case, the only part of marriage that remains is the physical side; but a *cohabitatio* that is merely physical, and from

which all love and affection have disappeared, is simply *πορνεία* (§ 18). If in these circumstances the marriage relation were still kept up, the injured spouse would be degraded by being used merely as a means of satisfying sexual desire, a desire into which no love would enter, and which would therefore not be human, but solely animal. Accordingly Christ says, *μὴ ἐπὶ πορνεία* (Matt. xix. 9); marriage must not exist for the sake of *πορνεία*. And therefore, where the spiritual elements of love and affection are wanting, neither State nor Church can compel husband and wife to live together, because marriage must not be turned into *πορνεία*. Thus we adhere to the words of Christ and His apostles when we take up the following position. On the one hand, we do not regard marriage as being something of the nature of dogma, purely divine, and indestructible—in other words, as a sacrament; we regard it, on the contrary, as also an *ethical* product, and therefore as both exposed to the danger of being destroyed and as delivered up to loyal and moral keeping. But, on the other hand, we give no countenance to divorce, or to second marriage on the part of those who have been divorced, unless it can be proved that the marriage has been broken in one of the two chief ways above mentioned. For to do so would be to favour the breaking of an obligation still in force for both husband and wife, the obligation, namely, of continuing their married life.[1] When both parties are Christians, no such thing as divorce can take place. But when this is not the case, marriage may be destroyed by sin, and it may be necessary (as with the Jews under the Old Testament dispensation) to make allowance for hardness of heart, in order that the evil may not be made worse.[2]

[1] That disease, even mental disease, does not sever the marriage tie, results from the facts, that it is, on the contrary, a summons to increased conjugal fidelity and support, and that it can never be absolutely certain that recovery is impossible.

[2] Remarriage following divorce is in general unadvisable. For it becomes even the innocent party to acknowledge that he (or she) is not without fault, were it only in having entered upon a marriage that had afterwards to be dissolved. He should therefore be inclined to mistrust himself, and not only to fear committing fresh blunders, but also to doubt his own fitness and vocation for married life.

Note.—Relation of State and Church to Marriage.[1] Neither the State nor the Church makes or contracts a marriage. But it is the duty of Christians to seek the recognition of both, and also to become members as married people of the moral communities. At an earlier period this was done by a single act, the nuptial rite of the Church, without which marriage was not recognised as such by the State; at present two acts are required, the so-called civil act and the wedding. This corresponds with the two sides of marriage, for marriage is essentially a legally moral association, and is to become a religiously moral association. The legal side comes first in conformity with the whole structure of Ethics, according to which an advance is to be made from eudæmonism, through the stage of law on to the stage of Christianity. Natural sexual intercourse is raised and ennobled through the idea of law. Law is the negative condition of the ethical, and therefore precedes the positively ethical. It belongs to the State, as the public administrator of law, to fix the conditions requisite to its recognition of marriage, and to bring individual marriages under the sanction and protection of public law. Since this is the case, the power which the Church once possessed of giving legal validity to marriage could only have arisen, from its acting in the name or by mandate of the State. Hence there can be no doubt about these two propositions: (1) The State, which had entrusted the Church with the right of acting in its name, could without injustice withdraw this right in order to exercise it itself; and (2) when it does exercise this right, its action must precede that of the Church, because objective right or law is the basis of all that follows [cf. § 33*a*. 2].

The earlier arrangement, according to which the Church's performance of the nuptial ceremony included the civil act as well, while it afforded certain advantages also involved various drawbacks, especially in cases of remarriage on the part of those who had been divorced. For no one could be married without the rites of the Church, and yet the Church could not recognise many of the grounds upon which divorce was sanctioned by the State (by Prussian statute-law in particular). Now, when a divorce of this kind had been permitted by the State, the Church was bound, not indeed to look upon the nuptial tie as still existing, but to regard the separated parties as still under the moral obligation of endeavouring to restore their previous connection. A second marriage, however, rendered such a restoration absolutely impossible; the Church,

[1] [In this note I have followed the lectures of 1879, since these presuppose recent legislation; but have added certain additions from the lectures of previous years in the form of footnotes.]

therefore, could not take part in it by performing the nuptial rite, *inasmuch as the latter would have meant the formation of a new marriage.* The State, again, on its side could not but permit a second marriage to those whom it declared legally divorced, and such a permission could not take effect as long as the rites of the Church were necessary to give legal validity to marriage. Thus, without taking the Old Catholics into account, whose Church refuses to sanction any such remarriage, the State had good grounds, even for the sake of the Evangelical Church, to assume the control of marriage on its legal side.[1]—There are two ways in which these collisions might have been avoided without splitting up the one act into two. On the one hand, the State law of divorce might have been so improved that the Church, as it had so long done, could have continued to go hand in hand with the State, and all remarriages of divorced parties might have been recognised by Church and State alike.[2] Or on the other, the Church might have excluded from her communion all those who had procured divorce in a sinful way, that the Church could not recognise. But the Church lacked an order of discipline; and in addition to this, it could not have excommunicated every one who had been wrongfully

[1] In addition to this, there were citizens, in the full enjoyment of their natural rights, who had merely an external connection with the Evangelical Church, which held the ratification of marriage in its hands. The points of view of State and Church with regard to marriage fall asunder as soon as the Church on the one side seeks to act as a Church, that is, to apply Christian principles to marriage, while having on the other within her communion people who ought not to belong to her, but to the State alone. For these ought to be treated, so far as marriage is concerned, in accordance with the universal principle of right; that is to say, they are justified in demanding that unbelief, sin, and disobedience to the Church should not in themselves deprive them of the right to marry. For that those who do not live a Christian life should be *robbed* of the right to marry, would be wholly opposed to the attitude of Christianity in the matter, since she *recognises the validity of both pre-Christian and extra-Christian marriages.*

[2] This was what v. Bethmann-Hollweg desired. But in vain; the First Chamber refused its assistance, for it introduced civil marriage as an optional form. [The author's opinion is that the State should have reformed its divorce laws.] "The norm by which we must decide, whether a marriage still subsists or not is the same, whether we look at the matter from the point of view of private or of public right. It is true that the words of Christ are addressed not to State and Church, but to the conscience of the individual. But since the idea of marriage which they set up is the true moral one, there is no *necessity* for Church and State disagreeing with and contradicting each other in their mode of dealing with marriage." [This, however, does not imply that the State cannot assume the legal control of marriage, more especially as it must take into consideration such as are not members of the Church (*vid. supra*), since marriage does not depend upon Christianity for its existence.]

divorced. And as long as these remained in the Church, the collision we have described would have arisen whenever they wanted to marry; the State would have admitted their right to marry again, the Church would have denied it, and yet she alone would have had the right to conclude a legal marriage.[1]

Hence it is clear—(1) that the conduct of the State was neither illegal nor arbitrary; and (2) that the act of the Legislature was a relief to the Church, as it saved her from coming into collision with the State, and delivered her from the responsibility of taking away all possibility of marriage from one who perhaps needed to be married, and who in the eye of the State was entitled to marry.

When civil marriage is introduced, the Church has quite a different position with regard to the contraction of marriage. It is no longer the Church that gives it validity. For even civil marriage must be recognised by the Church as morally binding, and not as a mere matter of contract. Since, then, she has no longer anything to do with the contraction of marriage, and the parties who come to her for the performance of nuptial rites are already husband and wife in the eye of the law, she must receive them as such; and hence, even should either of them have been previously divorced on wrong and sinful grounds, she must accept the divorce as an accomplished fact, and regard the former marriage as irretrievably broken by the new marriage,[2] the civil act. In these circumstances, it becomes the duty and the task of the Church to bring her moral influence to bear upon the relation that has been formed by the civil act, which, though sinful in its origin, is still binding. For this end she must use all the means at her command, must exhort, reprove, declare the promises of God, and demand of both parties a vow of mutual fidelity. On the other hand, she must do nothing in the way of endeavouring to dissolve the connection. The relation itself must not be characterized as sinful,—for in that case its dissolution would be a duty,—but only as

[1] This last point must evidently be understood in the following way. Marriage might have continued to be solemnized by means of a single act, at once ecclesiastical and civil, if the Church had excommunicated all those who in her opinion had been unlawfully divorced. For in that case the Church could still, as formerly, have effected for the State as well a *marriage between her own members*. But then civil marriage would still have been necessary to meet the case of those who had been excommunicated by the Church (p. 547, note 1); and, in addition to this, such excommunication as is here supposed is (as has been said above) impracticable.

[2] It is only before the new marriage has taken place that the Church can urge the duty of the separated couple to become reconciled to each other. If either of them marries a second time, the Church must not desire to bring them together again; for this would be bigamy.

one that has come into existence *through sin*. And, indeed, unless this last fact be acknowledged, there is little hope that the new marriage will turn out better than the old one.[1]

CHAPTER SECOND.

THE FAMILY.

§ 73.

Marriage is the bosom of the family, which is born of it, and the family again is the bosom, in which lie the civil and the religious community, not as yet separated from it. Christian family life is maintained by means of the *Christian family spirit*, which is natural family affection raised to a higher form of energy. Christian affection, which is the ruling influence in the Christian family, takes three specifically distinct forms: (*a*) parental love; (*b*) love of brothers and sisters; (*c*) filial love. The stream of love, taking its rise from the parents, arouses a responsive love on the part of the child, and the latter both turns to the source from which it came, and extends to those who are born of the same parents.

1. The family is an image of the kingdom of God; in it are the germs of every moment in the latter (§ 71). But more especially is the relation of parents to children an image of the relation of God to men, of religious fellowship. As the love of God owes its overmastering power to its pure, undeserved, prevenient character, so is it also parental love that kindles in children the first sparks of filial love, and thus awakens in them the first sense of human life. Especially is it the loving eye of the mother, which, resting upon the child,

[1] The Church should find in civil marriage an incentive to private pastoral work; and she will do well not to wait for the opportunity afforded by divorce, before she combats the loose morality that prevails in this matter. It is her duty to purify and shape public opinion, to bring back the pure idea of the sanctity of marriage to the consciousness of the people, and to quicken their conscience by *word and doctrine*.

makes it conscious that it is loved, and wins its love in return. Christian marriage not only begets, but educates children; it regards them as personalities made in the image of God, a fact to which the Church bears witness in infant baptism. For baptism shows that children are received into the fellowship of God and Christ, and into the Church. The whole *education* of the child must be directed by the *ideal of baptism*, since baptism is the representation of the central and supreme sphere. This education devolves upon the parents, as being the persons who are qualified by affection for the task. But it has also a public aspect, and hence there are public schools. Everything here depends upon both parents working harmoniously together, the characteristic differences of the sexes being brought into play. Mothers are apt to be vain and indulgent, even in their self-sacrificing love, and then the egoism of the little ones is developed. Fathers again, realizing vividly the goal of education, incline towards impatience, may make too stringent demands, and become imperious. These tendencies must in both cases be restrained by love. In particular, it is the seriousness of the father, as he exercises the right and discharges the duty of a priest in family worship, that arouses the conscience of the child at an early stage, and gives to natural love a moral tone. Authority in the family rests upon the mutual co-operation of both parents. They are the *autores vitæ* of the child, of its physical life to begin with, and then of spiritual life too, which ought to be implanted in the child through their agency. In performing this duty, parents have at first simply to give, while children are merely receptive. The reason of the parents lives in the children, and takes the place of reason in them. But education has for its purpose to train up children to be capable men and women both in body and mind, *i.e.* to be true Christians, worthy members of the State and of the Church. In the family, two generations are side by side, and it is meant that the blessings enjoyed by the earlier one should be handed down to the later, in order that the great boon of Christianity itself may continually increase and develope, and sons become better than their fathers were. Children are the issue of their parents, and so their natural heirs. The aim of education is to bring the child to *man's estate*. But for this end

obedience is required. From this often bitter root grows the sweet fruit of liberty. The exercise of authority in a Christian family does not mean, that harsh and despotic measures are employed, producing alienation between parents and children; on the contrary, it is conscience that is influenced, and affection that is quickened. Neither does the obedience required imply, that in parents children see only their masters[1] (Heb. xii. 7). The apostle demands that children *be not discouraged* (Eph. vi. 4; Col. iii. 21). Parental authority ought truly to be in God's stead, and to take the place of reason in the child, and then the obedience of children is not legal but spontaneous, being based upon the consciousness of parental love (Col. iii. 20, 21).

2. The cardinal virtue of the child is *obedience* (Eph. vi. 1 f.; Col. iii. 20; 1 Tim. iii. 4; Tit. i. 6). Obedience must not only be rendered, when the child is convinced that the will of its parents is substantially right. For if children were only to obey under these conditions, they would then merely obey themselves. On the contrary, parents must stand in God's stead to the child, and the formal obligation of obedience must extend to matters which as yet he does not understand, and for which the parents alone can be responsible. Filial love is maintained by reverence and gratitude towards parents, in accordance with the example of Christ (Luke ii. 51 f.). It is from their parents that children derive their first knowledge of God. Reverence is evinced in the open *sincerity* with which obedience is yielded. Gratitude finds employment in prayer on behalf of the parents; at a later period the parts of parents and children are reversed; it is the parents that are helpless, it is the children that give their help, but always in the same attitude of filial gratitude (John xix. 26 f.). The greatest difficulty of all arises at the period of transition from minority to full maturity. It is difficult for parents to hit the due measure of independence to be accorded to their children. On the one hand, parents should keep clearly in mind, that their children must be bound to them by ties of confidence and gratitude; at the same time it is no less incumbent upon the children to remember, that even should their emancipation be long in coming, they ought not to assert their rights and

[1] Employment of children in factories = slavery.

claims, or the duties of their parents towards them; for mere duty and justice form an alien and a fatal point of view for the warm affection which ought to characterize the whole sphere of family and married life. It is far better that children should remain in subjection to their parents longer than is necessary, than that they should assert their liberty in mistrust and thanklessness. It must not be left to children to decide for themselves when they should become independent; here, too, there must be an objective testimony coinciding with subjective opinion. What we have already said in § 68 holds good in this case as well, with the omission of the limitations that had then to be introduced. And even should the most unfavourable circumstances arise, the age of majority as fixed by the State assures the independence of the child.

3. *Love between brothers and sisters*, again, is an affection of an altogether peculiar kind, distinct from friendship, in having a basis in nature. As *natural*, it is a type of Christian love for one's neighbour, while as Christian it is a special and closer form of the same. This love (and what we say holds good of collateral as well as of lineal connections) is essentially a relation of *co-ordination*, even where great differences exist with respect to age. Younger brothers and sisters know this very well. This form of affection, too, is the means by which a transition is made from the life of the family to the spheres that lie outside of it, especially as children ought not to confine themselves to the household to which they belong, but ought to seek society of a wider kind. Family spirit can only be kept from becoming narrow and restricted by free intercourse with other circles.

CHAPTER THIRD.

EXTENSION OF THE HOUSEHOLD BY MEANS OF FRIENDS, GUESTS, AND SERVANTS.

§ 74.

While the household is a sanctuary that maintains its position of relative seclusion, it admits of extension in two ways. On the one hand, associations are formed with individuals

belonging to other households, or other spheres of life. Thus arise the relations of host and guest, of masters and servants, the former being one of essential equality, the latter of inequality. On the other hand, the family as a whole, and through the father as its representative, enters into vital connection with the public body corporate, both with the so-called secular community, that is, civil society and the State, and with the ecclesiastical community. In the latter case, this takes place with reference both to a particular congregation, and to the larger ecclesiastical organism, whose basis is a common confession.

1. We have already spoken in § 70 of family friendships and hospitality (Heb. xiii. 2; Rom. xii. 13; 1 Pet. iv. 9). Here, since the family has the most to do in the way of giving, it would seem to hold a position of superiority towards its guests. But inasmuch as it must feel it an honour to be permitted to give, the inequality is at once removed, and a relation of equality established, even apart from the *reciprocity* of the relation, which extends also to the privilege of giving. The host must not become a mere patron, nor the family friend a mere chaperon. In exercising hospitality, a family takes pleasure in admitting others to witness its household comfort and happiness; but it is necessary that married and family life should have a definite and substantial worth in itself, before it can do this properly. In the case of many families, however, hospitality is only a display of their own inward emptiness—the home, which is like a State wholly occupied with other States, that is, nothing but a ministry of foreign affairs, which cannot be carried on without a large amount of false show and artifice, is merely a distraction and delusion. For no one can give anything to others, unless he is first of all a personality concentrated in himself.

2. *Servants.* Servants are taken into the households of those who are better off as to outward means; and these, while occupying an inferior position, ought to be made sharers in the blessing of Christian family life, and in the benefits enjoyed by their superiors. The more the relation between

masters and servants rests upon a *mere bargain* (although this must ever be the basis of the relation, §§ 17, 18, 33*a*), the more *imperfect* it is; while the more it is inspired by fidelity and attachment on the part of the servants, and by confidence and kindness on the part of the masters, the more Christian does it become. Here, too, the bond that should unite them (as opposed to the merely natural or legal relation; cf. §§ 17, 23, 33*a*) is the consciousness, that in the absolute sphere, or in the presence of God, masters and servants are equal (Jas. i. 9, 10; Eph. vi. 5–9; Col. iii. 22 f., iv. 1; Tit. ii. 9, 10). At the present day, complaints with regard to the servant class are particularly rife. But in this matter masters and mistresses have more to answer for than they will acknowledge, nay, the chief share of the blame falls to them. For servants should be incited to virtuous conduct by the spontaneous love that is shown them, by those who are their superiors both in rank and in age.

The household, including servants, is a miniature of the *State* and the *Church*. The family, as an organization animated by love and ruled by wisdom, is at once a State and a Church, and accordingly has a system, a discipline, and a worship of its own.

SECOND SECTION.

THE MORAL COMMUNITIES, WHICH ARE THE PRODUCT OF REFLECTION OR OF HUMAN ART.

CHAPTER FIRST.

THE STATE.

§ 75.

Idea of the State and its Relation to other Moral Organisms.

The State is not merely a family on a gigantic scale; neither is it *the* moral community pure and simple; nor, finally, is it the mere sum of the various departments of human

life which it includes. On the contrary, although it embraces within itself and in its own way all the other ethical spheres, just as they, on the other hand, embrace it, it is an independent ethical fabric, with an ethical principle of its own. For it is the earthly embodiment of public justice; its function in the life of a nation is to be the representative of the Divine authority of Right; and this function it has to discharge with the necessity of a force of nature, and therefore by means of compulsion and power. Like marriage, the State is neither a direct creation of God nor something that is wholly secular; but it is a human product resting on a Divine basis, and thus has both a Divine and a human side. Since the State is founded upon the principle of right, we can deduce from this principle those essential claims which must be made of the State, and by the fundamental denial of which it would cease to exist. But right has its formal and its material side, and these must be distinguished. It attains its perfect form when it receives the form of law. And this it does most completely when law is brought to pass by a law of the Legislature called a *constitution*. With regard to their contents, right and law have a variable side, depending on change of circumstances and needs. Nevertheless a continuity of right is morally possible and necessary, and is maintained in the following way, without detriment to the variableness or changeableness above adverted to. The authorized legislative power—*not*, however, any revolutionary force, whether on the part of rulers or subjects—reforms and improves right and law so far as their contents are concerned; and thus, while formal continuity is preserved, it becomes possible both for right and the State to have a history. Since every State presupposes a common history of the land and the people, and since every nation is animated by its own peculiar national spirit,

and creates its laws and institutions in accordance with its degree of progress and its needs, it follows that the ends for which the State exists cannot be reached by means of legal institutions, which shall embrace the whole human race, that is, by one universal State, but can be realized only in a multiplicity of States, each possessing its own sovereign power (cf. *supra*, §§ 18, 23, 33*a*).

[Kant, *Rechtslehre.* Hegel, *Rechtsphilosophie.* Schleiermacher, *Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre*, ed. Schweizer, p. 274 f. *Lehre vom Staat. Ueber den Beruf des Staates zur Erziehung: Werke, zur Philosophie*, vol. iii. p. 227 f. *Christliche Sitte*, pp. 241 f., 440 f. Rothe, *Ethik*, 2nd ed. vol. ii. p. 204 f. *Encyklopädie*, p. 83 f. Chalybæus, *Speculative Ethik*, ii. § 197 f. Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, § 150 f. Stahl, *Rechtsphilosophie*, ii. 2. v. Mühler, *Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Staats- und Rechtslehre.* Herbart, *Praktische Philosophie*, vol. viii., cf. also vol. ix. Lotze, *Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie*, p. 60 f. Ulrici, *Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie*, i. 252 f. J. H. Fichte, *Die philosophischen Lehren von Recht, Staat und Sitte.* Ihering, *Kampf um's Recht.* Dahn, *Rechtsphilosophische Studien*, p. 112 f. Lasson, *System der Rechtsphilosophie.* Baumann, *Handbuch der Moral.* Schuppe, *Grundzüge der Ethik.* Thiersch, *Ueber den christlichen Staat*, 1875. Köstlin, *Staat, Recht und Kirche in der evang. Ethik. Studien und Kritiken*, 1877. Gladstone, *The State in its Relations with the Church.* Coleridge, *Church and State.* Weisse, *Philosophische Dogmatik*, iii. pp. 617–654. Vinet, *Essai sur la manifestation des convictions religieuses et sur la separation de l'église et de l'état*, 1842. Zeller, *Staat und Kirche.* Minghetti, *Staat und Kirche.* Geffken, *Staat und Kirche.* Thompson, *Church and State in the United States.* Herrmann, *Ueber die Stellung der Religionsgemeinschaften im Staate. Das staatliche Veto bei Bischofswahlen.* Harless, *Staat und Kirche.* Beck, *Kirche und Staat und ihr Verhältniss zu einander.* Vilmar, *Theologische Moral*, vols. ii. and iii. v. Oettingen, *Christliche Sittenlehre*, p. 678 f. Hofmann, *Theologische Ethik*, p. 262 f. Golther, *Staat und Kirche im Königreich Würtemberg.* Nippold, *Die Theorie der Trennung von Kirche und Staat.* Sohm, *Verhältniss von Staat und Kirche*, 1873. Krauss, *Das Dogma von der unsichtbaren Kirche*, p. 236 f. Dorner, *Kirche und Reich Gottes*, p. 305 f.]

1. *Dependence of the State upon Religion.* We have already

alluded to this subject (§ 34*a*, cf. § 63. 2), when considering the imperfection of the stage of right in itself. But the dependence of the State upon religion is shown more especially by the fact, that there is no law, no earthly power, which can exercise control or afford a guarantee against the abuse of force, except Christian conscientiousness and fidelity, and Christian respect for individual freedom and individual rights, alike on the part of rulers, officials, and the people at large. Without faith in a living Providence, no nation can successfully meet those crises in its political life which cannot fail to arise, or pass through them with courage and patience, with moderation and justice. And further, legislation also, which always bears the impress of the whole character of a people, lacks healthy productive power, when that character is without religious vitality; for then the nation wants that ideal element upon which the formation of its aims depends. It is this ideal element which unites rulers and subjects by inspiring them with a common spirit, upheld by enthusiasm for the discharge of national duties.

2. Many otherwise right-thinking Christians would fain regard the State as one great family, and the monarch as the father of his people. It is certainly in favour of a monarchical constitution, that it imparts to the State somewhat of the warmth of family life. But the State is not a family. This is shown, *e.g.*, by its power of punishing; that which is discipline in the family is punishment in the State. The State may go so far in this respect as to inflict death. But no father puts his child to death. Here, again, the confounding of different spheres is non-ethical. And this is also clear from the consideration, that if the State were merely of the nature of a family, its citizens would always be in the position of children, always under the tutelage of the ruling authorities. But the latter would fulfil its educational office very badly, if citizens were kept continually in the condition of minors. The State, in fact, would fall into the same error as the Roman Catholic Church. If, however, its citizens have passed out of their minority, then they must take an active part in political life and in the discharge of its principal functions. Nor, on the other hand, must the State be identified with the Church, either by making the State absorb the

Church or *vice versâ*. Christianity refuses to be either a political religion or a theocracy. Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's; the two swords must be kept separate. There is certainly an intimate connection between these two divine institutions, but their functions are distinct, and depend upon their different principles.

The principle of the State is the *idea of Right*. This does not mean that the State is the sole administrator of justice on earth; justice has also a place in the family and its discipline, in the Church, and in the life of the individual. But it administers *public* right, and has to enforce it by means of compulsion, and with the certainty of a natural force (§ 33*a*). For it is the supreme organism so far as right is concerned; it not merely exhibits right, but it is the representative of right raised to a higher power—that is to say, not merely as something self-existent, but as something that is active and self-determining. It has to manifest right as what must be enforced at any cost. It is a free power, a living existence, a moral personality (§ 33*a*). And its position with regard to all other provinces of life is, that it protects each of them in the rights based upon its respective ethical principle, that it embraces them all as an institution for the maintenance of right. The State, however, is by no means synonymous with the entire moral activity of a people, nor is it lord over the principles belonging to the other moral spheres. It is not part of its functions to make or to teach religion, to bring about marriages, etc. Neither is it the sum of all the other moral communities; on the contrary, it is itself one of them, which has been entrusted with the administration of right, in virtue of which it must ensure to them all the possibility of free development, in accordance with the different principles underlying them. This it must do not only negatively, by defending them from outward molestation, but also positively, by promoting all their lawful undertakings. Hence it is incorrect to maintain, that too little has been said when the State is defined as being based on the idea of right, and to hold that it must also care for the public welfare (*i.e.* exercise police functions). For the latter duty is comprehended in the idea of right when properly conceived. The State represents and upholds the conditions essential to the

free development of individual life, of marriage and the family, of communities, classes, and corporations, whether those whose principle is realistic, such as agriculture, trade and commerce, or of those whose principle is ideal, such as art and science, and finally of the Church also.[1] For it defends every circle of human life from anything that would make its free development impossible, and furnishes it with that which justly belongs to it, that which it would be an injustice to refuse—viz. the means by which its free development is really and not only apparently secured. Accordingly, the State must first of all establish *its own* rights, its rights as a State. But these comprehend, at the same time, the rights of all other spheres; and all rights, both those which the State creates (such as its own) and those which it recognises and upholds (such as the rights of other spheres), have a public character. Thus there arises an organized system of rights; and there are, besides, political and natural rights, private rights, rights of the family, of the community, of trade and commerce, rights belonging to science (academies and the press), to art, and to the Church. Hence the State, as the supreme representative of right, has not only to protect the other spheres in the enjoyment of their rights, and consequently to set limits to their rights as against each other; it has also to determine the rights of these spheres in relation to its own, and therefore it must be master in its own house, and fix what its own house is, and how far its domain extends. In doing this it may, of course, err; its decision is not infallible nor incapable of amendment; still, as the last and highest earthly decision in all matters pertaining to right, it must be honoured by obedience,[2] or if this would violate clear duties, by willingness to suffer.

For the idea of right establishes the Divine origin of the State, and excludes that theory of it according to which it is based originally upon contract (Rousseau's *Contrat Social*). And in the idea of right, too, we have the inward bond that connects the State with religion. For right, while in itself an absolutely necessary good, exists for the sake of positive

[1] Hence the *Apol.*, ed. Müller, p. 232, designates the State "defensor Evangelii."

[2] Conf. Aug. A. xvi. *Apol.*, ed. Müller, p. 225 f.

morality. The State derives its sovereignty or majesty from the fact, that it simply stands security for right, as something public and national; and hence it recognises no power superior to itself.

3. The difference between *Material* and *Formal* Right. Right attains to formal perfection when it takes the form of law. But in order that anything like arbitrariness—which, however well-meaning it may be, is always hurtful—may be excluded, *it is first of all necessary that there should be a law for legislation.* Law thus raised to its second power can only be realized by a constitution or fundamental law of the State.

The *contents* of right vary at different times and in different places, in accordance with national individuality. That which is conducive to the education of one people, and promotes its freedom, may be a restriction to the freedom of another that is more matured; and that which is just and indispensable in the case of one nation, whose life has reached a high degree of development, may be highly injurious to another which is on a lower level. Human laws change with human needs, and a contrast is often presented by the rights, not only of different peoples, but also of the same people at different stages of its progress. Material right has a history. It must grow and develop so as to meet the new relations that are ever arising, and which it must regulate; and laws must be reformed or purified when they are unjust, or are in danger of becoming so. It might, indeed, be supposed that in consequence of these changes right would suffer in sureness or stability. But the continuity of right, and its identity as an organized whole, are maintained when the development and improvement of material right takes place in a way that is formally correct—*i.e.* through the legitimate organs. The old strife between natural right, or right as a matter of reason, and positive right—a strife that ever and anon makes itself felt in practical life—cannot be brought to a favourable issue unless the two following facts are clearly recognised. On the one hand, whenever a collision arises between positive right and right as determined by reason, the former is shaken to its foundations if it seeks to avoid development and improvement; and, on the other hand, a legislative reform can only

be called rational when it can be shown to be the expression or result[1] of the general sense of right existing in the community at the time. This is the political expression of the theological principle which we met with at an earlier stage (§§ 5, 72): the coming of the kingdom of God depends upon the fact that it has already come. Stagnation and revolution must be alike condemned. The right thing is a reforming conservatism. This is no special political banner; it only describes the position that all must take who love their country truly and wisely. All Christian citizens must enrol themselves under it, however much they may differ as to the expediency of concrete political questions, by which they should never allow themselves to be separated.

Politics and religion must not be mixed. It is very dangerous to bring in religion to settle concrete political questions, and thus to make them religious questions. For by this means *political parties* become religious parties as well, and pride is the result; the political fanatic is very apt to regard an opponent as a non-Christian, and thus religion is defiled. Further, when Christian piety is identified with a particular political party, the mistrust and hatred, that are felt towards that party by its opponents, are turned against religion itself. On this subject the *Erlanger Zeitschrift*, 1862, makes the following apt observations:—"We are in danger of becoming not merely political perverts, but perverts from Christianity, if we seek to decide political questions, such as domiciliation, right of suffrage, finance and commerce, the administration of justice, trade, the legislature and popular representation in it, etc., by Christianity, according to our measure of Christian enlightenment. For then we suppose ourselves all the better Christians because we take up a certain position in politics, and we think we have a right to deny the Christianity of others because they do not share our political views; whereas the fact is, that political questions

[1] The Legislature, however, must not simply make into law whatever it finds existing as custom; on the contrary, it may oppose a prevailing custom, and acts rightly when it gathers from the healthy tendency of public opinion, to what it may warrantably give the formal sanction of law. It is only necessary that legislative changes should be in accord with the national spirit, and the test of their seasonableness is whether the national spirit is reflected in them. If not, the change is a step backward.

must be judged according to their own particular principle, and religion gives us as little information about them as about the best way of making any kind of fabric. *Should this tendency gain the upper hand, especially on the part of the clergy, then the sole peacemaking power that still keeps political parties together, inspiring them with mutual respect, with a sense of justice, with love for their country—the power, namely, of religion—would be drawn within the sphere of faction,* and the salt that keeps the body of society from dissolution would lose its savour."—Does it follow from this that the Christian is to take no concern in the public affairs of his country, and to form no political opinions at all? By no means. But he guards himself against mixing up different moral spheres; for this produces a chaos, or increases the chaos that exists. *Love to one's country and one's people* has received the blessing, not only of Moses (Ex. xxxii.) and the prophets, but also of Christ Himself.[1] But the most pious man is not necessarily the best versed in politics, and the gospel by itself settles nothing with regard to such matters as a political constitution and the like. Political questions have their own independent principle, and must be decided in accordance with it. Christianity simply demands of all, that they should bring their political intelligence to bear upon such questions in an upright and patriotic spirit, and that a solution should be arrived at in a legitimate way, and always in accordance with actual necessities and possibilities. As to what is the right solution, different views may be held by people who are equally pious, and these differences must be adjusted by friendly contest and discussion.

§ 76. *Continuation.*

Political organization begins when a people divides itself into a *magistracy*[2] (*Obrigkeit*) on the one hand, and *subjects* on the other. But this contrast between rulers and subjects, without which a people would be merely a uniform mass, destitute of organic structure, may take

[1] Luke xix. 41, xxiii. 29; cf. Rom. ix. 1 f.

[2] The "magistracy" (*Obrigkeit*) is equivalent to the "higher powers" of Rom. xiii. 1, and includes every form of legally constituted authority.—Tr.]

very different forms. Whatever form the magistracy may have, obedience, for God's sake (Rom. xiii. 1 f.), is due to it within the sphere over which its authority extends. But since it is only through God that it has a claim to obedience, it cannot make that claim valid in opposition to God and His ordinances. Thus no obedience is to be rendered it which would involve disobedience to God; in such a case, however, we must recognise the inviolability and sanctity of lawful authority by being willing to suffer.

1. Public right (§ 75) must have its organs. It is no doubt true that in a certain sense all citizens are its organs (§ 23, 33*a*); but this cannot possibly mean that every individual is appointed to protect others from himself, or himself from the whole community. In such a case, the very thing that is here of essential importance—viz. the community as a whole — could never come into actual existence or manifestation. It is the State which is the guardian of right, not the individual with his private leanings, party spirit passions, or weak pliability. A people must therefore divide itself into vehicles of public right and the force it employs, and those who are subject to them. Obedience to the State becomes obedience to those who are authorized to represent the State. Thus we have the antithesis of rulers and subjects. Civil authority must have persons as it vehicles. At the same time, however, office and person are not simply and absolutely coincident.

2. Here it is not of importance what the form of government may be. It may be a monarchy, or there may be more rulers than one: civil power may be regularly divided between a prince and the estates of the realm, or the latter may at least assist in its exercise; in short, civil authority, where it really *exists*—not merely when it seems to exist—must, according to God's ordinance, require obedience within its own sphere. Since St. Paul (Rom. xiii. 1 f.) addresses his demand to *every soul*, he demands at the same time that every one should attach himself to the State. For the individual does so by becoming subject to the ruling powers, to the will

of the commonwealth in its legally constituted form [the authorities being the representatives of the commonwealth, and for that reason inseparably allied with this constitutional will (§ 75, p. 556 f.)]. The king also who is called to the throne in the order of succession, in the very act of ascending it subjects himself to this general will. But now, what is the more exact meaning of Rom. xiii. 1 f.? Thus far all are agreed, viz. that we are here commended to render obedience to civil authority as an ordinance of God. The apostle, after previously warning us against taking the law into our own hands and avenging our own injuries, says, "there is no power but of God; and the powers that be are ordained of God." Here the first clause expresses the universal principle, that authority in general derives its existence from God, that it has no lower origin than this, no merely physical, or subjective, human origin. The second repeats this in a positive form, but in such a way that it is applied to authorities which exist in *concreto*. Each one of them must be regarded as divinely ordained within its own sphere, and must therefore be respected as such. Here St. Paul does not say what persons are, in any particular case, to be regarded as lawful rulers, and therefore as ordained by God; he does not enter into this question at all, but is occupied solely with the *institution*. Hence he makes no distinction between bad and good rulers; for the institution itself is always good, it is only the persons who are not always good. Still his words involve that obedience must be cheerfully given to the persons also, inasmuch and in so far as they are lawful authorities, that is to say, in so far as the person and the office or institution are one. It is said by some that St. Paul does not merely tell us what belongs to the ruling powers as an institution, but also how such powers may be recognised, namely, by their ὑπερέχειν. But if the sure mark of lawful authority were to be found in ὑπερέχειν, that is, if *might*[1] were the sole means whereby we discover who are Divinely-ordained authorities, then St. Paul would say—what he undoubtedly

[1] Might is not the same as right, as is maintained in the preface of the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, 1851. According to the theory of Hengstenberg, a successful revolution would at once have the right to be regarded as a divinely-appointed ruling power.

cannot say—that we have simply to obey the power which happens at any time to be in the ascendant. He says, on the contrary, the powers set over us. Who these are it is easy in ordinary times to say, but when extraordinary circumstances arise, it is hard and even impossible to determine this thoroughly, since in that case it depends upon concrete relations. An especial difficulty also arises from the fact, that just as something which at first was unjustly acquired may through length of time become lawful property, so a land which was seized and subdued by force, to begin with, may by and by be rightfully held, and lawful authority established within it. Now, while it is certainly true that the Christian must not assist in depriving his lawful rulers of their power, while, on the contrary, it is his duty to remain loyal to them,[1] yet he must not at such great political crises as we are speaking of, interfere arbitrarily and in his individual capacity; whether in the way of offering armed resistance, or of taking an active public part in favour of legitimacy. The matter at issue being one of universal interest, he must leave it, in the first place, to the *appointed representatives* of the people (see below, § 77. 2), and content himself with abstaining from committing any injustice.[2] Further, when a new governing power displaces an old one, it is, on the one hand, incumbent on the former to respect the old bonds of duty, and not to demand any oath of allegiance or of office, until the struggle has been brought

[1] We may here allude to those who use the name of Paul as a cloak for disloyalty. After having given an oath of fidelity to their ancestral prince, should he happen to be overcome for a while by his enemies, and should rebels or aliens demand that an oath of fidelity should be given to them, these persons readily give it,—it may be under the pretext that the enemies of their own prince would never have become possessed of this power, had it not been given them from above (John xix. 11), that their power is the decision of God. In certain circumstances it is no doubt a convenient doctrine to yield to might instead of right, and to regard those persons who have the power as its lawful possessors. But should any one, from cowardice or selfishness, or from essential contempt of the State, hold it to be a proper thing to swim with the tide of power on every occasion, he must not make the apostle his companion and adviser in disloyalty.

[2] [We can hardly believe that the author means to exclude attempts to influence public opinion within legitimate limits, since he demands publicity and free discussion as essential to free political life. § 77. 2, § 78, § 70. 2. —Ed.]

to a definite close; while, on the other hand, it is right that when once a final issue has been reached, the outgoing government should release the consciences of its subjects from their obligations. For a country must have a civil authority. Rulers exist for the sake of the institution. In such cases much will always have to be left to the judgment of the Christian conscience, since decisive marks, suitable to all cases, cannot be given to enable us to determine who still are or who have become the ἐξουσία. But what shall we say with regard to political commotions within the same nation? Here, too, St. Paul cannot mean that the ἐξουσία has a claim to obedience; *only* if at the same time it has superior power, and that when it has not the power it has not the claim. He would not say, for example, that in a time of revolution we should abandon a lawful dynasty and authority, and go over to the side of revolution, should the latter be stronger than the former. The apostle has no idea of teaching us to swim with the tide of power; it is lawful authority that is in his mind; to this, and in so far as it is lawful, our obedience is due.

We thus see that St. Paul's object is not to exalt certain definite persons, but to commend civil authority as a beneficial institution ordained by God. *For this reason* we never find him saying, that those who have the *power* have also on that account the Divine right to demand obedience, even should they shatter the basis of right upon which their authority rests; on the contrary, he says that where there is *true* civil authority, — and therefore not merely a power that may become so in the future, or has been so in the past, or seems to be so now, but a power that is lawfully authoritative at the present moment,—such authority must be honoured as an ordinance of God. The persons who fill the office may possibly act *in opposition* to the institution or office which has divine authority. Now, should it be said, that in such a separation of office and person it is nevertheless that which is accidental, viz. the *person*, and *not* the permanent Divine office, which, according to the apostle, must be emphasized, this would mean, that whoever is disobedient to the person, in order to obey the office which is God's ordinance, would resist God's ordinance by obeying it. In Acts iv. 19 the

necessary distinction is made between the *persons* who, either in general or in any particular instance, claim to have ruling authority, and the *office*. St. Peter asserts the possibility of separating between office and person when he says, not that we ought to obey God rather than the authorities, but—rather than "men." Obedience is always due to lawful authority; it is always an ordinance of God; for the administration of justice is its divine *right* as well as its divine *duty*. But the person, who enjoins something that is opposed to God and divine law, only *seems* in such an act to be a legitimate authority, authorized by God; in reality it is only the unworthy human being and not the office that demands the sin; and hence what is commanded is not binding. So with regard to Matt. xxii. 15 f. The two things are quite compatible,—although the Pharisees and theocrats did not think so,—to render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's, because civil authority has no rights that are opposed to God, but derives all its rights from Him. Christians do not obey their rulers blindly, but consciously, conscientiously, and for that reason all the more earnestly. By consciously we mean that when they obey they are certain of the magisterial position of their rulers, certain, too, with regard to what is commanded that it is not opposed to God or conscience. And this holds good not merely in directly religious, but also in moral matters. Christian obedience to lawful authority is not a mere obedience from fear of punishment, but is given for God's sake, because the Christian knows that God has appointed civil government upon earth (1 Pet. ii. 13; Rom. xiii. 5). Hence he obeys joyfully and willingly, as an act of worship rendered to God; even should the sacrifice be hard, it is still a sacrifice laid upon God's altar (Rom. xiii. 6).

In short, the *persons* who exercise magisterial functions have to demand obedience on behalf of their office—in its formal aspect, because it has been instituted by God, in its material aspect, because of its *aim*, which is *justice*. Hence it follows as a matter of course—

(*a*) That the Christian is bound to refuse compliance with every ungodly requisition, every invitation to do what is sinful,

as, for example, to violate the rights of others, even should it come from the ruling powers.

(*b*) That as long as rulers continue to be rulers, that is, as long as they do not overturn altogether that *general basis of right* upon which their authority rests, they must be obeyed within their own sphere, even though in many instances they may act unjustly. In the latter case the Christian must submit to the injustice. When resistance is offered, its purpose must never be more than *defensive*—to defend Right. Rulers must not suffer injury within their legitimate sphere; we must not go the length of attacking the right which belongs to them [the right, namely, which rulers in general possess, of demanding obedience as long as they still retain lawful authority].

(*c*) Should, however, a ruler resolve to have nothing more to do with right *at all*, but to act entirely from his own caprice, he would himself sever the bond which connects the person with the office as a divine institution, and which gives to the former a share of the sanctity of the latter. And this would be equivalent to an abdication and revolution. The conservative spirit of the Christian, his zeal for the maintenance of the State, would have to react against such a revolutionary change; and that for the very same reasons which make it a divine duty to found a State, and to bring chaos and caprice to an end by the establishment of law. But, on the other hand, until such an extreme crisis has occurred and is plainly manifest, neither individuals nor communities—whether from a mere wish to escape suffering, or from an arrogant but false desire for freedom—must presume to rise in rebellion, and attack the Divinely ordained authorities that are still in power, even should these often act in a way that is a caricature of justice.

§ 77. *Continuation.*

The Constitution.

The system which regulates the relations subsisting between rulers and subjects is the Constitution. There is no constitution that is the best absolutely; it can only be

relatively the best, according to the individuality of a people, and the stage of progress it has reached (§ 75. 3). Nevertheless it may be said, that a despotic relation between rulers and subjects, in the form either of Cæsarism or ochlocracy, is as little in harmony with the Christian spirit as anarchy. Christianity favours, although only indirectly, and not by positive precept, a political system in which the object is not to secure mere passive obedience, but also to give citizens an active participation in State affairs. The essential functions of the State as an organized political body, or the forms in which it exercises its authority, are, on the ideal side, legislation, and on the real, administration and the dispensation of justice. When a people takes a positive part in political work, by means of those persons to whom it has confided its interests, the latter, in this case, form a part of a composite government, and laws which are passed by both parts are binding upon all.

1. There has been much discussion, especially from the standpoint of natural right, as to what is the best form of constitution. But this is a question which cannot be answered *à priori*, nor is it answered by Christianity. It is part of the elasticity of Christianity, that it can maintain itself under any kind of constitution. The history and individuality of a people must here be considered, and therefore one and the same constitution cannot be the best for every people and for every stage of progress. Christianity, too, prescribes no particular form. It only lays down principles, which when followed, overcome, in an immanent way and without force, certain gross imperfections or ruder forms of political life. Now this must be said in general: that the *spirit* of Christianity, and especially of the evangelical Church, which aims at the full development of personality, is altogether adverse to every political system which looks for mere passive obedience on the part of its subjects, and is favourable only to a system which admits of citizens taking, *at all events* indirectly,

an active moral part in political affairs. And this does not mean only that they are to obey freely according to their conscience, but also to work freely. For the love of the Christian embraces his earthly fatherland also.

Now when we compare, from this point of view, the three chief forms of political constitution, viz. democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, we must remember—what the history of ancient nations has shown us—that a nation passes through different forms of constitution, and that each of these may be the best for its own age. But whereas in antiquity one system merely overturned and abolished another, the Christian era exhibits the effort to interweave with one another, the elements of truth which each of these systems contains.

(*a*) The truth in the idea of *Democracy* is, that it desires to have active citizens, swayed by the idea of the State. But the democratic constitution is optimistic, and the most elementary of all. The talent of the statesman is a *special* gift, not a universal one; yet the democratic theory speaks and acts as if every citizen could be, or had to be, politically active in a productive sense, as if politics were not an art. Productive action in politics is not of such a nature, that if a man had no share in it he would be excluded from a good of absolute worth. But the democratic view runs the risk of making it an absolute good. Further, democracy contains much that is mere appearance; for in reality it is not all who govern, but mostly demagogues, who push themselves to the front by flattering the people. Democracy has almost no means of guarding against that which is the greatest evil in every sphere, namely, that those who are inwardly the most competent for an office are excluded from it by ostracism of various kinds, while those who are incompetent receive it. Further, democracy has *then* become immoral when it makes ruling and the right to rule, not the rule of objective right or duty, the important thing. It is more apt than any other kind of government to cast into the shade the moral order of the State as a Divine institution, and the Divine right of constituted authority. Moreover, when a democratic form of government is not confined to a single city, but extends over a whole country, a *pure* democracy is a physical impossibility, because each one cannot directly take part in govern-

ment and legislation. *Elections* must be held, and in these there is the introduction of an aristocratic element. Were democracy not modified by aristocratic elements, it would lead to ochlocracy.

(*b*) *Aristocracy* has also its special advantages; also, but in a less degree, plutocracy, which, in North America, and to some extent in Europe, has displaced nobility of birth, or exists together with the latter. Nobility of culture, of character, and of intelligence *will*, thank God, always remain and assert its truly influential position. But aristocratic constitutions have exhibited as little permanence as democratic; they are themselves specially accessible to a *narrow* and often selfish spirit of caste.

(*c*) A *Monarchic* constitution is without doubt much more capable, than a democratic or aristocratic one, of maintaining the continuity of the State, and therewith its stability. It is likewise most in harmony with the idea of government. For the Homeric εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω holds good of the executive.

Hereditary monarchy is preferable to elective monarchy; witness the experience of Poland, and also of Germany in its imperial times. The hereditary principle raises the possession of sovereign power above rivalry and ambition within the State, above dangerous conflicts and civil wars. A hereditary dynasty also gives rise to a healthy tradition, which serves to secure continuity in politics; it enables love to the State to take root more easily in the hearts of the people, who, by seeing in the prince the representative of the State, gain a firmer sense of the objective reality of the State and its laws. The hereditariness of its monarchy, moreover, procures for a State the blessing of family affection, somewhat of the warmth of family life—so far, that is, as the idea of the State permits. This is a benefit which republics, whatever form they may take, cannot obtain. We must, however, distinguish between a monarchy and a *despotism*, in the latter of which even *judicial* power is dependent upon the arbitrary will of the ruler.[1] But more than this is required to correspond to the ethos of the State; it is not enough that those who exercise judicial functions should be unbiassed and independent. For there

[1] In Prussia, courts of justice were independent, even before 1848, and hence the Government was not a despotism.

cannot be an independent administration of justice, if the *legislative* power could lay down, perhaps arbitrarily, rules to regulate the proceedings of the law courts. Further, since legislation must be constantly carried on, and must proceed from the real, manifest needs of the people,—not from any extraneous or external source, whether it call itself human or Divine (§ 75),—it follows as a matter of course, that the mind of the people must enter into and take a share in the construction of the laws. *Not even the appearance of a merely individual origin must attach to laws.*

2. Since Right, for the sake of which the State exists, only reaches its perfect shape in the form of law (§ 75), legislation is the fundamental *function* of the State, and hence a law is required to regulate legislation, a *fundamental law of the State* (§ 75, pp. 554, 556). This law is the *constitution*, in the narrower sense of the term. *A republic, no less than a monarchy, requires a constitution.* But a republic is not so well adapted as a monarchy to overcome any disorders that arise, and it is especially liable to fall into one of two extremes, both hostile to *freedom*, anarchy and the absolutism of centralization. In both of these respects a *constitutional* monarchy is superior.[1] Accordingly, when a people is under a monarchy, and has a share in the work of legislation secured to it by constitutional law, the form of the State has reached that stage which is as yet the highest.

Legislation must be the work of the people in common—that is, of that part of the nation which possesses rights, or is of age. For only then has law an origin corresponding to its significance as a public legal ordinance, with which the people has to familiarize itself, or in which it has, as it were, to feel at home. Law must proceed from those for whose sake it exists, of course from their true better nature or sense of right. Now, it is just as much a moral perversion to understand by the people only those who are governed, and to regard the Government as opposed to or restricting them, as, on the other hand, it is to look upon the State as consisting entirely of the

[1] The principal advantage of the monarchic form of constitution is its elasticity, which enables it to forbid its framework, to exclude any beneficial elements to be found in other possible constitutions, but to appropriate them and incorporate them in itself.

Government or those in office. It is those who govern and those who are governed taken together that constitute the people, and reveal the true mind of the people. Hence it follows—(*a*) that those who are governed *should have a share in legislation*, and it is a *law of legislation that this share should be used*, that no law should have legal force unless they give it their consent through their representatives (that is, it must receive the consent of the Chamber of Representatives). (*b*) Moreover, since the Government, too, is a part of the people, it must also be demanded that, as being the *natural representative of the existing order of things*, and of the stability of the State, it should not merely have a deliberative voice in legislation, but should give its free consent to the enactment of laws, and that there should not be the possibility of outvoting it. Accordingly, the idea of a merely suspensive veto on the part of the Government must be condemned. It has a right to an absolute veto, and this the Chambers also have with reference to the proposals of the Government. Likewise, it must never come to pass that the majority should tyrannize over the minority, nor that all the distinctions which exist within the nation should be obliterated, that all the organic combinations which men have formed with each other should be destroyed by bringing every one to the same level of abstract equality. On the contrary, a State only attains to fresh and vigorous life, and a people to actual freedom, when the latter exhibits an abundant variety of organized bodies, which are in their turns members of the greater organism, the State, and each of which, *while resting upon a natural basis, is nevertheless a moral produet, e.g. Communes, Districts, Provinces, and the Classes.* In the abolition of the old class distinctions there is a genuine moral idea, viz. that there are no longer to be *merely physical* classes, to which a man belongs at once by birth, but only ethical, that is, classes with a physical basis indeed (§ 17), but formed by actual work, and by morally justifiable interests. There are therefore to be no castes, no nobility in the old sense of the word. If the nobility can become ethical,[1] if they can point to some special *work*, which from the physical advantages of their order they are best

[1] As, for example, in England, where nobility of birth does not necessarily elevate a man to the rank of nobleman.

qualified to perform for the general welfare,[1] then ethics can have nothing to say against them. But there must be no class whose only work is enjoyment. The mere negation, however, of the old class distinctions is just as pernicious as these distinctions themselves, unless something higher be put in their place. A reorganization of *classes, communes, corporations, and guilds* is necessary for the State in general, but especially with regard to the social question.

It is probable, too, that such a reorganization alone affords a way to the right solution of the problem, as to how a true representation of the governed classes is to be contrived. For every one must be excluded, who cannot give an adequate guarantee that he is an actual, living member of the State. A census is insufficient; the timocracy which it implies has something lowering about it, since it makes the idea of the State depend upon wealth; it is a makeshift, although the payment of taxes must remain a condition of the enjoyment of political rights. But most of all, it is only by a regeneration of guilds and the like, that class-honour and class-usages can arise, or that the respective classes can again each win a fixed place in the social organism, without which they have neither centre nor support. One of the most important duties of the State is to see that there is no mere rabble in the community, no proletariat. In all classes the proletariat has its members and candidates. Its essential character is moral disconnection, the want of a definite relation to society, due to the lack of an organization including all classes. It has indeed its peculiar seat among the poorer classes. It is pauperism that makes the proletariat so dangerous (cf. § 63). It is true that all must form the material, the component parts of the public community, which the idea of Right calls into existence. But these countless atoms must be organized by means of their vocations (§ 68), or the classes to which they belong. For all must have an ethical basis, they must have duties and hence rights (§ 23). Such questions, we may also observe, always show the limits of the power of the State, its dependence upon other potencies, without which it cannot cope with the dangers that threaten its life (§ 34*a*, § 75. 1).

3. Legislation is the ideal side of the functions of the

[1] *E.g.* Court duties, ambassadorships, and *to some extent* military offices.

State; it determines the aims to be pursued, and in so doing requires to be guided by creative love and wisdom. The *real* side of the State functions is *administration*, in the *wider* sense. Here its principal task is to carry out and enforce the laws themselves, or public right. This demands wisdom, technical skill, and power. Administration must be carried on in accordance with law, and hence comes itself within the sphere of legislation. Not that legislation and administration must be confounded with one another, but their legitimate relations must be defined by constitutional law.

Further, the laws and ordinances of civil and political life —the administration of which is the first duty of the State —must also be maintained and put into execution against the disturbances and injuries occasioned by wrongdoing, and this without respect of persons and in the case of both the highest and the lowest. Hence the administration of justice must necessarily be made independent of *administration in the narrower sense*, and thus this real side itself falls into the divisions known as the *administrative*, the *executive*, and the *judicial functions*.

The function of administration in the narrower sense belongs to the Government, and is again divided into different branches. But since it must be carried on in accordance with the *law*, it follows that the classes, which take a share in the formation of the laws, exercise a *controlling* influence over the Government, without, however, forming a superior court over it, since this would make the Government subordinate to them. Publicity is essential to free political life. Since laws are made that they may be put in force, the organs of the Government (through whom, under a monarchy, the ruler acts) are responsible for their execution. The king is not responsible, nor are the classes. Hence the king's Government also must be so composed as to be in general harmony with the people. To meet the case of incurable divisions arising between the Government and the representatives of the people, there must be a *supreme court independent of both parties*, to settle the matters in dispute, and thus obviate any revolutionary action from the one side or the other.

4. *Judicial Functions.* As the judicial functions of a

State must necessarily be independent of the administration, so too they must have one source. This comes out in courts of appeal. Judicial decisions are a prerogative of the State, and hence in monarchies they are rightly given in the name of the king, although it is quite possible that they may be against the king (witness the miller of Sans-Souci and Frederick II.). In the administration of justice also, publicity is essential to free national life. Trial by jury is a good thing in itself; but it can only be attended with beneficial results, when a courageous and impartial sense of right is widely diffused among all classes. With regard to the right of administering *penal justice*, we have seen in § 33*a* the moral grounds on which it is based. But the question still remains —ought capital punishment to be inflicted in a *Christian* State? Objections are frequently urged against it on the score of humanity; while, on the other side, policy and care for the common welfare demand it. But may an individual be deliberately sacrificed for the common welfare? If the right to inflict capital punishment be maintained on such grounds as these, we are landed in the theory that it is merely meant to deter from or prevent crime; and this would make the individual a means or sacrifice for the general good. But man must not be treated merely like a noxious creature, like an animal. Society recognises him as a rational human being not only by rendering him harmless, but *punishing* him, and the State has not only full power to do this, but it is its duty to do it. If capital punishment is to be justified on ethical principles, the grounds assigned for it must be in accordance with the *rights* of the criminal himself, as well as with the general welfare and with true humanity. And this they are if they accord with justice, for justice contradicts no other virtue. He who intentionally murders another is unworthy of earthly human existence, he is worthy of death. This verdict is just, it may and ought to be pronounced, unless we are to regard the lives of good citizens as valueless, and only the life of malefactors as inviolable. On moral grounds, therefore, it is not permissible to declare by law, that no crime is henceforth worthy of death. The humanity of such legislation might turn out to be very inhuman indeed, inasmuch as it might again let loose, both in those who make criminal

assaults and in those who defend themselves against them, a savage element which is held in check by the public administration of law.[1] Against the execution of capital punishment it is especially urged, that the space of time is thereby shortened, which the malefactor has for conversion. But conversion is in God's hands; Scripture does not teach that a definite locality is indispensable to it.[2] It is opposed to the sense of Scripture to make a man's final destiny depend upon what is external, or upon what he suffers. On the contrary, it depends upon his personal guilt. Now, with reference to the latter, experience shows, that the very seriousness of approaching death leads many criminals to repentance, that the solemnity of the death-sentence makes them conscious of the greatness of their guilt, whereas lenity would obscure their sense of its enormity, and would thus have a hurtful effect. Let, therefore, the authorities simply do what their office requires, without taking those factors into account, the knowledge of which is denied them. Experience proves, too, that it is just converted criminals who acknowledge that their crimes are worthy of death by being willing to suffer it; and even if such expiation is against their will, they at least wish that their death should have a good effect, and should strengthen in the community at large the sense of the sacredness of human life. Christian humanity shows itself not in abolishing capital punishment entirely, but in limiting it, in using every possible means for the conversion of the transgressor, as well as in calling to mind the common guilt of all, whenever an execution actually takes place. If such general feeling became strong, capital punishment would come to an end in the right, the truly humane way—namely, by crimes which are worthy of death no longer existing.[3]

Finally, Christian humanity is shown in the right of pardon. Clemency, especially in the case of those who exhibit decided signs of amendment, must not be prohibited

[1] The New Testament is in agreement with these positions (Rom. xiii. 4; Matt. xxvi. 52).

[2] [Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. p. 412.—Ed.] [Referring to the possibility of conversion in the intermediate state.—Tr.]

[3] Trendelenburg expresses himself to the same effect, *Naturrecht*, § 70, p. 123 sq.

by law, any more than capital punishment must be abolished by law. The legal abolition of capital punishment, even though it should merely take the shape of making it a duty to grant a reprieve in every case, would effect more than we may desire — for it would be a denial that the crime is worthy of death. Sentence of condemnation must therefore, in right and justice, be passed. And this may act as an incentive to repentance. But whether the sentence should be carried out or a reprieve granted, must depend upon a consideration of the particular case, and upon the moral state of society. The criminal must have the fact impressed upon him, that he has forfeited his life, and has *no right* to pardon. But if pardon does not create the impression of being a privilege, of being an encouragement to crime, it may and ought to have a place.

§ 78. *Continuation.*

Relation of the State to its future and to other States. An individual State must not seek to shut itself up in itself, in its present existence, as if it were an absolute quantity, and needing no completion. On the contrary, it must leave room within itself for the free formation and expression of public opinion, and must learn to lead a social life with other individual States. Such a life demands international laws, *but excludes the possibility of a universal State.*

1. The organs for the formation of public opinion are partly free associations (§ 70), and partly the press. As long as these do not become extravagant, and, in particular, do not interfere or claim to interfere with the Executive, but confine themselves to the ideal region of the interchange and ventilation of thoughts, liberty must be granted them, unless they should corrupt the popular mind by immorality and irreligiousness. For the State must recognise morality and piety as its actual foundation, and must allow no injury done to them, and thereby to public morals, to pass unpunished. Energetic repressive measures, however, carried through in the law courts, are much to be preferred to preventive measures

on the part of the administration—both in themselves and on account of the results which might ensue. For in the latter case, the use might be injured in preventing the possible abuse, and yet the use is essential to the healthy existence of the State. For when there is no public spirit, the State is without a soul; and how is a public spirit to be formed or maintained, if there is to be no public opinion? However much it may be the duty of those who conduct political affairs to hold fast to the institutions which have been tried and tested, it nevertheless becomes every Christian statesman not only to recognise that the State is imperfect in every age, but also to take pains to supply its deficiencies and raise it to a higher level. And for this end it is necessary that, by means of debate and the formation of public opinion, a preparation should go on in the sphere of thought, for the introduction of new schemes in the sphere of practice. Without such a preparation, the best measures lack that intellectual support which they require.

2. But while the State must not cut itself off from growth, from its future, neither must it shut itself out from other States. No State has the right or the need to be the sole ruling one; but all are, on the contrary, independent of each other and co-ordinate. On the other side, however, it is one and the same humanity that is in all the different States; there is not a different class of human beings in each of them. Christianity has quickened this consciousness of the unity of mankind in spite of its being split up into nations. Hence it has caused an increased *intercourse* between different States. The effect of this is that, on the one hand, more strife arises, than if all nations were utterly indifferent towards one another; while, on the other, the Christian era shows us the beginnings of a system of universal international laws or rights of nations. It is certainly true that each single State requires for its stability a national basis,—a fact which makes a universal State an impossible ethical idea (§ 75),—but nevertheless each State must be open to active moral relations with other States, must not seek to injure or destroy them, but rather to defend them from harm; and this may be done even in honourable warfare. Christian prudence cannot come into collision with wisdom. Those beginnings

of international law which we see, make it possible for Christian nations to hope that one day Christian princes and Christian peoples will unite to form a high Areopagus, to which they will commit the task of settling their differences with each other, so that Christian blood will no longer have to be shed by Christian men.

3. The *Christian character* of the State does not consist in its forbidding non-Christians to be citizens, but in its being what it ought to be, viz. *just*. But since it is only by means of the Christian principle that a State can be perfectly just, this fact must lead to beneficial results for Christianity in particular. For among the various religions it is the Christian religion alone that, by its history, has given the State a safe guarantee that it will exercise a blessed influence on its citizens. Hence, just from its own special standpoint, the State must not treat other religions as though they were on the same level with the Christian religion, so far as their value for the State is concerned. The State is just when it recognises, that Christianity is essentially more closely allied with its own principle, and gives effect to this recognition by promoting Christianity. The demand for abstract religious freedom—the demand, that is, that the State should treat all religious parties absolutely alike, even such as it has never tested—is often put forward in the name of justice. But it would, on the contrary, be nothing short of an injustice to treat things that differ in the same way.

War is not in itself unchristian, when it is not, as regards its purpose, an offensive one. The State has to guard its honour, that is, its sovereignty; and when this is assailed, it is its duty to make use of every material means, and therefore of war also, to repel such assault—an imposing example of self-defence. But its aim is not to destroy the enemy, not to strike him to the heart, but to attain to an honourable peace.

CHAPTER SECOND.

ART.

§ 79.

Art presents the reality of the Ideal, of Freedom, of the Reconciliation of Mind and Nature, under a *semblance* of reality. Its principal forms are the plastic and the poetic arts.

THE LITERATURE.—Winckelmann, Lessing, *Laokoon.* Hegel's *Æsthetik.* [Vischer, Weisse, Schleiermacher, *Philosophische Ethik; Christliche Sitte; Æsthetik.* Schelling, *Philosophie der Kunst.* Herbart, *Encyclopädie,* Sect. i. cap. 9. Lotze, *Geschichte der Æsthetik in Deutschland; Grundzüge der Æsthetik.* Portig, *Kunst und Religion.* Bethmann-Hollweg, *Christenthum und bildende Kunst.* Dorner, *Kirche und Reich Gottes,* pp. 287 sq., 111 sq. Liebetrut, *Vom Schönen und vom Schmuck.*—ED.]

1. The Beautiful is the Ideal in manifestation, but manifesting itself in the semblance of reality. In art-perception man feels the ideal as actually present; he is raised above the strife of opposites, and sees them reconciled. But art must not be an enervating luxury; it must not take the steel from character; on the contrary, the ideal world, which it sets before man, must give him a more ideal conception of life, and thereby quicken his sense for the practical and his energy. Art has a right even to have special moments of life devoted to it; but this does not mean either that the rest of life is to become rude or ungraceful, or that life is to be filled up entirely by art, but that art must be like Sunday among the days of the week, throwing its brightness over and transfiguring the whole moral life of man.

It is true that the function of *Art,* in the strict sense of the word, is not that of delivering a moral lecture; but at the same time it must not glorify and immortalize existing evils, nor in any way flatter them; on the contrary, instead of being a sensual stimulus, it must display chastity and purity as well as ideality, and thus exert a purifying and elevating influence. Art is not covetous of *applause,* does not

desire praise and honour for their own sakes; but it is chaste and true, far removed above fashion, affectation, or mannerism. And this it is, when the artist seeks only to represent something which has already made a powerful impression upon his own feelings, seeks to make it touch the feelings of others, and thus to propagate the emotion it first awakened within himself. Art has the power to elevate—if but for the time being—and to purify. When it takes a national form and style, it is an important means of refined culture to a community. Even artistic production, properly so called,—which, of course, is only to be found in artists of genius, in virtuosi, —has a wider range than is generally supposed, for it must have a place in refined social life. This is true, *e.g.*, of *singing*. But in addition to this, it is desirable that there should be a general susceptibility to art; not, indeed, that all should be art-connoisseurs, and still less that all should practise art-criticism, which is of doubtful value as a branch of art, and was hardly mentioned in ancient Greece as having special functions of its own. The forms in which the people as a whole can most readily take a share in art—both in the way of production and of enjoyment—are especially *poetry* and *vocal music;* it is of especial importance that the young should learn classical poetry, hymns and national ballads, and the practice of singing them is of special value.

But the Beautiful has a much more general significance than we have yet indicated, since it forms part of the outward manifestation of the virtuous life itself. The beautiful and the moral are allied to each other, and morality is not manifested in its perfect shape, unless an artistic sense for what is noble and beautiful pervades the whole life (§ 62. 4, 61. 5). For the life of Christian virtue has an inward melody and measure, a certain rhythm and harmony. Christians are to be living *ἀγάλματα θεοῦ*, they are to show forth the divine *δόξα*. Here the artist is love, which does not merely hold fast to morality as something characterized by narrow legal austerity, but which exercises a free sway in the Christian life, and gives to all manifestations of Christian virtue, both in word and in deed, a living ideal character.

2. Art, properly so called, falls into two main divisions: literary or poetic, and plastic arts. In the latter, it is *nature*

that furnishes the material which is to be moulded into beautiful shape; there is here, therefore, somewhat of a glorification of nature. In the literary arts, the material—which in this case consists of *words*—is itself the product of the mind, and nature is, as it were, only a thin, transparent vesture for the ideality of the thoughts conveyed. Here the *form*, which in the former instance was the principal matter, is here only secondary.

The plastic arts present the beautiful as form animated by mind; the literary present the beautiful in the drapery of words. The transition from the one to the other is found in music with its tone-waves and tone-imagery, which, however, address only the most intellectual of the senses, viz. the ear, and hover between reality and ideality. Each of these main divisions, again, falls into three subdivisions, the one set corresponding to the other.

A. *Plastic Arts.* *Architecture* is plastic art characterized by objectivity. It presents ideals in their abstract universality and simplicity; and for this reason its symbolical power is all the greater, especially in the representation of the sublime. *Sculpture* is plastic art characterized by subjectivity, and presents what is concrete and personal. *Painting*, finally, is the union of both. For it groups the figures of sculpture in accordance with the principles of architecture and perspective.

B. *Poetic Arts.* These occupy a more purely mental region; their objects lie in the *world of mind;* and although, for example, they describe nature, yet nature must first be brought to ideal or spiritual form in the mind, before it can be presented artistically. In the *Epic* we have poetic art characterized by objectivity, in the *Lyric* by subjectivity. The *Drama*—like painting—unites both. In the drama the fabula is the epic root, while the lyric element appears in the personal dialogue or in the songs (of the chorus, for instance). Tragedy presents the beautiful under the aspect of sublimity. Apparent collisions with justice occur, but the result is a higher Nemesis, a higher revelation of justice. Comedy represents the victory of truth over appearance. A play combines both the tragic and the comic elements.

All the different arts, music, orchestration, as well as the three kinds of poetic art, and even the plastic arts (in the

shape of scenery and dramatic representation), appear in combination on the *stage*, the central point of which is the drama in the wider sense of the word. There they mutually support each other, and succeed most completely in presenting an ideal picture of reality in a beautiful form.

The *Theatre* must not be regarded as in itself reprehensible. If we read ancient and modern classical dramas, and even esteem them as treasures, there is no reason why they should not also be recited or acted. He who may read them and see in his mind an image of what he reads, may also witness their objective representation upon the stage. This holds good of the public in general, while a similar observation is applicable to actors themselves. A player must not indeed lose himself in the part he acts, however readily this may happen (§ 68), or identify his own person with it. For then he becomes *untrue;* in his own mind he must always remain distinct from the part he plays, and only live in it and represent it by his imaginative power. If he is carried away by his feelings, so as to imagine that he is actually the hero whose character he assumes, then he is no longer an actor, but begins to transgress the limits of objective truth, and to lose self-control. From what has been said, however, we see that acting is morally permissible.

But the theatre, as it exists at the present day, exhibits many deficiencies, and is in many respects morally hurtful,—and this both with regard to the pieces that are played, the *vast number* of performances, the taste of the theatre-going public, and the spirit that prevails among actors themselves. It is even morally objectionable that actors should form a special *vocation* (§ 68). The Greek theatre was chaste, and dramatic exhibitions were infrequent, being held annually on the occasion of great *national festivals.* The Greeks employed no unlawful means of attraction; nor was there any need of a special professional class in connection with their theatres —a class that is too apt to degenerate through untruthfulness, display and vanity.

3. *Relation of Art to Religion and Christianity.* (*a*) Art requires religion. It must indeed have no laws imposed upon it from without; it lives and works in the atmosphere of freedom. Nevertheless, if there is a want of true inner

life, a want of inward harmony,—and this there must be if a moral spirit be absent,—then art cannot give a truthful representation of the harmonious; in other words, art and the beautiful must languish. In this sense it must be said that art is dependent upon morality and religion; and, more especially, that there is an inward connection between Christianity and art, or that it is only through Christianity that art can arrive at true maturity.

(*b*) Religion requires art. Among Christian confessions, the old Reformed confession shows less appreciation of art than the Lutheran; it is just the reverse with reference to the State. For the Protestant idea of the State has been carried out most completely in the sphere of Reformed theology. Still, even the Scotch Reformed Churches deny that they have any aversion to art on grounds of principle. They simply maintain that the second commandment is still valid, and hold that it applies not only to representations of God Himself,—a position which might easily be justified, even from artistic considerations,—but also to representations of Christ, especially in the form of sculpture. And this they do, because sculpture has more of the appearance of reality about it than painting, and therefore tends, in this case, to engender in the minds of the uneducated a confusion of God with the creature.

Barren, prosaic spiritualism has no notion of the fact that the body is a gain even to the spirit. In art, the spiritual importance of the body, and of what is corporeal, is brought forth in its essential dignity, and made an object of perception. Art is a kind of glorification of nature, although more as a prophecy than as anything else. Roman Catholicism, on the other hand, places art too high; it mixes æsthetic and religious feelings.

Primitive Christianity, on the contrary, holds a middle course. In the New Testament, instruction is conveyed in the language of poetry and parable, while singing and music[1] are both recommended. Further, art is also valuable in public worship, and even in the formation of religious ideas. For, unless the *imagination* is cultivated and developed (§ 64. 1), it is impossible for the mind to form a vivid image

[1] Cf. Col. iii. 16; John xv. 1 f.; Matt. vi. 28 f.

of Christ, of the consummation of all things, of the majesty of heaven, or of the angelic world. All Christian eschatology shows that Christianity is not hostile to art, but that it involves the final perfection or glorification of nature. And in art we have the beginning of this final result. In these respects, then, it forms an essential factor in the religious life both of the individual and of the community.

But art must likewise, as we have already shown, maintain its independence as an *ultimate end*. Although it must always be Christian, that does not mean that it is to assume a specially Christian form and manner, nor that it must deal only with subjects taken from sacred history. On the contrary, its choice of material, so far at least as the drama is concerned, is limited by the fact that nothing which pertains to the essence of religion,—Christ, for example,—no religious acts, such as prayer, must be represented on the stage. To do so would be to treat religion as a means, and would therefore be profane. But art maintains its Christian character by exhibiting purity and chastity as well as artistic truth. With reference to the material of art, the only limitation laid down by Schleiermacher is, that what is profane or worldly must only be employed by art, in so far as it is also fitted to furnish a subject for religious art.

4. *Relation of Art to the Civil Community and the State.* The importance of national art has already been pointed out. Art in this form exhibits a much higher style, than when it depends upon private patronage merely, and serves for the adornment of private houses, etc.; for in the latter case it is always apt to degenerate into triviality and impurity. Hence the State must take an interest in art. It cannot, of course, create artistic talent; but it can arouse it when it exists, and afford it the possibility of free development. And this it can do by providing the means for the cultivation and maintenance of art, so that no one who has artistic powers may lack the opportunity of developing them. For this purpose schools and academies of art must be formed, and in connection with these, and forming as it were their libraries, there should be art collections open to public view.

CHAPTER THIRD.

SCIENCE.

§ 80.

Science too, in its own way, has claims not only upon all departments of human life, but also upon all men, although in different degrees. The centre of the scientific sphere is formed by the *learned*, properly so called, and their primary functions are (*a*) research and (*b*) communication of scientific knowledge both by word and by writing. The way, in which people in general take a share in science, is by receiving instruction and by reading. Moreover, since science is necessary to the prosperity of all the other spheres of life, it must also be furnished with the institutions which are essential to its self-maintenance and propagation, as well as to its progress. The organizations for this purpose are as follows: — (1) *Schools* (Elementary and Middle-class schools, high schools and gymnasia). (2) Universities. (3) Academies, which, in addition to the personal energies of their members, must also be possessed of the material means for carrying on their work (scientific collections, libraries, museums, etc.). Sound science has everywhere a *national* character; nevertheless, since it is *truth*, and truth alone, with which it is concerned, it also aims at a general interchange and arrangement of scientific knowledge,[1] because each nation is specially fitted for the cultivation of some particular side of the whole organism of truth.[2] It is the duty of the State to ensure to science the possibility of its vigorous and free

[1] The law of hospitality is commonly observed among academicians.

[2] In particular, the English and French on the one hand, and the Germans on the other, mutually supplement one another; the former being more of a practical, and the latter of an ideal bent of mind.

development; to ensure its actual development is beyond its power. And that the progress of science may be rendered possible, it is necessary not only that those institutions should be formed, which we have already mentioned, but also that there should be liberty in teaching, and also liberty in the publication of *scientific* works. Christianity has nothing to fear from true science; secure in the divine certainty of its own truth, and in the victorious power of truth in general, it gives full freedom to scientific research.

[The Literature.—Cf. especially Schleiermacher, *Philosophische Ethik*, ed. Schweizer. *Gelegentliche Gedanken über Universitaten. Werke*, 3 Abth. Bd. i. p. 537 f. Hofmann, *Christl. Ethik*, p. 317. Zeller, *Ueber akademisches Lehren und Lernen. Vorträge und Abhandlungen*, iii. Nr. 5. Cless, *Die Frage nach demethischen Werthe der Wissenschaft*, 1879.—Ed.]

1. All the great advances of mankind are advances in knowledge, and hence in science, although it is true that only intellectualism can hold, that the culture of intelligence is either a substitute or a guarantee for religion and morality. All the best discoveries are due to science. It is true that the spheres of life covered by religion and positive morality are in no sense scientific discoveries; they precede science, furnish it with material and so render it fruitful. And this holds good with regard to Christianity. But science, which then appreciatively directs its attention to the higher life that has been won, raises the appropriation of the objective contents of that life to a higher level, and to a firmer and more secure objective form. And these contents Christianity itself seeks to become through the organ of the scientific function. To be afraid of knowledge, to draw up *Indices librorum prohibitorum*, is unworthy of Christianity; a Church which does so shows but little confidence in truth. As long as Christianity continued to maintain its early promise and vigour, and the noble purity of its life, no such *Indices* existed,—although Tertullian, for example, has as many heterodoxies as Origen. The case is quite different, of course, with regard to the care that should be exercised in making a wise and prudent selection of books

for the various stages of life and education; this, however, is a *matter for individual judgment* (John xvi. 12). Science, of course, may go astray and so do harm. But if it could not do this, neither could it be of any real service; it would not be free, and would consequently be unable to be truly productive, while it would fail to make a deep impression or awaken any confidence, since it would merely work, as it were, to order. False science is not to be refuted by force, but by a higher degree of scientific knowledge, which exposes the contradictions in which false science is involved, and proves it to be science in appearance merely. And this inward method, slow and tedious though it may be, is always sure to succeed; moreover, it is a method which must always be possible, since whatever is false can exist only upon what is true, and consequently carries its enemy in its own breast.

2. In connection with *grammar schools*[1] (gymnasia) has arisen the opposition between humanism and realism. The former is in favour of classical, the latter of modern culture. The reason why they cannot come to an agreement is, that both of them have in many ways become estranged from the Christian principle. As a natural consequence of this, an opposition has arisen between the different forms which the spirit of nationality assumes among different peoples—an opposition which Christianity has, in principle, overcome (Gal. iii. 28). If modern German culture is dominated by a truly Christian spirit, it will not take up an exclusive attitude towards classical culture; and conversely, the latter, if it be *φιλολογία* in the true sense, will also respect that national form of culture with which it is in contact—nay more, it will become love to the *λόγος* who became flesh. For *φιλολογία* is not merely love of words or language, nor even of artistic language merely, it is also love to reason and to the world of thought. And the richest world of thought is found in Christianity, in which the innermost thoughts of God are revealed. Christian science is a form of the subjugation of the world by Christianity, and a means by which it is carried out.

3. *Universities,* in the strict sense of the word, are to be found only in Germany, although even here they fall far

[1] Cf. Martensen, *l.c.* iii.

short of their idea. In Scotland and America we see an effort made to realize true university culture. In order that a university may truly discharge its functions, it is necessary that the universum of knowledge should be kept in view; and for this end there must be a mutual active intercourse between the various departments of knowledge, while each must be surveyed in its connection with the whole. The faculty of philosophy must form the universal medium of intercourse and agreement; when this is not the case, there cannot be any possibility of an active interchange between the separate faculties. At the university, students must seek to know the *truth*, to apprehend it in its principles, and to love it unselfishly; they must not merely seek to become fitted for some definite, practical vocation, or to be made capable of performing its duties. And this love to science must dominate all their studies, so that the latter may not degenerate into a mere training for earning a livelihood. When they do not rest satisfied with a knowledge that is superficial, or only empirically acquired, when, on the contrary, their studies lead them to the knowledge of truth itself in its essential principles, so that they master the truth, or rather so that the truth masters them,—then it will be found that the truth thus gained will not be without an impulse towards practice. For it is a property of all that is ideal, to desire to exist for other minds also; this, which is the universal characteristic of truth, may be called, as it were, its innate quality of love. And every one who has been taken possession of by the truth, or is enthusiastic for it, is thus compelled by its power to become, in his own sphere, and alike in thought, in word and in deed, a witness to the truth, to its majesty, and to the blessings which it brings. His outward practical life, in his vocation, will thus become the rich fruit of his inward development and convictions. And so, without any declension from science,—which is a sort of intellectual self-mutilation,—without any fatal inward rupture, the transition will be effected to practical life and the duties of one's vocation. Superficial study, on the other hand, without a real love for truth, either lands us in negation and confusion, or causes us to take a leap into practical life, and to make a violent, *immoral breach between*

faith and knowledge. But a faith attained in this arbitrary way bears its character stamped upon itself. For it unconsciously transforms evangelical faith, which is a principle of life, into a work and law, after the fashion of mere intellectual and lifeless orthodoxy. Where, on the contrary, moral stedfastness and freedom in the investigation of truth are preserved, they do not fail to meet their reward in the joyful consciousness of the great harmony that subsists between all the different sides or regions of truth. The most important thing is to know the connection of all the various spheres of life with each other, the connection of even the natural or physical with the moral, and of the moral with the religious; for such knowledge gives a direct impulse to the moral and religious life.

THIRD SECTION.

THE ABSOLUTE SPHERE. THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY.

I. IDEA OF THE CHURCH.

§ 81.

[Cf. *Glaubenslehre,* ii. 2, pp. 689 f., 782 f., 784 f., 804 f., 844 f., 876 f., 883 f., 887 f., 899 f., 910 f., 924 f., 977 f. —ED.

The Church is the community to which the absolute religion gives rise. It is built up out of believing humanity, through the power of the Holy Spirit, and on the basis of the Word and Sacraments, and is a constantly self-reproducing association (§§ 31, 34*a*, 71). It is the moral duty of all men to belong to this community. As it is a universal human duty to become a Christian,—for Christ is the law of faith (§§ 40, 44),—so, by reason of the relation subsisting between man's consciousness of himself as a believer and his sense of affinity with all men, it is necessary that there should be a Christian religious community or Church, and that every Chris-

tian should attach himself to it as a living member (§§ 17. 3, 31, 71). The virtue corresponding to this sphere is the *churchly* sense, which, while remaining loyal to its own native Church, has a wide heart for the one ecumenic Christendom, and is equally far removed from a spirit of sectarianism and a spirit of laxity. The starting-point and the goal being here both universal, the way to the latter lies through the historical forms of Church life.

Cf. Schleiermacher, *Christliche Sitte.*

[The Literature.—Petersen, *Die Idee der christlichen Kirche.* Harless, *Kirche und Amt,* 1851. Harnack, *Die Kirche, ihr Amt, ihr Regiment,* 1862. Köstlin, *Das Wesen der Kirche, beleuchtet nach Lehre und Geschichte des N. T.,* 1854. *Der Glaube,* 393 f. Walther, *Die Stimme unserer Kirche in der Frage von Kirche und Amt,* 1852. Kliefoth, *Acht Bücher von der Kirche.* Delitzsch, *Vier Bücher von der Kirche.* Löhe, *Drei Bücher von der Kirche,* 1845. *Kirche und Amt,* 1855. Ritschl, *Ueber die Begriffe, sichtbare und unsichtbare Kirche. Studien und Kritiken,* 1859, 2. *Begründung des Kirchenrechts im evangelischen Begriff der Kirche,* 1869. *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung,* iii. J. Müller, *Die unsichtbare Kirche dogmatische Abhandlungen,* pp. 278–403. Andersen, *Das protestantische Dogma von der sichtbaren und unsichtbaren Kirche. Theologische Mitarbeiten,* 1841. Muenchmeyer, *Das Dogma von der sichtbaren und unsichtbaren Kirche.* Nitzsch, *Praktische Theologie,* vol. i. Krauss, *Das protestantische Dogma von der unsichtbaren Kirche.* Kierckegaard, *Christenthum und Kirche,* 1861. Thiersch, *Vorlesungen über Protestantismus und Katholicismus,* 1848. Hofmann, *Ethik,* p. 164 f. Martensen, *Christian Ethics,* iii. 306 f. Frank, *System der christlichen Gewissheit,* ii. § 39. *Der christlichen Wahrheit,* ii. Schweizer, *Die christl. Glaubenslehre,* ii. p. 314 f. A. Dorner, *Kirche und Reich Gottes.* Schmidt, *Die Lehre von der Kirche,* 1884. Seeberg, *Der Begriff der christl. Kirche,* 1885, Part I. Lotze, *Mikrokosmus,* iii. 379; *Religionsphilosophie,* §§ 94, 101. O. Pfleiderer, *Religionsphilosophie,* 2nd ed. ii. c. *Grundriss der christl. Glaubens- und Sittenlehre.* Lasson, *Ueber Gegenstand und Behandlungsart der Religionsphilosophie.* Harless and Harnack, *Die Kirchlichreligiöse Bedeutung der reinen Lehre von der Gnadenmitteln.* Cf. the literature mentioned above, § 75.—Ed.]

Note.—The word "Church" comes from κύριος; the bride takes the name of the bridegroom. The controversy as to

whether the Church should be set in a superior position to the other moral spheres, is an idle and unfruitful one so far as the Church herself is concerned, for she seeks to become great by serving. That which is befitting to *religion* must not, without modification, be transferred to the Church or religious community. On the other hand, the Church, regarded in her real nature, is certainly the absolute sphere, since she has directly to do with God. In the midst of the other moral spheres, she forms the central sphere in the kingdom of God; she is the hearth on which the sacred flame of the higher life of humanity is fed. She has to do with the sun itself, not merely with some of its individual rays.

1. As to the *essential nature* of the Church, the Roman Catholic and Evangelical Churches more especially are at strife. For the former lays stress upon the external side of the Church, upon the Church as an *institution;* nay, it regards the outward form and constitution of the Church as established by a Divine act. Hence, its conception of the Church is altogether a *dogmatic* one, just as we saw with regard to its conception of marriage (not with regard to the State, however, for it insists on being itself the true State; it degrades the State, and is its rival). The Evangelical Church, on the other hand, takes the right view, however often it may be reproached with conceiving of the Church as a *civitas Platonica.* It is true that it also ascribes the origin of the Church to a *Divine act,* to the person and work of Christ, which continue to operate in *the word and sacraments.*[1] But it is not the Church as an institution which is thus directly produced; it is believers, the redeemed, who are first of all gained.[2] It is only when a foundation has been laid in *faith* (§ 43 sq.) that a fellowship of love arises,—freely, yet by an ethical necessity. The Church consists of *vere credentes;* it is a *congregatio sanctorum,* that grows up around the word and sacraments.[3] Thus it is an *ethical* product, resting upon the *act of God,* through which *faith* comes into existence; in other words, it is the community formed by believers, who, even when they do not know one another, are yet ideally united by their intercession for each other and by Christian

[1] Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine,* iv. §§ 128, 134.

[2] Gal. iii. 28, ii. 20.

[3] *Conf. Aug.* vii., viii., not a *politia externorum rituum.* Heb. x. 24, 25.

love, and who, wherever they meet, quickly understand each other by reason of the spiritual kinship of their higher nature.

But the love of believers does not remain a merely ideal thing; it seeks, as far as possible, to exhibit itself in active exercise. Believers seek to realize and enjoy their union with one another; and this takes place through their self-manifesting activity. The common self-manifestation of believers is displayed, in the first place, in the sphere of the religious life; and accordingly, their fellowship with each other, which already exists inwardly, *finds outward expression in their associating together for public worship, an association which is the soul and centre of Church fellowship.* Moreover, the fellowship which believers have with Christ in faith and love gives rise to love among themselves (§§ 69. 1, 31. 3, 45. 4), and this love again, in which believers stand to each other in a relation of co-ordination, gives rise to active brotherly love, or to the Church as the manifestation of fellowship in the absolute religion. This is the *absolute derivation of the Church;* it is peculiar to the Evangelical Church.

Still, it is only the idea of the Church that we thus obtain, not its empirical form, which contains non-believers as well as believers. In order to arrive at the latter, a second factor must be introduced. Love also is present in faith in unequal proportions, though its aim is the removal of inequality. The *ecclesia vere credentium* does not manifest its activity for the sake of true believers alone; it has also *pædagogic* functions to discharge, it is always *extending itself* farther and farther, and *reacts* against the disturbances which it suffers from the world (§ 69. 4). In addressing itself to this task, it does not, in a Donatistic spirit, attempt to discard the unregenerate, but rather works patiently with them; while it also holds fast to its Christian contents (word and sacrament) in their essential principles, carries them into effect, and demands from all its members the recognition of the foundations of the Christian faith. In this way it becomes the *ecclesia large dicta*,[1] and, ever carrying on a process of self-purification, lives and works as the salt and light of the world. Thus it

[1] *Apol.* ed. Müller, pp. 153–163.

is evident, that (and why) the Church must at every time not only exhibit the character of a Church that is learning, and therefore needing growth, but must also exhibit self-manifesting activity. In *both* of these forms of Church life the central element is *fellowship in public worship*. For even piety grows by exercise, and the manifestation of piety on the part of mature Christians has a pædagogic, stimulating and edifying effect.

2. *Fellowship in public worship*, which is the innermost sanctuary of the Church, and exercises a ruling influence over everything else, deepens and intensifies individual piety (§ 50 sq.). In the united prayer of an assembled body of believers there is more than a mere act of man; for in true public worship God Himself, in the strictest sense of the word, is present in the midst of the worshippers,[1] and hence God and the congregation enter into the closest union with each other. Thus it necessarily follows that in public worship we reach the highest moments of life. Uniting ourselves to God, we unite ourselves to the personal centre of the universe, not merely to reflections of Him or single aspects of His nature (such as the State, science, etc.), but to God Himself in His majesty and love, which are alike unfathomable. Public worship therefore is not merely one among the various legitimate departments of life, and like them its own ultimate end; it is an absolute end both for God and man. For man, in the entirety of his nature, finds rest and blessedness, not in any single region of life, but only in the absolute whole, which is God: and God Himself is not satisfied until this act of love has taken place, in which He enters into the most intimate union with human spirits. Now it is, of course, true that congregations upon earth are always limited by space and time. Nevertheless, the common worship, in which the believer engages with those who are more nearly allied to him, forms the natural bridge by which his religious life passes out of the isolation of mere religious feeling, out of the idealism of the merely invisible Church or fellowship of all the children of God, and enters the sphere of outward reality, —thus becoming a life in which the whole man, both in body and in soul, rejoices in the living God. Wherever public

[1] Matt. xviii. 20.

worship is held, however, it must be the true spirit of Christendom (and Christendom is the true humanity) as inspired by the Holy Ghost that finds outward expression; the spirit which praises God not merely as the protector of these individual worshippers, but as the Father of all mankind whom He makes His children in Christ. The true spirit of common prayer represents the true catholicity of the Church of Christ on earth, by enlargement of range and heart in intercession and love. And no less does true worship strengthen the bond which unites the Church invisible with the Church visible. For on earth the Church can never be such a complete whole as is presented in the case of other communities (marriage, the family, the State), because those who belong to it are not merely its members on earth, while the latter themselves are scattered throughout many different lands. True worship draws the forces of truth and holiness, of victory and immortality, down from the invisible into the visible sphere. Thus in its public worship each separate Church and confession renews its life as a member of the body of Christ, animated by the spirit which pervades the life of the whole, and which unites the Church above to the Church beneath. And thus, too, it protects itself from the guilt of shutting itself off from the truth which other Churches represent, and from the gifts with which they have been endowed.

3. The *virtue* which corresponds to this sphere is the *churchly* mind (§ 55), *i.e.* an active interest in the welfare of the whole community, shown by an advocacy of the interests of the Church community and a co-operation in promoting its welfare,—always in accordance with the God-appointed vocation and the station which it assigns. This churchly sense of the Christian is shown, not merely in performing certain acts connected with the Church, such as attending public worship or partaking of the Lord's Supper, but also in his readiness to sacrifice energy, time and means for the aims of the Church, and to promote the same in his daily life. The Christian Church should so live in the heart of each individual Christian, that in his whole life he proves himself to be a loyal and worthy member of it; or that it, as it were, acts through him. But love to God in Christ always remains the first and

foremost thing for the Christian. Hence he can never be satisfied with a Church adherence, which has not as its basis a living adherence to Christ. Should the former seek to pass for the latter, the Christian will regard it as a mere appearance, without any real substance. Since the relation we hold to Christ is the basis of Christian piety, it is through Christ that we first become united to the Church, which without Him would, for us, have lost its centre.

But now, in consequence of the influence of sin, the *one* Christian Church is, in its historical life, split up into different Churches or confessions. In this state of things, what is the attitude which the churchly mind of the Christian assumes? He does not take up an attitude of indifference towards the excellences of the creed of his own Church, but at the same time, being alive to the spirit of catholicity, he does not fail to acknowledge the common inheritance of truth which belongs to other confessions as well as his own; nay, he is ready to recognise their superior excellences where they exist. For it is for the good of the whole σῶμα, that these have been conferred by the κεφαλή upon one of its members. Hence, *wherever* we see anything that is Christian in other Churches, we are bound to love it, and neither to deny or disparage it, lest we grieve the Spirit of Christ, or wound, as it were, His body by word or deed. According to John xvii. and Eph. iv. 1 ff., two Churches, which are at one in acknowledging the fundamental facts and truths of salvation, are in duty bound to hold fellowship with each other; and this is the case with regard to the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, which cannot refuse, on grounds of principle, to hold sacramental fellowship with one another without falling into error and sin. Of course, Christian fellowship is not a renunciation of the convictions we have won, nor an acceptance of what is erroneous—on the contrary, we manifest love by combating error in a loving spirit—but it is the means by which different Churches maintain an interchange of the special advantages which they severally possess. On the other hand, it is not requisite to the unity of the Church that Church organization and usages should be everywhere the same.[1]

[1] *Conf. Aug.* vii., viii.

II. The Cardinal Functions of the Church.

§ 82.

The cardinal functions of the Church are self-manifestation, self-propagation, and self-purification, the last of these being the means by which Church unity is promoted.[1] It discharges all these functions both in its teaching and its life, by means of its official organization as well as in other and voluntary ways.

1. *Self-manifestation.* Many hold that such a thing as religious self-manifestation is out of question in our religious communities. It is said that they are in a state of nonage, are unchristian, are subjects for missionary exertion, that in their case self-manifestation would be untrue. But we reply, they have been baptized, and therefore *before* they take up a position hostile to the Church, they are under the *law* of Christian faith and life. Such a state of things already makes Christian self-manifestation possible, nay, particularly salutary and beneficial. By Christian self-manifestation we mean, not simply the manifestation of objective Christian truth, of the love of Christ to men, but also of a religious life. Even the Christian piety which savours of legalism is a stage gained; it is a surrender to the love of Christ, to the word of Christ, to hearing it, and meditating thereon. There is a pious confession of sin, there are pious desires which ought to be manifested. There is in it a drawing by the Father to the Son. Moreover, the *pædagogy*, under which we may too rashly comprise everything, is impossible unless there are leaders, who by *self-manifestation*, by demonstration of the Spirit and power, enkindle the hearts of others. Wherever, then, the Holy Spirit has already been carrying on His work by means of the word and sacraments, there must the Christian spirit also manifest itself. It must, above all, show its love to Christ, its union with the fundamental institutions of

[1] This division of the cardinal functions is based upon, § 81. 1. The Church is a fellowship of love in the relation of equality,—then its action is that of self-manifestation—and in the relation of inequality,—then its action is that of propagation and purification.

Christ, we mean the word and sacraments, to which the Church is bound by the inner law of its life, a bondage which is perfect freedom.

We have seen (§ 51) that *contemplation* and *prayer* are the essential acts in which individual piety is manifested. They are also the acts of Church piety in congregational worship, but in this case they are united with the objective factors of the *word of God* and the *sacraments*. The word of God is the ideal of all devotional language in public worship, and promotes contemplation, while the *sacraments* directly promote the life of the religious community, *ζωή*. St. Peter gives the exhortation—if any man speaketh, let him speak as it were oracles of God. The *word* of God produces religious *consciousness*, *φῶς*. A sacrament is not merely a word of Christ but an *act*, in which He enters into perfect union with believers and the congregation; and this act of Christ is the type of the way in which we unite ourselves with Him, that is to say, it is the productive ideal of congregational *prayer*. We should so pray that our prayer becomes an act, in which the soul is joined in the closest union with God in Christ. This is the will of our Lord who instituted the sacraments. Christ's self-sacrificing devotion to us should draw forth the sacrifice of our prayer, nay, of our very souls.

In the self-manifestation of the Church in public worship, the ideal side, namely, the religious *consciousness* of the community, represented in common *contemplation* based upon the objective *word of God*, is united with the real, namely, fellowship in religious life which is realized in common *prayer*, based upon the objective *sacrament*. This fellowship is the union of consciousness and life, *φῶς* and *ζωή*.

2. *Self-propagation.* (*a*) *Extensive.* The manifestation of the unity of the Church with God in Christ is not, in the first place, for any external object, but for an object contained within itself. The congregation engages in contemplation and prayer, not in order to produce an effect upon outsiders, or to convert them, but for its own sake, and in order to experience and manifest its fellowship with God, or its possession of the supreme good. But this does not prevent such self-manifestation from being at the same time, though unintentionally, a power which propagates and purifies Christian piety. Who-

ever looks upon a congregation engaged in worship, and truly possessed by the spirit of devotion and prayer (such as we see, for instance, among ourselves on Good Friday), cannot fail—even should he be a non-Christian—to carry away a deep impression, a sense of the blessedness which the congregation enjoys, of a real power of God present in these services, and thus the latter will involuntarily exercise a propagating effect. Nevertheless, since the Church on earth has always to combine self-manifesting with pædagogic functions (§ 81), it must not merely produce *unintentional* effects upon unbelievers; or, in other words, it must not organize itself with a view to self-manifestation alone. Wherever such a tendency becomes predominant in the ritual of public worship, the manifestation of blessedness, which the Church makes in thanksgiving and praise, becomes an anticipation of the victory of untruth, of mechanism. For the manifestation of religious life made in public worship must never go beyond the actual stage which the worshippers have reached. Otherwise, we have the beginning of mere display, the principle of the *missa solitaria*, and we offend against the principle of all manifestation, against truth (§§ 55, 65, 66). The Christian congregation will not merely manifest its needs, its longing for the Bridegroom and the blessedness of communion, but, strengthened by the enjoyment it has of the absolute good, it will traffic therewith for the purpose of bringing it to those who as yet have it not, and will expressly act with such a purpose. Such is the self-propagation to which Christians are impelled by the universal purpose of the love of Christ, by the love of the Church for itself and for the brethren. For the Church knows, that even its moments of triumph cannot as yet be free from pain and grief, that it cannot regard itself as complete while still devoid of the members which ought to grow on it. It is by its self-propagating function that the Church grows in *extension*.

(*a*) This is effected in a *pædagogic* form by the education and instruction of those who, by means of infant baptism, are living in appearance in Christian grace. The new generations which successively grow up, are appropriated by means of catechetical and educational agencies. The case of their elders is met by continuous efforts for their further develop-

ment in the conscious possession of a personal justification through faith, and by pastoral care.

(*β*) On the other hand, there is the *missionary activity* of the Church. By its missions to Jews and heathens the Church is ever enlarging its borders and lengthening the cords of its tent. According to the purpose of Christ's love, mankind and Christendom should be coextensive.[1]

No one ought to be able to plead, as the reason of his unbelief, that the offer of salvation was never made to him. It is an essential function of the Church to take heed that such guilt cannot be imputed to her. Nature in every instance expends her heartiest efforts, her best powers, upon growth, upon reproduction. This normal Church activity is of specially animating power for our own Church as well as others, in virtue of the self-sacrifice it calls forth, the enlargement of view and affection it produces, and the consolation it affords amidst the corruption and the contests in our native Church.

(*b*) But self-propagation must take place *intensively* as well as extensively. Everything that really lives has within itself a tendency to grow. And this tendency will be self-operative, when that which checks and restrains it is done away with. And this consideration points to the Church's function of self-purification.

3. *Self-purification.* Growth in extent will have an externalizing effect, unless it is at the same time a growth in *intensity*. It becomes intensive in the Church by the same process as in individuals—by purification (§ 48); the shadows of the unconverted world reach far into the Church, though not to its centre, which always remains in unvarying brightness, in the light of eternity. Hence intensive growth is carried on by two processes. There is, on the one hand, a continued assimilation of those vital forces which are Divine, accompanied by the use of such pure forces as already exist, for the purpose of purification. There is, on the other, a continual rejection of error, the intellectual, and sin the actual opposite to the Church, for the purpose of giving free action on behalf of the kingdom of Christ, and for the appropriation of the *πνεῦμα*, to those powers which were restrained or

[1] Matt. xxviii. 20, xxiv. 14.

corrupted by the spirit of evil. Hence the Church can only be regarded as Christian, if engaged in a course of continual reformation and renovation. It is blameable sloth and presumption to think, that a single century could complete the work of reformation. This third essential function, viz. self-purification, has to be exercised against all the stains and imperfections with which, through sin or error, the Church may as a whole, or in its individual members, whether externally or internally, be affected. To it belongs,—

(*a*) The action of the whole body against the power of sin and error in individuals by *Church discipline*. This is authorized by Matt. xviii. 18; 1 Cor. v.; 2 Cor. ii.; Tit. iii. 10. It has been disputed whether the saving of the sinner, the amendment of him who has caused notorious scandal, or the warning which would preserve from infection, or the *honour* of the Church, should be the governing principle of such discipline. No safe point of departure for Church discipline—that *nervus ecclesiæ*, according to Calvin—will be found, if it is regarded as penal power, except in the sense of ἐλέγχειν. But neither is the first view sufficient. For the amendment of the offender is not in the power of man. If only such amendment could make Church discipline lawful, it must either not exist at all, or else must cease just where it is most needful. On the contrary, *the certain and unassailable point of view* is that it is the Church's right and duty to assert itself against offences, and not by silence to draw down upon itself the saying: *qui tacet, consentire videtur*. In Church discipline the Church is, in the first place, engaged in vindicating its own *honour;* for if that is injured, her mission to the world is made void. Against notorious sinners, who live as if a life of impenitence were compatible with Christianity and Church-membership, the Church has to secure her own dignity by renouncing all connection with sin and all toleration of sin in herself. By this means offence, *i.e.* the infectious power of sin, is already done away with. Such an assertion of dignity on the part of the Church is certainly an act of justice—in the first place towards herself; she must not be partaker of other men's sins, but must separate from the unholy. And thus also will she most surely prepare the way for the restoration of those who turn the grace of God into

lasciviousness. We see, then, that when the Church is content with fulfilling the duty of preserving her own purity, she is thereby most certainly on the road towards meeting the first requirement, viz. the awakening and amendment of the sinner. For only by walking in the way of justice and law, and not by overleaping them, can that of restoration and grace be found.[1]

Note.—Church discipline must not become a civil penalty. The stress laid upon the honour of the Church must not take place in that external and secular manner, which the hierarchical spirit would desire. Christian maintenance of honour includes both wisdom and ministering love (§ 65), for it is the Church's honour to minister. Self-maintenance against all that is unholy is, at the same time, love to the world, to which the Church can be of no service if the salt has lost its savour.

(*b*) But corruption in doctrine may also seize upon the empirical Church to a still greater extent, in heresy and schism. Even those who act in the name of the Church may themselves be overtaken by them, as in the time of the Reformation. Then there is nothing left but the contrary process to that just described, viz. the *action of the individual upon the Church* in the way of reform and purification; for then the Church must live in the bosom of each individual. If corruption maintains itself against such action, it may become the cause of a division in the Church. The reforming process must nevertheless continue, however powerful the party of corruption may be. The reforming force must ally itself to whatever is true within the Church, and neither forsake the word of God nor the Church. If the Reformers should then be excommunicated by the religious community, which would by such an act excommunicate itself from the truth, if they are thus passively placed in a state of separation, even then the purifying energy of love must not cease to bear its testimony to the truth. In this way the process of purification will at last, according to the Lord's promise, become also a process of unification (cf. § 81. 3, § 55).

[1] Compare on Church discipline, *Glaubenslehre*, ii. 2, pp. 911, 883 sq. (895, 897, 906).

III. Church Organization.

§ 83.

It is by its government that the Church is organized for the performance of its three cardinal functions (§ 82). Organization being a means and not an end, must be sufficiently elastic to correspond to the varying needs of different ages. It must embrace the ideal side, viz. that of Christian consciousness or *doctrine*, and the actual side, viz. that of practice in its self-manifesting, its self-propagating, and its self-purifying action. The *functions* of teaching, governing, and ministering are of Divine institution, not so the form of their administration, and still less the individuals who perform them. The Church, with its organized offices, must also leave room for voluntary exertions, and Christian associations in many varying forms.

[The Literature.—Comp. *Glaubenslehre*, ii. 2, pp. 784 f., 883 f. Schleiermacher's *Darstellung vom Kirchenregiment*, ed. by Weiss. Spener, *Vom geistlichen Priesterthum.* Hermann, *Ueber die neueste Bestreitung der Autorität des kirchlichen Symbols. Die nothwendigen Grundlagen einer die consistoriale und synodale Ordnung vereinigenden Kirchenverfassung.* Lechler, *Die neutestamentliche Lehre vom heiligen Amt.* Höfling, *Grundsätze evangelischer Kirchenverfassung.* Steinmeyer, *Begriff des Kirchenregiments.* Zezschwitz, *Die wesentlichen Verfassungsziele der lutherischen Reformation. System der Katechetik*, vol. i. p. 687 f. Harnack, *Die freie lutherische Volkskirche.* Jakoby, *Staatskirche, Freikirche, Landeskirche.* Jacobson, *Studien und Kritiken*, 1867, *über den Begriff der Vocation und Ordination.* Nitzsch, *Praktische Theologie*, ii. 452 f. Richter, *Geschichte der evangelischen Kirchenverfassung.* Hundeshagen, *Beiträge zur Kirchenverfassungsgeschichte.* Kliefoth, *Liturgische Abhandlungen*, i. p. 341 f. Rietschel, *Luther und die Ordination*, 1883. Comp. the literature, § 81.]

1. *The ethic necessity of organization.* If the Church is to be an actual power, effecting an actual work in and among human beings, and not a *civitas Platonica*, it must have an organization based upon its own principle. By giving to her Church activity the form of settled official functions performed

in the name of the whole community, both the existence and principle of the Church are rescued from arbitrariness and chance, and a connected, stable, and orderly instrumentality secured. The regulation of official functions is effected by Church government. Office implies a union of right or power and duty by means of commission. The Church is called *στύλος καὶ ἑδραίωμα*,[1] and this she actually is by means of her offices, although the roots of her power are planted in the invisible world. The varied *necessities* of the Church are met by the varied gifts of the Spirit;[2] while, on the other hand, the capacity thus bestowed can only develop its full benefits, when the special vocation in which it can, by express adaptation and exercise, attain to virtuous aptitude, is determined by some stable appointment.[3]

It is true, indeed, that *offices* in the Church are of a fundamentally different character from offices in the State. The contrast of rulers and subjects is softened down in the Church to the contrast of guides and guided, of givers and receivers. Church officials should not have dominion over the faith of their fellow-Christians, but be helpers of their joy.[4] Their part is to minister, they are therefore authorized to give. But *beneficia non obtruduntur;* they must bring souls to Christ, and must themselves decrease that He may increase;[5] *i.e.* they should *seek* to reconcile the difference between giving and receiving, by bringing those whom they teach to Christian maturity.

It is further the duty of *every Christian* to show forth, in his *walk* and *conversation*, the praises of Him who hath called him. In the word of God the blessings of salvation are entrusted to every believer as such. Christians are a prophetic, priestly and royal generation, and thus are *in the abstract* capable of dispensing the word and sacraments. The use, however, of this capacity is quite another matter. There must be a public use of it in the name of the whole body of Christians, because a commission was given to the whole body to dispense the word and sacraments to mankind.

[1] 1 Tim. iii. 15; Matt. xvi. 18.
[2] 1 Cor. xii. 14–31, xiv.
[3] 1 Cor. xiv. 26, 40.
[4] 2 Cor. i. 23; 1 Pet. v. 1–6; John xiii. 12 sq.
[5] John iii. 28–30.

And an individual cannot give himself this commission to act in the name of the entire body. The Church has likewise *its* duty, and must so organize itself that all things may be done in order. Only the Church is in a condition to secure, by its governmental action, that basis and rule of fellowship, a stable and well-ordered administration of the word and sacraments. It is her duty to institute offices where they do not as yet exist. It is that of the individual to enter into Church fellowship, and consequently to adhere and accommodate himself to the instrumentality, which it is the Church's duty to employ in the fulfilment of her mission.

If this order is to be carried out successfully, *an organic body must exist through the institution of settled offices.* The individual Christian must not desire to assert his particular right. That which is to be done in the name of the whole, which is the mission of the whole, must not be arbitrarily undertaken by the individual, in his own name and by his own authority. It is precisely from the essential equality of all, through the priesthood of all Christians, that Luther infers that not every one may presume to teach publicly and to administer the sacraments, except in cases of necessity and isolation. "If the office belongs to all, why dost thou arrogate it to thyself singly?" Here, as elsewhere, it holds good that *it is unethical not to seek the objective confirmation for the subjective inward call* (§ 68). Strictly speaking, it is not an office, but only a duty that devolves upon every believer. An office is a vocation conferred by the joint will of the entire body upon an individual, to act constantly and consistently in the name of the whole. In this case authority or right and duty are identical.

On the other hand, it is just as reprehensible when offices are *hierarchically* constituted, or when it is sought to supplement them by sacramental ordination;[1] the office is bestowed upon the Church, to which the laity belong as well as the priesthood. It is indeed the Church's duty to transfer it to individuals, because this is the most judicious manner of administering its functions. But this transference to individuals of the offices given to the Church is no sacramental

[1] See, on the other hand, *Artic. Smalc.* ed. Müller, pp. 341, 342, ordinatio = comprobatio electionis.

act of Christ, but an ethical act of the community, or of those authorized to act for it. The divine calling takes effect by means of the human freedom of the community, and therefore in an ethical manner. The *assurance of a man's consciousness that he has a call from God*, no more suffers from such ethical intervention, than, *e.g.*, a husband's consciousness of being in a state ordained of God suffers from the intervention of free choice on the part of both husband and wife. It is legalism to see the Divine only where God acts exclusively, without the Church and without human agency. It is equally so to perceive only arbitrariness where human freedom co-operates. On the other hand, it is of the essence of Christian organism for the Divine and the human to be combined therein.

2. *The limits of official organization.* It is certain that every official act cannot be organized. Here, too, it is evident that the Church cannot present so rounded off an appearance, as other moral spheres. The Church is not absorbed in the office. It has other functions besides those performed by appointed office-bearers. It is only Roman Catholicism that insists on seeing the Church only in the clergy, the *ecclesia repraesentiva*. The voluntary and the official agency of the Church must, however, be distinguished. The former has attained special importance in the various Christian societies for missionary and other purposes. It is a short-sighted notion that regards these two parts of one whole as a hindrance to each other. The regular *official*, who acts in the *name* of the Church, has set before him this test of his evangelical tact and power: Does he suffer the members of the Church to be inactive and unemployed, or do the babes in Christ attain maturity; is he the means of so kindling the zeal of Christians, that they cannot help becoming his fellow-workmen and helpers? For Christians will not desire to act on their own responsibility, or to make fresh starts as though no Christian work had been in operation before them, but to work in the closest possible union with efforts already existing. Such a disposition will lead them to regard the official as the centre, by which alone stability and order can be imparted to the agency of the laity. Where the two elements of lawfully established office and voluntary effort combine in Church work, we have a realization of that

evangelical Church life, which will make fruitful and elevate all who take part in it.

Unfortunately, among ourselves the copious variety of offices and gifts, spoken of in the New Testament, have for a long time often dwindled into *one* office, from which everything was required which it could not possibly perform. To this state of things many of the clergy have accustomed themselves as though it were an ideal condition, and when any higher ideal is placed before them they can see only anarchy and danger. At the same time, they regard with hostility any State or ecclesiastical authorities, who are helping to put an end to so indefensible a system. The New Testament says *nothing* of devolving all the functions of the Church upon *one* office or *one* person in a congregation. Wherever this has taken place, Church life has been paralysed, or at best has displayed great immaturity. On the other hand, where there has been a multiplicity of offices, as, *e.g.*, of old in the Churches of Corinth and Ephesus, there many other agencies have also existed. Nor is it the intention of the *evangelical confessions* either to make the "preacher's" the sole office, or to suffer all voluntary Church work to be absorbed by officialism. Even teaching is not entirely taken from the laity, nor all preaching of the word, all μαρτυρεῖν forbidden them. On the contrary, Church order is considered as sufficiently observed, if the *publice docere et administrare sacramenta* takes place only in the name of the Church, and therefore by means of Church officials. This leaves room for *religious meetings* for the purpose of edification, for societies, for associations for Church purposes.[1] To this must in our days be added, that after the example of the ancient Church, laymen may also take part *officially* in the work of the *diaconate*, and in general care for the *Church life of the community*. Not till this is permitted will the gifts latent in it become active and fruitful.

The Christian, as before observed, is to manifest in all his actions the churchly mind, nay, the Church is to live in him; but it is at the same time impossible that *all* should in every respect perform the functions of officials of the

[1] *Art. Smalc.* ed. Müller, p. 320 iv., mutuum colloquium et consolatio fratrum.

organized Church. Hence it necessarily follows that we must in our *ethical* notion of the Church maintain the needful distinction between the settled and organized Church, which is to be the central point for the world of Church life, and its unorganized but voluntary agencies. We must learn to see Church life in both, nay, to perceive in their union and unanimous co-operation the specifically new feature of the evangelical form of the Church, which is at the same time tending towards the form of primitive Christianity.[1]

3. *Mode of Church organization.* The details of this subject belong rather to practical theology and ecclesiastical law. They depend upon the organization of the Church's cardinal functions of self-manifestation, self-propagation, self-purification on the two sides of life and knowledge or doctrine.

A. On the side of *Life*, organization has respect to—

(*a*) The task of *manifesting* the Christian life: (*α*) in *public worship* by preaching and the administration of the sacraments, by sacred music and hymns, by *a liturgy* and *an order of Divine worship;* (*β*) in Church government, which *manifests union* in individuals and in large circles; and (*γ*) in the *diaconate as manifesting the agency of love.*

(*b*) *Self-purification* points to an organization of *Church discipline* by means of elders, or at all events by some participation of the congregation.

(*c*) *Self-propagation* needs also its organization, in both its *intensive* and *extensive* agency; (*α*) Its intensive progress is effected by an organization of the *legislative function* with respect to Church life. This embraces a Church representation in synodal form according to the doctrine of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. (*β*) The organization for *extensive* propagation includes institutions for the education of the

[1] According to a marginal note, the author divides the *voluntary* functions as follows:—1. Self-manifestation. (*a*) *Life*, voluntary meetings for prayer. (*b*) *Knowledge*, voluntary theological meetings and literature. 2. *Self-purification.* The self-purifying is also the unifying function, for the impulse to unity in Christendom is only hindered by what the purifying function does away with. (*a*) *Family discipline.* (*b*) *Moral censure*, freely passed by classes from a nice though strong *esprit de corps—e.g.* by the military, clerical, and academical classes. Both these are directed to *life.* (*c*) *Dissemination of the Scriptures* (chiefly directed to *knowledge*). (*d*) Inner Mission directed to both life and knowledge. 3. *Self-propagation.* Foreign Missionary Societies.

young, *schools*, together with *catechization* and *confirmation*, also *missions* for the conversion of the non-Christian nations.

B. On the *ideal side*, or that of *Doctrine*, the organizations for preservation (manifestation), purification and the increase of intelligence are the following:—

(*a*) The *objective* organization for *doctrine* is the *symbol* (creed), the system of doctrine, and the regulations relating to teaching.

(*b*) The *subjective* organization consists of the *teaching class*, the theological *faculties* and theological *literature*, which must all be active, though in various combinations, in the self-manifestation, self-purification, extensive propagation and intensive growth of the Church. *Manifestation* devolves especially upon the *teaching class*, the clerisy in the narrower sense; for it is their special duty to advocate and make evident all that is latent in the common faith. Literature, on the other hand, and the *theological* faculties should exercise a *purifying* and *developing* agency upon the ground already won, upon the system of doctrine. The collective agency of the Church with respect to the system of doctrine must seek to combine the continuity or self-consistency of the Church's consciousness, *i.e.* of its system of doctrine, with its active progress.

Collisions may arise between the conservative, and the purifying and further developing activity. Some movement may, in its supposed acceleration of progress, forsake the truths contained in the Church's creed, and seduce others from them. That which is extolled by some as an advance, may be regarded by others as declension or apostasy (Neology, Paleology). Thus parties are formed, and if the counterpoise to party-spirit should be lacking, the consequence would be the dissolution of the Church. When the Church has no longer a definite faith, it will no longer have a right to existence as a separate community alongside of the State. On the other side, the necessity of movement may be denied, and it may be ignored that the most perfect words of the Church are still not equal in authority to the words of Christ and the apostles, but imperfect. The result is that the creed of the Church, placed by such immobility on a level with Holy Scripture, then becomes its guardian. This latter pro-

cess leads to the apotheosis of tradition and the Church, as the former does to the apotheosis of the subject. The union of the tendency to movement and the tendency to continuity is impossible in the region of doctrine, of dogma *per se*. It can only take place when both, in opposition to intellectual orthodoxy and heterodoxy, cease to regard dogma as of primary importance, and turn from it to simple living faith in Christ. For this, and not a scientifically formulated body of doctrine, was the first form of existence taken by Christianity among men. The faith which is in its simplicity expressed by the κήρυγμα of Christ, is the vital condition of all true Christian theology. It is by such faith that scientific research is qualified for a deeper comprehension of the contents of objective Christianity in the form of speculation. By means of faith, too, will such scientific research be regarded as a lawful process of continuous development, and will manifest itself, in presence both of the logical and religious conscience and of Holy Scripture, as a purer, deeper and more copious apprehension of the evangelical principle itself.

It is our happy case that preservation and manifestation, no less than purification and continuous development, are in every respect demanded by the nature of the Evangelical Church itself, in virtue of the fundamental relation between the material and formal sides of its constituent principle. The Evangelical Church requires that we should be faithful and free, making these qualities permeate each other. Past and present history form one whole. The kingdom of God is come, but it is also to come. Let no reaching towards the future, no hope, be divorced from the past. For God's great moral work on mankind is one, is woven of one strong texture, and must hold us fast in the world of *faith* to His past dealings in the history of revelation and of the Church. Let no faith be without the *hope* which looks and strives onwards. And finally, let *love* be the ever pulsating soul of the present. Let love in combination with faith and hope be also the motive power of all our work, in the great and new duties placed before the present generation, our native land and the Evangelical Church.

INDEX.

Absolute sphere of right, 301.
Action, definition of, 129–132.
Administration, 575.
Aristocracy, 571.
Aristotle's notion of justice, 85.
Art, 581; relation of, to Christianity, 584; to the civil community and the State, 586.
Arts, the plastic and poetic, 583.
Ascetics, 405; Romish and Greek errors concerning, 406; permissibility of, 407.
Association, sexual, 304.
Association, tendencies to, 183; depreciation and over-estimation of, 185; natural, inadequate, 187.
Augustine, 267.

Beautiful, the, 581.
Bible, the, as an authority in ethics, 45.
Blood relationship, 181.

Capital punishment, 577.
Care for personal honour, 452; for our physical existence, 453; of the body, 456; for virtuous happiness, 458; for a good name, 487.
Casuistry, 218.
Celibacy, 536.
Certitudo salutis, 370
Chastity, 467.
Christ, the incarnate good, 343; the perfect revelation of the Divine law, 344; the all-embracing virtue, 348; the substitute of humanity, 349; the principle of the kingdom of God, 351; the principle of repentance and righteousness, 353; the object of faith, 366.
Christian love, 360; wisdom and hope, 361; faith, 364.
Christian idea of God, the basis of ethics, 51, 58.
Christian virtue, in the individual, 356; faith the fundamental, 357.
Christian character, the, maintenance of, 401; self-manifestation of, 412.
Christian hope, character of, 386; object of, 386.
Christian humour, 398.
Christian piety, 413.
Christian view of the world, 388.
Christian and philosophical ethics, relation of, 17, 24; no essential contradiction between, 20; nor direct identity, 21 ff.; mutual dependence of, 25.
Christianity, 4, 211.
Church, the, idea of, 591; essential nature of, 593; cardinal functions of, 598; self-manifestation of, 598, 607; self-propagation of, 599, 607; self-purification of, 601, 607; authority of, in ethics, 47.
Church discipline, 602; Church organization, 604; ethic necessity of, 605; mode of, 609.
Church representation, 609.
Churchly mind, the, 596.
Civil authority, 563; Christian obedience to, 567.
Cognition, relation of, to morality and religion, 138.
Cognitive faculty, the, 126.
Collisions in the sphere of property, 470.
Collisions between the parties of conservancy and development, 610.
Communities, 304.
Comradeship, the analogue of friendship, 182.
Concept of humanity, the Christian, 447.
Confession of Christian faith, 443.
Confessions, different, 597.
Connection of morality and religion, 137.
Conscience, forms of its manifestation, 249; imputation, 250; judgment, 251; requital, 251; an erring, 251.
Conscience, 193; not the ground but the perception of law, 196.
Conscience, doctrine of, 225; biblical, 227; positive, 229.

Conscience, and moral consciousness, 231 ; origin of, 233 ; not based on self-legislation, 235 ; God's voice, 235 ; stages of, 237 ; growth of, 238 ; abnormal state of, 242 ; appropriates the matter of experience, 245.
Consilia Evangelica, 205.
Constitution, the, 569–572.
Contemplation, 417 ; essential nature of, 418 ; object of, 419.
Cosmopolitanism, 508.
Counteraction of good against evil, 325.
Courage, Christian, 397.
Created world, the source of, 95.
Culture, true, 481.

Darwinian theory, 167.
Democracy, 570.
Determinism, absolute physical, 255 ; psychical, 261 ; theological, 266.
Determinism and Indeterminism, 255 ff.
Diaconate, the, 608.
Dissimilarities, adjustment of, 509.
Divine agency, continuous, 195.
Divine and human activity, co-operation of, 365.
Division of labour, the analogue of civil society, 182.
Divorce, 540 f.
Dogmatics, province of, 4.
Drama, the, 584.
Duelling, 454 ff.
Duties, conflict of, 213 f., 217 ; perfect and imperfect, 210.
Duty, notion of, 9, 54.
Duty and right, 221 ; in human relations, 223.

Earthly productions, permanence of, 295 ; in the final consummation, 297.
Elections, 571.
Enjoyment and recreation, 461 ; means of, 463.
Eschatology, ethical, 284 ; different views of, 284 ; classical view of, 285 ; Christian view of, 283 ; Reformation view of, 286.
Ethical knowledge, source of, 43.
Ethical life of man, 5.
Ethical world, God's ideal of the, 96 ; nature a necessary factor of, 97.
Ethics an independent department, 5.
Ethics, history of, works on the, 28, 42 ; system of, 3.
Eudæmonism, 321.
Evil, notion of, 13.

Faith and hope, 385.
Faith necessarily produces love, 372.
Faith in Christ morally necessary, 337 ; not an act of caprice, 339 ; the fundamental Christian virtue, 357.
False forms of love to God, 374.
Family, the, 549 ; an image of the kingdom of God, 550.
Feelings, the, 124.
Formative principle, the, 107.
Forms of virtue, classification and analysis of, 359.
Freedom, 193, 209, 253, 268 ; positive doctrine of, 273 ; biblical doctrine of, 275 ; stages in its realization, 278 ; theological, 281.
Freedom and conscience, union of, 371.
Freedom, indispensable to progress, 336.
Friendship, science, and art on the stage of right, 310.
Friendships, family, 514.

Giving and receiving, right, 511.
Gnosis, 383.
God and the world, analogy between, 97.
God-man, the, necessity of, 334 ; uniqueness of, 338 ; absolute and permanent significance of, 344.
God's nature the source of moral law, 196.
Good, the, as realized in Christianity, 343 ; science of, 7, 54.
Gospel, effects of, 368.
Grammar schools, 589.

Habits, 401.
Heathenism, 322 ; development of evil in, 323 ; degeneration of science in, 323.
Heathen world, apotheosis of the State in, 323 ; consciousness of guilt in, 327 ; philosophy in, 328.
Hebraism and Christianity, 247.
Hebrew, consciousness of guilt, 327 ; settled moral ideas, 329 ; Messianic hope.
Household, the, the fundamental moral community, 522 ; extension of, by friends, guests, and servants, 522.
Human instinct, deficiency of, 189.
Human nature, unifying tendencies in, 178.
Humanity, 320.

Ideal, the moral, 283 ; biblical doctrine of, 292 ; contents of, 293 ; realization of, 298 ; synopsis of, 300.
Identity, man's consciousness of.
Independence, Christian endeavour after, 485.

Indeterminism, 257; absolute, 259; of indifference, 260, 263 f.
Individuality, 141; necessity of, 142; ethical significance of, 143; permanence of, 145; general nature of, 145; different views of, considered, 147; genesis of, 149.
Individuality and likeness, antithesis of, 111.
Intercession, 507.

Jewish forms of sin, 324–5.
Judicial functions, 575.
Justice, history of the notion of, 81; theological conception of, 91.

Kant on the immoral, 14.
Kant on moral feeling, 139.
Kant's categorical imperative, 199.
Kant's critical system, 4.
Kingdom of God, the, moral communities in, 516.
Knowledge, Christian, 2.

Law, 191; binding character of, 196; necessity of, 198, 203; absoluteness of, 198, 203; universality of, 201, 203.
Law or right, stage of, 301; imperfections of, 311; cannot prevent sin, 312; insufficient even with respect to the State, 314; with reference to sin, 316.
Law, moral, erroneous views of, refuted, 202.
Law, standpoint of, called by Rabbis a new creation, 302.
Legal standpoint, imperfection of, 311.
Legislation, 560, 572.
Leibnitz on the notion of justice, 86.
Leibnitz's theodicy, 388.
Lies, white, 490; degree of guilt in, 491.
Love, relation between communicative and receptive, 379; the unity of the productive virtues, 381.
Love, the stage of, 332.
Love the essence of God's moral nature, 69; three views of, 69; distinction between, and righteousness, 74; as self-devotion, 92; *amor concupiscentiæ*, 70, 374; *complacentiæ*, 70, 374; *benevolentiæ*, 71, 374.
Love to one's neighbour, 504 ff.; care for his spiritual welfare, 517; between brothers and sisters, 552.
Love as the opposite of selfishness, 378.

Man's physical endowment, 113; his finiteness, 113–117; his bodily organism, 118; his hand, 118; voice, 119; his means of self-preservation and reproduction, 121; psychical element of his moral constitution, 122; his rational constitution, 134; his capacity for morality and religion, 135.
Marriage, scriptural conception of, 523; history of ideas concerning, in Christian times, 525; socialistic and communistic theories of, 529; Hegel and Schleiermacher's views on, 529; indissoluble, 530–539; its physical side, 531; a school of virtue, 532; contraction of, 535; relation of State and Church to, 546; civil, 547.
Materialism, doctrine of, 101–103; an inadequate hypothesis, 103; denies human freedom, 105.
Method, 42; the descriptive and the psychological, 49.
Modification of the idea of property by Christianity, 473.
Monarchy, 571; hereditary preferable to elective, 571.
Monogamy, 539.
Moral feeling, the, 139, 193; relation of, to freedom, 141.
Moral law, oneness of, 213.
Moral ideas, confusion of, among heathen, 244.
Moral choice, possibility and necessity of, 275.
Moral evil, universality of, 321.
Morality, meaning of, 6, 12; formal aspect of, 13; essential to the Divine Being, 61; a necessary thought, 67; supremacy of, in God, 67; nature of, in God, 68; the idea of, tends to existence, 62; not an arbitrary creation, 63; of the very essence of God's being, 64; positive nature of, 72; relation of, to religion, 137; relation of temperament to, 161.

National distinctions, importance of, 173.
Natural theology, 24.
Nature, man's dominion over, 179.
New personality, the, in relation to itself, 445.
Nitzsch's system of Christian doctrine, 3.
Nomadic life, 179.

Oath, idea of an, 492; a covenant with God, 493; a contract between men, 493; a religious confession, 494; New Testament passages with regard to, 494.
Oaths, 492.
Obedience, 551.

Official organization of the Church, 606 ; limits of, 607.
Optimism, 390 ; the two forms of, 391 ; the joy of, 397.

Party spirit, 508.
Passions, the, 465.
Permissible action, theory of, 213.
Personal character of love, 377.
Pessimism, 389 ; the true forms of, 392 ; within the Church, 393 ; pain of, 395.
Petition and intercession, 423.
Philosophy not necessarily non-Christian, 24.
Plato's notion of justice, 83.
Politics and religion, 561.
Polygamy, 540.
Ponerology, ethical, 316.
Powers, the, that be, 565.
Prayer, 422 ; forms of, 428 f. ; times of, 430 f.
Predestination, 267.
Predeterminism of freedom, 270.
Pride, lovelessness of, 378.
Property, 309.
Property, unequal distribution of, 475.
Public worship, fellowship in, 595, 596.
Punishment, right of, 306–308.
Purpose and worth, notions of, 16.

Race, differences of, character and limit of, 164.
Races and nationalties, 162 ; as related to temperament, 171.
Redemption, man's need of, and capacity for, 331.
Relation of the natural to the spiritual, 109.
Relation of God's ethical and non-ethical attributes, 65.
Relations of men to men, 180.
Religious zeal, 441 ; limit of, 444.
Religious meetings, 608.
Reverence and love, 415.
Right, material and formal, difference between, 560 ; public, 563.
Right as universal will, 306.
Ritschl on justice, 89.
Rothe on the moral ideal, 289.
Rudimentary civilisation, defects of, 183.
Rulers and subjects, 563.
Rural life, 186.

Schleiermacher, 215, 216.
Schleiermacher quoted, 3, 199, 268, 287.
Schleiermacher's *philosophische Ethik*, 15.
Science, 587.
Secondary sphere of right, 303 ; imperfection of the stage of law in the, 313.
Self-activity of the Christian, 403.
Self-assertion and self-manifestation, 484.
Self-assertion, the Divine, 78.
Self-defence, 308.
Self-inspection, 421.
Self-love and social love in relation to love to God, 376.
Self-love, Christian, 445, 447 ; its nature, 449.
Self-love essential to self-impartation, 77 ; of God, 94.
Self-love with respect to the mind, 480.
Self-manifestation, the Divine, 80.
Self-preservation, 178.
Self-surrender to Christ, 369.
Sensuality, 321.
Servants, 553.
Sex, difference of, 150–155.
Sexual love, 181.
Sin, not a mere defect, 318 ; shows the insufficiency of the legal standpoint, 318 ; actual existence of, in humanity, 320.
Social intercourse, 305, 514.
Socialism and communism, 478.
Soul, the, as activity and as a state, 133.
Soul's, the, three forms of existence, 123.
Species, human, unity of the, 169.
Species, theory of, 165.
State, the, 305 ; the community of right points to the higher community, the Church, 316 ; Rothe's view of, 518 ; idea of, 554 ; its dependence upon religion, 556 ; principle of the idea of right, 558 ; relation of, to its future, and to other States, 578 ; Christian character of, 580.
Strife, 513.
Sunday, 435 ff. ; foundation of the Christian, 438.
Supererogatory works, 207.
Supralapsarianism, 268.
Syllabus of the system, 48 ; of Part I., 112.
Systematic theology presupposes faith, 2.

Talents, the, 174 ; identity of, 183 ; democratic and aristocratic conception of, 175.
Temperament, the phlegmatic, 158 ; the sanguine, 158 ; the melancholic, 159 ; the choleric, 159.
Temperaments, the, 155 ; their relation to morality, 161

Thankfulness towards men, 512.
Thanksgiving and praise, 427.
Tribal habits and customs, 182.
True culture, 481.
Truthfulness, 487.

Universities, 589.

Virtue, doctrine of, 10, 54; means of, 409; religious, 410; moral, 410.
Virtuous ownership, 469.
Virtuous purity and beauty, 464; their connection, 464, 467.
Virtuous stability, 483.
Vocation, 498; its universality, 500; choice of, 501 f.
Voluntary agencies, 607.

Wisdom, Christian, 382.
World designed for morality, and morality for the world, 93.

THE END.

BJ
1263
D712
1887 Dorner 16533
System of Christian
ethics
DATE

BJ
1263
D712
1887 Dorner 16533
System of Christian
ethics

DATE DUE

MAR 2

DEMCO 38-297

THE KING'S LIBRARY
3000014371